Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Secunda Pars Artis Logicae

The definitions of these objects that we gave in Book I of the Summulae¹ are to be presupposed. With these presupposed, we speak of the dependence of a thing on something extrinsic in its specification.

LET THE FIRST CONCLUSION BE: An object in general, insofar as it abstracts from a motivating and a terminating object, consists in being something extrinsic from which the intrinsic character and species of a power or act is taken and on which it depends. This is reduced to the genus of an extrinsic formal cause that does not cause existence, but specification.

For the conclusion to be understood, note from Cajetan, Prima Pars, q. 77, a. 3, that some things are wholly absolute, depending on nothing extrinsic for their specification and constitution, such as substance, quantity, etc. Others are wholly relative: they have their entire being toward something else and depend on it as a pure term. Others are intermediate between these: they have a quiddity and absolute essence in themselves, so that they have something besides regarding and being related; nevertheless, in their constitution and specification they depend on something extrinsic, not in order to regard it, but in order to act, cause, or perform some operation. Powers, acts, and habits stand in this way in relation to the things they reach, and are said to have a transcendental order to them.

Note carefully that it is one thing for a thing to be wholly absolute from something extrinsic in its specification, and another for it to be absolute from it in its existence. In existing, no thing is absolute from something extrinsic except God alone, who is from himself; everything else is from God. Here, however, we are speaking of the dependence of a thing on something extrinsic in its specification, and in this way an object stands in relation to a power. An object is not related to a power or act as an efficient cause or as something that influences its existence; that belongs not to the object but to what produces it. But the specification of an act or power depends on an object in itself, even when existence is set aside.

Finally, an object differs from an idea or exemplary cause, even if it is an extrinsic formal cause. First, an idea is that after whose likeness the thing ideated is made; an object, however, is not that after whose likeness a power or its act is disposed. Second, an idea expresses an exemplary cause by way of origin, whereas an object is not a principle of origin with respect to a power or act. Finally, an idea is an effective exemplary cause and, in this respect, also causes existence: for it contributes to forming a thing in act and in an individual, and thus belongs to the practical intellect, which extends to a work and to the existence of an effect. An object, however, does not move with respect to exercise or efficiency, but only with respect to form and specification.

THUS THE CONCLUSION JUST STATED IS TAKEN FROM ST. THOMAS, Prima Secundae, q. 9, a. 1, who says that “an act is specified according to the account of its object,” and that “the object moves by determining in the manner of a formal principle, from which action in natural things receives its specification.”

And in Prima Pars, q. 77, a. 3, he says that “the object is compared to a passive power as a principle and moving cause,” and “to an act of an active power as a term and end.” “From these two,” he says, “an action receives its species, namely, from a principle or an end or term.” St. Thomas therefore holds that the object of a passive and an active power agree in specifying the act. Finally, in De Anima II, lect. 6, near the end,² he says: “It is clear that every object is compared to an operation of the soul either as something active or as an end; but from each of these the operation is specified.” Here the word every expresses the universal account of object.

THE REASON FOR THIS IS that although active and passive powers are founded on accounts as diverse as act and potency—since one is for acting and the other for receiving, as St. Thomas teaches very well in Prima Pars, q. 25, a. 1—the object of each agrees in determining or perfecting the power or its act extrinsically. It is clear that, with respect to a passive power, the object stands as something that perfects it extrinsically, since it reduces the power from potency to act; for it is compared to that power as the principle of its act, which belongs to actuality and perfection. It is compared to an active power as a term and end. Although what is a pure term does not perfect, as in the case of relatives, because a relation does not tend by acting but purely by regarding, and similarly what is a pure effect does not perfect but is purely perfected, as creatures are with respect to God—since they are so produced by God that his action does not depend in itself on their being terminated—nevertheless, in created acts, termination gives perfection to the acts. If they are not terminated, they are not perfect or complete, but are as though on the way and tending; they are therefore perfected by the very determination toward which they tend. Thus St. Thomas says in De potentia, q. 7, a. 10,³ that in the effect or passion itself a certain good and perfection of the mover is considered, as in univocal agents, which perpetuate the being of their species through their effects, and in other things that, when moved, move, act, or cause. “For by their own motion they are ordered to producing effects. And the same holds in all things in which some good of a cause arises from an effect.” So St. Thomas. From this teaching it is clear how a terminating object can perfect a power or action.

SECOND CONCLUSION: A true account of object is preserved in a motivating object, even insofar as it is distinguished from a terminating object.

This is against some who think that the account of object is preserved only in a terminating object, but exclude a motivating object from the account of object because it implies efficiency; yet it does not belong to an object as object to cause efficiently, but to specify.

However, a great equivocation is committed by applying the term “motivating” only to an efficient cause, since it is applied to other causes as well: an end is said to move, a proposed object moves the will, and an exemplar moves toward its imitation. We therefore distinguish a motivating object by way of exercise and by way of specification: the first belongs to an efficient cause, the second to a formal object. This is clear from the passages of St. Thomas cited in the preceding conclusion. There St. Thomas plainly teaches that a motivating object specifies a passive power and is compared to it as a moving principle; thus it is prior to what it specifies in the order of definition. Therefore, as motivating, it has the true account of an object and not of an efficient cause. For insofar as an efficient cause is efficient, it regards the being of the thing it produces, not its specification or the principles of its definition. Yet St. Thomas specifically says in the cited passage of De Anima II, lect. 6,⁴ “that objects are prior to operations of the soul in the order of definition”; and he had spoken of terminating objects as well as active or motivating ones. The account of a motivating object therefore does not express efficiency in the object, but remains within the limits of an objective form, that is, a specifying form.

Finally, this is confirmed because a passive power, as such, can be specified by something extrinsic, since by its species it is ordered to that thing; consequently, its species is not wholly absolute in itself and independent of everything extrinsic. But whatever is not wholly absolute in itself, but is by its species orderable to something else, can be specified by it. A passive power as such, however, is not compared to an extrinsic specifying thing as to a term, but as to a motivating object, because it is in potency to being actualized, not to having its actuality terminated; for it is a passive, not an active, power. Therefore what motivates it is truly a specifying object.

YOU WILL SAY: At least a motivating object must cooperate efficiently with the power in producing an act; therefore the motivating character in the object belongs to the genus of efficiency.

I answer first that this does not hold with respect to every power, but only with respect to a cognitive power, in which it is more probable that a species in the genus of efficient causality cooperates with the power in producing an act. This efficiency, however, is not the formal and per se account of the species, which per se says only that it is representative and takes the place of the object on which the act depends for its specification. That it also depends on the object effectively with respect to being does not belong to the object insofar as it is an object, nor to the species insofar as it is precisely representative and takes the place of an object. Rather, this is because it determines and actualizes the power intrinsically; once actualized and determined in this way, the power contributes vitally and effectively to the act. Therefore, just as the power’s force contributes effectively, so too its actuality and the intrinsic determination of the object contribute, so that it may elicit an act in its specification, which depends on the object.

If you ask how the account of a motivating object is understood in an objective cause, given that it does not move by way of an efficient cause, the response from what has been said is that it moves with respect to specification, not exercise. This is explained from St. Thomas, Prima Secundae, q. 9, a. 1, who says that “a power or force of the soul can be in potency in two ways: in one way, with respect to acting or not acting; in another, with respect to acting on this or that. Thus sight sometimes sees, sometimes does not see, and sometimes sees this—for example, white—and at another time something else—for example, black. It therefore needs something that moves and determines it with respect to both.” That which determines or moves it to act or not act is said to move on the side of the subject or exercise; that which moves it to act on this or that is said to move and determine on the side of the object. St. Thomas then adds “that the object moves by determining the act in the manner of a formal principle.” Moving by way of an agent—that is, on the side of the subject and exercise—belongs to the genus of efficient causality and is distinguished from motion by way of a motivating object, which is reduced to the genus of an extrinsic formal cause. This consists in nothing other than that a power, in order to elicit an act of this or that species, needs to be actualized or ordered to an extrinsic object, not only in the termination of the act but also in its eliciting and principle. For even in order to elicit an act, the power is not sufficiently determined to the species of that act; it is determined, moved, and completed by the object.

FROM THIS IT FOLLOWS that although sometimes the production of a thing, which belongs to the genus of efficient causality, must intervene when a motivating object actually moves, this is not what per se constitutes the formal account of a moving object; it holds accidentally or concomitantly. This occurs especially in cognitive powers, which cannot be moved by objects unless species are impressed in them and effectively produced. Yet the effective production of species is not objective causality in the formal account of a motivating object. For the effective production of species does not belong to the account of an object, as is clear in our intellect and in an angelic intellect. In us, the agent intellect effectively produces species, not the object; and in angels, God infuses species, which is to produce them effectively. According to St. Thomas, objects do not act efficiently on an angel’s intellect. It is agreed by all that in infused knowledge God effectively produces or infuses the species, and that they are not produced by the objects themselves. Thus the account of efficiently producing species is preserved apart from the account of the specifying object, and vice versa. Consequently, the formal account of a specifying motivating object does not consist in the efficient production of species.

It follows, second, that a motivating object is not formally identical with an instrumental sign, nor is a terminating object identical with a secondary object, although these often coincide materially.

The first point is clear because the account of a merely motivating object, although it moves toward something beyond itself, does not directly regard a signified thing that it represents and for which it takes the place. Rather, it directly regards a power as something to be moved by it. Hence it belongs to the line of an object coordinated with a power, not to the line of a representation that takes the place of another and is coordinated with the thing represented. The formalities are therefore diverse, since they directly regard different terms: a sign expresses the account of a means leading to something else, whereas a motivating object expresses the account of a principle moving a power. Hence a motivating object does not imply that it is something lower and less perfect than that toward which it moves—for example, when someone is moved by real being to know a being of reason, by God to know creatures, or by an angel’s essence to know its accidents. A sign, however, as a sign, is always something less perfect than the thing signified, since it takes its place and substitutes for it in the genus of what is cognizable. This is why the genus of sign is a categorical relation, as we said above, whereas the account of a motivating object is not a categorical relation: an object does not regard a power, but is regarded by it, since their relation is that of measure to measured, which is not mutual.

The second point is clear when I know a prototype through an image or an ox through a footprint. The prototype and the ox are merely terminating objects, since they are known through the species of another object; yet they are not secondary objects but principal ones, since they are intended first and per se, while the image and footprint lead to them.

THE FINAL CONCLUSION: A terminating object with respect to a cognitive or appetitive power also has the account of an extrinsic formal cause.

This is against some recent authors who think that a terminating object has the account of a pure term, like the term with respect to a categorical relation.

BUT THE CONCLUSION JUST STATED IS TAKEN FROM ST. THOMAS, Prima Secundae, q. 18, a. 2, ad 2, where he says “that an object is not matter from which, but matter about which, and in a certain way has the account of form, insofar as it gives species.” The holy Doctor is clearly speaking of a terminating object. For matter about which is not a moving principle of an act that moves a power to elicit an act, but terminates the act, because the act concerns it. Therefore a terminating object specifies extrinsically, for a motion takes its species from its term, as is said in Physics V,⁵ lect. 8. It is also taken from St. Thomas, In I Sent., d. 1, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2,⁶ where he says “that the object terminates and perfects an operation and is its end.” But everything that perfects stands formally with respect to what can be perfected, at least extrinsically; and since it does not perfect by causing efficiently but by terminating, we say that it stands formally and extrinsically.

NEXT IT IS PROVED that a terminating object does not stand as a pure term, as it does with respect to a categorical relation. For a terminating object specifies an active power, which is not a categorical relation but regards an object by a transcendental order. Therefore an object is not a pure term; otherwise it would terminate only a categorical relation, not a transcendental one. That it terminates and specifies not in another genus of cause but in the genus of formal cause is inferred as follows. It does not stand as an efficient cause, since it is not a principle of action but a term; nor as a material cause, since it is not in a thing by affecting it as a receiving subject or a disposing cause; nor as an end, because an end is either an end that is an effect or an end that is a cause—that is, that for whose sake something is done. An end that is an effect does not specify as an effect, because as an effect it does not perfect an act or an active power, but is perfected or made by it; nor does it cause that act as an effect, but is caused by it. An end as a cause does not specify an act by terminating it, but metaphorically moves the efficient cause. In this way it does not regard the specification of an action or its essential predicate, but its existence, since it moves toward that; therefore it is numbered among the circumstances. As an object, however, it can specify, as is clear in Prima Secundae, q. 1, a. 4, where the specification of a moral act is taken from the end as a good and an object of the will. In q. 18, a. 6, and q. 19, a. 2, an end is said to specify insofar as it is the object of an interior act or of a commanding act; but it is a circumstance of the commanded act, which is done for the sake of the end. If, then, an end specifies, it takes on the account of an object. The account of an object specifying is therefore different from that of an end moving. Specification belongs to the genus of extrinsic formal cause, while the motion of an end belongs to final causality that moves toward producing things in existence. Moving toward being and existence, however, is outside specification.

From these points you can distinguish other divisions of object, such as into primary and secondary, formal and material. That which per se or first, or formally, specifies, or is the form and account of specifying, is called the object per se or the account of the object; the remainder is called the object secondarily, through another, and materially. The account of specifying, taken in itself, is also usually called the account under which or the object by which. But insofar as it is considered in some thing by affecting it, the thing thus affected is called the account which, while the material object is called the object that. An easy example is a colored and luminous wall with respect to sight.

THE ARGUMENTS ARE ANSWERED.

First, an argument is made against the first conclusion. The divine intellect and its power truly and properly have objects, for they are concerned first and per se with something: the intellect with the divine essence, and omnipotence with creatures. Yet they are not specified by those objects, for divine power is not specified by creatures; otherwise it would receive actuality and perfection from them, as well as species. Likewise, the divine essence does not specify the divine intellect; for there one cannot distinguish an extrinsic specifying thing from what is specified, just as one cannot distinguish what perfects from what can be perfected, or what actualizes from what can be actualized. Therefore the account of object does not consist in extrinsically specifying.

THE RESPONSE is that in divine things the account of object is found with imperfections set aside, that is, dependence on something as an extrinsic specifying and formally causing thing. For no species or thing specified is given there that is caused, and consequently there is no account of an object that is an extrinsic formal cause as cause. But in the acts of understanding and willing there is an account of object with respect to what belongs to perfection and actuality: a term and specifying thing is given for cognition, since cognition and volition must reach something. Nevertheless, the specifying thing is not distinct from what is specified, nor does it have the account of a cause with respect to it; they are one and the same because of supreme eminence, as is clear from St. Thomas, Prima Pars, q. 14, aa. 2 and 4. With respect to the executive power directed outward, or omnipotence, there is an account of object insofar as creatures are that about which this executive power of God is exercised, as its pure effects, not as what perfects the power, which has every perfection from itself.

Second, an argument is made against the account of a motivating object that we explained. Speaking of a motivating object formally as motivating, either the word motivating expresses the account of efficient motion or of formal motion. If the first, it is not properly and simply an object, as we showed above, because efficient motion does not give specification but existence. If the second, the account of a motivating object is not distinguished from that of a terminating object; both have the same mode of causality, namely formal causality, and thus the motivating and terminating object will specify in the same way. That the motivating object has the account of a principle does not change the account of extrinsic formal cause. Consequently, a motivating object does not have the account of an object insofar as it is motivating, but insofar as it agrees with a terminating object in the account of extrinsically specifying, not insofar as it has the account of a moving principle.

This is confirmed because, if a motivating object insofar as motivating expresses the proper account of an object, it follows that there is no account of object in general in which a terminating and a motivating object agree. For there can be no other common account for a motivating and a terminating object than regarding a power as something outside it. But this also belongs to an act, which is distinct from the power and regards it by specifying it, and yet is not its object. Therefore the account of object as such does not consist in regarding a power as something extrinsic that specifies it.

THE RESPONSE is that in a motivating object the word motivating is understood of formal motion by way of a principle with respect to a passive power, as was said above. Thus the specification of the act, and not only its exercise or being, depends on such an object—not on the side of termination but on the side of eliciting and of the principle.

When it is objected that in this it agrees with the terminating object, the response is that they agree in the genus of causing specification, but not in the mode or species of the act caused. Different habits and acts are likewise specified in the same general way of specification, but not by the same mode of specification, since they are of different species. The different mode of specifying and the different specification, as was said, are taken from the object’s standing by way of a principle or a term—that is, from whether the specification of an act depends on it in the eliciting of the act or in its termination. For, as St. Thomas often says, in Prima Secundae, q. 1 and q. 18 and elsewhere, the account of an act is taken from its principle and end. Standing by way of a principle induces a different mode of specifying from standing by way of a term, because it specifies an active or passive power, which are always different powers and have different acts.

In answer to the confirmation, just as power in general abstracts from active and passive power and agrees in the account of a principle of act, so object in general abstracts from a motivating and a terminating object and expresses an extrinsic specifying thing of a power on the side of a principle or a term. An act, however, is not wholly extrinsic to a power, since it proceeds from it. Or it is better to say that two things are considered in an act with respect to a power: the account of something produced or an effect, in which case it does not regard the power by specifying it, but receives from it its being, species, and nature; or the account of what perfects the power in acting, insofar as it finally consummates the action. In this case it does not specify except insofar as it stands on the side of the term in which the actuality of the power is consummated, and for this reason it takes on the account of a terminating object, like other effects with respect to their agents insofar as they perfect and consummate them in act.

A THIRD ARGUMENT: An object is motivating in the way in which the power that regards it is passive; for an object as motivating corresponds to a cognitive power insofar as it is passive. But a cognitive power is passive insofar as it receives species, and in this reception the object does not influence it as an object, but as an efficient and impressing cause. Therefore the account of a motivating object does not belong to the object as object, but to the account of an efficient cause or of what impresses species, since a passive power is passive as such insofar as before the act it undergoes something and receives species. But in that prior moment when the power receives species and is moved, an object is not presented, because it is not then reached as an object, when species are impressed.

This is confirmed because a motivating object can specify neither an act nor a power; therefore it specifies nothing.

The antecedent is proved: It does not specify an act, because only what is movable by an object is specifiable by it. But an act is not movable by an object, since it is an effect caused by the power and by the object. Therefore it is not specifiable by a motivating object, because a motivating object as motivating specifies only what is movable as movable. Nor can it specify a power, because an object specifies a power only through an act, as St. Thomas teaches in Prima Pars, q. 77, a. 3. Therefore, if it does not specify an act, neither does it specify a power.

THE RESPONSE is that a power is passive both with respect to an agent that impresses species and with respect to the impressed form. An impressed form has two functions: to inform entitatively or physically, which belongs materially to its species and is common to it with other accidents; and to inform intentionally, that is, representatively, by being the same as the object. In this way the object informs intentionally in the order in which the species does—that is, formally—although the object is outside the power and the species is within it. The effective impression of species, however, does not come from the object as something moving objectively, but from the producer of species; the productive power does not always belong to the thing that is the object, but to another agent, as the agent intellect is in us and God, who infuses species, is in angels. Hence the account of a motivating object is not the account of impressing or efficiently producing species, but of actualizing and determining a power objectively through a species, insofar as it informs intentionally, not merely entitatively. For this reason a motivating object is preserved with respect to an angel’s intellect, not because the object moves it by impressing species, but because it determines and actualizes the power formally, not entitatively as it is in itself but intentionally, as represented in the species; God, however, infuses that species effectively.

In answer to the confirmation, it is said that a motivating object specifies an act by determining or actualizing the passive power, which is movable by it, and by originating or causing the act with respect to specification. For a motivating object that specifies an act does not regard the act as something movable by it, but as something originated; it regards the power that it determines as something movable. Hence we deny that a motivating object specifies what is movable, which is like a subject; rather, it specifies the act of which it is the principle, as something originated by it. For, as St. Thomas says,⁷ an action is specified by its principle and end; but because the motivating object originates an act by moving and determining the power to elicit an act of this species, it is called a motivating object.

A FOURTH ARGUMENT is made against the account of a terminating object. An object is constituted by us as an extrinsic specifying thing; but a term as a term does not specify an act or power. Therefore a terminating object as terminating is not an object.

The minor is proved, first, because otherwise the term of a categorical relation would be its object, since it specifies by terminating. Second, an actual and real specifying thing of an act and power must be something real, since the species it gives is real and depends on it as on what perfects and actualizes. But a terminating object is not always something real; for the account of object is found even in a being of reason, as we said concerning the object of Logic in the introductory question, q. 1,⁸ Third, everything that specifies is at least an extrinsic formal cause. But every formal cause is a principle that gives being, for form is what gives being to a thing. Therefore every object is a principle insofar as it is an object and not a term, since it is a formal cause specifying. In this way it would be a motivating object, which specifies by way of a principle.

This is confirmed because a motivating and terminating object participate analogically in the account of object. Therefore one has it simply and the other in a qualified sense, and the account of object does not belong simply to both.

The antecedent is proved both because the account belongs to a real object and a being of reason, and because active and passive powers are related analogically in the genus of power, as is said in Metaphysics IX, lect. 1, as cited by St. Thomas.⁹ Therefore the corresponding motivating and terminating objects are also analogues. Hence the motivating object is what actualizes and informs simply; thus, analogically, both are said to specify or to have the account of a specifying form.

THE RESPONSE to the principal argument is to deny the minor.

In answer to the first proof, it is said that the term of a relation does not specify insofar as it is precisely a term, but insofar as it is subject to the foundation, without which the species of relations is not taken, as we said in q. 17,¹⁰ and is clear from St. Thomas, In I Sent., d. 26, q. 2, a. 3.¹¹ An object, however, specifies per se insofar as it is an object.

In answer to the second proof, it is said that an intrinsic specifying thing that gives species to an act must necessarily be something real. An extrinsic specifying thing need not be real, because it specifies not by informing and inhering, but by extrinsically terminating the tendency of another or determining it to elicit an act. Thus it suffices that, through a real species which informs the power intrinsically and really, it determine the power to an act, even if the object itself is not real in itself or does not really exist.

In answer to the third proof, it is said that a term, under different considerations, has the account of a cause or of an effect, just as causes are causes of one another. Insofar as it terminates precisely by way of execution and effect, it does not specify, but receives species and existence. But insofar as this term is considered as perfecting and consummating the act of a power in its completed being, it gives species by terminating and perfecting. It is then considered as a principle and extrinsic cause that gives being consummatively and finally, not by moving and initially; for it is the account of perfection in an act as consummated, not as initiated. Thus St. Thomas says in Prima Secundae, q. 33, a. 4, ad 2, “that operation causes pleasure as an efficient cause, while pleasure perfects operation as an end.” It therefore does not coincide with a motivating object. It also precedes in intention, although in execution it follows as an effect or receives existence; it does not give specification.

The antecedent is denied in answer to the confirmation. To the first proof it is said that an object’s being real or of reason makes a difference only in the account of being, not in the account of object and what is cognizable. It is entirely possible for something to be simply an object and not simply a being. For there are different distinctions among things under the aspects of thinghood and being, and others under the account of object and of what is cognizable, as Cajetan rightly observes in Prima Pars, q. 1, a. 3. Thus several things agree univocally in the account of what is knowable, but not in the account of being, or conversely. Likewise, they can agree specifically in the account of what is knowable and not in the account of being, or conversely, as is said more fully in the final question of the books of the Posterior Analytics,¹² It suffices now to give the example of Logic, which is univocally a science with the others that treat of real being, although it treats of a being of reason; and God and creature agree univocally in the account of what is knowable by metaphysics, but not in the account of being; and quantity and substance are univocally knowable by Mathematics and Physics, just as these sciences are univocally sciences, but not in the account of being. For the account of what is knowable expresses only the necessary connection of truth, which agrees univocally in the account of truth with any other necessary connection, even if they do not agree in the account of being. When it is said that an object perfects a power, the response is that a being of reason also perfects it, not formally by reason of itself, but by reason of its foundation and of the real being after whose likeness it is conceived.

If you say: This account of what is cognizable is transcendental with respect to this or that account of what is cognizable; therefore it is not univocal. The response is that what is cognizable in general, like truth, good, and the properties of being, is analogous to this or that cognizable thing in the manner of a certain quiddity predicable as a second predicate or as a first predicate, that is, transcendentally. But we call this or that determinate cognizable thing univocal with respect to subjects or beings to which it belongs denominatively by way of a fourth or fifth predicate, although those beings are not univocal entitatively, because it does not follow on being taken absolutely in itself, but comparatively and in relation to a cognitive power. The same mode of comparison can apply to things that do not agree univocally in themselves and entitatively.

In answer to the second proof, it is said that St. Thomas plainly speaks of power as a principle for acting. In this way passive and active power do not agree univocally, because passive power does not originate an act except dependently on active power, since it is not in act of itself. But as specified by an extrinsic principle, passive and active powers are univocally related, since both have a signification dependent in this way. As for the further point that a motivating object actualizes simply, whereas a terminating object does not, the response is that in specifying extrinsically both actualize simply, insofar as a power or act depends on each of them for its action and perfection. Although that by which a passive power is moved so that an act may be elicited comes closer, in its mode of moving, to the actualization of an intrinsic form, specification depends simply on both.