Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Secunda Pars Artis Logicae
John of St. Thomas (1589–1644)
Secunda pars artis Logicae of the Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus of John of St. Thomas (Joannes a Sancto Thoma), from the Reiser edition (Marietti, Turin, 1930), Reiser tomus I, pars secunda.
Praefatio I: Author's preface to the fourth edition of the second part of the art of Logic
Prooemium I: PROEM
Quaestio I: ON LOGIC: WHAT IT IS AND HOW FAR IT EXTENDS
Articulus I: WHETHER THE ART OF LOGIC IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY FOR ACQUIRING THE OTHER SCIENCES
Articulus II: WHETHER LOGIC IS A TRUE SCIENCE AND ART
Articulus III: WHETHER THE FORMAL AND ADEQUATE OBJECT OF LOGIC IS A BEING OF REASON, WHICH IS A SECOND INTENTION
Articulus IV: WHETHER LOGIC IS A SPECULATIVE OR PRACTICAL SCIENCE
Articulus V: HOW LOGIC AS A DOCTRINE IS DISTINGUISHED FROM LOGIC IN USE
Quaestio II: ON LOGICAL BEING OF REASON, WHICH IS A SECOND INTENTION
Articulus I: WHAT A BEING OF REASON IN GENERAL IS, AND HOW MANY KINDS THERE ARE
Articulus II: WHAT A SECOND INTENTION AND A LOGICAL RELATION OF REASON ARE, AND HOW MANY KINDS THERE ARE
Articulus III: WHAT THE DISTINCTION AND UNITY OF REASONED REASON AND REASONING REASON ARE
Articulus IV: BY WHAT POWER AND THROUGH WHICH ACTS BEINGS OF REASON ARE MADE
Articulus V: WHETHER GOD FORMS BEINGS OF REASON
Quaestio III: ON THE UNIVERSAL IN ITSELF
Articulus I: THE VARIOUS MEANINGS OF ‘UNIVERSAL’ AND ITS DEFINITION EXPLAINED
Articulus II: WHETHER THE UNIVERSAL TAKEN MATERIALLY AND AS SUBJECT IS FOUND ON THE SIDE OF THE THING
Articulus III: WHETHER FORMAL UNITY, AS DISTINCT FROM THE SINGULAR, BELONGS TO A NATURE BEFORE THE OPERATION OF THE INTELLECT
Articulus IV: WHETHER APTITUDE AND INDIFFERENCE TO MANY BELONG TO THINGS OUTSIDE THE OPERATION OF THE INTELLECT
Articulus V: WHETHER UNIVERSALITY CONSISTS ESSENTIALLY IN A RELATION
Articulus VI: WHETHER METAPHYSICAL DEGREES IN ANY THING ARE DISTINGUISHED BY A MERE DISTINCTION OF REASON OR BY THE NATURE OF THE THING
Quaestio IV: ON THE CAUSE OF THE UNIVERSAL
Articulus I: WHETHER, BY THE BENEFIT OF THE AGENT INTELLECT, THE METAPHYSICAL UNIVERSAL IS REPRESENTED IN THE SPECIES PRODUCED BY THAT INTELLECT
Articulus II: WHETHER THE METAPHYSICAL UNIVERSAL BECOMES ACTUALLY KNOWN THROUGH AN ABSOLUTE ACT OF THE INTELLECT, AND THE LOGICAL UNIVERSAL THROUGH A COMPARATIVE ACT
Quaestio V: ON THE ACT OF THE UNIVERSAL, WHICH IS TO BE PREDICATED OF MANY
Articulus I: WHAT ‘BEING IN MANY’ AND ‘BEING PREDICATED OF MANY’ MEAN IN UNIVERSAL NATURE
Articulus II: WHAT PREDICATION IS AND WHAT IS REQUIRED FOR ITS VERIFICATION
Articulus III: HOW MANY THINGS ARE REQUIRED FOR SOMETHING TO BE CALLED UNIVERSAL OR COMMON
Articulus IV: HOW PREDICATIONS ARE VERIFIED IN SUBSTANTIAL CONCRETE AND ABSTRACT TERMS
Articulus V: HOW PREDICATIONS ARE VERIFIED IN ACCIDENTAL CONCRETE AND ABSTRACT TERMS
Quaestio VI: ON THE DIVISION OF THE UNIVERSAL INTO THE FIVE PREDICABLES
Articulus I: WHETHER THIS DIVISION IS GOOD AND ADEQUATE
Articulus II: WHETHER THIS DIVISION IS A DIVISION OF A GENUS INTO SPECIES AND IS IMMEDIATE
Quaestio VII: ON THE GENUS
Articulus I: WHETHER THE DEFINITION OF GENUS GIVEN BY PORPHYRY IS GOOD
Articulus II: WHAT IS DEFINED IN THE DEFINITION OF GENUS: THE INTENTION ITSELF, THE SUBJECT, OR A COMPOSITE OF BOTH
Articulus III: HOW GENUS IS CALLED A POTENTIAL WHOLE AND IS DERIVED FROM MATTER
Quaestio VIII: ON PREDICABLE AND SUBJECTABLE SPECIES
Articulus I: WHETHER SPECIES IS CONSTITUTED AS SPECIES BY THE CHARACTER OF BEING SUBJECTABLE OR PREDICABLE
Articulus II: THE DEFINITIONS OF SPECIES EXPLAINED
Articulus III: WHETHER THERE CAN BE A SUBJECTABLE SPECIES THAT IS NOT PREDICABLE OF MANY BUT HAS ONLY ONE INDIVIDUAL
Articulus IV: WHETHER SPECIES CAN BE PRESERVED IN ONLY ONE INDIVIDUAL AND GENUS IN ONLY ONE SPECIES
Quaestio IX: ON THE INDIVIDUAL
Articulus I: WHETHER THE DEFINITIONS OF THE INDIVIDUAL ARE RIGHTLY EXPLAINED
Articulus II: WHAT AN INDIVIDUAL IN GENERAL, OR A VAGUE INDIVIDUAL, IS
Quaestio X: ON DIFFERENCE, TAKEN IN GENERAL AND AS THE THIRD PREDICABLE
Articulus I: WHETHER DIFFERENCE IS RIGHTLY DIVIDED INTO COMMON, PROPER, AND MOST PROPER
Articulus II: WHETHER THE DEFINITIONS OF DIFFERENCE AS THE THIRD PREDICABLE ARE GOOD
Articulus III: WHETHER DIFFERENCE IS CALLED UNIVERSAL IN RELATION TO ITS SPECIES OR IN RELATION TO THE INFERIORS OF THAT SPECIES
Articulus IV: WHETHER SUPERIOR AND GENERIC DIFFERENCES ARE INCLUDED IN ATOMIC DIFFERENCES AND PREDICATED OF THEM
Quaestio XI: ON THE PROPER
Articulus I: THE NATURE OF THE PROPER IS EXPLAINED, AND ITS DIVISIONS ARE EXAMINED
Articulus II: WHAT THE FOURTH PREDICABLE PROPER IS AND WITH RESPECT TO WHICH THINGS IT IS TAKEN
Quaestio XII: ON THE FIFTH PREDICABLE, ACCIDENT
Articulus I: WHETHER THE DEFINITIONS AND DIVISIONS OF ACCIDENT WERE RIGHTLY GIVEN BY PORPHYRY
Articulus II: HOW ACCIDENT IS CALLED THE FIFTH PREDICABLE AND WITH RESPECT TO WHICH INFERIORS
Liber I: BOOK OF THE CATEGORIES
Quaestio XIII: ON THE PRE-PREDICAMENTS AND ANALOGUES
Articulus I: WHAT THE PRE-PREDICAMENTS ARE AND WHY ARISTOTLE TREATED THEM HERE
Articulus II: ON THE DEFINITION AND DIVISION OF EQUIVOCALS
Articulus III: WHAT ANALOGY IS AND HOW MANY KINDS THERE ARE
Articulus IV: THE CONDITIONS OF THESE ANALOGUES ARE EXPLAINED
Articulus V: WHETHER IN ANALOGUES THERE IS ONE CONCEPT ABSTRACTED FROM THE INFERIORS
Quaestio XIV: ON PREDICAMENTAL BEING AND ITS DIVISION INTO TEN CATEGORIES
Articulus I: WHAT A CATEGORY IS AND WHAT IS REQUIRED FOR SOMETHING TO BE IN A CATEGORY
Articulus II: WHETHER BEING IS UNIVOCAL OR ANALOGOUS WITH RESPECT TO THE TEN CATEGORIES
Articulus III: BY WHAT ANALOGY BEING IS ANALOGOUS
Articulus IV: WHETHER ACCIDENT IS UNIVOCAL WITH RESPECT TO THE NINE GENERA
Articulus V: WHETHER THE DIVISION INTO TEN CATEGORIES IS ADEQUATE AND GOOD
Quaestio XV: ON PREDICAMENTAL SUBSTANCE
Articulus I: WHAT THE FORMAL CONSTITUTIVE ACCOUNT OF PREDICAMENTAL SUBSTANCE IS
Articulus II: WHETHER SUBSTANCE IS RIGHTLY DIVIDED INTO FIRST AND SECOND
Articulus III: HOW THE DEFINITIONS OF FIRST AND SECOND SUBSTANCE ARE TO BE EXPLAINED
Articulus IV: WHICH THINGS ARE REJECTED AND INCLUDED IN THIS CATEGORY
Articulus V: WHETHER RECEIVING CONTRARIES IS PROPER TO SUBSTANCE IN THE FOURTH MODE
Quaestio XVI: ON QUANTITY
Articulus I: WHAT THE PROPER AND FORMAL ACCOUNT OF QUANTITY IS
Articulus II: WHETHER DISCRETE QUANTITY IS A TRUE SPECIES OF QUANTITY
Articulus III: WHETHER TIME AND MOTION, PLACE AND SPEECH ARE EXCLUDED FROM THE SPECIES OF QUANTITY
Articulus IV: WHETHER LINE, SURFACE, AND BODY ARE TRUE SPECIES OF QUANTITY
Quaestio XVII: ON THE CATEGORY OF RELATION
Articulus I: WHETHER THERE ARE, ON THE PART OF THE THING, RELATIONS THAT ARE INTRINSIC FORMS
Articulus II: WHAT IS REQUIRED FOR A RELATION TO BE PREDICAMENTAL
Articulus III: WHAT THE DIVISIONS OF PREDICAMENTAL RELATION AND ITS SPECIES ARE
Articulus IV: WHETHER RELATION IS DISTINGUISHED FROM ITS FOUNDATION ON THE PART OF THE THING
Articulus V: WHETHER RELATION IS FORMALLY TERMINATED AT THE ABSOLUTE OR THE RELATIVE
Articulus VI: FROM WHAT THE SPECIFIC AND NUMERICAL DISTINCTION OF RELATION IS DERIVED
Articulus VII: HOW THE PROPERTIES OF RELATIVES ARE TO BE EXPLAINED: THAT THEY ARE SIMULTANEOUS BY NATURE AND BY KNOWLEDGE
Quaestio XVIII: ON QUALITY
Articulus I: THE FORMAL ACCOUNT OF QUALITY AND ITS DEFINITION ARE EXPLAINED
Articulus II: THE DIVISION OF QUALITY INTO FOUR SPECIES IS EXPLAINED
Articulus III: HOW EACH OF THE SPECIES IS TO BE EXPLAINED
Quaestio XIX: ON THE SIX LAST CATEGORIES
Articulus I: WHETHER THESE CATEGORIES ARE ABSOLUTE FORMS, RELATIVE FORMS, OR EXTRINSIC DENOMINATIONS
Articulus II: WHAT PREDICAMENTAL ACTION AND PASSION ARE
Articulus III: WHAT THE CATEGORY OF WHERE AND POSITION IS
Articulus IV: WHAT THE CATEGORY OF WHEN AND HAVING IS
Textus I: TEXT FOLLOWING THE CATEGORIES
TEXT AFTER THE CATEGORIES1
SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 10.: ON OPPOSITES.
In this chapter Aristotle DOES THREE THINGS: first, he explains the genera of opposition; second, he compares them with one another; third, he explains contraries in particular.
Concerning the first, he sets out four genera of opposition: relative, contrary, privative, and contradictory opposition. He defines relatives as “those things whose very being is said in relation to opposites, or which are said of them in some other way.” He does not define contraries, but explains them by example, such as white and black; and he divides them into immediate contraries, “one of which must necessarily be present in the subject,” such as health and sickness, and mediated contraries, “neither of which must necessarily be present in the subject,” such as white and black. Habit and privation are called privatives; affirmation and negation, contradictories.
In the second part, he proves that these opposites are distinct from one another.
In the third, he gives the properties of contraries: 1) Evil is contrary to good, while both good and evil are contrary to evil. 2) If one contrary is given, the other is given as well. 3) It is impossible for both contraries to belong to the same thing. 4) Contraries are about the same subject. 5) All contraries are either in the same genus or in contrary genera.
SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 11.: ON PRIORITY.
He recounts five modes of priority. First is being prior in time. Second is priority according to the consequence of subsistence: for example, “It is an animal, therefore it is a horse” does not follow, but the converse does; thus animal is prior to horse. Third is priority in order, as the premises are prior in order to the conclusion. Fourth is priority by authority, as a prince is prior to a commoner. Fifth is priority by nature, which is mutually implied with something and yet is its cause, as with the sun and light: the sun is prior by nature to light, although it is simultaneous with it.
SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 12.: ON SIMULTANEITY.
He gives three modes of simultaneity. The first is being simultaneous in time, that is, things whose generation occurs at the same time. The second is simultaneity by convertibility, or by nature, as with correlatives, which are convertible, though neither is the cause of the other. The third is simultaneity in order, or in the division of a genus, as two species under the same genus are simultaneous.
CHAPTER 13.: ON MOTION.
He enumerates six species of motion. The first two are substantial changes, namely generation and corruption. The next two are motions of quantity, namely increase and decrease. The fifth is motion according to quality, namely alteration. The sixth is motion according to place, namely local motion.
CHAPTER 14.: ON HAVING.
He enumerates eight more customary modes of having: 1) Having qualities, such as virtues or vices. 2) Having quantity, such as being three cubits or two cubits in size. 3) Having things that surround us, such as clothes. 4) Having something on a bodily member, such as a ring on a finger. 5) Having the member itself, such as a hand or foot. 6) Having something in a vessel, such as wine or grain. 7) Having by possession, such as a field. 8) Having by cohabitation, such as having a wife.