Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Secunda Pars Artis Logicae

Habits of non-evident cognition are reduced to three: opinion, faith, and suspicion.

OPINION IS DEFINED as assent to something on account of a probable reason and motive, accompanied by fear of the opposite side. Created faith (for we are speaking only of this) is a thought with assent, or the assent of one who thinks, on account of the authority of the speaker. Suspicion is assent inclining toward one side on the basis of some slight sign. Finally, doubt is cognition without firm assent, that is, without a determinate inclination toward either side. Thus teaches St. Thomas, II-II, q. 2, a. 1, and q. 14 of the De veritate, a. 1.¹

From these definitions it is easy to understand what the habits of these non-evident cognitions are, by putting “habit inclining to assent” in place of the term “assent.” Doubt, however, does not seem to generate a habit, because one who doubts has no assent but suspends judgment, and therefore does not generate a habit that inclines determinately, but rather one that suspends itself from inclination. Yet no habit seems necessary simply for suspending, since this is a negation, unless something positive is joined to it: namely, that it be done for some end, for example, to avoid effort or for the good of virtue, and so on. That concerns something moral pertaining more to the will than to the intellect.

THREE THINGS HERE NEED EXPLANATION: First, what uncertainty and non-evidence consist in; this must be explained from their opposites, evidence and certainty. Second, whether uncertainty and non-evidence are so intrinsic to these habits that they can in no way be separated from them. Third, whether these habits differ essentially from one another.

On the first: Certainty, as may be gathered from St. Thomas, III, dist. 23, q. 2, a. 2, question 3², is nothing other than the determination or adherence of the intellect to one thing. Certainty is therefore greater in proportion to the strength of what causes this determination. Two kinds of certainty are suggested: one caused, or formal, on the side of the act; the other causing, on the side of the object or subject. For sometimes certainty is caused by the known object, which suffices to determine the intellect; sometimes by the will, which stands on the side of the subject because the object by itself does not suffice to determine it. Thus St. Thomas adds there that certainty is caused in the intellect of principles because something can be sufficiently inspected through the principles themselves; in science, because it is resolved into principles seen in themselves; but in faith, because the will commands the intellect. There is thus a threefold certainty: formal, in the act; objective, on the side of the object that compels assent; and subjective, on the side of the will that adheres and makes the intellect adhere. Hence, when God moves someone to faith, he first touches the will and through it the intellect, so that the intellect is determined through the will’s choice, as St. Thomas explains in his commentary on Hebrews, ch. 11, lect. 1.³ This subjective certainty is without evidence, for the will supplies what is lacking to the object on the side of evidence. Objective certainty, however, is necessarily joined to evidence, because it arises from an object that is sufficient to move by itself, which does not happen without evidence.

Evidence, as may be gathered from St. Thomas, II-II, q. 1, a. 4, is that which moves a power by itself; for those things are said to be seen which move the intellect or sense by themselves. He gives three modes of vision or evidence in III, dist. 24, q. 1, a. 2, question 1.⁴ First, the notion of vision is found in simple cognition, because vision is found primarily in sense, “insofar as the visible species is actually formed in sight.” Transferring the term “vision” to the intellect, we properly say that we see intellectually when, through intellectual light, the intellectual form itself is made present in our intellect, whether through natural light, as when we understand the quiddity of a human being, or through supernatural light. Further, those complex objects whose cognition arises from the vision just described are said to be seen by the intellect: thus by natural light we see first principles, which we know as soon as their terms are explained. Further still, those things that we can resolve into these principles are said to be seen by reason, as are things we know to have been proved demonstratively.” Behold all the grades and modes of vision taught by St. Thomas. He attributes vision not only to things seen immediately and intuitively in themselves, but also to things resolved by science and demonstration into what is known in itself. For precisely because they are connected by necessary connection to things seen in themselves, they remain illuminated by those principles, as if they had been seen. Evidence is also recognized by its effect, when something is presented to the intellect in such a way that it fully compels it, so that the intellect is at rest and does not need to be moved by anything extrinsic, namely by the will supplying the object’s insufficiency. For if the intellect is fully moved by the object, it reaches the object as it is in itself; otherwise it would not be said to be moved precisely by the object’s power, if the object did not actualize the power entirely but were reached only imperfectly. In that case it would not overcome the power’s resistance or compel it.

It remains explained, then, what non-evidence and uncertainty are: they are privations of evidence and certainty. An object presented with such a privation is not sufficient to compel and move a power entirely. Since it does not determine the power fully, it needs an affection of the will inclining the intellect, as appears in faith. The will does not do this by adding light to the intellect so as to supply the motion of an obscure object. For then that addition of light would either make the object evident or leave it obscure. If it made it evident, faith would be removed through the will; if it remained obscure, it would remain as before, and the obscure light would not be supplied by adding light. Rather, the will is understood to incline the intellect insofar as the will’s own affection and adherence to the object as something fitting is represented to it. Therefore the intellect adheres to the object itself, not because the truth is more manifest, but because it is fitting to the will, provided the intellect is not certain that the object is false. Once that disposition and affection of the will are removed, the object remains as probable or doubtful. This is why faith requires the command of the will not only for the execution of the act in its exercise, but also for its specification, that is, for determination on the object’s side: by presenting the object’s fittingness, the will supplies what the object cannot determine through the evidence of truth.

On the second question, whether opinion essentially has uncertainty and fear attached to it, there is difficulty because of certain propositions that we believe without any doubt, for example, that Rome exists, though we have not seen it. Likewise, within the domain of what is opined there are certain immediate propositions, as it were principles, since they are not proved by other probable propositions. An example is “Every mother loves her child,” as Aristotle expressed it in Posterior Analytics I, ch. 26⁵, and St. Thomas there, lect. 44.⁶ The reason is clear: even in probable arguments there is no infinite regress, so we must stop at some proposition that lacks a probative middle term. This cannot be necessary but must be probable, because a contingent conclusion does not follow validly from a necessary premise. Therefore those first propositions are both immediate and not necessary, but probable. Hence in these and similar cases THERE IS A DIFFICULTY about how uncertainty and fear can be separated from them.

Some, then, distinguish two kinds of uncertainty or fear: one on the side of the middle term or formal reason for knowing, the other on the side of the effect it leaves in the subject, namely the subject’s actual adherence to the thing. They say that the first cannot be separated, but the second can, as experience itself shows when we believe many things we have not seen without any hesitation.

Yet a difficult argument remains to be solved: how can someone form a judgment that is intrinsically non-evident and uncertain, while the subject does not share that uncertainty, when the subject tends toward the object only through that uncertain act? The authors of that solution reply that the intellect shares the intrinsic fear that belongs to the object’s side, but lacks only the fear that comes from the will, because the will adheres so firmly to one side that it does not allow the opposite side to be feared or doubted. For in these obscure assents the will’s motion always has a place. Hence, if the will is wholly firm, every doubt is removed.

However, because the will sometimes becomes wholly firm in an object, as is clear in divine faith, while the intellect still undergoes speculative doubt and fluctuation, as happens to those tempted concerning the faith without obstinacy—although the intellect does not suffer such doubt regarding certain propositions of human faith, for example, that Rome exists—IT MUST BE SAID FURTHER that in faith and opinion there can be moral evidence and certainty, not concerning the truth they reach, for this always remains obscure and uncertain; this is called intrinsic or metaphysical uncertainty because it concerns the truth itself. Rather, this evidence and certainty concern credibility or probability. When so many motives are accumulated that they make credibility evident, leaving no room for disbelief, then all extrinsic fear is removed, since the motives and inducements to faith are called extrinsic to the assent of believing. But as regards the very truth believed or opined, so long as it is not seen in itself, the intellect always remains intrinsically without evidence and unsatisfied. Thus, although it can be free from all moral fear or movement of doubt, it cannot be free from fear concerning the manifestation and evidence of the truth. The fear of obscurity can therefore never be removed from faith and opinion, and consequently neither can the fear of objective uncertainty in things reached by human faith or opinion. In divine faith, objective uncertainty does not occur because of the infallibility of the testimony; intrinsic imperfection of obscurity nevertheless remains. Whatever wavering or doubt there may be in believing or opining is removed or diminished to the extent that the motives and reasons inducing credibility or probability increase; they can increase in evidence to the point of excluding all such fear. A sign of this is that even temptations concerning the divine faith are usually diminished by accumulating motives that induce faith, and those fully convinced by signs to believe do so without a movement of speculative doubt.

If you object that science can never cast off certainty, so neither can opinion or faith cast off fear, since science stands to certainty as opinion stands to fear, the consequence is denied. In science there is only one certainty, namely insofar as it reaches the thing in itself. In opinion, however, there is a twofold fear: one intrinsic, with respect to the truth; the other extrinsic, with respect to the motives inducing probability or credibility. Thus one can be removed while the other remains.

On the third difficulty, concerning the formal distinction among these habits of non-evident cognition, I say briefly that human faith and opinion differ essentially, because their means are entirely different and the formal reason for knowing differs greatly in each. Opinion uses reasons that produce probability and have a connection that, though not complete, is probable and plausible; on this account the intellect can be inclined, though not moved and compelled entirely. Faith, by contrast, relies only on the authority of the speaker and thus does not use proof or reasoning. Once the authority is known to be worthy of faith, and the proposition itself does not appear impossible or false, this alone suffices for assent in believing. Therefore they differ essentially in the mode and formal reason by which they tend toward their objects.

On this conclusion one may consult St. Thomas, II-II, q. 2, a. 1, and more fully in III, dist. 23, q. 2, a. 2, question 1⁷, where he sets out the difference between the intellect’s operation through the habit of principles, through science, through faith, and through opinion. He shows that “thinking with assent” distinguishes the believer from all the others, understanding “thinking” not as an act of the imaginative power but as an act or movement of discursive reason, and “assent” as a determinate judgment. One who understands through the intellect of principles has assent without thinking, that is, without a movement of reasoning, but only through the explanation of terms. A knower has cognition and assent because, by thinking or reasoning, he reaches assent through the vision of principles, where the intellect’s movement terminates; hence he includes vision insofar as he is ordered to principles that are seen in themselves. A believer has assent with thinking because he does not reach assent through thinking and reasoning, nor is he led to principles known in themselves; rather, he is determined to assent from some extrinsic principle, namely the will’s choice, because it appears good to him. In this he has firmness and assent, yet he undergoes movement or thought even concerning the opposite. One who opines has thinking without perfect assent, though he has some assent insofar as he adheres to one side more than the other on the strength of some proof that is not evident but merely apparent. Thus, because he accepts one side while fearing the other, his assent is not fully determined. One who doubts has no assent at all, but only thought, suspending judgment. One who does not know has neither assent nor thought. Thus St. Thomas. It is therefore clear that opinion differs in species from faith, both by reason of the means by which it is moved—faith on account of the speaker’s authority, opinion through the probability of reasons—and by the mode of its being moved: faith assents through the choice of the will, while opinion assents with fear arising from the reasons.

If you ask ABOUT SUSPICION, whether it differs essentially from opinion and faith, the answer is that it belongs to opinion as something imperfect within that genus. Hence St. Thomas, in the cited passage from the Sentences, did not list it separately, but explained it in the cited place from II-II, saying that suspicion and opinion differ because one who suspects inclines on the basis of some slight sign, whereas one who opines adheres to one side, though with fear of the other; thus they differ only by more and less in adherence. Or one may say that suspicion is something common, as an imperfect state in either genus. For if the slight judgment that moves someone is a statement of little authority, it is reduced to weak faith, by which someone believes readily. But if the slight judgment is a reason with little weight, it belongs to imperfect opinion.

BUT YOU WILL OBJECT: Faith and opinion seem to agree essentially. Each requires probable reasons, for no one is moved prudently to believe unless something is presented to him as probable or plausible. Each also requires a pious affection, because opinion too is not moved to assent by the force of an object that compels; consequently, it must be determined by something extrinsic, that is, by the will supplying the object’s determination. Therefore opinion and faith agree in their formal motive, differing only on the side of the different matter, as two opinions can differ.

Second, opinion is no less uncertain and non-evident than faith. Therefore the motive of each agrees essentially in its formal reason for moving. Hence the Philosopher says in Topics I, ch. 7⁸ that faith is an opinion established by induction or probable syllogism.

To the first, the answer is that faith does not formally require probable reasons, but presupposes them and requires them antecedently; opinion, however, requires them essentially and formally, while the movement of the will is joined to it accidentally. For in faith, the probability of reasons is required for two things: first, so that the matter does not appear impossible; second, so that it or the speaker’s authority appear fitting, and so that the will be affected by them. Once this affection is present, the intellect is moved to believe through the presentation of what is good and fitting. On this St. Thomas grounds the claim that the pious affection preceding divine faith arises from the intellect’s presentation of the fittingness of the promised good, in De veritate, q. 14, a. 2, ad 10.⁹ Hence, since the intellect’s presentation of the good’s fittingness is ordered only to attracting the will, although it requires a supernatural presentation if the good proposed is supernatural, it does not require evidence concerning the truth of what is presented, but evidence concerning the good’s fittingness. This is to be practically, not speculatively, evident; it does not require supernatural evident light, but a prudential judgment from special supernatural help. In opinion, by contrast, the probability of reasons is required not to present a good but to make the truth manifest, though not fully and perfectly. Thus opinion’s adherence, which is neither full nor firm, does not essentially depend on the will, but can be found without it, resting only on the weight and force of the reasons. If a movement of the will is joined to it, this is not something required first and essentially, but accidentally, because the will sometimes uses opinion as faith, as when a judgment is produced more by passion than by the probability and weight of reasons alone.

To the second, the answer is that faith and opinion agree in being uncertain and non-evident in a generic sense, but differ in species because their means and modes of moving differ, as was said. The Philosopher, however, takes faith broadly, as in common speech whatever is not seen is called faith or opinion.