Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Secunda Pars Artis Logicae

Speaking of relation in its full breadth, as it comprehends transcendental and categorial relation, relation according to being said and according to being, I find no one who has absolutely denied every relation. For even the ancient philosophers did not deny relations according to being said, as is clear from the text of the chapter “On Relation,” although Aristotle there asserted against them a categorial relation that differs altogether from absolute being.¹

Speaking, then, of relations in the present question insofar as they are distinguished from every absolute entity—a feature that belongs only to relations according to being—some have held that they are nothing other than extrinsic denominations or something of reason. This view is usually attributed to the Nominalists and to those who do not distinguish real relations from their foundation. The latter, however, speak in a very different sense, as we shall see below when treating the difficulty. Finally, others think that relations belong to things only according to objective being and are merely intentional affections by which we compare one thing with another. Hence they constitute relations not in respect but in comparison; in the thing, however, all relations are according to being said, because a relative thing is nothing other than an absolute thing known by comparison with another. They claim that this is Aristotle's opinion in this chapter, “On Relation,” and in Metaphysics 5, chapter 15². Others cite St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 7. art. 2. ad 1., where he teaches that a relative thing is denominated not only from what is in it, but also from what is extrinsically adjacent to it.

To begin with this last view, it can in no way be ascribed to the Philosopher, since in the chapter “On Relation” he manifestly rejects the definition of the ancients, who defined only relatives according to being said, because from their definition it followed that substance too is relative, as is any being that is said with dependence and comparison to another. Aristotle, however, in defining relatives says that “they are those whose whole being is toward another.” But in the opinion of those who posit only relations according to being said, the whole being of relatives is not toward another, since the being they have in reality is absolute; they have a relation only because they are known comparatively with another. Therefore Aristotle's definition—those whose whole being is toward another—does not apply to such relative things. Aristotle would have corrected the definition of the ancients to no purpose if he himself had ever posited relations according to being said; for the ancients did not deny them, nor that they are known comparatively with another. Cajetan therefore rightly noted in his commentary on this chapter “On Relation” that, in this definition, the Philosopher defined relation according to the nature it has, not according to how it is known or spoken of. Thus he said “they are toward something,” not “they are said to be toward something”; in the definition of the ancients, however, it was said “they are said to be toward something.” Therefore the Philosopher posited real relations distinct from relations according to being said.

There can be no doubt whatever about the mind of St. Thomas, since he expressly refutes those who said that relation is not a thing in nature but something of reason. See 1. p. q. 13. art. 7.; q. 28. art. 2.; q. 39. art. 1.; Contra Gentiles 2, chapter 12; q. 7. De Potentia, arts. 8 and 9³; and q. 8. De Potentia, art. 2⁴. In a thousand other places as well, but especially in these, he clearly affirms that relation is something real and an inhering accident.

THE BASIS IS THIS: Relations according to being said have absolute being and are not wholly toward another; relations of reason exist only in the intellect that apprehends them, from which they have objective being. But in reality, even when no intellect considers them, there are some things whose only being is toward another. Therefore there are real relations that are not according to being said, and so they can constitute a category separate from absolute things.

The antecedent is proved as follows: even when no intellect considers them, there are found in reality things to which no absolute being can be assigned. For example, order is found, as in an ordered army or an ordered universe; likeness, dependence, paternity, and other similar things are found, and these cannot be explained by any absolute being; their whole being is toward another. A sign of this is that when the term does not exist, likeness or paternity ceases. But if their being were something absolute, it would not cease solely from the absence of a term. To deny that these things are given in reality, with no intellect forming or fabricating them, is to deny what even the most unlearned people know is given in reality.

St. Thomas often uses this argument, and he indicates another in To Hannibald, book 1, dist. 26, q. 2, art. 1⁵, drawn from the divine relations, which are given on the part of the thing insofar as they are really distinct from one another; otherwise, the relative persons would not be really distinct, which would be heretical. They are distinct only insofar as they are pure relations according to being. For if they were distinct in something other than a pure relation, absolutes too would be divided in God, not only relatives. Therefore real relations are given in God, although, because of the supreme simplicity of the divine nature, they are identified with the substance. Why, then, would it be impossible for such relations to exist in created things, where they are neither substances nor infinite?

Finally, how does the intellect form pure respects if it has only absolute things, or relations according to being said, after the likeness of which it might form them? Relations formed by the intellect would therefore be mere fabrications, since there are no pure and true relations in reality after the likeness of which they could be formed.

Nor can one say that these relations are indeed given in reality, but by way of extrinsic denomination, not as an intrinsic form. The contrary is clear, because every extrinsic denomination comes from some real form existing in another subject, as being seen or known comes from cognition existing in the knower. Therefore, if relation is an extrinsic denomination, it comes from some form existing in another subject. That form, then, is either in itself a relation or an absolute entity. If it is a relation, an intrinsic relative form is already given, and thus, just as it is given in that subject, it can be given in another. But if it is an absolute form that nevertheless informs extrinsically, how can a relative denomination proceed from it? For no relative formal effect, either intrinsic or extrinsic, emanates from an absolute form. For example, being seen in a wall is not a denomination of relation but of termination, although we conceive it by way of relation; in reality, however, there is no relation.

Finally, this opinion will have great difficulty explaining how the relative persons in divine things are really constituted and distinct if they are extrinsic denominations, and from what absolute form such denominations proceed. But if there are no extrinsic denominations in God, but rather intrinsic forms, even though they are substantial and identified with the divine substance, why should we say that such a kind of relative being is impossible in creatures, even if it is not identified with substance, when created things have a stronger foundation for such relation, since they are more dependent on and ordered or subordinated to another?

THE ARGUMENTS ARE ANSWERED.

You will object first: Relation posits nothing real in a subject beyond the extrinsic denomination of coexisting extremes. For it is not apparent how this mode, called relation and distinguished from the other absolute forms, comes to a thing without an intrinsic change in it, if it is an intrinsic mode; nor how it is newly caused merely by the position of a term, at any distance whatsoever. For example, if something white is produced in India while I am in Spain, a relation results from that term, so distant; it is not now produced by the agent that produced whiteness here, because that agent often has already ceased to act when the relation results, and therefore cannot act then.

Second, the multitude of relations in the same subject seems to increase without limit, in relation to everything that is like or equal to it, that acts on it, that is acted upon by it, and so on. This seems especially so because one relation can also be the foundation of others, since two relations are no less alike than two absolute things; thus the number of relations would increase without limit.

Finally, there seems to be no need to multiply these relative entities and distinguish them from absolutes. For as soon as two white things are posited, they will be alike without any other entity or mode; and as soon as someone has begotten, he will be a father without any addition of entity. Since, then, there is no experience of these relations, and the other reasoning by which their existence is proved is sufficiently preserved by the mere positing of the two extremes, there seems to be no solid basis for proving that these relations are intrinsic forms. Hence St. Thomas, in opusculum 48, treatise On Relation, chapter 3⁶, says that relation differs from its foundation only by reason of the extrinsic term. And in the place cited above, from 1. 2. q. 7. art. 2. ad 1., he teaches that a relative is denominated not only from what is in it, but also from what is extrinsically adjacent to it.

To the first, it is answered that relation comes to a subject without any change that terminates directly and immediately in the relation, but not without a change that terminates in it mediately and indirectly. Just as risibility flows from the same action by which a man is produced, so, when something white is produced, likeness to another existing white thing is produced. But if that other thing does not exist, by the force of the generation of the white thing that likeness and every other relation remain as it were virtually, so that the relation may result once its term is posited. Hence distance neither contributes to nor prevents this, since these relations do not depend on local position: a son is a son of his father in the same way whether the father is distant or near. Nor is relation in the other extreme produced by the term itself when it is posited through some emission of power. Rather, the position of the term is a condition for the relation to result from the previously posited foundation by the force of the first generation, through which it was placed in the nature of things as apt to regard any term of such a foundation. Thus, although the generator has already ceased, it remains in its power insofar as it leaves a sufficient foundation for the relation to result, just as a heavy thing retains the power to move downward when an obstacle is removed, even though its generator is gone.

When an objection is made that Aristotle often teaches that relation is not the term of a change, the answer is that it is not the term of a physical change per se and directly; the Philosopher does not, however, deny that it is the term of a change accidentally, that is, through another thing and secondarily. Hence St. Thomas, in Physics 5, lect. 3⁷, expressly teaches that a real change occurs in real relations, namely, some new determination by which what was in the foundation is made explicit in actuality. And in Metaphysics 11, lect. 12⁸, he says “that in relation there is motion only accidentally.”

To the second, it is answered that there is nothing unreasonable in these relations being multiplied whenever their foundations and terms are multiplied. In particular, according to St. Thomas the number of relations is much smaller, because he holds that one relation numerically can be referred to numerically diverse terms, in 3. p. q. 35. art. 5. St. Thomas altogether denies that one relation is founded on another, as we shall show more fully below. See q. 7. De Potentia, art. 9, ad 2⁹, and 1. p. q. 42. art. 1. ad 4.

To the third, it is said that there is no less need to posit this genus of relative entity than the genus of quantity or quality. For, because we see the effects of quantity and quality in things, we infer that such forms exist. Likewise, because we see this effect given in the nature of things—namely, that some things are ordered and have a relation to others, as likeness, paternity, order, and so on—and because in these the effect of regarding another is not mixed with an absolute character, but their whole being consists in relation, we rightly infer that this genus of relative entity exists, just as we infer absolute entities from absolute effects. Nor is more experience required here than for the other accidental forms, whose effects we indeed experience, but not their distinction from substance. If God were to leave two white things without a resulting relation, they would remain alike fundamentally, but not formally.

As for the passages of St. Thomas: To the first, from opusculum 48¹⁰, it is answered that the sense is that relation differs from its term by reason of its termination; he does not deny that relation is intrinsically a form, which St. Thomas affirms so often. Specifically, he teaches in q. 7. De Potentia, art. 9, ad 7¹¹, that it is an inhering accident. In the second passage, from 1. 2., St. Thomas teaches only that relation takes its denomination not only from what is in it, that is, insofar as it inheres, but also from what is extrinsically adjacent, that is, from the term or its order toward that term. This does not remove, but presupposes, that it inheres; this is his explanation in the cited place in De Potentia and in 1. p. q. 28. art. 2.