Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Secunda Pars Artis Logicae

To reach the point of difficulty, we must distinguish several relations that can converge in a sign. There is no doubt that some of them can be real in a natural sign; yet those relations are not the formal and quidditative character of sign itself. For since, according to its definition, a sign is said to be “that which represents something to a cognitive power,” a sign must, in order to represent something else, if it is a sign outside the power, have the character of an object cognizable in itself, so that once it is cognized the power may proceed through it to something else. But if it is a formal sign within the power, it must be a real and intentional representation—which in a thing is a certain quality—with a relation of likeness to that of which it is a representation, and an order to the power.

Likewise, there must be found in a sign some agreement, proportion, or connection with the thing signified, so that it is said to represent this rather than that. This proportion or agreement varies. At times it is that of an effect to a cause, or a cause to an effect, as smoke signifies fire as its effect, while a cloud or wind signifies rain as its cause. At times it is likeness, an image, or some other proportion; in signs by convention it is an imposition and assignment by the community. In a word: since a sign is related both to what is signified and to a power, there may precede the constitution of the character of sign certain relations or respects that make it apt in relation to the power or to what is signified. But the formal and quidditative character of sign does not consist in these, nor does its relation to the thing signified, although the Conimbricenses hold the opposite, In Periherm. I, q. 1, a. 2. For these relations can be separated from the character of sign and found without it. The character of an object is found without that of a sign; and the character of an effect, cause, likeness, or image can likewise be found without the character of a sign. Further, a relation to something as an effect or cause—which is founded on action—or as an image—which is founded on likeness through imitation, without an order to a power—has a different foundation and formal character from the relation of a sign. The latter is founded on the measured in relation to the measure, by way of a representative that substitutes for another in an order to a power, an order that the other relations do not regard.

WE ASK, THEREFORE whether that formal and most proper relation of a sign, which is found in addition to all these or arises from them, is a real relation in real or natural signs. We certainly acknowledge that the relation of an object to a power, which precedes in an instrumental sign, whether by way of moving or terminating, is not a real relation: an object, in its being, does not regard a power by a real relation; rather, the power regards the object, depends on it, and is specified by it. Even if the relation of an object to a power were real and the object regarded the power reciprocally, just as the power regards the object (which is plainly false, since the object is the measure and the power the measured), it would still not be the relation or character of a sign. For the character of an object formally and directly regards, or is regarded by, a power, so that the respect between them is immediate; but a sign directly regards what is signified and regards the power obliquely, since it regards what is signified as something to be manifested to the power.¹ The line and order of reference, then, are different in an object as object and in a sign as sign, although a sign must be supposed to be an object.²

I ANSWER, THEN, AND SAY: The relation of a natural sign to what it signifies, by which it is constituted as a sign, is real and not a relation of reason, considered in itself and by virtue of its foundation, provided that the term exists and the other conditions of a real relation are met.

This seems more in accord with the mind of St. Thomas. First, he teaches that the relation of the sign of character is founded on a quality added to the soul, which is a real foundation, as is clear in ST III, q. 63, a. 2, ad 3, and In IV Sent. d. 4, q. 1, a. 1.³ He is speaking of the proximate foundation, for he refutes those who said that this relation is immediately founded on the soul, and teaches that something else must intervene on which the relation of the character-sign is founded, namely, the quality of character. He is therefore speaking of the proximate foundation. And in ST I, q. 16, a. 6, he says that although health is not in urine and medicine, “there is nevertheless something in each by which the one produces health, while the other signifies it.” Therefore the relation of a natural sign is founded on something real, as is that of urine to health: namely, on something it has in itself by which it signifies, just as medicine has something by which it produces health.

THE FOUNDATION of the conclusion is drawn from the very nature and quiddity of a sign, which consists in its being something better known, through which something less known is represented and manifested, as St. Thomas rightly notes in De veritate, q. 9, a. 4, ad 5,⁴ and In IV Sent. d. 1, q. 1, a. 1, q. 1, ad 5,⁵ q. 2. For something to be better known than another and make that other cognizable and representable, its knowability must be more apt than the other’s to move a power, and must be determined or disposed toward that particular thing signified, so as to move the power to it rather than to something else—whether this motion and representation takes place formally or objectively. But for something to be cognizable in itself cannot be something of reason; and for it to be more cognizable in relation to another and make that other represented is likewise something real in natural signs. Therefore the relation of a natural sign is real.

The minor has two parts: namely, that a thing is really cognizable in itself, and that in relation to another it also really makes that other represented and cognizable.

As to the first part, it is proved as follows: before every operation of the intellect, a thing is cognizable. For if it were made cognizable by an operation of the intellect, it would be cognizable through being cognized, and so it would not be cognizable before cognition—which is contradictory, since in us cognition is derived from what is cognizable. But if it were made cognizable by reason or cognition, cognition would precede knowability, and consequently would not be derived from it as from an object.

Nor is it an objection that the cognizable, or object, does not regard a power by a real relation but by a relation of reason, for this rather proves the reality of knowability itself. It regards a power by a relation of reason precisely because the power depends on the object, not the object on the power; the object stands as measure, while the power stands as measured. This belongs to relations of the third order, in which the measured depends and therefore really regards the measure, whereas the measure does not depend on the measured and so regards it only by reason. Yet this very fact argues for a greater reality in the character of measure: the less it depends, the greater its reality; and consequently there is less reality in the relation. Thus God’s being Lord relatively is something of reason, but in power it is something real. Likewise, a free act is really free in God, and all the more real because it is related to a free object by reason alone and does not really depend on it. So what is cognizable in real objects is something real absolutely and in itself, but something of reason relative to a power. That one object’s knowability is greater or more evident than another’s does not arise from the relation of reason to a power, which is found in every object, but from a greater force and efficacy in moving and manifesting, which is something real in itself.

The second part of the minor is shown as follows. Although what is cognizable in its order to a power is something of reason, it is nevertheless really cognizable in itself. Therefore, if it is to be not only cognizable in itself and with respect to itself, but also cognizable with respect to another, whose place it takes and for which it substitutes in knowability and presentation, a real relation intervenes. The consequence is clear, because this relation is founded on the real knowability of the sign itself and its real connection with this thing signified, so that it represents that thing—not on a connection with the power. Therefore it will be its substitute by a real relation and will regard it as what is signified, even though such knowability does not really regard a power. For the fact that smoke represents fire rather than water, an ox’s footprint an ox rather than a man, and the concept of a horse a horse rather than a stone, is founded on some real proportion and intrinsic connection of these signs with those things signified; and from a real proportion and connection with something a real relation arises. This is where some are especially liable to fall into error: without examining the matter, they see that the knowability or apprehensibility of a sign grounds the relation of sign, and that this apprehensibility is a relation of reason to a power, and conclude simply that the character of sign itself is a relation of reason. But they are quite mistaken. The relation of knowability to a power precedes and is presupposed by the character of sign, for it belongs to the common character of an object or of what is cognizable. For the character of sign further requires that the sign’s knowability be connected and coordinated with another thing, that is, with what is signified, so that it substitutes for it and is subordinated and serves it by conveying it to a power. Thus the relation of the sign’s knowability to the knowability of what is signified is a real relation in its own right, because it is founded on the proportion and greater connection that this knowability has with that one rather than another, enabling it to substitute and take its place. This is given on the side of the thing, and the act of representing to a power is also given on the side of the thing, even though the order and relation to the power is not real. For whether the relation of an object to a power is real is one question; whether its representation is real is another.

Hence St. Thomas says, De veritate, q. 3, a. 1, ad 2,⁶ “that two things are required for a species, which is a means: namely, the representation of the thing cognized, which belongs to it by reason of its nearness to what is cognizable, and spiritual being, which belongs to it according to the being it has in the one who cognizes.” I weigh these words: “representation, which belongs to it by reason of its nearness, etc.” Therefore representation in a natural sign is founded on its nearness to what is cognizable, for which it substitutes and in relation to which it is a means. But in things that are really proportioned and joined, this nearness is a real relation, since it has a real foundation.

FROM WHAT HAS BEEN SAID YOU WILL GATHER that in signs by convention the character of sign must also be explained through a relation to what is signified. But this relation is one of reason. A sign does not consist merely in the extrinsic denomination by which it is made or designated by the community to signify, as some recent authors think, supposing that without that fiction of the intellect it is denominated a sign solely by the imposition itself. This imposition is indeed required as the foundation of the relation and character of sign, because through it something is made apt and designated to be a sign, just as a natural sign grounds a relation to a particular thing signified by being proportioned and connected with it.

Accordingly, from that extrinsic denomination of designation and imposition there arises a twofold relation of reason. The first is common to every extrinsic denomination, insofar as it is conceived by the intellect in the manner of a form and a denominating relation, as being seen in relation to the one who sees, or being loved in relation to the one who loves. The other is a particular relation by which one designation is distinguished from another. For the community can designate and assign someone to various offices, which are distinguished only by their relations to the things they are appointed to do: someone is designated and appointed to be a judge, governor, or teacher, and certain things to be the signs or insignia of these offices; likewise, words are designated to serve human communication. These offices arise from a distinction made by the community, which is an extrinsic denomination. They are distinguished, however, because a judge is ordered to judge such subjects, a governor to govern, a teacher to teach, and so on. These distinctions are taken from the order to their functions or objects, with respect to which they are exercised, and are explained only through relations; therefore they are distinguished by relations to their functions and objects. The same must therefore be said of signs by convention, although they are founded on the extrinsic denomination of imposition. When the relation ceases, these things are said to remain fundamentally, insofar as that designation by the community is said to remain morally or virtually.

THE ARGUMENTS ARE ANSWERED.

FROM TWO SIDES arguments can be made to prove that a natural sign is a relation of reason: from the side on which the sign regards a power, or from the side on which it regards what is signified.

From the side on which it regards a power, the argument is common but difficult: A sign regards a power by a relation of reason. But this relation is intrinsic and essential to it, indeed more principal. Therefore a natural sign does not consist precisely in a real relation.

The major is certain, because the order between a sign and a power is found to be of the same line and character as that between an object and a power. For a sign is a kind of object, or a substitute for an object, and so it moves a power objectively, not effectively; consequently it regards a power in the same order as an object. But it is clear that an object regards a power by a relation of reason, because there is no mutual relation between the power and the object. Therefore the relation is not real on the side of the other extreme—not on the side of the power, since the power really regards the object—and so it will be a relation of reason on the side of the object. In particular, an instrumental sign cannot manifest anything to a power except insofar as it is cognized; but being cognized is something of reason. Therefore an instrumental sign leads to what is signified by means of something of reason, namely, by means of being cognized.

The minor is proved: First, because a sign is an instrument that a power uses to arrive at what is signified. Second, because the end to which a sign is ordered is the manifestation of what is signified to that very power. Therefore the power itself, or its cognition to which the sign leads, is the end principally intended by the sign; consequently, an order to the power is intrinsic and essential to it.

This is confirmed because formal and instrumental signs differ in their character as signs, as we shall say in the following question; and they do not differ in their order to what is signified, but in their order to a power. For smoke as an instrumental sign and the concept of fire regard the same thing signified, namely fire; but smoke does so instrumentally and the concept formally. Therefore they differ in their different orders to a power; and thus this order is essential to a sign, insofar as a formal sign regards a power as a form of cognition, and an instrumental sign as an extrinsic mover.

THE RESPONSE IS that whether the order to what is signified and to a power in a sign is only one or is twofold, a matter to be treated in the following article, nevertheless, insofar as it is a sign and under this formal character, it does not regard a power directly and principally, or as its measure. Rather, it regards the power obliquely, as a way and means by which the power is led to what is its object and can be manifested to it, namely, what is signified. Hence the power, rather than the sign, regards what is signified as an object that can be manifested, by which both are specified and measured: the power as a cognitive capacity knowing and tending toward it, and the sign as the way and means through which one tends toward it. That the sign is also an object and first cognized, so that through it the power may tend toward what is signified, is not what essentially constitutes a sign as a sign. For a formal sign manifests to the power without being an object cognized by it; rather, it is a form that makes the power cognitive. What therefore belongs per se to the character of a sign is that it substitutes for an object in representing that object to a power. This substitution implies a real subordination and relation to what is signified as the principal object, and is the essential relation that formally constitutes the sign, although it also reaches the power obliquely, insofar as it regards what is signified as something manifestable to the power.

Therefore, the argument in its formal shape is answered: A sign regards a power by a relation of reason. I distinguish: formally, insofar as it is a sign, by a direct relation of measure to measured, I deny; presuppositively, and insofar as it is an object of some kind, I concede.

In answer to the proof, it is said that a sign is in the line and order of an object principally, per se, and as a measure—I deny; as a substitute and stand-in for an object, I concede. Hence it does not regard a power in the same way as an object does: it directly regards the object that can be manifested, and the power obliquely, just as a habit, which is in the powers, directly regards the object by which it is specified, although it does so in order to assist the power in relation to that object. Nor is an instrumental sign founded on being cognized as regards its character as a sign; being cognized is required for the exercise of signifying itself, not so that the sign may be constituted as a sign that regards an object as its substitute. It has this character before being cognized, because a sign does not consist in actual representation but in the capacity to represent.

In answer to the first proof of the minor, a sign is called an instrument of a power in the way that it is an instrument of what is signified and its substitute for manifesting that thing to the power. A sign is not an instrument of a power on the side of eliciting an act, as though the power elicited an act by means of the sign; it is an instrument on the side of representing the object, insofar as the object is manifested through the sign. Thus it is subordinated principally to the object, as that for which it substitutes in representing it to the power.

In answer to the second proof, the end of a sign is to manifest what is signified to a power, but through subordination to what is signified itself as the principal thing, for which the sign is deputed and substituted in representing it. What, through subordination to another and substitution for it, regards some end, regards more principally that for which it substitutes and for which it is deputed than that toward which it moves, or the end toward which it tends. For it regards the latter as an end produced, but that for which it substitutes as the end for whose sake it acts; through its subordination to that, it regards such an effect.

In answer to the confirmation, the division of signs into formal and instrumental, if it is essential (a question for the following question), is not taken solely from the order to a power, but from the different order to what is signified. For the different way of affecting a power—as an object first cognized or as a concept intrinsically informing it—is reduced to a different character of manifesting and representing what is signified, because manifestation and representation themselves are a kind of motion. Thus the way of affecting a power, which varies the motion, is reduced to a variety of representation. But a different representation regards what is signified under a different formal character, or formal account, of what can be represented, because representation and what is representable must be proportioned to one another; when one varies, the other varies too. The sign itself is thus made formally diverse by reason of what is signified and what is representable, although materially it is the same.

A SECOND ARGUMENT is made to prove that even on the side of what is signified, and in the order to it, the relation is not real. First, when what is signified does not exist, the sign is nevertheless no less formally a sign in relation to it, because it actually represents it to the power; then the relation to what is signified, which does not exist, is not real. Second, when the sign represents some being of reason, such as the concept of a chimera or its external likeness and image. Third, the relation of a sign differs from the relation of an image only in this: a sign touches what is signified as something to be represented to a power, whereas an image regards its exemplar as something to be imitated by it. But in what is signified, being representable to a power is not something real but something of reason, because what is signified is not ordered to a cognitive power by a real order and relation, but as something manifestable; so too are other objects, which do not regard a power by a mutual relation. Therefore what is signified is reached by the sign under a certain character of reason, and so not through a real relation. Finally, the very exercise of signifying or representing posits nothing real in what is signified. For no change occurs in what is signified by being represented by a sign, whereas a real change occurs in the power when it is newly moved by the sign. Therefore the relation of a sign to what is signified is not real, since the capacity to signify cannot be more real than its act and exercise.

THE RESPONSE to the first proof is that, when what is signified does not exist, the sign does not remain formally a sign, but it remains fundamentally so, because the formal and actual character of substitution is lacking when that for which it substitutes does not exist. But the power to manifest both itself and what is signified as absent in this way remains, because its proportion or connection with that thing remains and can ground such a relation. Representation takes place by virtue of this power, not by virtue of the relation by which the sign is formally constituted as a substitute.

To the second proof it is said that a concept of a being of reason or an image of a chimerical thing represents an impossible thing after the manner of possible things. Thus a chimera is represented through its parts, which are something real—for example, a lion’s head, a goat’s body, and a serpent’s tail—even though their combination is not real. But with respect to what is purely chimerical in such an object and is a being of reason, there is no real relation of a natural sign; there can instead be something real that manifests and represents, namely, a species that represents a being of reason after the likeness of a real being. This manifestation, however, neither requires a real relation nor expresses the formal character of a sign, but the transcendental character of a representative.

In answer to the third proof, what is signified, as an object that can be manifested to a power, is something real in itself, although it is not related by a mutual relation either to the power to which it can be represented or to the sign through which it can be represented. Indeed, because in its order it depends less on the power than the power depends on it, it does not, as an object, have a mutual relation to the power. Thus just as science and a power themselves regard an object by a real relation of the third kind, although the object is not related to the power by a real relation—because the reality of the term in the being of the thing and in the formal character of a term suffices for this, as was said in q. 17, a. 5—so too the relation of a sign to the same object as something signifiable to a power is real. For in the being of the thing, what is signified is real, even though the relation of what is signified to the power or to the sign itself is not real.

In answer to the final proof, the exercise of a sign posits nothing in what is signified, since the sign rather receives and depends on what is signified, as one that substitutes for it. If it really changed what is signified, it would really regard the sign by which it was changed. Hence from the fact that it does not really change what is signified, it does not follow that the sign does not really regard what is signified, but that what is signified does not really regard the sign—which we readily concede. But it was necessary to prove that the sign is not really changed by, or dependent on, what is signified, for which it substitutes. In relation to a power, a sign does indeed move it really and objectively, not by acting effectively, as will be said below.⁷ But such motion belongs to the sign not formally as a sign, but as an object. To move by substituting for another is an act of the sign, or signifying; but in this way it implies the relation of a substitute to what is signified. Therefore, insofar as it is a sign, it does not directly regard the power, but what is signified, for which it substitutes in order to move the power.

A THIRD ARGUMENT: A natural sign and a sign by convention agree univocally in the character of sign. Therefore one cannot be real and the other a relation of reason, since nothing is univocal to a real relation and a relation of reason; nor are both something real, since a sign by convention is plainly something of reason. Therefore both are something of reason.

The antecedent is proved as follows: The character of an object, or of what is cognizable, is univocal in real beings and beings of reason, because it belongs to univocal sciences and to the same power. For Logic, which treats of beings of reason, and Metaphysics, which treats of real beings, are sciences in a univocal sense. Therefore their objects too are univocally objects and knowable things. Likewise, then, signs are univocal, since the character of sign and of what is signifiable belongs to the class of object and of what is cognizable, for which the sign substitutes.

This is confirmed by the familiar argument that sign in general is a determinate species of being or of relation; therefore it must be placed in a determinate genus and cannot abstract from what is real and what is of reason. Indeed, even within relation it is not apparent in which genus it is to be placed determinately. For it is not always placed in the genus of measure and measured, since sometimes a sign is not perfected by what is signified, but conversely—as when a cause is a sign of its effect, for example, a cloud is a sign of rain. Nor is it easy to see, among signs that are effects, how smoke is measured by fire, or how two relations of measure are distinguished in an image, one under the character of image and the other under the character of sign, since they are different.

THE RESPONSE is that it is true that the character of what is cognizable and of an object can be univocal in real beings and beings of reason. For there are divisions of being according to the being of the thing, and other divisions according to the genus of what can be known, as Cajetan rightly teaches, ST I, q. 1, a. 3. Thus the character of what is cognizable is not formally the character of being, but is being only presuppositionally and is consequent upon being. For truth is a property of being and thus is not formally being, but is consequent upon being and presupposes being; what is true is the same as what is cognizable. Hence it is entirely possible for something incapable of existence to be capable of truth, not as a subject but as an object: it does not have in itself an entity that, as a subject, grounds truth and knowability, but it can be cognized as an object after the likeness of a real being, and thus be objectively in the intellect as something true. Therefore, although real being and being of reason are analogical in entity, insofar as one is represented after the likeness of the other they can agree univocally in the character of object, even things that are not univocal in entity, such as God and creature, substance and accident, in the character of what is knowable by metaphysics or intelligible to the intellect. But since the character of sign does not consist in the character of object absolutely, but in substitution for another, which is supposed to be an object or what is signified, so that it may be represented to a power, it does not belong to the genus of what is cognizable absolutely, but relatively and ministerially. In this respect it takes on something of the order of entity—namely, insofar as it is a relation and draws the genus of what is cognizable into the genus of relation. In this respect the relation of a natural sign, which is real, does not agree univocally with the relation of a sign by convention, which is a relation of reason.

The response to the confirmation was given near the end of the preceding article. As for the further point about the species in which the sign is placed in the genus of relation, the answer is that it belongs to the genus of measure and measured. What is signified always stands as the principal thing to be represented, and the sign as serving and ministering in this genus; thus it regards its principal as an extrinsic measure in the genus of what is representable, and the sign is perfected all the more by its approach to that measure, the better it represents. Thus smoke regards fire as a measure in the character of what is representable, not in the genus of being. An image, as an image, regards its exemplar as a measure in imitation and derivation from it as a principle from which it is derived; but in the character of sign it regards it as a measure in the genus of what is representable and manifestable to a power. These are different relations. As for the relation of cause or effect, whether efficient or formal, found in signs with respect to what they signify, such relations are not formally the relation of sign itself, but something presupposed or concomitant, making this sign proportionate to that thing signified rather than another. The proper relation of sign is to what is signified as representable to a power, not as an effect or cause.