Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Secunda Pars Artis Logicae

Just as this division is famous, it has also proved difficult for many, dividing authors into various schools. The whole difficulty arises from the different senses of the name “substance.” It is sometimes taken for the highest genus of the category; sometimes for the nature or quiddity of the things contained throughout this entire category, whether at higher or lower levels; sometimes for a supposit or individual exercising the role of subsisting in itself and underlying or sustaining other things. This last sense has two modes: first intention and second intention. In first intention it is the subject of real information and actualization; in second intention it is the subject of predication. All this variety has caused confusion about what is divided in this division, what sort of division it is, and what the dividing members are.

To present our solution, we must observe that what is special to this category is that it sustains other things; this is what it means to be substance. Consequently, substance must be subject to other things and stand beneath them. Insofar as it actualizes them and they are predicated of it, it is their subject. Since “first” means that there is nothing prior to it, although things that are not substances can be beneath other things and underlie them, they do not underlie them first. Rather, they presuppose something prior that sustains them, at which the regress ultimately stops. This is why it is called first or primary substance, and the first subjectible thing for others. The relation of fittingness is one thing, the relation of receiving or sustaining accidents another. The relation of fittingness is understood through the connection that can be found between a nature, insofar as it is a nature, and the proper accident of that nature. The relation of receiving and sustaining, however, is considered according to the account of a subject, and it belongs first to what is more a subject, or more beneath other things: the individual.

Some, then, take this division only according to first intention, both on the side of what is divided and on the side of what divides it. The divided thing is substance as really underlying—that is, substance insofar as it bears the real property of underlying—and it is divided into what underlies first as an individual substance and what underlies secondarily as a universal. Others, at the opposite extreme, take both the divided thing and the dividing members according to second intention: the divided thing is substance invested with the second intention of being subjectible and subject to a predicate; it is divided into the intention of a first subject, or what is ultimate among all subjectible things, and what is not ultimate in being a subject, such as a universal, which is rather a predicate. Others, finally, take the divided thing according to first intention, namely the nature of substance, and the dividing members according to second intention, namely the modes of underlying individually and universally; or they take the things themselves, which are substances, insofar as they are denominated by these second intentions of underlying universally or individually. For these and other opinions, see the commentators of Coimbra here, q. 2; the Carmelite Course, disp. 12, q. 2; Araujo, 5. Metaph., q. 2, art. 1; and Suarez, disp. 33, Metaph., sect. 2.

NEVERTHELESS, I ANSWER AND SAY FIRST: What is divided in this division is neither substance as it abstracts from complete and incomplete substance, nor substance taken for a grade—that is, what signifies the highest genus.

THE REASON IS that what is divided is what is shared by both dividing members. But the highest genus is found in only one dividing member, namely, second substance, because it is the highest genus and second substances are genera or species. Therefore, it is not something common that is divided into first and second substance. A genus is indeed divided into its species and descends all the way to individuals, but it is not divided into individual and generic substance, as first and second substance are. Likewise, incomplete substance is neither first nor second substance, because it is incomplete and a part, not a whole. A part as a part is not per se but in another—that is, in the whole—not by inhering but by composing it. Hence it is neither what underlies first, since something prior is given that underlies—the whole—nor what underlies second, since it is not the whole that is predicated of the first underlying thing and said to underlie through it. A part, then, is not denominated as underlying but as constituting, although it can be a medium through which something is received in the whole, as sight is received through the eye. The eye does not underlie; the human being does. For although the eye receives, it does not stand beneath other things; the whole underlies it as a part. Otherwise the part itself would underlie not identically, as universals do through an individual; for a part is not identified with the whole as a universal is with what falls under it.

I SAY SECOND: What is divided in this division is not appropriately taken according to second intention alone, as the intention of subjectibility.

THE REASON IS that the second intention of subject to predicate, whether essential or accidental, is something common to accident and substance. For an accident is also subject to its predicates and receives them, whether essential—as whiteness is a quality—or accidental—as whiteness is intense.

YOU WILL SAY: The account of subject is found in accidents participatively and derivatively from substance. Hence being a subject per se and primarily is found in substance. But this is nothing: although what belongs to entity and reality is found principally in substance and participatively in accident, intentions that belong to things as cognized are predicated equally of both, as being universal and particular, genus and species; the same holds for the intention of subject and predicate, and so on. Finally, substance is not only a subject of predication, but also a subject that really informs and sustains accidents. Therefore, the account of underlying should not be explained solely through the second intention of subject to predicate, but also through the real property of underlying that which really informs it.

I SAY THIRD: It can plausibly be said that what is divided here is the very property of underlying, or substance insofar as it exercises that office of underlying. But it is much more probable that what is divided is the very nature of categorical substance into its various modes, one of which is to underlie as an individual that subsists and receives things in reality, while the other is to underlie only through denomination from those first underlying and receiving things.

This conclusion, AS TO THE FIRST PART, can be taken from St. Thomas, Opusc. 48, treatise on the Categories, ch. 3.¹ There he says that “underlying is said in two ways: of underlying accidents, and of underlying universals, as the less universal is beneath the more universal.” He adds that “it is proper to first substance to underlie accidents. From this it follows that accidents inhere principally and primarily in first substance.” Thus St. Thomas takes the whole division according to the property of underlying and sustaining accidents. This does not mean that this property of sustaining is divided into different properties. For the property of underlying is not one in universals and another in individuals; it is one and the same, just as the nature is one and not different. Rather, this property underlies per se and primarily—that is, not through another—and underlies secondarily insofar as a higher nature is identified with the individual, and what belongs to the individual touches the universal denominatively, while what belongs to the universal in signate act is exercised through the individual. It is not necessary, then, to take as what is divided anything other than the property of underlying itself: in individuals it underlies first, that is, with exercise; in universals it underlies secondarily and denominatively through individuals.

If you say: In this way, some accidents will also be said to underlie secondarily, namely, through first substance, since they too sustain other accidents, as quantity sustains color and a power sustains a habit or an act. I answer that these accidents do receive other things as a medium of reception, but not as the reason for sustaining them. Since the accidents themselves inhere, they cannot give other accidents a sustaining being. They can, however, mediate between the reception of one accident and another, which is like disposing and enabling the subject to receive that other accident. Universal substances, by contrast, are identified with individuals. Hence they receive accidents as individuals do, namely, under the denomination of that which sustains, while leaving the exercise of sustaining to individuals.

THE SECOND PART of the conclusion is taken from St. Thomas, q. 9, On the Power of God, art. 2, ad 6.² There he says: “When substance is divided into first and second, it is not a division of genus into species, since nothing is contained under second substance that is not in first; rather, it is a division of genus according to diverse modes of being. For second substance signifies the nature of a genus taken absolutely in itself, while first substance signifies it as individually subsisting. Hence it is more a division of an analogate than of a genus.” Thus St. Thomas. His disciples commonly note that he did not mean that it is an analogical division, but rather that it is more a division of an analogate than of a genus—although it is neither, but a division of a subject or nature into modes of being, which resembles the division of an analogate, made through modes rather than differences, as a genus is divided. Finally, in 1. p., q. 19, art. 1, ad 2, St. Thomas says that in the definition of a person, when it is said to be an individual substance, the term substance does not signify a determinate substance, but “what is divided commonly into first and second, and by the addition of ‘individual’ is made to stand for first substance.” According to St. Thomas, then, what is divided into first and second substance is what is signified by the name “substance” in the definition of person. But when one says “individual substance,” it is not the same as an individual property of underlying; it is the substantial thing itself. Therefore, this is what is divided in this division. Since first substance is not merely a determinate property of underlying, but a determinate thing that has the property of underlying per se and primarily, it is more fitting to say that this division is not of a property into properties, but of the thing itself that has properties into the very modes of those properties.

It is clear, then, that first and second substance do not signify different natures, since they stand to each other as singular and universal in the same category. The bearer of this denomination—underlying first or underlying second—is therefore one and the same, because it is the same nature. These modes or properties cannot be distinct realities, since no property belonging to second, universal substance fails to belong to the singular; the very account of real underlying found in the singular also belongs to the universal nature. But the exercise of underlying, or of really sustaining accidents, belongs to first substance and denominatively to second substance. Underlying as the second intention of being subject to higher predicates belongs to first substance in such a way that it does not belong at all to second substance, even denominatively. For genera and species are not subject to all the predicates to which first substance is subject, nor even by denomination taken from it.

It remains to clarify the sort of division this is. If what is divided is taken to be the nature of substance, affected by these two modes, then it is a division of a thing into its modes, or of a subject into its accidents, as we saw from St. Thomas in the question On the Power of God.³ It is no objection that the holy Doctor said that the division is more a division of an analogate than of a genus. He did not say absolutely that the division is analogical, but only that, compared with the division of a genus into different species and natures, this division more closely resembles the division of an analogate, because it is made through different modes. One mode—underlying first—is found really in first substances; the other—underlying second—is found only denominatively and by reason, as when nature is divided into universal and singular. If, however, what is divided is taken to be the account of the property or mode of underlying itself, then the division is analogical, insofar as one mode, namely, underlying first, is found really, while the other is found only denominatively and by reason, namely, underlying second.

ARGUMENTS ARE SOLVED.

First, it is argued: This division should be presented according to the account of subsisting rather than according to the property of underlying. But the account of subsisting belongs equally to first and second substance. Therefore, the division is neither analogical nor into analogical modes.

The major is proved: this division should be presented through what the dividing members share. But they share subsisting more than underlying, since they simply do not share the latter. Therefore, the division should be presented through subsisting. The minor is proved as follows: subsisting, or being per se, belongs to the nature of substance even in common, and descends from it to individuals, as St. Thomas teaches in 1. Sentences, to Hannibald, dist. 23, q. 1, art. 4.⁴ Therefore, the account of subsisting is no less intrinsic to second substance than to first.

I ANSWER that the term subsisting is taken equivocally. It can signify a thing that calls for subsistence, which is being per se; or it can signify the very mode of subsisting, which belongs to a nature that calls for it. Likewise, underlying can be taken either for a nature that calls for the account of underlying, or underlies radically, or for the very mode and property of underlying. If they are taken in the first way, this pertains to the nature, and St. Thomas takes them in this way in 4. dist. 12, cited above,⁵ where he defines substance as “being per se,” that is, a thing to which being per se is due. In this way it is found prior in genera and species than in individuals, as St. Thomas says in the cited dist. 23.⁶ In the second way, subsisting and underlying as an exercise belong first to individuals. Although both belong radically to the nature, their exercise belongs first to first substances, from which they are most properly said to underlie. This division, however, is not made according to nature, since the same nature is in first and second substance, nor according to subsisting itself, which is taken only in relation to itself, but according to underlying, which expresses an order to other things by sustaining them and standing beneath them. Thus there are two ways of receiving a denomination from what one underlies: either because it is received immediately and in exercise, or because one is denominated only through identification with such a receiver, as a universal nature is identified with an individual.

Second, it is argued: In this division, what is divided coincides with one of the dividing members, or one dividing member with the other. For what is divided is substance taken in common; therefore, it is second substance, which is universal substance. Likewise, first substance can be taken in common, since it belongs to all individual substances not only to be substances but also to be first substances. Therefore, because first substance, even as first, is predicated of all, first substance will be second substance; and because second substance is predicated of first, as genus and species are predicated of an individual, one dividing member belongs to the other. Finally, what is found most principally in substance is its quiddity and nature. Therefore it is wrong to say that first substance is substance most of all because the property of underlying belongs to it most of all; nature is more principal than property. So something should be denominated a substance more principally from its nature than from its property. But nature belongs first to genera and species and descends from them to individuals. Therefore second substances will be substances most of all.

I ANSWER that what is divided first in this division is nature in itself, not insofar as it is individual or universal, but as a nature that has the property of underlying. Thus it need not be a universal, but something capable of either mode. Or, if what is divided is not nature into modes but the property of underlying itself, then what is divided is something higher and common, but not second substance, because it is not universal as a nature is universal, like genus and species, but as a property or mode of underlying—just as one speaks of the individual in common.

This makes the answer to the second point clear: although first substance can be taken in common for all first substances, it is not then taken as second substance, because it is not common as genus and species are, which alone pertains to second substances, but as an indeterminate individual, such as “some man.” Nor is it true, as some say, that first substance cannot be taken in common, as “some man,” but only for a determinate supposit. It is clear that Aristotle⁷ gave “some man” as an example of first substance; thus first substance signifies a singular and determinate supposit as that by which a supposit is singularized. This form or mode can nevertheless be conceived in common as a certain thing, as with the name “person”; otherwise it could not be defined. That second substance is predicated of first substance proves only that the nature of first and second substance is the same, and therefore the division is not according to different natures but according to the office and function of underlying. In this way second substance is not said of first, just as universality is not said of singularity.

To the third point, the answer is that nature and quiddity are principal in substance radically, because they are the root of the property or mode of underlying, which is found principally in second substance. The office of underlying, however, insofar as it is exercised, is exercised principally and most of all in first substance; and insofar as underlying is a second intention of being subjectible to higher predicates, it belongs only to first substance. The property of really underlying belongs radically to the nature, but not as something to be exercised in every state, only in individuation. It was necessary to distinguish substances according to property and not according to quiddity in this way because we know them more through properties than through their intrinsic quiddities.

YOU WILL SAY: Then accidents, too, will be divided into first and second, since an accident inheres really in an individual, while an accident in a universal inheres only through an individual. The same can be said of any property: its exercise belongs to the individual, but its denomination also belongs to the universal.

It is answered that an accident cannot be divided simply into first and second as substance is, because insofar as an accident inheres, even individually, it presupposes something prior by which it is sustained. Therefore, being first in inhering is not being first absolutely and in being, but first in informing; for what inheres informs. Thus it presupposes something prior by which this informing is sustained. Substance, by contrast, is a sustaining subject, and so one must arrive at something first in it, with nothing prior in sustaining; thus it is first simply in being. Likewise, properties do have their exercise first in an individual rather than in a universal, but this does not give them a special mode of being and sustaining as first and second, as it does in substance.