Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Secunda Pars Artis Logicae

FOUR OPINIONS concerning the quidditative account of these predicaments are noted by Cajetan in his commentary on the chapter on the six final predicaments. Some said that these predicaments signify something absolute together with a relation; for example, “where” signifies a place with a relation to what is located. Others say that they consist only in an extrinsic denomination, as what is located is denominated from place; St. Thomas favors this view in Physics III, lecture 5.¹ Others say that they consist only in a relation. But because relation is a predicament distinct from these, they disagree in explaining how these predicaments are distinguished from the predicament of relation. Some say that the predicament of relation is founded upon absolute things, both spiritual and bodily, whereas these predicaments are founded upon relative modes that are bodily only. Others distinguish relations that arise intrinsically or extrinsically: they call those relations belonging to the predicament of relation which necessarily arise once the extremes are actual; they call the relations belonging to these six final predicaments those which do not immediately result once the extremes are actual. For example, when begetter and begotten are posited, the relation of father and son results; but when agent and patient are posited, even if they are brought together, action does not necessarily result, as with contingent or free agents.

FOR THE RESOLUTION, we must distinguish two kinds of extrinsic denominating cause. One denominates immediately through itself, without any change, as the thing seen is denominated from vision. The other denominates through some application and mode of itself to another; from this change or application something like a change is necessarily left in that to which it is adjacent or on which it depends. Some explain this through a relation, others through a mode. In fact, that mode or change is not something wholly absolute from the extrinsic thing, but depends on it, although it is not related to it as to a terminus—for that is proper to a real relation. Thus the principal denominating cause is the extrinsic form itself, as it were originally, while its application is effected by the mode through which it is applied to inform. Hence authors sometimes attribute this denomination to the extrinsic form and sometimes to the mode left by its adjacency: for example, “having” is sometimes said to be the extrinsic clothing itself, and sometimes something intermediate between the clothing and the clothed, as we shall see below.

LET THIS, THEN, BE THE CONCLUSION: The six final predicaments consist neither in extrinsic denomination nor in a real relation, even if they are said to arise extrinsically, but in a mode left by the extrinsic application, on which their denominating depends.

This conclusion is held by many authors and is drawn from St. Thomas. In Opusculum 48, the single chapter on the six predicaments², he denies that these predicaments consist in a relation, since otherwise they would belong to the predicament of relation. In Metaphysics V, lecture 15³, he says that these final predicaments are determined to some genus of natural things; and in lecture 17⁴ he adds that they are something consequent upon relation rather than something that causes relation. It follows that he constitutes them neither in relation nor in pure extrinsic denomination, since the latter is not a genus of natural things. In particular, he teaches that “having” is something intermediate between clothing and the clothed, in Summa theologiae I–II, q. 49, art. 1, and in Metaphysics V, lecture 20⁵, following Aristotle.⁶ Therefore, if it is intermediate and is neither a relation nor a purely extrinsic denomination, what remains is that it is some mode left behind. He suggests the same about “where” and “when” in Sentences IV, dist. 16, q. 3, art. 1, question 1⁷, when treating circumstances. As for action and passion, and how each expresses something in the agent and patient, we shall discuss this more fully in Physics III⁸, God willing.

THE REASON FOR THIS, AS TO THE FIRST PART, that they are not pure extrinsic denomination, is this: such a denomination, insofar as it touches the denominated things extrinsically, expresses no real nature, since it posits nothing in them. But insofar as it belongs to the side of the denominating form, which is intrinsic in its subject, that form is already assumed to belong to its own predicament. For example, vision, insofar as it is an act of the eye, belongs to its own predicament, namely quality. Therefore it cannot again be placed in another predicament on account of extrinsic denomination: first, because that denomination, insofar as it is extrinsic, adds no new real nature and therefore no new ground for placing it in another predicament; and further, because the form itself and its informing do not constitute two predicaments. All the less, then, can it be placed in another predicament by reason of informing or extrinsic denomination, which adds much less, since it adds no reality over and above the form.

AS TO THE SECOND PART, concerning a real relation that also arises extrinsically, the first proof is this: whether a relation arises extrinsically or intrinsically, and whether it necessarily results when the extremes are posited or does not result, does not alter the essential account of relation, since it changes nothing in its definition, which consists solely in this: its whole being is toward another. This is preserved in either kind of relation. Therefore there is no reason to exclude the second kind from the predicament of relation if it is a true relation and this definition applies to it. If the definition does not apply to it, it is not a real relation but a relation only in speech.

Second, it is false that, in these extrinsic relations, once the foundation and terminus are posited, the relation does not immediately result even when its proximate foundation is present. For the foundation of action and passion is not merely the positing of the thing that is agent and the thing that is patient, together with their application to each other; beyond this, the effect must also be posited. For the agent is denominated from that effect; “where” is denominated from a body not just anyhow but as circumscribed by place; and the clothed is denominated from clothing as surrounding it. Once circumscription is posited, “where” necessarily follows; and once the effect is posited, the denomination of action necessarily follows, no less than the relation of likeness follows when two white things are posited. For in the latter case not only are the extremes posited but also the proximate foundation, which is their agreement. If the proximate foundation is removed, no relation results, however much the extremes may be posited. Thus the reply given by authors of the opposing opinion does not hold: they say that when both relatable extremes are posited in intrinsic relations—for example, two white things—the relation cannot be impeded, whereas when both extremes are posited in extrinsic relations—for example, agent and patient—the relation does not immediately follow. The comparison is not equal in this respect. When two white things are posited, both the remote and the proximate extremes of the relation are posited, since identity or agreement, its proximate foundation, is also posited. But agent and patient, even when applied to each other, are only the remote extremes. The proximate ground for denominating the agent is the positing of the effect (without this there is no terminus and, consequently, no action), not merely the application of the patient. Once the effect is posited, however, that denomination cannot be impeded.

That these predicaments are not formally relations, but modes left by some adjacency of an extrinsic thing, is clear because none formally consists in “toward” as “toward.” Action is from another as an emanation; passion is in something as a change; “where” is in place absolutely; position is in the arrangement of parts; “when” is in time; and “having” is in the clothed, through the adjacency of clothing. None, therefore, formally regards a pure terminus under the aspect of “toward,” which relation essentially requires, whether it arises intrinsically or extrinsically. Rather, each merely depends for its denomination on something extrinsic. For that reason they are not modes wholly absolute, although they are absolute with respect to their terminus.

THE ARGUMENTS ARE ANSWERED.

First, it is argued from the authority of St. Thomas, Physics III, lecture 5⁹, where he affirms that these six final predicaments are taken from an extrinsic mode of predicating, and proceeds there to show that they are extrinsic denominations. He speaks in the same way in Metaphysics V, lecture 9¹⁰, in his account of the predicaments. Likewise, he teaches that local motion terminates in something extrinsic, namely place, in Summa theologiae I, q. 110, art. 3. Therefore it is denied, contrary to St. Thomas, that they are extrinsic denominations.

This is confirmed because what formally denominates in these predicaments is something extrinsic, although its application posits an extrinsic mode—not one that is a form, but one that is the application of a form. Otherwise St. Thomas's account is not preserved when he says that these do not denominate intrinsically, and that nothing intrinsic is acquired when place and time contribute to the denominations “where” and “when,” not effectively nor under any other genus of cause than the formal. Therefore the denomination is simply extrinsic, since its extrinsic character must be taken from the form, not from its application.

THE ANSWER is that St. Thomas is speaking according to the distinction stated above¹¹: something denominates extrinsically through some mode or intrinsic change, and not purely extrinsically, as we said these predicaments denominate. Likewise, he teaches that local motion acquires something extrinsic, in contrast with motion of alteration and growth, which produce a form that denominates purely intrinsically. Local motion, however, acquires place, which cannot be understood without something extrinsic and does not denominate without it, although it leaves an intrinsic “where.”

In reply to the confirmation, the denominating form is not simply the extrinsic form as it remains extrinsic, but the form insofar as, through its external adjacency, it leaves some change in the thing. This is not mere application or a condition; it is the ground of denomination, with an order and essential dependence on the extrinsic thing that contributes to the denomination itself. Thus, if a form informs through inherence, an intrinsic form results in the order of informing. If it does so through some mode that is not inherence but a change left by adjacency, it is a form that denominates neither purely intrinsically nor purely extrinsically: it is an extrinsic thing acting through an intrinsic change, which is the ground of denomination. But if it denominates with all inherence and every mode of change removed, the denomination is purely extrinsic, as vision denominates the thing seen.

Second, it is argued: These six final predicaments, in their intrinsic account, express a relation to something extrinsic as existing, so that if its existence is removed, the denomination is removed—as action is removed when the effect is removed, and “where” and “having” when place and clothing are removed. Therefore they are neither transcendental relations, since they depend on the existence of the terminus, nor wholly absolute things, since they depend on something extrinsic.

The argument is confirmed: if they are absolute entities, they must necessarily come to be through an action whenever they arise anew, and thus there would be an action for action. Indeed, it would be impossible to assign a subject for action and passion; for if action were in the agent, the agent would be changed by an absolute form in order to act, and the patient could not be acted upon immediately by a form such as quality or quantity, but would be acted upon immediately by that absolute form which is passion.

THE ANSWER is that these predicaments depend on something extrinsic that exists, not as on a terminus, as a real relation does, but as on a principle and form from which the denomination originates or around which it is concerned. This relation is a relation only in speech, or a transcendental relation. For although it depends on the existence of that extrinsic thing in order actually to denominate, because it depends essentially and per se on such an extrinsic thing—as “where” depends on place, action on the effect, and so on—it is called a transcendental relation or a relation only in speech. A real relation, however, does not consist merely in depending on the existence of a terminus in order to exist actually, as other things also do; it consists in being toward that terminus alone, as a pure terminus.

In reply to the confirmation, it is not necessary that every absolute entity have an action per se when it is produced anew, if it is itself an action or is a mode or account essentially connected with or consequent upon something prior, as are subsistence, union, and other modes, and even proper passions. Nevertheless, in these predicaments a local motion per se is given for “where.” On Scotus’s view, however, who posits an action per se for the extrinsic relations that are these predicaments, it manifestly follows either that an action per se is given for action, or that action is not an extrinsically arising relation, or that such a relation requires no action beyond the positing of its foundation and terminus.

As to the final part of the argument, concerning the subject of action, we refer the question whether it is in the patient or in the agent to the treatment in Physics III¹². For the present, we say only this: since the denomination of the predicament of action is taken from the effect produced as something extrinsic, as St. Thomas teaches in Physics III, lecture 5¹³, and in Opusculum 48, the treatise on Action¹⁴, as will be seen in the next article, it is not difficult to understand that the effect denominates the agent through the very issuing forth that leaves the agent determined and applied—not to act by way of a power, but to be acting in second act. In the same way, place, through “where,” leaves what is located subject to it; and passion is a mode through which the inhering form, as proceeding from the agent, changes the patient, not through another form but through another mode of the form. Thus quantity or quality is immediately received under the aspect of form, although something follows under the aspect of a mode.