Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Secunda Pars Artis Logicae

For the point of difficulty to be clear, we must presuppose that, although some ancient thinkers did not posit science as a habit distinct from the species ordered among themselves, and consequently science for them was not one simple quality but several ordered qualities, we now presuppose as commonly accepted that the habit of science is some quality beyond the species. It imports the character of a principle, or a power belonging on the side of the faculty, whereas the species belong on the side of the object; and species can be multiplied just as the objects represented by them are multiplied. For cognition requires not only the object, or its representation, but also a faculty and a power belonging on the side of the faculty.¹ Therefore the difficulty concerns this habit, which is a power of the faculty, not the species: whether it is one simple quality.

Since it is clear that one simple quality, whether a faculty or a habit, can extend to several objects when it reaches them all under one motive and one mode of tending, as is clear in the case of one visual faculty extending to all visible things, the habit of faith extending to all credible things, charity to all lovable things, and one prudence to all things to be done, the whole difficulty arises especially in the sciences. They do not reach all their objects under one motive or means, since the principle or definition that proves one conclusion does not prove another; each is demonstrated by a distinct mode and proof. The particular difficulty, therefore, is whether one habit or quality suffices to tend toward all those conclusions and diverse motives, or whether, when the motive or proof changes, a new partial power on the side of the faculty must also arise, so that all the partial qualities joined together constitute the whole science by one ordering, but not as one entity.

THERE ARE TWO OPPOSED POSITIONS in this controversy, which conflict with equal authority from both ancient and recent authors. The first teaches that every whole science is one simple quality. This is the position of St Thomas, 1–2, q. 54, a. 4, and of Cajetan and Conrad there, Master Soto in the proemial question 3 of his Logic, Ferrariensis in Against the Gentiles I, ch. 56, and many others whom Merinero cites in his proemial disputation, q. 5.

The other position teaches that science is not a simple quality in its extension to its objects and diverse conclusions. This position is attributed to Scotus, Prologue, q. 3, and the collateral question 2, and d. 3, q. 2 of his Sentences commentary. His school follows it, as Father Merinero cites above. Father Suárez also follows it, Metaphysics disputation 44, section 11; as do Fonseca, Metaphysics V, q. 5, section 2, and many others.

NEVERTHELESS, LET THERE BE ONE CONCLUSION: A whole science is one simple habit in relation to all the objects to which it extends.

This conclusion is clearly drawn from St Thomas in the place cited from 1–2. In the body of the article he says: “If we consider a habit with respect to the things to which it extends, we will find in it a certain multiplicity; but because this multiplicity is ordered to one thing, to which it principally looks, the habit is a simple quality, not constituted from several habits, although it extends to several things. For one habit extends to many things only in relation to one, from which it has its unity.” In his reply to the third objection, speaking specifically of the habit of science, he adds: “Someone who acquires through a demonstration knowledge of one conclusion in a science does indeed have a habit, but imperfectly. When, through a further demonstration, he acquires knowledge of another conclusion, another habit is not generated in him; rather, the habit that was already present becomes more perfect, as extending to more things, because the conclusions demonstrated in one science are ordered, and one is derived from another.” Thus St Thomas. One cannot say that St Thomas does not deny a new real perfection being added to the pre-existing habit when a second demonstration is acquired, as some maintain. For either that new perfection is a new quality superadded, that is, a habit, or it is not. If it is not a quality, then after that new demonstration science remains just as simple a quality as before. But if it is a newly superadded quality, then a new habit or quality is generated alongside the pre-existing one, since generation alongside another occurs by adding a new part to the prior one. Yet St Thomas denies that a new habit is generated alongside the prior one when a new demonstration is made, and teaches that the quality is simple. Therefore this response is incompatible with his text.

This also rules out another response: that from his reply to the third objection one may infer only that the habit dealing with one demonstration is perfected and extended with respect to another, while he does not deny that it is perfected by something superadded, which must indeed be a quality. But St Thomas does not merely affirm that the prior habit becomes more perfect through a second demonstration; he also adds the denial that a new habit is generated, and says that it is a simple quality. In this way he excludes the production of every partial quality, which is included in the term “co-generation,” not merely a new total habit; for the latter was already assumed when it was said to concern a different conclusion within the same science. Therefore he excludes every new generation of a habit or quality.

The principal FOUNDATION of this position comes down to two arguments: the first proceeds from similarity, the second from what is prior.

The first is formed from what we have already suggested above: a faculty is one simple quality, as is clear in the visual and intellectual faculties, although it extends to eliciting acts of different species. Likewise, an infused habit is a simple quality, as are faith and charity, although they have distinct difficulties to overcome in different matters or acts. For faith has a different difficulty in believing one article than another, as is said in 2–2, q. 1, a. 6; and charity has a different difficulty in loving an enemy than in loving a friend. These difficulties cannot be overcome from the same motive unless it is applied differently to different matters; nevertheless, they are one habit and one simple quality. Finally, this is clearer still in the moral virtues. Each is one simple quality and habit—for example, prudence, religion, justice, and so on—and yet they concern different matters in which different difficulties must be overcome; facility in these matters is acquired through diverse exercises. Thus by one exercise someone becomes prudent in the matter of one virtue, by another in the matter of another; and in religion one is inclined in different ways to the act of prayer or to fulfilling a vow. Consequently one uses a different proximate judgment and motive for one act than for another. Nevertheless, because the formal account in the moral order is one, one quality suffices for all these things. Therefore one quality likewise suffices in the sciences because the formal account in the knowable order is one, although different premises or means are required to infer different conclusions proximately.

The OPPONENTS answer these points in various ways. Regarding the first example, concerning faculties and infused habits, they draw this distinction: a faculty is not acquired through our acts, as science is; therefore a partial faculty is not acquired as partial science is. Otherwise the argument would prove something, and it would also prove that one habit suffices for all acts of the sciences, just as one faculty suffices for all of them.

As to the second example, concerning the moral virtues, some simply concede that even the moral virtues are not one simple quality but several, according to the difficulties to be overcome. So says Father Merinero in the place cited above. Others, such as the cited Father Suárez, admit that the moral virtues are simple qualities because they tend toward their objects under the same formal account and motive, whereas the sciences tend toward different truths and conclusions to be demonstrated under different motives or means, and therefore are not simple qualities.

But against the first response the argument already made is strengthened. As to faculties, we are not giving the example with respect to universality and extension, as though a habit had as much extension as a faculty. Rather, the example consists in this: if a faculty, being a more universal cause than any habit and extending to more things, nevertheless suffices as a simple quality, then a habit too will suffice as one simple quality extending to all acts that fall under that habit’s specific scope. As for the claim that a faculty is not acquired through our acts whereas a habit is, this is not a sufficient distinction. It pertains only to the way in which a faculty or habit is efficiently produced, not to its formal or intrinsic character, from which its specific unity and distinction are derived. For it remains to be seen whether the several acts through which a habit is acquired are also several acts that produce the entity of the habit, or whether its entity can be acquired by one act that fully convinces, while the others generate no new entity but modify or perfect the prior one. For example, the visual faculty itself could be generated as an entity through one act, though weak and imperfect, and later be sharpened and perfected by several actions without producing several qualities of the faculty. Therefore whether a habit is generated in its full perfection and extension through one act or several is incidental; for even through one act God can produce a perfect habit.

Likewise, in per se infused habits no sufficient distinction is assigned. Although an infused habit has a certain mode of a faculty, since it gives the whole power for the supernatural character of the act, it is nevertheless truly a habit, and within the scope of its operation it has distinct difficulties in distinct matters or acts. Thus infused religion has a difficulty in the act of adoration, prayer, or a vow; faith in believing one article rather than another; charity in loving one object—for example, an enemy—rather than another. Although these difficulties are overcome by different motives, at least differently applied, the power of one quality suffices for all of them because the formal account of the moral motive is one. Therefore one formal account in the knowable order will likewise suffice in the sciences.

Hence the answer concerning moral virtues is finally clear. Those who admit that there is one quality in reality cannot posit any difference at all between virtue itself and science. For a moral virtue too is acquired through several acts and has different difficulties concerning different particular matters. There is, for example, a different difficulty in religion concerning an oath than concerning adoration, and another difficulty in justice concerning not damaging someone’s reputation or not taking money. Consequently these virtues need distinct particular motives to overcome these difficulties. If one simple quality overcomes them, why should it not do so in science as well? If, instead, the moral virtues are held not to be simple qualities, no sufficient distinction is given between infused and acquired moral virtues: why should the infused be simple qualities but not the acquired, when they undergo similar difficulties in different matters? Nor is it a sufficient distinction that one is had through infusion and the other is not, if the intrinsic character of the diverse difficulties itself requires a different partial quality to be infused to overcome each distinct difficulty. For how do we know that several partial qualities composing one infused virtue are not infused, if a different difficulty to be overcome in different matters through different partial motives, or motives applied in different ways, requires this? If it does not require them in infused virtues, why should it in acquired ones?

The a priori foundation is taken from what St Thomas signifies in the place cited above, in 1–2: “One habit does not extend to several things except in relation to one, from which it has its unity.” Therefore, in one whole science—for example, physics or metaphysics—where different conclusions and truths are shown through different means and principles, either they constitute diverse qualities in such a way that one is not coordinated and connected with another under some formal account in the knowable order, or they are connected and coordinated with one another. If the first, then each quality or habit will be a science distinct from the others; consequently, there will be as many metaphysicses or physicses as there are conclusions known in them. Further, each science will then be a simple quality, because each habit concerns its own conclusion without dependence on or coordination with another; thus each science will be one simple quality. If instead the second is said to be the case—that there is one formal account in the knowable order in which all those demonstrations agree—then that account of what is knowable or cognizable expresses one specifying account in the order of knowing and cognizing. For an account of what is knowable is one insofar as it can be known and cognized in one way; consequently it can terminate and specify one mode of knowing and acting with respect to it. Where there is one mode of acting, there is also one mode of being and one formal account, because the mode of acting is founded on the mode of being. Therefore it is impossible for one account and mode in the knowable order to shine forth on the side of the object unless one mode of knowing and acting with respect to that knowable object corresponds on the side of cognition and science. Therefore it is not incompatible that from such unity in the knowable order there be specified some real form inclining toward all cognitions that proceed under that mode, since the knowable object specifies that real form by which we know and cognize, not in its being as a thing but in its being as knowable. Therefore, where there is one mode in the formal account and order of what is knowable, it must specify in one way the form that tends toward that object under that mode; this is the habit of science. Therefore the habit of science will be of one species in its intrinsic entity precisely because the object, in its being as a knowable object, is one specifying object.

And this is confirmed: the account of the object according to its formal character in its being as an object and in the knowable order specifies something real. For, as we showed in the preceding article, faculties and habits are not specified by objects as considered in their being as things, but in their being as objects. But what is specified by an object is some habit or quality whose intrinsic specification depends on that object in its being as an object. Therefore it is self-contradictory to say that science is one in the knowable order but not one in the order of quality and habit, since it is the quality and reality itself that is specified in its intrinsic entity by the object in its being as an object.

YOU SAY: On this reasoning, one numerically single act of cognition would suffice for all the objects of one science, since one simple quality specified by the object suffices; and this holds for a habit as well as for an act.

But this objection is childish. From the unity of the object in its being as an object there follows only specific unity, both in a habit and in an act. Whether that quality is numerically one depends on other principles: the numerical unity of a habit depends on the unity of its subject, while the unity of an act or operation depends not only on the unity of the subject but also on the unity and determination of the operative principle and of the matter on which it operates. For one act cannot use all the species and means that a science uses to exhaust its entire object. But because a habit imports the character of inclination and power, one habit that is numerically one can proceed to diverse acts, each of which is of the same formal species, although it has some diversity on the side of the matter it reaches.

THE ARGUMENTS ARE RESOLVED.

First it is argued: In any whole science there are several demonstrations distinct in species, since they demonstrate properties distinct in species through definitions and principles also distinct in species. Therefore, since each demonstration is apt to generate science, if the demonstrations are distinct in species, they will generate habits distinct in species. If it is said that the habits generated through such demonstrations are distinct in species quasi-materially and in their being as things, but not formally and in their scientific account, the contrary follows: this is precisely what the opposing position intends. For if those demonstrations are distinct in species materially and in their being as things, but not formally, then they generate scientific habits that are materially distinct in their being as things or qualities. This is what is intended, even if they are not distinct in the knowable account.

And this is confirmed: in learning a second or third demonstration, a new difficulty may arise and a distinct motive be required. Therefore a new, at least partial, habit is required, since habits are given to overcome difficulties. Thus where there is a distinct difficulty, there is a distinct habit; otherwise acquired habits of science would not be distinguished, as simple qualities, from those that are wholly indivisible in operation, such as faculties, faith, and infused habits. Therefore a scientific habit cannot be a quality as indivisible as faculties and infused habits.

THE ANSWER IS THAT demonstrations dealing with diverse conclusions and truths are said to be distinct in species materially, not formally, not because they require a diverse quality or habit distinct in its being as a thing, but because they deal with matters diverse in their being as things, yet capable of being reached under the same formal account. Thus light informs and illuminates colors distinct in species in their being as things, but not distinct in their account as illuminable and visible; and in one person the eye and hand differ in species not on the side of the form by which they are informed, but according to the material disposition of the organ. It is not incompatible that demonstrations proceeding from the same form or quality, specified by the object in its account as object and knowable, concern diverse matters that take on the same formal account of cognizability. Although, because the matters themselves are diverse in their being as things, those demonstrations are said to differ materially in species—which is to differ in species in a qualified sense—as the eye and hand and the other heterogeneous parts in one animal differ, and as the visual faculty regards colors diverse in their entitative species but visible under the same account. Thus a scientific habit is a quality that orders diverse species, from which the total object of such a science is integrated; therefore it must be one form, so that all those species are subject to its ordering. Acts or demonstrations proceeding in an ordered way from such a habit, although they reach things diverse in species in their entity, are nevertheless of the same species on the side of the same formal account and scientific order in which they proceed. The habit of science is not multiplied, nor does it correspond to the diversity of the ordered species as they are in themselves, but to the diversity of the ordering formal account.

In reply to the confirmation, setting aside other solutions, it is said that in scientific habits and virtues there are two kinds of difficulty: one accidental, the other essential. Essential difficulty arises from a defect in the formal account or inclination toward the formal object of the virtue or science. Accidental difficulty arises from a defect in application to the matter, whether from a lack of practice or from some accidental circumstance on the side of the agent that makes operation concerning such a matter more difficult. Such a difficulty can also be found in infused habits, which the opposing authors nevertheless acknowledge to be simple qualities. For charity may have a difficulty on the agent’s side in loving an enemy but not in loving a friend; and faith may have one in assenting to one article rather than another. Yet overcoming these difficulties does not require a new quality or habit, because they are only accidental difficulties on the agent’s side, not on the side of the formal account. Likewise, then, science and acquired habits, although given to overcome difficulties, do not require a distinct habit for every individual difficulty; diverse accidental difficulties can be overcome through the one formal account that specifies the habit.

The fact that science uses a different means or principle for one conclusion than for another, whereas these virtues do not, is no obstacle. First, although infused virtues do not require a distinct means, they do require a distinct application to the matter where there is a new difficulty; nevertheless, a distinct quality is not required, because the formal motive is one. Second, the diverse means required for distinct conclusions influence those conclusions as coordinated with one another and informed by the same formal account of science. Therefore, by reason of this coordination and unity of motive, they constitute one habit or form, which is one under that formal account and inclines toward all the conclusions and all the means coordinated in this way.

Second it is argued: When a second demonstration is made in some science, the pre-existing habit is really increased through that demonstration, and thus with respect to another object; therefore it is increased through something real newly superadded. This reality cannot be anything other than some reality which, together with the pre-existing habit, cannot constitute some third thing—an indivisible entity or quality per se one, compounded from the two. Therefore there are several qualities.

The first antecedent is evident, because through a second demonstration the pre-existing habit formally and actually extends to something to which it did not extend before; therefore it is increased extensively. Hence St Thomas, 1–2, q. 52, a. 2, and 2–2, q. 24, a. 5, admits that in the sciences there is an increase of extension through addition, but not an increase of intensity.

The first consequence, namely that the increase occurs through the addition of some real entity, is proved as follows: St Thomas, in the cited places, establishes a difference between increase of intensity and increase of extension. Increase of extension occurs through the addition of a new reality, whereas increase of intensity does not occur through some new reality superadded. For St Thomas denies that the latter increase occurs through addition, while in the cited places he says that increase of extension occurs through addition. Therefore something is granted to increase of extension that is denied to increase of intensity. But in the school of St Thomas it is only denied of increase of intensity that it occurs through the addition of a new entity. Therefore it is granted that increase of extension occurs through such addition.

This is confirmed: this increase is newly produced by a real cause and has a new real effect in the intellect itself, namely making the intellect inclined and facilitating it proximately and formally toward some object or conclusion toward which it did not previously make it so. Consequently it really changes the pre-existing science, perfecting it; therefore it is an increase of a new reality. Nor can it be said that a new relation, rather than a new quality, is acquired: first, because there is no per se action for a relation; second, because that new relation must have a new foundation, which must be a new reality.

THE ANSWER IS THAT increase of a habit with respect to extension does not occur through the addition of a reality, but through the same form newly applied to a distinct matter. Thus the same light can illuminate diverse colors extensively without the addition of new light, but by its application to a new color capable of being illuminated; and the same soul extends to informing a new part of matter without adding a new entity of the informing soul, but by adding a distinct entity capable of being informed. Accordingly, this addition and increase occur through an extrinsic addition, not an intrinsic one. If from this application of matter a new mode results in the form itself, newly applied and extending to it, I do not object, provided that this mode is not posited as a new informing account but as an application of what already existed. We will discuss this more fully in the books on Generation, when treating the intensification of forms.

And in answer to the proof from St Thomas, it is said that extensive increase is said to occur through addition because through it a habit can elicit diverse acts or reach diverse objects to which it did not previously extend. This distinguishes it from increase of intensity, which is not said to occur through addition to diverse acts or objects, but through greater rooting in the same subject. The latter certainly implies no addition, because it adds neither a new subject nor a new object or act, but a greater actualization in the same subject. Thus extensive increase occurs through an addition that is not intrinsic, form to form, but extrinsic—that is, through a new application to the matter subjected to it. And when St Thomas signifies that extensive addition belongs to the form according to itself, whereas intensity belongs to it through participation in the subject, the phrase “according to itself” means the same as according to its order toward an extensive and material object. The order toward an object is said to belong to the form according to itself because the order toward an object is on the side of specification, which belongs to a thing according to itself; the order toward a subject, however, is on the side of individuation.

In reply to the confirmation, it is said that through that extensive addition the habit or form becomes more perfect and the intellect more facilitated and actualized toward other objects, not through some new form or quality, but through a new application of what already existed to new matter. For of itself that pre-existing habit and form is an inclination toward everything contained under its formal object. If it does not incline proximately and actually toward this or that matter, this is not due to a defect in the form of inclination but to a defect in the matter or subject. The subject does not yet have the coordinated species, nor, on its side, the exercise that pertains to its application; without this, the form itself is not sufficiently applied, nor are those species sufficiently ordered, for the habit to incline toward them with equal facility on the subject’s side. This is clearly shown by the example of faith newly inclining toward new credible things proposed by the Church, toward which it did not previously incline actually. The same is shown by the example of infused charity or religion, which are simple qualities even according to the opposing position; some also hold that acquired virtues have this same character. Yet they do not incline with equal facility on the subject’s side toward all acts or matters, as was said.

Thus, when a habit is first generated through some demonstration, an essential and formal facility is generated for all acts and objects contained under that formal account. Through a second or third demonstration, however, no new essential facility is generated; rather, the facility is extended or communicated, and the accidental difficulty is removed on the side of the subject itself and of the application to the matter. And because such a form, as an inclination, is required absolutely, whether first generated or applied later, it is therefore rightly proved that, in addition to the ordered species, some quality called a habit is required.

As for the claim that a second or third demonstration is a new act and requires a new effect, it is answered that it does indeed have a new effect, not because it produces a new habit in its entity, but because it makes the pre-existing habit more perfect, as St Thomas says in the cited place, 1–2, q. 54, a. 4, ad 3. For, St Thomas says, to become more perfect is to extend to more things. This, then, is a new effect in the natural order: the same form reaches things not absolutely, but as newly applied, as when faith extends to new credible things or the soul to diverse parts of matter to be informed. Not every action must produce a new form; it suffices that it be applicative or unitive, as is clear from the examples given. We will say the same about intensification, by which a quality is more deeply rooted in a subject, in the book on Generation. Many theologians say the same about an action substantially reaching Christ’s body in the Eucharist; for that body itself is not newly produced, since it already exists.

Finally it is argued, that an indivisible quality cannot be lost or generated in one respect and remain in another. But it is clear that the habit of science with respect to a second or third conclusion can be lost while the first demonstration remains; or it is also not incompatible for it to be generated before the first demonstration takes place. Therefore there cannot be the same habit inclining toward the first and toward the second demonstration.

Nor can it be said that through an error concerning a second or third conclusion no habit is destroyed, but only its mode. First, the principle of assent to that conclusion is destroyed, and a principle cannot be a mode. Second, an erroneous habit is generated that is opposed to the scientific habit in its entity—that is, by a real opposition requiring real extremes. Therefore it destroys a reality, not a mode; and since this occurs concerning the second conclusion, not the first, a distinct habit is given concerning the second.

THE ANSWER IS THAT an indivisible and simple quality, when it is virtually multiple in extension or intensity, can be lost with respect to a new perfection or application toward those things to which it extends, without any loss of its entity—just as the soul ceases to inform some parts of matter without losing any entity of its form. Thus whoever generates an erroneous habit concerning a second or third conclusion destroys the habit of science not absolutely and in its entity, but relatively, insofar as it inclined proximately and actually toward those conclusions. This proximate inclination does not signify merely a quality and habit, but a quality duly applied with such a coordination of species as the opposing error destroys. Therefore, by destroying or impeding such application or extension, the error is said to destroy the proximate power for the opposing demonstration, because this consists in a form applied in this way. The erroneous habit thus generated is really opposed to the scientific habit, but not absolutely and in every respect, since it does not remove the habit absolutely, but only as it is determined and applied to the matter with which that error deals; it leaves the habit in the state it was in before the second demonstration was generated. It is like someone cutting off an arm: he does not destroy the form absolutely, but only as informing and applied to that matter.

As for the further claim that science can be generated concerning a third or final demonstration without being generated concerning the first, it is answered that this is not certain because of the dependence and connection that a subsequent demonstration has with its antecedent as a principle. But even if this is granted, since by its nature it can be coordinated with the first demonstration as contained under the same formal scientific account, it belongs to the same habit—even if a final demonstration could be found without extending to the first, just as a first could be found without a final one.

At the end of this article, note that in the sciences as they now exist among us there are not only demonstrations but also many opinions. With respect to what falls under opinion, a scientific habit does not serve, because such opinions truly do not pertain to science with respect to scientific assent. Although they concern the same subject matter as the science and are treated in the same science, they generate a distinct habit.

END OF LOGIC