Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Secunda Pars Artis Logicae

It is beyond doubt that an instrumental sign is truly and properly a sign; nothing is more evident than that instrumental and external signs are truly signs. But THE WHOLE DIFFICULTY concerns formal signs, by which the cognitive power is formed and informed for the manifestation of an object and its cognition. The whole difficulty comes down to this: how the character of a medium leading a power to what is signified belongs to a formal sign, and how the conditions of a sign belong to it—especially that it be less perfect than what it signifies, and that a thing is said to be known less perfectly through a sign than if it were known and represented in itself and immediately.

The reason is that a formal sign, since it is the very knowledge or concept of a thing, is not counted alongside the very cognition to which the power is led. Hence it cannot have the character of a medium by which the power is made cognitive and an object is made manifest from being unmanifest, since it is itself the very account and form of knowing. A sign of this kind leads to the concept and knowledge being placed in the power, so that it becomes cognitive; the concept itself, however, is not a medium for knowing. Indeed, something is said to be known equally immediately when it is known in itself and when it is known through a concept or knowledge: for the concept does not make cognition mediate.

To grasp this matter more briefly and clearly, observe, following St. Thomas in In IV Sent. d. 49, q. 2, a. 1, ad 15¹ and Quodlib. 7, a. 1², that a medium in cognition is threefold: a medium under which, such as light, under whose illumination something is seen; a medium by which, namely a species by which a thing is seen; and a medium in which, namely that in which another thing is seen, as I see a person in a mirror. This medium in which can itself be twofold: one is material and outside the power, namely that in which there is a likeness or image of another, as the image of a person in a mirror; the other is formal and intrinsic, such as the expressed species or word of the mind, in which the thing understood is known. For that this is distinct from the act of cognition is taught by St. Thomas in De potentia, q. 8, a. 1, and q. 9, a. 5³, and we shall show it in the books On the Soul, q. 10. It is also clear that the chief reason for explaining the Word in divine things is that in us such a word is given, proceeding through intellection. Those who deny that a word is given in us remove this reason. The first medium in which makes cognition mediate—that is, derived from another thing known or from another cognition—belongs to an instrumental sign. The second, however, does not constitute mediate cognition, because it neither duplicates the object known nor the cognition. Nevertheless, it truly and properly is a medium representing an object, not as an extrinsic medium but as intrinsic and formative of the power. For to represent is nothing other than to make an object present and joined to the power in its knowable being, whether by way of a principle, in the impressed species, which belongs to the side of the principle because cognition must proceed from it and the power, or by way of a terminus, in the expressed species, which belongs to the side of the terminus because in it the object is proposed and presented as known and as terminating cognition within the power, within which it takes on the character of an object. The object is made present to the power, or represented to it, not immediately by itself but through a concept or species. A medium in representing, then, is that by which the object is thus made represented and joined to the power.

I SAY, THEREFORE, FIRST: In the opinion of St. Thomas, it is more probable that a formal sign is truly and properly a sign, and therefore univocal with an instrumental sign, although they differ greatly in their mode of signifying.

To clarify the mind of the holy Doctor, we must consider that sometimes he speaks of a sign precisely as it performs the office of representing something other than itself, and thus he attributes to the formal sign the character of a sign simply speaking. At other times St. Thomas speaks of signs which, as things presented as objects and known beforehand, lead us to something signified; in this sense he teaches that a sign is found principally among sensibles, not among spiritual things, which are less manifest to us, as he says in In IV Sent. d. 1, q. 1, a. 1, qla. 2⁴ and ST III, q. 60, a. 4, ad 1.

That, then, a formal sign is simply and absolutely a sign is deduced first from Quodlib. 4, a. 17⁵, where he says “that a spoken word is a sign and not what is signified, but a concept is both sign and what is signified, as is a thing.” But according to St. Thomas, a concept could not be an instrumental sign, as is clear in itself, since it is not an extrinsic object that moves us. Therefore he attributes to it the character of a sign insofar as it is a formal sign.

Again, in De veritate, q. 4, a. 1, ad 7⁶, he says: “The character of sign belongs earlier to an effect than to a cause when the cause is a cause of the effect’s being, but not of its signifying. But when the effect has from its cause not only that it is, but also that it signifies, then, just as the cause is prior to the effect in being, so it is in signifying; and therefore the interior word has the character of signification earlier than the exterior word.” So St. Thomas, speaking absolutely of any word of the mind, attributes to it the character of a sign. It cannot be instrumental, since it is not outside the power nor does it move it, as was said.

Finally, in De veritate, q. 9, a. 4, ad 4⁷, he says “that signs in us are sensible, because our cognition, being discursive, arises from the senses. But we can commonly call anything known in which something else is known a sign. And in this sense an intelligible form can be called a sign of the thing known through it. Thus angels know things through signs, and one angel speaks to another through a sign.” So St. Thomas. When he says, “We can commonly call a sign, etc.,” commonly does not mean the same as improperly and not truly, but according to the common account of a sign, which is true, though not under that appropriation by which we use signs according to our mode of knowing, proceeding from one thing to another and forming an imperfect or discursive cognition from sign to signified. Thus, with respect to the mode of knowing, the character of a sign is found with a certain greater propriety in an external and instrumental sign, insofar as the leading from one thing to another is exercised there more manifestly, with two cognitions—one of the sign, the other of what it signifies—rather than only one, as is found in a formal sign. Hence, at the last place cited, in the solution to the fifth objection⁸, St. Thomas says “that it does not belong to the character of a sign properly taken that it be naturally prior or posterior, but only that it be known beforehand by us.” It follows that to preserve the proper character of a sign it is enough to preserve its being known beforehand, which is found in a formal sign—not because it is known beforehand as an object, but as the account and form by which an object is made known within the power. Thus it is known beforehand formally, not denominatively and as a thing known.

From this we draw the BASIS OF THE CONCLUSION: it belongs truly and properly to a formal sign to be representative of something other than itself, and by its nature it is ordered to this representation as taking the place of the thing or object which it makes present to the intellect. Therefore it preserves the essential character of a sign.

The consequence is clear, because it preserves the received definition of a sign: that it is representative of something other than itself by way of something better known and taking the place of another, and therefore is not equal to that other, but less perfect and deficient. All of this is found in a formal sign. For a concept, for example, of a human being represents something other than itself, namely a human being; and it is better known, not objectively but formally, since it makes the human being known and cognized, whereas without the concept that person is hidden and not presented to the intellect. For the same reason it is known first formally, that is, it stands as the account by which an object is made known. What is the account by which something is such, insofar as it is account and form, is prior to it in the way in which form is prior to a formal effect. If, then, a concept is the account by which a thing is known, it is prior by the priority of form to subject and of a denominating account to the denominated thing. Likewise, it is not equal to the object represented, but is lower and less perfect than it, as is clear in created concepts, because created concepts are intentions naturally ordered and subordinated to objects, so that they may take their place and act as their surrogates on the side of the terminus represented and known by the power. Therefore they are lower than the object they are of, since the object always stands as principal and the concept as representing it and acting as its surrogate. Thus in intentional being it is always inferior, although from another perspective a concept can sometimes surpass its object in the character of a spiritual entity. When we say that the object is more principal and perfect, we speak of the primary and formal object of the concept; for the material and secondary object is present incidentally, and need not be more perfect, since the concept does not directly and of itself take its place.

Finally, it is no objection that the concept does not seem to be counted alongside the represented object, since the thing is seen in the concept and not outside it. For although in the representative mode the concept representing and the object represented seem to become one, this unity does not destroy the true and proper being of representation and signification. Indeed, the more representation is one with the thing represented, the better and more effective the representation. Nevertheless, no concept in us, however perfect, reaches identity with what it represents, because it never reaches the point of representing itself, but represents something other than itself: it always stands as a kind of surrogate with respect to the object. It therefore always retains a distinction between what is signified and the sign itself.

It is otherwise in divine things. For because the Word is the supreme representation in pure act, by the force of so great a representation it reaches identity with the divine essence represented, and thus loses the character of a sign, as St. Thomas says in ST I, q. 27, a. 1. For this same reason, a concept or expressed species retains the character of a medium, enough to preserve the character of a sign. For it has the character of a medium in which, because it never represents itself but something other than itself; it stands on the side of the terminus of cognition, not on the side of the principle, as does the impressed species. But because it is not the ultimate terminus, or what is known as a thing, but serves the power so that it may apprehend the thing in it as ultimately known, it sufficiently has the character of a medium precisely because it is not the ultimate terminus in knowing. Nor is it said to stand deficiently in relation to what it signifies, as though it represented it deficiently and imperfectly. A deficient and imperfect representation does not belong to the character of a sign, but is incidental to it. It is enough that by itself it serves what is signified, acts as the surrogate of the object represented, and takes its place; for insofar as it does so, it is inferior to that for which it takes the place.

I SAY, SECOND: The division into formal and instrumental sign is essential, univocal, and adequate.

That it is univocal and essential follows from the preceding conclusion, because a formal sign is truly and essentially a sign, as we have shown. No one doubts that an instrumental sign is a sign. Therefore the division is essential and univocal.

That it is adequate is clear, because the members of a division reduce to contradictories and thus exhaust the whole divided. For since every sign is a medium leading to something else, either this medium is known beforehand so that something else may be known, or it is not. If it is known beforehand denominatively or objectively, it is an instrumental sign. If it is not known beforehand objectively and yet represents something else, it does so formally, because it is the account by which something else is made known within the power, not outside it as an object known. Therefore it is a formal sign.

Finally, that the division is essential and not accidental is clear from this: the essential character of a sign consists in representing what it signifies, insofar as an object is made present to a power and joined to it. But the mode of representation differs essentially between making something else present to the power formally by itself, and making it present as something known beforehand and as an object of the power. Therefore the presence differs—by a representing form immediately, or through an object known beforehand—and consequently the representation and notification differ essentially, and so too does the sign itself.

THE ARGUMENTS ARE ANSWERED.

Against the first conclusion, arguments can be framed either from certain authorities of St. Thomas or by attempting to prove that the conditions required for the essence of a sign do not belong to a formal sign.

From St. THOMAS, then, one may object first, because in ST III, q. 60, a. 4, ad 1, he says that those things are called signs first and principally which are offered to the senses, while intelligible effects do not have the character of a sign unless they are made manifest through certain signs. But formal signs are certain intelligible effects, such as concepts and expressed species. Therefore they are signs only insofar as they are manifested by something sensible.

Likewise, in In IV Sent. d. 1, q. 1, a. 1, qla. 2⁹, he says that “a sign, with regard to its original institution, signifies some sensible thing, through which we are led by the hand to knowledge of something hidden.” Therefore, since formal signs do not designate something sensible that leads to what is hidden, they are not signs first and in themselves.

The same point is served by what we cited above from De veritate, q. 9, a. 4, ad 4¹⁰, where he says that a sign is properly found when one reasons from one thing to another; nevertheless, anything known in which something else is known can commonly be called a sign. Therefore a formal sign is not properly a sign.

We answer that in these passages St. Thomas speaks of a sign not according to the common account of a sign, but insofar as it serves our cognition, since our cognition needs first to be led by an external object and then to be formed by concepts and intelligible forms. In this respect it agrees with that of angels, but differs in the first step; thus it is proper to our cognition to be led by an object presented externally. With respect to us, then, the proper character of a sign is found in a sensible sign leading us to what it signifies. I say “proper” not of a sign according to itself, but as proper insofar as it serves us and comes into use in our cognition. Hence spiritual things, unless they are manifested to us through something sensible, do not serve our cognition by way of a sign. St. Thomas speaks this way in ST III and in In IV Sent. But he explains his proper meaning in the cited De veritate, q. 9, where he says that a sign is properly found when one reasons from one thing to another. I say “properly” with respect to us and insofar as it serves the acquisition of cognition. He adds, however, that anything known in which something else is known can commonly be called a sign. By commonly he does not mean an improper sign, but the common account of a sign, which is proper in itself, though not so proper to our mode of acquiring cognition.

A SECOND ARGUMENT IS MADE, because the conditions required for a sign are missing from a formal sign. For a formal sign does not have the character of a medium, but can have the character of a terminus of cognition and consequently be posterior to that cognition and proceed from it, as is clear in a concept or word of the mind, which is the terminus of intellection and proceeds from it. Therefore it is not a medium for intellection itself. Again, it does not make cognition mediate, but immediate; for we understand an object immediately in itself, even when we understand it through a concept and knowledge. But it is contrary to the character of a sign to make cognition of a thing in itself immediate: when we know a thing through a sign, we know it less perfectly than if we knew the thing in itself immediately. Therefore, since a formal sign does not prevent but rather contributes to knowing a thing in itself, it does not take on the proper character of a sign.

This is confirmed, because we see that the formal character under which is not called a sign in relation to the objective character which, nor is the impressed species, which is the intrinsic principle of knowing, as we shall say below. Therefore neither will a formal sign be a sign, since it is itself the form of knowing and is not counted alongside the object so as to make it known; it stands on the side of the intrinsic terminus of cognition, just as the impressed species stands on the side of the principle. Therefore either both will be signs, because they are representative, or neither will be a sign, because each is an intrinsic form of knowledge and cognition.

We answer the first part of the argument by saying that a formal sign, which is a concept, has the character of a terminus of cognition, but not of the ultimate terminus; rather, it is ordered to a further terminus, namely the thing which is known and represented in that terminus. It is no contradiction that something be both terminus and medium when it is not the ultimate terminus, but looks beyond and is ordered to something outside itself.

Nor can one object that the object as it exists outside is not attained, but is attained as contained within the concept and made intelligible; therefore the concept is not a medium leading to something outside itself, but one that stops in itself. We answer by distinguishing the antecedent: the object is not attained as it exists outside, if as expresses the aspect under which it is attained—this is true; if it expresses the thing attained, it is false. For the thing that exists outside is truly attained and known, although through intrinsic cognition and a concept. This is enough for it to be a sign or intrinsic medium.

To the other part of the argument we answer that a formal sign need not make cognition mediate through the mediation of an object known, but through the mediation of a form that informs and makes the object present, as we shall explain at greater length when treating the word of the mind in On the Soul, q. 11¹¹. In the same way we verify that a formal sign leads one formally to what it signifies—that is, as a form representing and uniting the object to the power—not instrumentally, as a thing known beforehand. It is also more known formally, not objectively or denominatively.

As to the further claim that it belongs to the character of a sign to produce imperfect cognition, and not cognition of the thing as it is in itself, we answer that this belongs only to an instrumental sign, which represents what it signifies through something extraneous, not to a sign taken commonly, which says only that something better known manifests something less known, as we have often said from St. Thomas in that question 9 of De veritate, a. 4, ad 4¹². This is preserved in a formal sign, which is better known than the thing signified because it formally makes that thing known and is a medium to it, also formally and representatively. Its representation is not imperfect and extraneous, but is only a representation of something other than itself, in whose place it stands and to which it is ordered.

And if you object: the divine Word is excluded from the character of a sign only because it represents the divine Essence most perfectly; similarly, a son of Peter, although he is his image, is not a sign because he perfectly matches his likeness; and God is not a sign of creatures, although he represents them, because he represents them most perfectly. Therefore it belongs to the character of a sign to represent imperfectly. We answer that the divine Word is not a sign of God not only because it represents him most perfectly, but because it is consubstantial and equal to him. Thus it is neither better known nor a substitute for him or something serving him—much less with respect to creatures, to which it is not ordered, but to which creatures are ordered. Therefore creatures are signs of God, representing him to us as things better known to us. Imperfection in the cognition it produces does not belong to the character of a sign; rather, what belongs is its substitution for what it signifies and represents. A human being who is the son of his father, however, is not better known than his father, but is equal to him univocally, and therefore does not take on the character of a sign.

To the confirmation we answer that the formal character under which is not a sign because it does not make an object present to the power, but constitutes the object itself in the being of this or that determinate and specific object. As for the character of being present and joined to the power, that is accomplished by a formal or instrumental sign, or by something that supplies their place.

As to the further claim that a formal sign is not counted alongside the very thing signified so as to make it known, we answer: that it is not counted alongside it as though there were two things known and represented is true; that there is not one representing and another represented is denied. This suffices for it to be both sign and what is signified, although in intentional or representative being it is said to make one with the object—not merely as things agreeing in one common character, but rather because it wholly contains the very same thing numerically that is in another and represents it. But this presupposes that the representing and the represented are distinct, so that the same thing never represents itself; for this identity removes the character of a sign.

Finally, as to the claim about the impressed species—that it will be a sign just like the expressed species—this will be treated below, in article 3. For now it is enough to say that the impressed species, if excluded from the character of a sign, is so excluded because it does not represent to cognition but to the power, so that cognition may be produced. The expressed species, however, represents both to the power and to cognition, because it is the terminus of cognition and a form that represents to cognition itself as well. But more on this below.

An argument is made against the second conclusion, because this division does not seem to be univocal, adequate, or essential. Therefore it is not.

The antecedent with respect to the first part is proved because this division includes instrumental signs in their full range, and thus includes instrumental signs that are natural and those established by convention, which do not agree univocally in the character of sign, since one is real and the other a being of reason.

Likewise, the character of a medium is not found univocally in formal and instrumental signs, but belongs earlier to one than to the other and dependently to the external sign.¹³ Hence St. Thomas says in De veritate 4, a. 1, ad 7¹⁴, that signification is found earlier in the interior word than in the exterior word. Therefore the signs are not univocal.

The second part is proved because there seem to be some signs which are neither formal nor instrumental, and others which can be both at once. An example of the first: a phantasm is that in which the intellect knows a singular, yet it is neither a formal sign, since it does not inhere in or inform the intellect, nor an instrumental sign, since it does not lead to what it signifies from a preexisting cognition, but represents it immediately. For the intellect does not first need to know the phantasm as a thing known in order to know singulars. Likewise, a phantasm of smoke with respect to the intellect is not a formal sign of fire, since it does not inform the intellect; nor is it instrumental, since it is not an effect of the fire, as smoke in reality is. Again, an incomplete concept is a formal sign with respect to a spoken word, and an instrumental sign with respect to the thing signified by the word; and a concept of a human being or an angel is a formal sign in relation to itself, and an instrumental sign in relation to the one to whom it speaks. Therefore the same thing can be an instrumental and a formal sign.

The third part, finally, that the division is not essential, is proved because the division into instrumental and formal is taken by reference to a power: a formal sign is one that inheres in the power, an instrumental sign one that is known. But relation to a power does not belong directly to the constitution of a sign, but only obliquely, as we said in the preceding question. Therefore this is not an essential division, first and in itself.

This is confirmed because the same thing cannot be divided by two essential divisions that are not subordinated to one another. But the division of a sign into natural and conventional is essential, as will be said below¹⁵, and is not subordinated to this division into formal and instrumental, since a natural sign is also higher than formal and instrumental signs, and, in turn, an instrumental sign is divided into natural and conventional. Therefore these divisions are not essential.

To the first part of the argument, ONE MAY ANSWER in two ways. First, that this division does not divide a sign in its full range, but only a natural sign, because only a natural sign is capable of either member. Although a conventional sign is also instrumental, it is not instrumental insofar as it is the member opposed to a formal sign; for in this division a formal sign is opposed only to a natural instrumental sign. A conventional sign, however, is a sign as it were from outside and not in itself. In every division, one must always take as the thing divided what is capable of both dividing members. For example, when an intellectual habit is divided into wisdom and science, the division is univocal; yet wisdom should not be understood in its full range, including uncreated wisdom, for in that sense it does not divide a habit. Likewise, relation is divided univocally into the relation of paternity and that of likeness; but paternity is not to be understood in its full range, including divine paternity. In this way a sign is divided univocally into instrumental and formal—not taking instrumental in its full range, but restricting it to a natural sign.

Second, we answer that the division can also be univocal when instrumental sign is taken in its full range, so that it includes a conventional sign. For although what is real and what is a being of reason do not agree univocally in the character of being, they can agree univocally in the order and formality of a sign, insofar as a sign belongs to the knowable and objective order. It is indeed possible for a real object and an object of reason to agree univocally as objects and knowables when they belong to the same specific power or to sciences that agree univocally—for example, to Logic, which treats of a being of reason, and Metaphysics, which treats of real being—even though these objects are analogical in the character of being. Thus a conventional and a natural sign, although they name relations that agree analogically in the character of being, nevertheless agree univocally in the character of a sign, as belonging to the genus of the knowable and as a medium representing an object. And so, when the division is understood of a sign precisely in the genus and line of the knowable, it can extend univocally to conventional signs, but not of a sign in its being as a thing or relation.

This explains how formal and instrumental signs agree univocally in the character of a representative medium, insofar as each truly and properly serves to represent. The dependence of an instrumental sign on a formal sign, and of a spoken word on a concept, is physical dependence, not logical: that is, one species may physically be put into operation, or some operation of one may depend on another, as a surface depends on a line, a ternary number on a binary, a mixture on an element, and so forth. But this is not logical dependence, namely dependence in sharing a common character, as an accident depends on substance in the very character of being; this latter dependence produces analogy, not the former. This doctrine is common and is taught explicitly by St. Thomas in In I Periherm., lect. 8¹⁶.

To the second part of the argument we answer that the first example is not to the point, because a phantasm of singulars does not serve the intellect’s cognition as a sign, but as that from which the agent intellect receives species. Therefore it represents a universal with some connotation to singulars; because of this relation and connotation, the intellect, by reflecting, reaches the singulars themselves—not through the phantasm as through a sign, but through the abstracted species as originating from the phantasm and therefore connoting the singular as a terminus left behind, not directly representing it. We shall discuss this at greater length in Physics I, q. 1, and in the books On the Soul, q. 9. If, however, the intellect regards the phantasm as something knowable and through it reaches a singular, it uses the phantasm as an object known that manifests another thing and consequently as an instrumental sign. But this occurs through a cognition that reflects upon the being of the phantasm.

The same answer is given to the other examples brought forward in the argument, such as the phantasm of smoke with respect to fire, and an incomplete concept with respect to the thing signified, etc. These show that the same thing can be a formal sign and an instrumental sign with respect to different objects and different modes of representation, but not with respect to the same object. For example, a phantasm of smoke is a formal sign with respect to the imagination, and through that formal representation it immediately knows smoke and mediately knows fire, as contained in the smoke represented. External smoke, however, when known, is an instrumental sign. If the intellect reflects upon the phantasm as a thing known, it will understand in the phantasm, as an instrumental sign, both external smoke and the fire it signifies. An incomplete concept also represents a spoken word as signifying; the thing signified and contained in the word it will represent mediately, but formally, as two things represented in an ordered way in the same concept. With respect to the cognition by which the incomplete concept is known reflectively, it will represent instrumentally both the word and what the word signifies—if, however, the concept of the word reaches the thing signified in some way, which is not so certain; we shall treat this below¹⁷. Finally, the concept of an angel who is speaking represents formally to the speaker himself; to the hearer, however, who perceives the concept as a thing known and the thing represented in it, it represents instrumentally. But this is with respect to different subjects.

To the third part of the argument we answer that, although a sign’s relation to a power follows its relation to what it signifies, insofar as it represents that thing as signified to the power, nevertheless a different mode of leading what is signified to the power results in a formal difference in what is signified as such, insofar as it regards a different mode of being representable in what is signified in order to represent it to the power in a different way. A division based on intrinsic modes is referred back to, or presupposes, an essential difference in the things on which those modes are founded. For example, differences based on obscurity and clarity diversify revelations and lights, although in faith obscurity is an intrinsic mode and not a formal character.

To the confirmation we answer that, as we showed in Summulae, q. 5, a. 4, ad 2, it is no contradiction for the same thing to be divided by several essential divisions that are not subordinated but immediate, when each division is made on the basis of an essential formality taken inadequately, not of the whole taken adequately; we proved this there with various examples. Let the reader consult that discussion.