Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Secunda Pars Artis Logicae

Almost everything that can be discussed about the quiddity of action and passion must be treated in Book 3 of the Physics¹: the subject of action, the distinction between transitive and immanent action, and the specification of action by its term or its principle. Here, however, we need only see how this category is constituted insofar as it depends on something extrinsic for its denomination.

THEREFORE, IT MUST BE SUPPOSED that, besides the operating supposit and the principle or operative power, in the very issuing or procession of an effect from a cause there is found an effect proceeding, and a motion or change by which it proceeds, and a relation that the effect grounds toward the cause and the cause toward the effect. But neither the effect nor the relation suffices to constitute the cause as actually acting; something further is required, a certain formality called a second act, which regards both the cause itself as its source and the term or effect as that toward which it proceeds, not merely regarding them but also changing or producing them. Hence it cannot be separated from something extrinsic. This is called the causality of an efficient cause. The effect does not suffice, for it is the thing caused itself in its completed being, not the principle of causing. Nor does motion suffice, for it is the effect itself in its becoming; just as an effect in its completed being is not the principle of causing, neither is it in its becoming. Hence motion, under the concept of motion, is a post-predicament and denominates the thing moved, not the agent, which is what this category does. Finally, neither is it a relation, since a relation is founded on the action and the effect produced, and thus presupposes the action. It remains, therefore, that it is “that second act by which a cause is actually causing.”

As St. Thomas observes in opusc. 48, chapter 1, On Action², a second act can be compared with a first act either according to the relation of having a form, or according to the relation of passing on or emitting a form from oneself, which occurs through transitive action. For example, to be hot is the same as to have heat in act; to exist is the same as to have existence; but to heat is the same as to produce heat. The second act as emitting, insofar as it emits or produces, is what belongs especially to this category, as St. Thomas says there. For the second act of having belongs to any form that gives being formally. By “producing” I mean whether a thing newly comes into being, is newly united, or is changed in any way, even if it does not newly come into being.

From this follow two points about action and two others about passion. The first consequence concerning action is that, although action proceeds from an agent and expresses a relation to, the agent is denominated not by the action’s proceeding but by the effect’s proceeding, which proceeds by means of the action. For as long as the effect does not proceed, the action alone does not denominate the agent as producer: it must produce something. Thus, without something extrinsic from which the denomination of agent derives, the second act does not denominate within the category of action. And so, in God, the action does not proceed from the power, but the effect does, as St. Thomas teaches in Summa theologiae I, q. 25, art. 1, ad 3; the second act, however, is identical with the power, and yet God is not denominated an agent until an effect is produced. And because the effect itself, as proceeding, is something extrinsic to the agent, whether it subsists in itself or inheres in a patient, this denomination of acting is said to arise from something extrinsic, as St. Thomas says in the cited opusc. 48³ and in Physics III, lect. 5.⁴ The Author of the Six Principles⁵ defines action as “a form or act according to which we are denominated as acting upon that which is subjected”—that is, upon the patient. The effect’s very proceeding from the agent leaves in the agent a sufficient determination, mode, or application by which this denomination arises from the effect produced.

The second consequence is that immanent action, precisely as immanent, is not formally an action of this category, but is so virtually insofar as it virtually implies production; nevertheless, this does not belong to every immanent action. Understanding can occur without production: for example, divine understanding, not as it is in the Father; in us, contemplation after the word has been formed; and sight, touch, and the other external senses do not produce a term within themselves. The same is probably said of the beatific vision. We shall speak of these matters in the books On the Soul⁶; see also St. Thomas, opusc. 48 cited above, chapter 1, On Action, where he says this expressly.⁷ And in Summa theologiae I, q. 34, art. 1, ad 3, he says, “understanding, as distinguished from speaking—which is to produce a word—implies only a relation of the one understanding to the thing understood, in which no notion of origin is implied, but only a certain informing in our intellect, insofar as our intellect is brought into act by the form of the thing understood.” Therefore, if it implies a second act by way of informing, having something, and emitting, then by the force of its proper concept it is most formally not an action of this category, but a second act by which the power is made actually understanding in second act. For this reason St. Thomas likens understanding to existence or being itself in Summa theologiae I, q. 14, art. 4; thus these acts are directly qualities in the manner of dispositions. Nevertheless, since immanent action sometimes also produces, it is called action virtually, as when a word is produced through understanding, insofar as this is a kind of speaking.

We said in question 11, On the Proper Attribute⁸ of actions called simple emanations, and shall say immediately below, that they are not actions but connections between an essence and its proper attributes, or some dependence in the manner of a connection. For an action, which is the very proceeding of an effect dependent on an agent, is said to emanate, not to be made. Properties too are made through the generative action of substance; but insofar as they are connected with substance, they are said to emanate from it.

The first consequence concerning passion is that it stands to action in the opposite way. It denominates the patient not precisely insofar as it is a reception of a form—for then it would denominate purely intrinsically—but insofar as it is in the patient through the bringing about of an agent as producer, with a subject presupposed. For a subject is not said to undergo passion through a reception of a form that is, as it were, innate (as when a proper attribute is received in its own nature), but through a reception brought about by an agent. Therefore St. Thomas defines passion in the cited opusc. 48⁹ as “the effect and bringing about of an action.” Or, as others define it, “it is the form by which the patient, as an intermediate subject, receives something from an agent.”

The second consequence concerns the reason why action and passion are said to be identified with motion entitatively. Some disciples of Scotus deny this, but St. Thomas asserts it clearly in opusc. 48 cited above, chapter 1, On Action¹⁰ and chapter 1, On Passion¹¹, and it will be said more fully in Physics III.¹² For motion is said to be the act of a being in potency—that is, a form or effect insofar as it is in flux, being changed and coming to be from one thing to another. Hence it necessarily consists in a twofold formality: from something and in something, since every motion is from an agent and is in a patient or recipient. Thus motion cannot be understood without this twofold formality: that of action, as from something, and that of passion, as in something.

But if they are one and the same thing, how is passion said to be the effect of action? St. Thomas answers in the cited chapter 1, On Passion¹³: “An effect can be said in two ways. In one way, properly, when something is caused or has been caused by something; in this sense passion is not the effect of action. In another way, because when both come to be, they come to be together in such a way that one is understood to follow the other by necessary connection, and in this way one is said in a certain manner to be an efficient cause with respect to the second, as was said in the treatise On the Proper Attribute.” This teaching confirms very well what we said about emanation, which is not properly an action with respect to the essence, but a connection—not merely of one thing with another, as with quidditative predicates, but of one thing following another. For in this way it is a connection of succession or emanation. In this way passion is the effect of action.

THE ARGUMENTS ARE ANSWERED.

You will object: Action and passion agree in something univocally common, namely under the notion of motion or a way; therefore, they are not distinct categories, since these agree in no univocal respect. Nor can one say that they agree identically and physically, not in some superior predicable. For against this is the fact that things really identical cannot constitute different categories, since categories are primarily diverse and therefore agree in nothing. Much less can there be such agreement that they are identical entitatively.

THE REPLY IS that many are perplexed by the agreement of these two categories in that superior notion of a way and tendency. Some want them to agree in it as in something transcendental. Others say that it is a univocal common notion, because they do not consider it improper that something superior could be univocal to two categories.

It is better, however, to reply with the solution already given: motion is not a common predicate in the manner of a superior grade, but in the manner of a post-predicament, for it is numbered among them. Thus motion is common through identity and in reality, not through universality and a notion.

In reply to the further objection, one says that a formality can indeed be identified with something from which it differs categorically, as a mode is with its subject and sitting with the seated person, where it is with the located thing; nevertheless, the mode belongs to one category and the thing to another. It suffices for categories to be different that they are primarily different formally and quidditatively, even if materially and entitatively they are the same.

A second argument is made against the given definition of action, namely, “a form by which we are said to act upon a subject.” The reason is, first, that creation is a true action and does not presuppose a subject; second, that that according to which we act is a principle of acting, whereas causality or action is not a principle of acting.

This is confirmed: action is something incomplete insofar as it is action; therefore, it does not constitute a category. The antecedent is proved as follows: insofar as action is action and is distinguished from passion, it does not inhere; but inherence completes an accident, just as subsistence completes substance. Therefore…

THE REPLY IS to the first proof that active creation is not an action of this category, since it is God’s own substance and power, together with a relation of reason to creatures and the real dependence of creatures on God. For, as we said, action does not proceed from God, but the effect does; God is in himself the power that is pure and ultimate act. Passive creation, however—that is, the creature’s procession—is not an action but the effect of an action, namely, the term’s dependence on God together with the newness of its being.

To the second proof one says that action is not that according to which we are said to act as a principle, but as causality and the reason for proceeding; for we are denominated agents in act not from the principle alone, but also from the second act itself and its causality—or rather, from this alone.

In reply to the confirmation, one says that action also inheres, although it is not signified as inhering insofar as it is action, as St. Thomas teaches expressly in On the Power of God, q. 7, art. 9, ad 7¹⁴ and in Sentences I, dist. 32, q. 1, art. 1.¹⁵ Hence it is one thing to say that action does not inhere absolutely, which would exclude the notion of accident from it; it is another to say that insofar as it is action it does not express inherence, because it is considered as from another, even though it includes being in another, just as a relation under the concept to does not express in, although it includes it.

But you will say: Although a relation under the notion to does not express inherence, it also does not constitute a category distinct from the category of in by virtue of that notion to. Action, however, under the very notion of from, constitutes a category distinct from passion itself, which expresses the notion in. Therefore, the same difficulty remains: how is action a complete accident, so as to constitute a distinct category, if it does not express the notion in?

The reply is that passion does not consist in the inherence of the action itself, but in the reception of the effect, which is the form from which passion arises insofar as it is from an agent. The mode itself, which is action, inheres through itself, because it is identified with motion through itself and not by reason of passion, although it is not signified as inhering.

It remained to discuss the term of action with respect to its formality. In this matter one may consider either the general conditions of action—for example, that its term be produced, drawn out, introduced, or changed, and some dispute which of these conditions constitutes a term precisely as a term—or special notions that specify actions, such as that the term be toward quality or place, or some formality in the mode of acquisition, as when the same place is acquired by ascent or descent. Since these involve the difficulty of specification, they must be treated in Physics III¹⁶ and in the books On the Soul.¹⁷

THE ARRANGEMENT OF THE CATEGORIES OF ACTION AND PASSION.

The most general genus of action is first divided into transitive and immanent, according to the opinion that immanent action is properly action. Immanent action is divided into cognitive and appetitive. Each is divided into corporeal and spiritual. Corporeal cognitive action is divided into the actions of the internal and external senses. Spiritual cognitive action is divided into intellectual action, as in an angel; discursive action, as in us; and supernatural action, such as the beatific vision. Each of these is divided into various species according to different objects. Corporeal appetitive action is divided into various passions. Spiritual appetitive action is divided into various species of natural and supernatural acts, each of which is further divided into various species according to different objects.

Transitive action seems first to be divided into artificial and natural action. Artificial action is divided according to the infinite species of art, such as building, painting, and so on. Natural action is divided into substantial and accidental. Substantial action is generative, and varies according to the different terms of its production. Accidental action is divided into growth, alteration, and local motion, each of which is divided into various ultimate species, such as local motion into circular and straight motion, and so on; alteration into intensification, remission, and so on.

In the category of passion, the same species are to be posited as in productive action proceeding from a subject.