Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Secunda Pars Artis Logicae

The soundness of this division presents no difficulty with respect to adequacy, for the whole divided is exhausted by these members; the difficulty concerns its quality, namely, how the conventional sign is truly a sign and, consequently, whether the division is univocal.

LET THERE BE A SINGLE CONCLUSION: If this division of sign into natural and conventional is considered entitatively and in the being of a thing¹, it is analogical; if considered in the genus of what represents or is knowable, it is univocal, and the conventional sign is truly a sign, exercising the office and role of an object.

THE FIRST PART of the conclusion is manifest, because, as was treated in the preceding question, sign is constituted formally in the genus of relation. But nothing is univocal between a real relation and a relation of reason, when considered entitatively, since they cannot be in the same category; the relation of a natural sign is real, as we saw there, whereas the relation of a conventional sign cannot be real. Therefore they are not univocal when considered entitatively.

You will say: It is not certain that the relation of a natural sign is real, nor that a conventional sign consists in a relation of reason; an extrinsic denomination by which it is said to have been imposed by the will is enough for it. Therefore the proposed basis will not hold.

Moreover, the second point weakens that objection, because if it has being a sign only through an extrinsic denomination, then precisely for this reason it is such in a qualified sense and not simply. For an extrinsic denomination is not a real being formally existing in what is denominated, but exists presuppositionally in the extrinsic thing that denominates it. The first point, however, was explained in the preceding question, where we showed that a natural sign signifies something real by way of a relation, although some say that this relation is transcendental, not predicamental. Those, however, who say that a sign formally consists in a relation of reason must consequently hold that the account of conventional and natural sign is univocal.

THE SECOND PART of the conclusion depends on the celebrated doctrine of Cajetan, Summa theologiae I, q. 1, art. 3: there are differences among things as things, and others among them as objects and in the being of an object; and things that differ specifically or more than specifically along one line need not differ, or need not differ to the same degree, along another. Thus, since the account of sign belongs to the account of what is knowable, inasmuch as it stands in the place of an object, it is quite consistent that a real natural sign and a conventional sign of reason be univocal signs in the account of object. In the being of an object, a real being and a being of reason assume one account, since they terminate the same power, namely the intellect, and can be reached by the same habit, namely metaphysics, or at least can specify two sciences that agree univocally, for example, logic and physics. Therefore they agree univocally in the being of an object that specifies.

Likewise, the power is truly and univocally moved and led to the signified through a conventional sign and through a natural sign. Experience itself shows that we are moved by conventional signs to perceive what they signify; that this happens univocally is clear, since the conventional sign does not signify in a qualified and dependent way, in the very account of signifying, upon a natural sign. For a significant uttered word by itself leads to what it signifies, just as other natural instrumental signs do.

Nor is it an obstacle that a word or name signifies only through a concept, which is a natural sign. This is also true of a natural instrumental sign: it represents only through a concept and knowledge of itself, and yet for that reason it is not an analogical sign but a truly and univocally so. For signs’ dependence upon a concept in representing does not remove the univocal account of sign, since the concept and cognition are what they represent to, not that by means of which they represent as a formal account, although they can be its efficient cause. Not every dependence of one thing on another constitutes analogy, but only that which is ordered to participating in a common account; unless that account is unequal, partly the same and partly different, dependence does not destroy univocity, as St. Thomas teaches very well in Perihermeneias I, lecture 8, at the beginning.²

Finally, this second part of our conclusion is clearly deduced from St. Thomas. For in Summa theologiae III, q. 60, art. 6, ad 2, he says that “although words and other sensible things are in different genera as pertains to the nature of the thing, they agree in the account of signifying, which is more perfect in words than in other things. And so, in a certain way, one thing is made from words and things in the Sacraments, insofar, namely, as the signification of things is completed through words.” And in Sentences IV, d. 1, q. 1, art. 1, quaestiuncula 5, ad 4,³ he says that “although a representation arising from the likeness of a natural property implies a certain aptitude for signifying, nevertheless the determination and completion of signification comes from institution.” St. Thomas therefore holds that signification in conventional signs is not analogical, since it can actualize and perfect natural signification and constitute with it one artificial sign, which is a sacrament.

THE ARGUMENTS ARE SOLVED.

First it is argued: When the generic account is removed, the specific account cannot remain; but in a conventional sign the generic account of sign, namely relation, is found only analogically; therefore neither is the specific account of sign found except analogically.

The minor is clear from what was said, because the relation of sign in conventional signs is a relation of reason, which does not agree univocally with a real relation in the account of relation.

THE REPLY is that the argument proves that a conventional sign, taken predicamentally in the genus of being, is not univocally a sign together with a natural sign; it does not prove that it is not univocally a sign in the being of what is knowable and representative. For just as some things can fail to agree univocally in the being of a thing, such as quantity, quality, and substance, and yet agree univocally in the being of an object and of what is knowable because they belong to the same science or power, so some signs can differ by genus in the being of a thing and in the account of predicamental being, and not agree univocally, yet agree univocally in the objective account, or in the place of an object, which is the account of what represents and signifies.

And if you insist: For this very representative genus is relation, since otherwise we wrongly said in the preceding question⁴ that sign, in the account of sign, is placed in the genus of relation. Therefore, if it does not agree univocally insofar as it is a relation, neither does it agree univocally in the account of what represents:

It is answered that the very genus of signifying is considered in two ways: in the being of a thing, and in the being of an object or what is knowable; it cannot wholly abstract from these accounts, because they are transcendental. In the account of what is knowable it is only a property of being and presupposes being, but is not formally being; in the account of being, however, it is a relation, either transcendental or predicamental. And when we said above that sign is constituted in the genus of relation, we spoke of sign formally and predicatively⁵, that is, representatively in the objective genus.

Second it is argued: A conventional sign is constituted by the very imposition, which places nothing real in it, but only an extrinsic denomination. Therefore, it does not consist in a relation as a natural sign does, nor does it have anything in itself by reason of which it is representative; rather, it moves only through something else, namely, through the intellect’s knowledge of the imposition of the word itself.

The consequence is proved thus: an extrinsic denomination is an effect proceeding from a denominating form, but a form denominating extrinsically is not a relation; it is an act of the imposing will. The antecedent is proved because if a conventional sign consists not in extrinsic denomination but in a relation of reason, it will not actually exist as a sign unless it is actually cognized; and thus writing in a closed book, or when it is not actually considered, will not be a sign.

THE REPLY is that some hold this view when treating the Sacraments: the account of a conventional sign in them consists in an extrinsic deputation, not in a relation of reason, as Father Suarez, Opera omnia III, part 3, disputation 1, section 3. Nevertheless, since the imposition of the will serves only to determine the sign’s function and office, not as something absolute but with respect to what is signified, for which by nature the word is not determined, it is clear that the will’s deputation does only what the nature of the thing itself does in natural signs: nature orders the sign by its nature to what is signified, and thus grounds the relation in which the very account of sign consists. In the same way, therefore, an imposition that assigns a word to signifying grounds the sign-relation, because the assignment itself is in the sign through a relation to another. But because this relation is grounded in an assignment that places nothing real in the thing assigned, it is a relation of reason. Moreover, the same account applies to conventional signs as to natural ones, since the account of sign is a relation that exercises its function in an order to what is signified by way of a substitute. Therefore, if a conventional sign is a sign and exercises this function, it must assume the account of relation—not a real relation, since it lacks a sufficient foundation, but a relation of reason.

And to the reply it is said that writing in a closed book or not considered by the intellect is a sign actually fundamentally, not actually formally, because a relation of reason has being formally only through the intellect. Nevertheless, it is denominated a sign absolutely and simply, because in these relations of reason a proximate foundation suffices for absolute denomination, since on the part of the thing capable of being denominated everything required on its own part for such denomination is posited. But because that relation does not result from its foundation as real relations do, but depends on an act of cognition, it does not await the relation itself in order to be denominated such absolutely, although it does await it in order to be denominated actually related. Thus God is denominated Lord and Creator absolutely, even though the relation of lordship and creation is not actually cognized; but he is not denominated actually related to creatures unless it is cognized in this way.

As for the additional point, that a conventional sign does not signify and move through something it has in itself, but through another, it is answered that it signifies through imposition, which is proper to it, although this is an extrinsic denomination; and through that imposition, as knowable by the intellect, it moves in the way proper to what is knowable, although knowledge of that imposition is required as a condition and application for the exercise of signification, not for constituting the form of the sign.

Third it is argued: There are some signs that are neither conventional nor natural; therefore the division is not adequate.

The antecedent is proved as follows: an image made by a painter, for example, of Caesar whom he does not know, is not a natural sign, because it signifies not by the nature of the thing but by the painter’s free accommodation; the same is true of the many images often assigned to this or that saint, whom they do not signify by their own properties. Nor are they conventional signs, because they signify not by imposition but in the manner of an image.

Again, signs given by God, such as the rainbow in the clouds to signify that there will not be another flood, as in Genesis 9:12–17, and the sign he placed upon Cain so that he would not be killed, were not signs by imposition, since they were known to everyone; but conventional signs are not the same among all, as Aristotle says in Perihermeneias I, ch. 1⁶, nor were they natural, otherwise God would have imposed them in vain.

THE REPLY is to deny the antecedent.

To the first example it is answered that although a painted image is a sign made by art, it nevertheless represents naturally, namely, by reason of the likeness it really has, and not by reason of imposition. It is called an artificial image because of its efficient cause, by which it was made, not on the part of the formal account by which it signifies, which is real and intrinsic, namely, a likeness ordered to another for representing it. Nevertheless, these images do not directly signify an object as it is in itself, but as it is in the painter’s idea, which the image directly represents. And because the painter’s idea is sometimes proper with respect to its object, sometimes improper or less proper, the image too does not always represent the object properly as it is in itself, but represents its own idea. When, however, an image is assigned to this or that saint through human usage, that representation constitutes a sign by convention, as we shall say in the following article.

To the second example it is answered that many signs are conventional by divine institution, as is clear in the Sacraments. Such signs do not represent to everyone, but only to those who know the institution itself; and in this way the rainbow signifies that there will not be another flood by a particular imposition of God. The sign placed upon Cain, however, was perhaps a natural sign, namely a certain trembling of the body, as St. Jerome says in epistle 36⁷, which trembling moved everyone to pity, so that they would not kill him. If, however, it was some conventional sign by divine institution, it must be said that God instilled knowledge of it in all who saw Cain, so that they would not kill him.