Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Secunda Pars Artis Logicae

THERE IS A TWOFOLD DIFFICULTY in this article. First, is what is here defined that which functions as a primary substance as that which, or as that by which?

THE ANSWER TO THIS IS: What is formally defined here is that by which a substance is primary, namely the mode by which it subsists and underlies, or by which it is subject to its predicates.

For what is defined is the formal constitutive feature and property of primary substance. Its proper constitutive feature is a mode or property, just as the formal constitutive feature of a person is personality. For what constitutes primary substance insofar as it is primary is not the quiddity itself or the account of its nature, but a mode of nature, as was said in the preceding article. Therefore that is what is formally defined in this definition. Since, however, it is defined in the concrete, it must be judged as other concrete defined things are, in which the defined thing that and the defined thing by which are distinguished. What is a primary substance as the that is not the formal defined thing; only the mode by which it is constituted is, because the account of primary substance belongs formally and essentially to that mode alone.

The second difficulty is what this form or mode that is defined here might be. Some think primary substance is here defined by two negations. One concerns the first intention, namely not being in a subject; the second concerns the second intention, namely not being predicated of a subject. The first is clear because not being in a subject pertains to the mode of being, subsisting. This mode is something real, although we describe it by a negation: the negation is not the defined reality, but the defining—or rather, describing—account, since a negation does not define a positive reality. They prove the second point as follows: that negation explains the opposite of the form it negates; but the opposite of that form is something of reason, namely the intention by which secondary substance is constituted; therefore, so it is here. Nothing real can be opposed to this intention, but only something of reason, namely the second intention of singularity, since opposites must belong to the same genus.

This is confirmed because the defined thing by which of secondary substance is a second intention. For Aristotle says¹ that secondary substances are the genera and species under which primary substances fall. Therefore the defined thing by which of primary substance will also be something of reason, so that both are defined according to the same proportion. So Father Merinero, question 3 here.

NEVERTHELESS, THE ANSWER IS: The formality of primary substance defined here is a first intention, namely the mode of really subsisting and underlying; consequently, a second intention of being subject to predication is also defined. For from the fact that it is really informed by accidents and constituted through higher levels, it follows that it is also subject to predication.

THE REASON IS that the formal constitutive feature of primary substance must be explained through what makes it ultimately underlie, or be the substrate for everything else. This is not the intention of subjectability, but the mode of support. For the intention of being subject to predicates is an intention of primary substance only insofar as it is founded on that very account of supporting other things. Therefore this account or mode of underlying is what most fundamentally underlies and lies beneath everything else, since it also grounds subjectability itself; therefore, so it is. As for the first negation, namely not being in another, it is clear from the proof of the opposing view that it pertains to the first intention. As for the second, this is clear once the opposing view's foundation is overturned. Although the form negated is a second intention and a being of reason, its negation is truly found in a first intention and a real being: a real being negates a being of reason. Indeed, the first intention is best explained by negating the second. Thus it is false that nothing real is opposed to a second intention or form of reason. It is opposed to it not by formal contrariety, since they do not belong to the same genus, but by an included negation. For a first intention negates a second intention, namely predication of something of a subject belonging to it. Nor was it necessary to make primary substance proportionate to secondary substance by defining each through a similar intention; rather, each is defined through an opposed one, since primary substance supports and grounds secondary substance and stands in the opposite relation to it. This answers the foundations of the opposing view.

BUT YOU WILL STILL OBJECT: Each of these negations belongs to a nature considered in itself, which is neither in a subject nor predicated of a subject, since it includes only quidditative predicates; yet it is not a primary substance. Therefore the definition is not good. Again, it is false that primary substance is not predicated. An individual is predicated of only one, as is said in the chapter on species, and a vague individual, such as “some human being,” is predicated of many.² As an example of primary substance, moreover, the Philosopher gave a vague individual, such as “some human being.”³ Finally, a negation explains or defines nothing. Therefore this definition, given through two negations, is defective.

To the first point, the answer is that these negations can be taken in two ways. First, as purely and precisely negative; in that way they also belong to a nature considered in itself. Indeed, these negations can belong even to a being of reason and to nothingness, insofar as they simply negate being and predication. In a second way, they can be taken as founded on some positive mode of being and serving to circumscribe it. In this way they do not belong to a nature considered in itself, but to a nature as having that mode of subsisting and underlying.

To the second point, it is said that primary substance is predicated of itself, not of some subject—that is, of something inferior to it. The definition does not say that it is not predicated, but that it is not predicated of a subject. “Some human being,” or primary substance taken in common, is predicated of many as a that and denominatively, not as a by which. That is, it functions as a mode by which something is constituted that cannot be predicated of many; nevertheless, this mode is taken in the signified act as a kind of common reality together with the intention of being predicated of many, just as the intention of genus is denominatively a species. Still, neither a vague individual nor primary substance taken in common is directly and per se universal, because it is not one in many—not through a lack of many, but through a lack of unity: it is not merely a nature and one thing, but a nature together with a mode of individuation.

To the third point, it is said that this definition through two negations is given not definitively but descriptively and circumlocutorily; it does not properly declare the account of primary substance.