Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Secunda Pars Artis Logicae

FOUR OPINIONS concerning the quidditative account of these predicaments are noted by Cajetan in his commentary on the chapter on the six final predicaments. Some said that these predicaments signify something absolute together with a relation; for example, “where” signifies a place with a relation to what is located. Others say that they consist only in an extrinsic denomination, as what is located is denominated from place; St. Thomas favors this view in Physics III, lecture 5.¹ Others say that they consist only in a relation. But because relation is a predicament distinct from these, they disagree in explaining how these predicaments are distinguished from the predicament of relation. Some say that the predicament of relation is founded upon absolute things, both spiritual and bodily, whereas these predicaments are founded upon relative modes that are bodily only. Others distinguish relations that arise intrinsically or extrinsically: they call those relations belonging to the predicament of relation which necessarily arise once the extremes are actual; they call the relations belonging to these six final predicaments those which do not immediately result once the extremes are actual. For example, when begetter and begotten are posited, the relation of father and son results; but when agent and patient are posited, even if they are brought together, action does not necessarily result, as with contingent or free agents.

FOR THE RESOLUTION, we must distinguish two kinds of extrinsic denominating cause. One denominates immediately through itself, without any change, as the thing seen is denominated from vision. The other denominates through some application and mode of itself to another; from this change or application something like a change is necessarily left in that to which it is adjacent or on which it depends. Some explain this through a relation, others through a mode. In fact, that mode or change is not something wholly absolute from the extrinsic thing, but depends on it, although it is not related to it as to a terminus—for that is proper to a real relation. Thus the principal denominating cause is the extrinsic form itself, as it were originally, while its application is effected by the mode through which it is applied to inform. Hence authors sometimes attribute this denomination to the extrinsic form and sometimes to the mode left by its adjacency: for example, “having” is sometimes said to be the extrinsic clothing itself, and sometimes something intermediate between the clothing and the clothed, as we shall see below.

LET THIS, THEN, BE THE CONCLUSION: The six final predicaments consist neither in extrinsic denomination nor in a real relation, even if they are said to arise extrinsically, but in a mode left by the extrinsic application, on which their denominating depends.

This conclusion is held by many authors and is drawn from St. Thomas. In Opusculum 48, the single chapter on the six predicaments², he denies that these predicaments consist in a relation, since otherwise they would belong to the predicament of relation. In Metaphysics V, lecture 15³, he says that these final predicaments are determined to some genus of natural things; and in lecture 17⁴ he adds that they are something consequent upon relation rather than something that causes relation. It follows that he constitutes them neither in relation nor in pure extrinsic denomination, since the latter is not a genus of natural things. In particular, he teaches that “having” is something intermediate between clothing and the clothed, in Summa theologiae I–II, q. 49, art. 1, and in Metaphysics V, lecture 20⁵, following Aristotle.⁶ Therefore, if it is intermediate and is neither a relation nor a purely extrinsic denomination, what remains is that it is some mode left behind. He suggests the same about “where” and “when” in Sentences IV, dist. 16, q. 3, art. 1, question 1⁷, when treating circumstances. As for action and passion, and how each expresses something in the agent and patient, we shall discuss this more fully in Physics III⁸, God willing.

THE REASON FOR THIS, AS TO THE FIRST PART, that they are not pure extrinsic denomination, is this: such a denomination, insofar as it touches the denominated things extrinsically, expresses no real nature, since it posits nothing in them. But insofar as it belongs to the side of the denominating form, which is intrinsic in its subject, that form is already assumed to belong to its own predicament. For example, vision, insofar as it is an act of the eye, belongs to its own predicament, namely quality. Therefore it cannot again be placed in another predicament on account of extrinsic denomination: first, because that denomination, insofar as it is extrinsic, adds no new real nature and therefore no new ground for placing it in another predicament; and further, because the form itself and its informing do not constitute two predicaments. All the less, then, can it be placed in another predicament by reason of informing or extrinsic denomination, which adds much less, since it adds no reality over and above the form.

AS TO THE SECOND PART, concerning a real relation that also arises extrinsically, the first proof is this: whether a relation arises extrinsically or intrinsically, and whether it necessarily results when the extremes are posited or does not result, does not alter the essential account of relation, since it changes nothing in its definition, which consists solely in this: its whole being is toward another. This is preserved in either kind of relation. Therefore there is no reason to exclude the second kind from the predicament of relation if it is a true relation and this definition applies to it. If the definition does not apply to it, it is not a real relation but a relation only in speech.

Second, it is false that, in these extrinsic relations, once the foundation and terminus are posited, the relation does not immediately result even when its proximate foundation is present. For the foundation of action and passion is not merely the positing of the thing that is agent and the thing that is patient, together with their application to each other; beyond this, the effect must also be posited. For the agent is denominated from that effect; “where” is denominated from a body not just anyhow but as circumscribed by place; and the clothed is denominated from clothing as surrounding it. Once circumscription is posited, “where” necessarily follows; and once the effect is posited, the denomination of action necessarily follows, no less than the relation of likeness follows when two white things are posited. For in the latter case not only are the extremes posited but also the proximate foundation, which is their agreement. If the proximate foundation is removed, no relation results, however much the extremes may be posited. Thus the reply given by authors of the opposing opinion does not hold: they say that when both relatable extremes are posited in intrinsic relations—for example, two white things—the relation cannot be impeded, whereas when both extremes are posited in extrinsic relations—for example, agent and patient—the relation does not immediately follow. The comparison is not equal in this respect. When two white things are posited, both the remote and the proximate extremes of the relation are posited, since identity or agreement, its proximate foundation, is also posited. But agent and patient, even when applied to each other, are only the remote extremes. The proximate ground for denominating the agent is the positing of the effect (without this there is no terminus and, consequently, no action), not merely the application of the patient. Once the effect is posited, however, that denomination cannot be impeded.

That these predicaments are not formally relations, but modes left by some adjacency of an extrinsic thing, is clear because none formally consists in “toward” as “toward.” Action is from another as an emanation; passion is in something as a change; “where” is in place absolutely; position is in the arrangement of parts; “when” is in time; and “having” is in the clothed, through the adjacency of clothing. None, therefore, formally regards a pure terminus under the aspect of “toward,” which relation essentially requires, whether it arises intrinsically or extrinsically. Rather, each merely depends for its denomination on something extrinsic. For that reason they are not modes wholly absolute, although they are absolute with respect to their terminus.

THE ARGUMENTS ARE ANSWERED.

First, it is argued from the authority of St. Thomas, Physics III, lecture 5⁹, where he affirms that these six final predicaments are taken from an extrinsic mode of predicating, and proceeds there to show that they are extrinsic denominations. He speaks in the same way in Metaphysics V, lecture 9¹⁰, in his account of the predicaments. Likewise, he teaches that local motion terminates in something extrinsic, namely place, in Summa theologiae I, q. 110, art. 3. Therefore it is denied, contrary to St. Thomas, that they are extrinsic denominations.

This is confirmed because what formally denominates in these predicaments is something extrinsic, although its application posits an extrinsic mode—not one that is a form, but one that is the application of a form. Otherwise St. Thomas's account is not preserved when he says that these do not denominate intrinsically, and that nothing intrinsic is acquired when place and time contribute to the denominations “where” and “when,” not effectively nor under any other genus of cause than the formal. Therefore the denomination is simply extrinsic, since its extrinsic character must be taken from the form, not from its application.

THE ANSWER is that St. Thomas is speaking according to the distinction stated above¹¹: something denominates extrinsically through some mode or intrinsic change, and not purely extrinsically, as we said these predicaments denominate. Likewise, he teaches that local motion acquires something extrinsic, in contrast with motion of alteration and growth, which produce a form that denominates purely intrinsically. Local motion, however, acquires place, which cannot be understood without something extrinsic and does not denominate without it, although it leaves an intrinsic “where.”

In reply to the confirmation, the denominating form is not simply the extrinsic form as it remains extrinsic, but the form insofar as, through its external adjacency, it leaves some change in the thing. This is not mere application or a condition; it is the ground of denomination, with an order and essential dependence on the extrinsic thing that contributes to the denomination itself. Thus, if a form informs through inherence, an intrinsic form results in the order of informing. If it does so through some mode that is not inherence but a change left by adjacency, it is a form that denominates neither purely intrinsically nor purely extrinsically: it is an extrinsic thing acting through an intrinsic change, which is the ground of denomination. But if it denominates with all inherence and every mode of change removed, the denomination is purely extrinsic, as vision denominates the thing seen.

Second, it is argued: These six final predicaments, in their intrinsic account, express a relation to something extrinsic as existing, so that if its existence is removed, the denomination is removed—as action is removed when the effect is removed, and “where” and “having” when place and clothing are removed. Therefore they are neither transcendental relations, since they depend on the existence of the terminus, nor wholly absolute things, since they depend on something extrinsic.

The argument is confirmed: if they are absolute entities, they must necessarily come to be through an action whenever they arise anew, and thus there would be an action for action. Indeed, it would be impossible to assign a subject for action and passion; for if action were in the agent, the agent would be changed by an absolute form in order to act, and the patient could not be acted upon immediately by a form such as quality or quantity, but would be acted upon immediately by that absolute form which is passion.

THE ANSWER is that these predicaments depend on something extrinsic that exists, not as on a terminus, as a real relation does, but as on a principle and form from which the denomination originates or around which it is concerned. This relation is a relation only in speech, or a transcendental relation. For although it depends on the existence of that extrinsic thing in order actually to denominate, because it depends essentially and per se on such an extrinsic thing—as “where” depends on place, action on the effect, and so on—it is called a transcendental relation or a relation only in speech. A real relation, however, does not consist merely in depending on the existence of a terminus in order to exist actually, as other things also do; it consists in being toward that terminus alone, as a pure terminus.

In reply to the confirmation, it is not necessary that every absolute entity have an action per se when it is produced anew, if it is itself an action or is a mode or account essentially connected with or consequent upon something prior, as are subsistence, union, and other modes, and even proper passions. Nevertheless, in these predicaments a local motion per se is given for “where.” On Scotus’s view, however, who posits an action per se for the extrinsic relations that are these predicaments, it manifestly follows either that an action per se is given for action, or that action is not an extrinsically arising relation, or that such a relation requires no action beyond the positing of its foundation and terminus.

As to the final part of the argument, concerning the subject of action, we refer the question whether it is in the patient or in the agent to the treatment in Physics III¹². For the present, we say only this: since the denomination of the predicament of action is taken from the effect produced as something extrinsic, as St. Thomas teaches in Physics III, lecture 5¹³, and in Opusculum 48, the treatise on Action¹⁴, as will be seen in the next article, it is not difficult to understand that the effect denominates the agent through the very issuing forth that leaves the agent determined and applied—not to act by way of a power, but to be acting in second act. In the same way, place, through “where,” leaves what is located subject to it; and passion is a mode through which the inhering form, as proceeding from the agent, changes the patient, not through another form but through another mode of the form. Thus quantity or quality is immediately received under the aspect of form, although something follows under the aspect of a mode.

Almost everything that can be discussed about the quiddity of action and passion must be treated in Book 3 of the Physics¹: the subject of action, the distinction between transitive and immanent action, and the specification of action by its term or its principle. Here, however, we need only see how this category is constituted insofar as it depends on something extrinsic for its denomination.

THEREFORE, IT MUST BE SUPPOSED that, besides the operating supposit and the principle or operative power, in the very issuing or procession of an effect from a cause there is found an effect proceeding, and a motion or change by which it proceeds, and a relation that the effect grounds toward the cause and the cause toward the effect. But neither the effect nor the relation suffices to constitute the cause as actually acting; something further is required, a certain formality called a second act, which regards both the cause itself as its source and the term or effect as that toward which it proceeds, not merely regarding them but also changing or producing them. Hence it cannot be separated from something extrinsic. This is called the causality of an efficient cause. The effect does not suffice, for it is the thing caused itself in its completed being, not the principle of causing. Nor does motion suffice, for it is the effect itself in its becoming; just as an effect in its completed being is not the principle of causing, neither is it in its becoming. Hence motion, under the concept of motion, is a post-predicament and denominates the thing moved, not the agent, which is what this category does. Finally, neither is it a relation, since a relation is founded on the action and the effect produced, and thus presupposes the action. It remains, therefore, that it is “that second act by which a cause is actually causing.”

As St. Thomas observes in opusc. 48, chapter 1, On Action², a second act can be compared with a first act either according to the relation of having a form, or according to the relation of passing on or emitting a form from oneself, which occurs through transitive action. For example, to be hot is the same as to have heat in act; to exist is the same as to have existence; but to heat is the same as to produce heat. The second act as emitting, insofar as it emits or produces, is what belongs especially to this category, as St. Thomas says there. For the second act of having belongs to any form that gives being formally. By “producing” I mean whether a thing newly comes into being, is newly united, or is changed in any way, even if it does not newly come into being.

From this follow two points about action and two others about passion. The first consequence concerning action is that, although action proceeds from an agent and expresses a relation to, the agent is denominated not by the action’s proceeding but by the effect’s proceeding, which proceeds by means of the action. For as long as the effect does not proceed, the action alone does not denominate the agent as producer: it must produce something. Thus, without something extrinsic from which the denomination of agent derives, the second act does not denominate within the category of action. And so, in God, the action does not proceed from the power, but the effect does, as St. Thomas teaches in Summa theologiae I, q. 25, art. 1, ad 3; the second act, however, is identical with the power, and yet God is not denominated an agent until an effect is produced. And because the effect itself, as proceeding, is something extrinsic to the agent, whether it subsists in itself or inheres in a patient, this denomination of acting is said to arise from something extrinsic, as St. Thomas says in the cited opusc. 48³ and in Physics III, lect. 5.⁴ The Author of the Six Principles⁵ defines action as “a form or act according to which we are denominated as acting upon that which is subjected”—that is, upon the patient. The effect’s very proceeding from the agent leaves in the agent a sufficient determination, mode, or application by which this denomination arises from the effect produced.

The second consequence is that immanent action, precisely as immanent, is not formally an action of this category, but is so virtually insofar as it virtually implies production; nevertheless, this does not belong to every immanent action. Understanding can occur without production: for example, divine understanding, not as it is in the Father; in us, contemplation after the word has been formed; and sight, touch, and the other external senses do not produce a term within themselves. The same is probably said of the beatific vision. We shall speak of these matters in the books On the Soul⁶; see also St. Thomas, opusc. 48 cited above, chapter 1, On Action, where he says this expressly.⁷ And in Summa theologiae I, q. 34, art. 1, ad 3, he says, “understanding, as distinguished from speaking—which is to produce a word—implies only a relation of the one understanding to the thing understood, in which no notion of origin is implied, but only a certain informing in our intellect, insofar as our intellect is brought into act by the form of the thing understood.” Therefore, if it implies a second act by way of informing, having something, and emitting, then by the force of its proper concept it is most formally not an action of this category, but a second act by which the power is made actually understanding in second act. For this reason St. Thomas likens understanding to existence or being itself in Summa theologiae I, q. 14, art. 4; thus these acts are directly qualities in the manner of dispositions. Nevertheless, since immanent action sometimes also produces, it is called action virtually, as when a word is produced through understanding, insofar as this is a kind of speaking.

We said in question 11, On the Proper Attribute⁸ of actions called simple emanations, and shall say immediately below, that they are not actions but connections between an essence and its proper attributes, or some dependence in the manner of a connection. For an action, which is the very proceeding of an effect dependent on an agent, is said to emanate, not to be made. Properties too are made through the generative action of substance; but insofar as they are connected with substance, they are said to emanate from it.

The first consequence concerning passion is that it stands to action in the opposite way. It denominates the patient not precisely insofar as it is a reception of a form—for then it would denominate purely intrinsically—but insofar as it is in the patient through the bringing about of an agent as producer, with a subject presupposed. For a subject is not said to undergo passion through a reception of a form that is, as it were, innate (as when a proper attribute is received in its own nature), but through a reception brought about by an agent. Therefore St. Thomas defines passion in the cited opusc. 48⁹ as “the effect and bringing about of an action.” Or, as others define it, “it is the form by which the patient, as an intermediate subject, receives something from an agent.”

The second consequence concerns the reason why action and passion are said to be identified with motion entitatively. Some disciples of Scotus deny this, but St. Thomas asserts it clearly in opusc. 48 cited above, chapter 1, On Action¹⁰ and chapter 1, On Passion¹¹, and it will be said more fully in Physics III.¹² For motion is said to be the act of a being in potency—that is, a form or effect insofar as it is in flux, being changed and coming to be from one thing to another. Hence it necessarily consists in a twofold formality: from something and in something, since every motion is from an agent and is in a patient or recipient. Thus motion cannot be understood without this twofold formality: that of action, as from something, and that of passion, as in something.

But if they are one and the same thing, how is passion said to be the effect of action? St. Thomas answers in the cited chapter 1, On Passion¹³: “An effect can be said in two ways. In one way, properly, when something is caused or has been caused by something; in this sense passion is not the effect of action. In another way, because when both come to be, they come to be together in such a way that one is understood to follow the other by necessary connection, and in this way one is said in a certain manner to be an efficient cause with respect to the second, as was said in the treatise On the Proper Attribute.” This teaching confirms very well what we said about emanation, which is not properly an action with respect to the essence, but a connection—not merely of one thing with another, as with quidditative predicates, but of one thing following another. For in this way it is a connection of succession or emanation. In this way passion is the effect of action.

THE ARGUMENTS ARE ANSWERED.

You will object: Action and passion agree in something univocally common, namely under the notion of motion or a way; therefore, they are not distinct categories, since these agree in no univocal respect. Nor can one say that they agree identically and physically, not in some superior predicable. For against this is the fact that things really identical cannot constitute different categories, since categories are primarily diverse and therefore agree in nothing. Much less can there be such agreement that they are identical entitatively.

THE REPLY IS that many are perplexed by the agreement of these two categories in that superior notion of a way and tendency. Some want them to agree in it as in something transcendental. Others say that it is a univocal common notion, because they do not consider it improper that something superior could be univocal to two categories.

It is better, however, to reply with the solution already given: motion is not a common predicate in the manner of a superior grade, but in the manner of a post-predicament, for it is numbered among them. Thus motion is common through identity and in reality, not through universality and a notion.

In reply to the further objection, one says that a formality can indeed be identified with something from which it differs categorically, as a mode is with its subject and sitting with the seated person, where it is with the located thing; nevertheless, the mode belongs to one category and the thing to another. It suffices for categories to be different that they are primarily different formally and quidditatively, even if materially and entitatively they are the same.

A second argument is made against the given definition of action, namely, “a form by which we are said to act upon a subject.” The reason is, first, that creation is a true action and does not presuppose a subject; second, that that according to which we act is a principle of acting, whereas causality or action is not a principle of acting.

This is confirmed: action is something incomplete insofar as it is action; therefore, it does not constitute a category. The antecedent is proved as follows: insofar as action is action and is distinguished from passion, it does not inhere; but inherence completes an accident, just as subsistence completes substance. Therefore…

THE REPLY IS to the first proof that active creation is not an action of this category, since it is God’s own substance and power, together with a relation of reason to creatures and the real dependence of creatures on God. For, as we said, action does not proceed from God, but the effect does; God is in himself the power that is pure and ultimate act. Passive creation, however—that is, the creature’s procession—is not an action but the effect of an action, namely, the term’s dependence on God together with the newness of its being.

To the second proof one says that action is not that according to which we are said to act as a principle, but as causality and the reason for proceeding; for we are denominated agents in act not from the principle alone, but also from the second act itself and its causality—or rather, from this alone.

In reply to the confirmation, one says that action also inheres, although it is not signified as inhering insofar as it is action, as St. Thomas teaches expressly in On the Power of God, q. 7, art. 9, ad 7¹⁴ and in Sentences I, dist. 32, q. 1, art. 1.¹⁵ Hence it is one thing to say that action does not inhere absolutely, which would exclude the notion of accident from it; it is another to say that insofar as it is action it does not express inherence, because it is considered as from another, even though it includes being in another, just as a relation under the concept to does not express in, although it includes it.

But you will say: Although a relation under the notion to does not express inherence, it also does not constitute a category distinct from the category of in by virtue of that notion to. Action, however, under the very notion of from, constitutes a category distinct from passion itself, which expresses the notion in. Therefore, the same difficulty remains: how is action a complete accident, so as to constitute a distinct category, if it does not express the notion in?

The reply is that passion does not consist in the inherence of the action itself, but in the reception of the effect, which is the form from which passion arises insofar as it is from an agent. The mode itself, which is action, inheres through itself, because it is identified with motion through itself and not by reason of passion, although it is not signified as inhering.

It remained to discuss the term of action with respect to its formality. In this matter one may consider either the general conditions of action—for example, that its term be produced, drawn out, introduced, or changed, and some dispute which of these conditions constitutes a term precisely as a term—or special notions that specify actions, such as that the term be toward quality or place, or some formality in the mode of acquisition, as when the same place is acquired by ascent or descent. Since these involve the difficulty of specification, they must be treated in Physics III¹⁶ and in the books On the Soul.¹⁷

THE ARRANGEMENT OF THE CATEGORIES OF ACTION AND PASSION.

The most general genus of action is first divided into transitive and immanent, according to the opinion that immanent action is properly action. Immanent action is divided into cognitive and appetitive. Each is divided into corporeal and spiritual. Corporeal cognitive action is divided into the actions of the internal and external senses. Spiritual cognitive action is divided into intellectual action, as in an angel; discursive action, as in us; and supernatural action, such as the beatific vision. Each of these is divided into various species according to different objects. Corporeal appetitive action is divided into various passions. Spiritual appetitive action is divided into various species of natural and supernatural acts, each of which is further divided into various species according to different objects.

Transitive action seems first to be divided into artificial and natural action. Artificial action is divided according to the infinite species of art, such as building, painting, and so on. Natural action is divided into substantial and accidental. Substantial action is generative, and varies according to the different terms of its production. Accidental action is divided into growth, alteration, and local motion, each of which is divided into various ultimate species, such as local motion into circular and straight motion, and so on; alteration into intensification, remission, and so on.

In the category of passion, the same species are to be posited as in productive action proceeding from a subject.

The difficulties that pertain to place do not belong to the present treatise, but to Physics IV. Here, therefore, only TWO MATTERS MUST BE EXPLAINED: first, whether where is an intrinsic or extrinsic mode of the located thing; second, the species of where that pertain to this category.

Concerning the first point, some distinguish two kinds of where. One is intrinsic: the very presence of a thing, independent of every extrinsic surrounding, which it acquires through local motion. The other is extrinsic: the surrounding place itself, which is also acquired through local motion, but secondarily and mediately; for it can persist without the motion itself. On this see the Coimbra commentators above, chapter 9 on the Categories, question 2, article 1, and Suarez, Metaphysics, disputation 51, section 1. The principal basis is drawn from local motion occurring in a vacuum or beyond the heavens. For I assume that a body can move in a vacuum. For St. Thomas teaches of Christ's body in Summa theologiae III, q. 57, art. 4, and Quodlibet 6, art. 3¹, that it is above the entire extent of the heavenly bodies, so that it is not contained by a place. For this to happen, at least some parts of Christ's body had to move beyond the outermost surface of heaven as he ascended and moved, so that only his feet touch that surface while the rest of his body is outside place. Thus, through the motion of his head and other limbs, they were placed beyond all the places of the world. But that motion of the head and other limbs acquired some terminus, since it is an action, and one that does not depend on an extrinsic surrounding; therefore it is intrinsic. This is where, because every terminus of local motion is where. Precisely the same argument applies to the outermost body of the world, which is in a place and has a where, since it is somewhere, yet is not enclosed by anything extrinsic. Therefore, there is a where that does not come from an extrinsic surrounding.

THE SECOND DIFFICULTY depends on this. For if where is an intrinsic presence arising from nothing extrinsic, there is no reason to deny an angel this kind of intrinsic presence; thus it would belong to this category. But that would not be so if the where of this category were only what depends on something enclosing it, because an angel is not circumscriptively in a place, but contains a place as our soul contains its body.

We cannot answer these difficulties fully here, since they touch on many matters from the books of Physics and from the subject of angels. For now, it is enough to note that the presence of place includes two things: one pertains to distance or absence of distance; the other pertains to passive or active containment. For if two people are near one another, they have a relation of absence of distance to each other and are contained by the surrounding surface. If the surrounding air were removed and no other body took its place, those people would remain as undistant as before, since they would have neither come closer nor moved farther away; yet they would no longer be contained by a place. If they move, they can acquire a greater distance or nearness than they had before, even though they do not acquire enclosure and containment. This distance or nearness is formally a relation, but fundamentally it is some mode, position, or determination of one body with respect to another, by reason of which it stands toward that other in different ways and grounds a different relation of distance. This is inferred a posteriori, because there can be distance or nearness between two bodies in a vacuum. But this relation cannot be grounded in the body's substance alone; therefore it is grounded in some new determination with respect to another body, or in some mode and position. Local motion acquires this mode or determination. Hence St. Thomas says near the end of opusc. 52², “that local motion is not only in place, but around place.” In place, it acquires enclosure; but around place it cannot acquire enclosure, only a different distance or nearness. Therefore, even if place is removed, it can still move around place or around another body.

If you say: If the entire structure of the universe were removed, as before the first creation, and a stone were created and moved, what would it acquire if it acquired nothing at all intrinsic? The reply is that it seems more probable that the body would in no way move, because it would move neither in place nor around place, nor with respect to distance or nearness to another thing, since there would be nothing else around which these could be exercised positively. A negative distance or absence of distance, which is purely negative, cannot terminate a positive motion. Thus, for lack of matter and accidentally, that body would be immobile, just as if fire were placed there it would not heat, because matter would be lacking. Nor would it then have or acquire a definitive where. For although it would not be everywhere and would thus be definitive negatively, it would not be determinately in any part, because at that time there would be no part in which it could be. But if a definitive where is positive, it must occupy a determinate part together with the negation of being everywhere. This is explained by another principle: motion is found per se only between contrary termini, as is said in Metaphysics XI, lect. 13³, in St. Thomas's commentary. He adds that contrariety according to place is the greatest distance along a straight line. But then there would be no contrariety between the termini of motion, because everything would be nothing; therefore there would be no motion.

FROM WHAT HAS BEEN SAID IT IS INFERRED that no presence can be given that is wholly an intrinsic absolute mode, independent of anything extrinsic, whether a surrounding, a distant thing, or a near one. This is clear because such a mode is only toward itself, since it is not toward anything other than itself. For something to be present to itself, existence suffices, by which it is in the nature of things. Presence toward itself cannot add any other effect beyond existence; existence, however, is had through production, not through motion.

IT FOLLOWS, SECONDLY, that where, considered completely and adequately, does not signify only a mode of distance or nearness, but also enclosure and containment in place. This is drawn from St. Thomas, opusc. 48, chapter 1, On Where⁴, and Metaphysics XI, lect. 12⁵, where he says: “Where signifies nothing other than being in a place, and to be moved according to place is nothing other than to be moved according to where.” Hence the outermost sphere is said not to be in a place as a whole, because it lacks an exterior container, as he says in Physics IV, lect. 7⁶, and opusc. 52⁷.

The reason for this can be gathered in some measure from the fact that in the connatural order no distance or nearness is sought for its own sake, but so that a thing may be contained in something where it can be preserved, avoid a contrary, or acquire something suitable; all this is what local motion intends. We see that nature gives local motion to heavy things so that they seek a place of preservation, and to animals so that they acquire what suits their appetite or flee what is harmful. Therefore, in local motion the acquisition of distance or presence is ordered to containment in a place, just as violent motion is ordered to the opposite. Since, then, everything acquired by local motion is where, and is not merely distance, it is clear that where primarily and completely signifies containment and enclosure in place, while presupposing distance or absence of distance, which is principally ordered to enclosure. Thus the category where is defined through enclosure by the Author of the Six Principles⁸: “The passive enclosure of the located thing, arising from the active enclosure of place.” And just as someone cannot be called clothed except by a garment, neither can something be said to be located except by a surrounding place. If local motion occurs in a vacuum, it will be imperfect and will acquire a where only in a qualified sense: not where without qualification, but a mode of distance or presence required for where. Or, if there is no body to which it is present or distant, it will acquire nothing.

IT FOLLOWS, THIRDLY what should be said about a spiritual definitive where, a sacramental where, and the presence of a substance stripped of quantity. According to St. Thomas, opusc. 48, chapter 1, On Where⁹, a definitive where is that which is not everywhere but has a determinate part of its presence, as if it were bounded by a fixed limit. In this general sense, a definitive where also applies to bodies, namely, the presence of a definite and determinate part; but it is applied to spiritual things because we lack a proper name for spiritual presence. A definitive where does not, however, apply to Christ's body in the Sacrament, as some wrongly think. For although Christ's body is not everywhere, it is not thereby delimited to a definite part. It is not the case that it is in these species of bread in such a way that it could not be in others, although in a qualified sense it can be called delimited, because it can be only in the species of bread and not elsewhere. Hence it is not called a definitive where, but a sacramental one. Finally, a substance stripped of quantity lacks a where, because it lacks positive presence in a place: it neither contains place nor is contained by place, except radically and virtually. We said more about this in question 16¹⁰.

THERE IS, HOWEVER, A DIFFICULTY whether the angelic where, which is the active containment of place, and the sacramental where, which is the presence of a body in an indivisible mode, agree with circumscriptive where in the category of where.

Certainly, St. Thomas excludes the where of angels from this category in opusc. 48, chapter 1¹¹, and in Summa theologiae I, q. 52, arts. 1 and 2, teaches that an angel is in a place equivocally with a body. This is right. For where is not mere presence as such, since this is formally a relation and belongs to another category; and the basis of presence does not always constitute a where, since presence is manifold, just as union is manifold. There is objective presence, as an object is present to an angel simply by existing, even if it is distant. There is also informative presence, as the soul is in the body; this does not ground a where insofar as it informs. A garment is also present to the body it clothes, and in this respect it does not ground a where but the category of having, which is another category. An angel, however, grounds local presence only insofar as it acts and operates; for this reason it is not contained by a place but contains a place. Thus, just as the soul is present to the body by informing it, so an angel is said to be applied to a place by acting and by the application of its power. Therefore, just as the informing and application of the soul to the body do not ground a presence that is a where and belongs to this category, neither does an angel's applied power ground a presence that is a where, but rather a presence of action. Nor is an angel properly distant, since it is not quantitative or measurable by spatial magnitude, so that some measure of distance from it to a body could be taken. Therefore its presence in no way belongs to the category of where. We leave these matters to theologians, for they do not belong here.

Likewise, the sacramental presence of Christ's body is of a different character from where, because it cannot be acquired immediately and per se through local motion, but only through the species to which it is bound. It moves accidentally through motion wholly based in the species, just as in a human being the motion of the body is not based per se in the soul, but in the whole by reason of the body, and in the soul accidentally. Hence, if the species are removed, Christ's body has no more of a where than a substance stripped of quantity. Therefore that presence is of a different character. This is discussed in the treatment of the Eucharist.

If you ask whether every accident has its own where, distinct from that of substance, the reply is that just as all things are quantified by the same quantity, so they are located by the same where. For they are contained under the same space and place, and thus, just as they are extended with respect to place by the same quantity, so they are commensurated to the place as a whole by the same where. Nor is there an objection that, after the consecration of the bread, quantity remains in place and substance does not. The reply is that just as quantity remains commensurate to place by the same extension as before, although it no longer affects substance as before but is sustained by God per se, so the dimensional where remains: it inhered in substance through the mediation of quantity, but now affects only quantity and also the other accidents that are in the quantity.

AS TO THE REASONS FOR DOUBT RAISED AT THE BEGINNING, what is acquired through motion in a vacuum and how the outermost body is in a place are clear from what has been said.

Concerning the category of position, we should note its definition from the Author of the Six Principles¹², cited by St. Thomas in opusc. 48, chapter 1, On Position¹³, and Summa theologiae I–II, q. 49, art. 1, ad 3: it is the position or arrangement of parts in a place, as sitting, standing, lying down, and so on. For through position, parts are formally arranged in relation to place, just as they are arranged in the whole through quantity.

HOWEVER, AS TO HOW IT IS DISTINGUISHED FROM WHERE, authors differ. Some distinguish them only by reason, perhaps because position is the arrangement of parts in a place, which seems to add nothing to being in a place except existence in a place arranged in a certain way; substantially, this is the where itself.

The opposite view, however, is proved more effectively: First, by a general argument, because different categories cannot be distinguished only by reason; otherwise there would not be first-order diversity in the order and quiddities of things. Second, specifically, because position can remain unchanged while where changes, as when someone sitting or standing is carried without any change in the posture of sitting, while moving through different places. Likewise, while the whole place remains unchanged, position can vary according to the parts, as someone can sit, stand, or lie down in the same place. St. Thomas derives the distinctness of this category from the category of where on this basis, in opusc. 48, chapter 1, On Position¹⁴. See also Physics IV, lect. 7¹⁵, where he shows that there is no motion per se to position, because its species are indivisible; for when anything is added or taken away, the species changes, as also happens with figures. Thus the species of position are related much as figures are, since position is like the body's external figure. But because it is taken through a relation to place, which is something extrinsic, the denomination of this category is not purely intrinsic, as figure is.

ARRANGEMENT OF THE CATEGORY OF WHERE.

Some divide the highest genus, which is where, into three species: circumscriptive, definitive, and supernatural or sacramental.

We know only one species of sacramental where, namely, the presence of Christ's body in the Sacrament.

A definitive where is the presence of created spirits in a place, which can vary according to their different ways of acting in a place. But we have already said that an angelic where does not belong to this category; it is the presence of power, not the presence of something located.

If, however, some division applies to it, it may be into active where, by which something is in a place through acting, and passive where, by which something is in a place through being bound to it.

It is probable that circumscriptive where is the lowest species, because being in Rome or Complutum does not vary the formal character of place, but only material distance. Hence local motions are not distinguished in species by varying any place whatsoever. If someone posits a subordinate species, they must posit as many species of place as there are distances.

IN THE CATEGORY OF POSITION Albert sets down two subordinate species under the highest genus: namely, being placed upright or bent. Under bent position are included infinitely many species, such as sitting, lying down, kneeling, and so on. Rough and smooth are also posited, insofar as they signify an equality of parts.

Some authors take the category of when to signify any intrinsic duration, by the same reasoning by which they posit that where is an intrinsic presence. Moreover, duration is something real and really denominates; therefore it must belong to some category, and to no category other than this one. It denominates intrinsically, like existence, because duration is the continuation of existence. So Father Suárez, Metaphysics, disputation 50, section 12.

This opinion cannot be admitted at all, even on its own principles. For the intrinsic duration of a thing is nothing other than the continuation of its existence; therefore it is not something distinct from existence. Otherwise it would not be the continuation and persistence of the same thing, but a succession. In the view of the opposing authors, existence does not constitute a category distinct per se from the thing that exists, since they say that existence is not really distinct from the produced thing and its real quiddity. In our view, although existence is distinct from the existing thing, it is reduced to the category of that thing, just as subsistence is reduced to substance, because existence does not by itself constitute a quiddity but only places constituted quiddities outside their causes. Thus one existence is distinguished from another by the species of the thing whose existence it is, since existence has the same formal effect in every case, namely, to place a thing outside its causes. Nor is it valid to say that duration is not an accident metaphysically distinct from the thing that endures, but is predicated accidentally of it, and that this suffices for it to constitute a distinct category. If that were so, existence too would be a distinct category, because it is accidentally predicated of creatures. Moreover, this would confuse every order of categories. The order of predicable accident is one thing, the categorical order another: substance can be predicated accidentally, as “A vessel is wooden” or “An animal is a horse,” but it is not thereby a categorical accident.

Therefore one must say that this category is not taken to signify the intrinsic duration of the thing that endures. It is constituted only with respect to a duration that measures, not informs. For that measurement by which something is said to be in time establishes the denomination of this category. Hence when is defined as “that which is left over from the adjoining of time,” that is, from its measurement, as St. Thomas explains in Opusculum 48, ch. 1, On When.¹ Thus time itself, insofar as it is the intrinsic duration of motion, is not placed in this category; rather, it is placed here insofar as it sets its adjacency in things subject to time. St. Thomas consistently explains the account of this category in the cited place and in Physics III, lecture 5,² where he says that “when is that according to which something is denominated by time”; he says the same in Metaphysics V, lecture 9.³

The reason is that although time is an extrinsic measure, things subject to time are no less affected by it than things subject to place or clothing, so that one is called located and another clothed. This suffices to establish in them a mode and denomination adequate for two categories. Therefore it also suffices for the category of when.

Nor is it valid to say that time merely coexists and accompanies the thing that is in time, which would pertain more to the relation of coexistence. For the contrary is clear: time does not merely accompany the things subject to it, both because it measures them and because it is the cause why these lower things are changed by the motion of the heavens, which is time in reality.

But you will ask whether all measures of duration, including spiritual and supernatural duration, are placed in this category, or only the measurement of time. St. Thomas answers in the negative in Opusculum 48, final chapter, On When.⁴ An indivisible duration does not per se have a “when” that measures and distinguishes or divides durations, thereby separating one duration or period from another by measurement, as we distinguish when something was or is. If something is present indivisibly, we cannot ask when it was or will be, because it always is in the same way. Thus when serves for mutable durations. Just as an angel is not located in place, because it contains place and is not contained by it, so it is not “whenned,” if I may say so, by a duration, because it is above every duration distinguishable by when.

But a twofold difficulty arises. First, to which category do the measurements of those indivisible durations belong? Why should we not say that every measurement of duration belongs to this category, although when is denominated more by the measure of time because it is better known to us?

Second, how is a real category constituted in the measurement of time, since the differences of time and its various measures arise only through the intellect? For time in reality is something continuous, like the motion of the heavens itself, with which it is identified; yet it measures according to number and division, which occur only through the intellect.

To the first difficulty, we reply that measures of other indivisible durations do not leave anything in lower durations by their adjacency, as time does in the things it measures. For things in time depend on time as on a cause, because all lower things depend on the motion of the heavens. Thus lower mobile durations are divided and marked by the adjacency of time—which is the motion of the heavens—from which they derive and to which they are subject. Place likewise constitutes the where insofar as it subjects a located thing to itself. The other indivisible measures, although one may be more uniform than another—for example, the duration of the highest angel and its discrete time may be more uniform than the durations of lower angels—do not cause lower durations or subject and contain them as lower motions are subject to the motion of the heavens and to time. For angels do not have natural motions caused by the motion of higher things, but only intentional and free motions, more or less uniform, one of which can measure another as a yard measures cloth, without the latter necessarily being subject to or changed by the former. Only God’s eternity, which is not in a category, contains and causes all other measures. But because it is indivisible, it does not measure them divisibly; rather, it contains them uniformly, without succession. Angelic duration cannot do this with respect to lower durations.

To the second difficulty, we reply that although the division and numbering of time are actually performed by the intellect, there is nevertheless in reality a fundamental numerability, or a before and after, in motion. Thus the adjacency of time called when is left by time itself, which is fundamentally numerable and divisible, although the actual division is performed only by the intellect.

We shall number the species of this category immediately in its coordination.

Concerning the category of habit: its definition is “the adjacency of bodies and of things that are around a body.” For just as a thing is made located by the adjacent and surrounding place, and is timed by being subject to time, so it is called clothed through the clothing surrounding it. Therefore it is false, as some say, that habit is a mode in the human body by which it is made suitable to be clothed, a mode that does not apply to other bodies. Such a mode does not make a human being clothed, but merely capable of being clothed, while simply remaining naked. It is clear, however, that the category of habit removes nakedness, since it makes a thing clothed. Therefore it does not consist in a mode compatible with actual nakedness. Rather, habit is left in a person by the adjacency of clothing, just as where is left by place. It is no objection that clothing is itself a substance, because its application is accidental and gives rise to an accidental denomination and category, just as a vessel is denominated golden or wooden. Yet this is not a purely extrinsic denomination; something is left in the person by this adjacency, just as where is left by place. Thus St. Thomas calls habit “a mean between clothing and the one having clothing,” Metaphysics V, lecture 20,⁵ and Summa Theologiae I–II, q. 49, a. 1. Hence animals, even if covered with hair or armed with claws, are not denominated clothed by them, because these are parts of the body. If they are surrounded by some clothing, however, as a horse decked or armored, they are denominated by this category, like a human being by clothing.

The properties of these categories can readily be seen in St. Thomas’s Opusculum 48, where he treats each one.⁶ Almost all do not admit more and less and have no contrary, except action and passion, which have both. Habit too is said to admit more and less, not according to intensity or remission, but according to a greater or smaller number of garments, as St. Thomas says in the cited opusculum, treatise on Habit, ch. 3.⁷ It has no contrary, however, because it has no intensity or remission.

COORDINATION OF THE CATEGORY OF WHEN.

Those who think this category is created duration divide it into time, aevum, the mode of aevum, and the mode of eternity. Time is divided into continuous and discrete according to continuous motion or distinct operations. Aevum belongs to incorruptible things; the mode of aevum, to instantaneous things; the mode of eternity, to the beatific vision, which is immutable by its nature.

Those who think that when is only the adjacency of time divide it, following Aristotle in Categories, ch. 4,⁸ according to the differences of time into present, past, and future, and each of these into the various species of months, years, days, and so on. For just as each unit changes the species of number, so each difference of time changes the species of when, which is a successive number. These divisions exist in reality only fundamentally.

COORDINATION OF THE CATEGORY OF HABIT.

St. Thomas divides habit, which is the highest genus, in Opusculum 48,⁹ into arms and clothing. Arms are divided into offensive and defensive, each of which has various species. Clothing is divided into clothing for human beings and for beasts, as horses are adorned with saddle, bridle, armor, and so on. Clothing is divided into various modes of wearing according to different adjacencies, such as a tunic, shoe, hat, and so on. These species are not taken from the material or craft by which clothing is made, but from the different way in which things clothe and cover. Wall hangings are also reduced to this category, although strictly speaking they are not clothing.