Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Secunda Pars Artis Logicae

There are two principal CONDITIONS in analogies of attribution and proportionality, from which the other accessory conditions depend. Among the many conditions usually assigned to analogies of attribution, or proportion, the chief one is that the form be found intrinsically in the principal analogate, but extrinsically and by denomination in the others. From this condition follow three others: First, the analogous form in these cases must be numerically one, since it is found only in one analogate. Second, the form of the principal analogate must be placed in the definitions of the others, which are denominated from it. Third, these analogates do not have one concept but several, with some mutual connotation, and are not like equivocal terms by chance. All these conditions can be seen in “healthy” as said of an animal, medicine, herb, and so on.

Similar conditions are found in metaphorical analogies, which also involve several concepts and are quite similar to analogies of attribution.

In proper analogies of proportionality, however, the chief condition is that some character of proportion be found intrinsically and formally in all the analogates, according to which they are likened to one another proportionally. From this follow three other conditions opposed to those of analogy of proportion: First, the analogous character must not be found formally in only one analogate and in the others by denomination, but formally in all, each in its own way. Second, one must not be placed in the definition of the others. Third, they can have one concept with imperfect and qualified unity, which is called proportional unity and belongs to the object.

Therefore, regarding the two principal conditions on which the others depend, THE DIFFICULTY IS whether they are necessarily required to constitute these analogies. Some recent authors think that in analogies of attribution it can be maintained that the signified character is found not only intrinsically in the principal analogate but also in the other analogates, although dependently on that first analogate. Conversely, they say that an element of attribution or metaphor is always required for analogy of proportionality. This follows from the first claim, for they think that analogy of attribution exists precisely when one form is found earlier in one thing and later in another, even if it is intrinsic to both. This is the view of Father Suárez, Metaphysical Disputations 32, section 3, whom others follow; see also Cabero, treatise 4, disputation 2, doubt 3.

The foundation of the first part is that in being and other things said of inferiors by intrinsic denomination, there can be an analogy of attribution; therefore that condition is not required.

The antecedent is established first from St. Thomas, who recognizes an analogy of attribution in good and true with respect to divine and created truth, as is clear in Summa theologiae I, q. 16, art. 6, and q. 6, art. 4. He teaches the same concerning being with respect to God and creatures in Against the Gentiles I, chapter 32. He also teaches in On Truth, q. 2, art. 11¹, that “being” is said of God and creatures, substance and accident, earlier and later, which is proper to an analogy of attribution. Second, the definition of analogy of attribution requires only that the analogates depend on one first and principal thing, not that the form be in them extrinsically and denominatively. For the definition says that analogates of attribution are the same according to their term and different according to their relation to it. How, then, is it established that this relation must consist in a form that is extrinsic in some and intrinsic in one? Third, this is clearly apparent in the analogous term “healthy,” which is an analogy of proportion with respect to an animal and a herb; yet in the herb there is not an extrinsic denomination, but an intrinsic relation—the very character by which it is denominated healthy. For that relation is grounded in something intrinsic, namely, the production of health, as is drawn from St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 16, art. 6.

The foundation of the other part is first from St. Thomas, who teaches generally that in every analogy all things must be said with reference to one thing, and that this one thing must be placed in the definition of them all, as is clear in Summa theologiae I, q. 13, art. 6, and q. 16, art. 6. But this is proper to analogy of proportion or metaphorical analogy; therefore it is also necessary for analogy of proportionality. Second, proportionality, absolutely speaking, can be found among univocals. For we can say that just as a human being is related to its being an animal, so a horse is related to its own; nevertheless, this does not exclude univocity. Therefore, for proportionality to exclude univocity and constitute analogy, some dependence of one analogate on another is required in addition to proportional comparison. But where one analogate is principal and the others, less principal, depend on it and are denominated from it, there is an analogy of attribution or a metaphor, which removes complete equality from proportions or comparisons, since such equality is directly opposed to analogy.

NEVERTHELESS, we must maintain both points against these opposing views. As to the first part, we say that an analogy of attribution, and likewise a metaphorical analogy, which is very close to it as regards the form that denominates analogically, must necessarily be intrinsic in one analogate and extrinsic and denominative in the others. Some intrinsic relations can nevertheless be presupposed in those less principal analogates—not relations by which they are denominated analogically and constituted under the analogous form, but relations by which they regard the principal analogate, so that they may afterward be denominated analogically and extrinsically by it.

This is drawn from St. Thomas, who teaches both points. That the analogous form in these analogies of attribution must be found intrinsically in only one and denominatively in the others is clear from Summa theologiae I–II, q. 20, art. 3, ad 3; Summa theologiae I, q. 16, art. 6; Metaphysics IV, lecture 1²; and Metaphysics XI, lecture 3³. There he says that the form must be found in only one of the analogates according to its proper character, and that the others are denominated from it. Therefore he holds that it is not found formally in all, since he says that it is found according to its proper character in only one, and is numerically one, something not formally communicated to the others. That the less principal analogates nevertheless have something intrinsic—not by which they are denominated analogically, but by which they intrinsically regard the principal analogate—is clear from the same St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 16, cited art. 6, when he says: “Although health is not in medicine and urine, in each there is something by which the one produces health and the other signifies it.” Thus, according to St. Thomas, the form that denominates analogically is only numerically one, existing in one analogate, namely, the principal one. Likewise, there is something in these analogates that regards the principal analogate, so that they may afterward be denominated from its form. For example, in a herb the power to produce health does not denominate it healthy, but as looking toward health; in urine, the character of signifying health denominates it as signifying health, but not as healthy, except through the extrinsic health of an animal.

AND THE REASON FOR THIS IS that if an intrinsic denominating form exists in both analogates, one is not denominated by a form existing in the other, but by the form it has intrinsically in itself. Thus it does not need to be denominated extrinsically from the other, which destroys analogy of attribution. This can be explained further: if a denominating form is intrinsic in both analogates, even if it is more principal and perfect in one, either both forms are similar and identically one, proportionally one, or wholly different. If wholly different, the result is equivocation, not analogy. If wholly similar and of the same character, the result is univocity. If they are one proportionally and are found intrinsically in both analogates, nothing is lacking for them to constitute an analogy of proportionality, as is clear from its definition. Therefore, for an analogy of attribution distinct from these to exist, denomination must occur not through a form existing intrinsically in each, but through a form intrinsic in one and denominating extrinsically in the others. Thus health is intrinsic in an animal, but in a herb or medicine the form of health is not present intrinsically, but extrinsically.

As to the second part, the foundation is also drawn from St. Thomas and from reason. From ST. THOMAS, because he entirely distinguishes analogy of proportionality from analogy of attribution and metaphor, as is clear in On Truth, q. 2, art. 11⁴, and at the end of Ethics I, lecture 7⁵. Indeed, in On the Power of God, q. 7, art. 7⁶, he admits that even if, impossibly, goodness in God and creatures were of the same character—that is, if one were not derived from the other—univocity would still be prevented by their different relations to being. Therefore, once all attribution or extrinsic and metaphorical denomination is removed, there is still room for analogy, and univocity is prevented by the different modes of being in God and creatures. In Sentences I, dist. 19, q. 5, art. 2, ad 1⁷, he says that analogates according to being and intention, which are analogates of proportionality, must be found intrinsically in the analogates. In Metaphysics III, lecture 8⁸, being and the other transcendentals lose the character of genus and univocity because they are imbibed in the differences themselves, as we will consider more fully in the next article and question. Therefore true analogy is preserved without any character of metaphor or attribution, since there is neither attribution nor metaphor in transcendentals; otherwise they would not be transcendentals.

The reason for this is very simple. Among things having complete and univocal likeness, a comparison of proportion and equality can be made: for example, one can say that just as a human being is an animal, so too is a horse. Yet there is not only this unity of equality and proportion; there is a greater unity, namely, univocal likeness, on which the unity of proportion is founded, and this does not remove univocity. But when there is only a unity of proportions and no complete likeness, however much it is found to arise according to intrinsic forms, it cannot constitute univocity. Since it is not a unity simply and completely, it is a lesser unity, univocal only in a qualified sense, and this is analogical. For example, we compare the proportion between the heart in an animal and the foundation in a house, and name both “principle.” This does not signify one nature or a complete likeness participated in by both, but the proportion of each form, so that just as the heart is related to an animal, so the foundation is related to a house. Accordingly, these two retain some unity in the very character of principle, but not a unity or likeness of things or natures—only of proportions. Therefore there is analogy without any attribution or metaphor, through proportional unity alone, when this has no other unity of likeness and agreement joined to it on which a comparison of proportions could be based, but consists in the bare comparison of proportion and in a form intrinsic to both, not in a denomination or metaphor derived from what exists in only one. For the heart truly, not metaphorically, is a principle, and the foundation is a principle; nevertheless the heart and foundation are named analogically by the term “principle.” We will show in the next article and question that similar cases are found among transcendentals, in which there is no univocity.

To the opposing foundations for the first part, the reply is as follows. To St. Thomas: we say that he attributes an analogy of proportion to those analogates under one consideration, but does not deny an analogy of proportionality under another. Thus in the same Summa theologiae I, q. 6, art. 4, where he says that all things are called good by divine goodness exemplarily and efficiently, he adds: “Each thing is called good by the likeness of the divine goodness inhering in it, which is formally its own denominating goodness.” The holy Doctor therefore holds that the analogy of goodness between God and creature is spoken of according to an intrinsic form in both, not by reason of attribution and metaphor. He says explicitly at the end of Ethics I, lecture 7⁹, that the analogy of good is spoken of more in terms of the goodness inhering in things; and he prefers this analogy to the others he had listed there according to proportion or attribution. St. Thomas therefore does not attribute the claim that things are said according to inherent forms to analogy by attribution, but rather to analogy of proportionality, although the same analogates can also fall under an analogy of proportion according to another consideration.

If you ask how both analogies can belong to the same thing, for example being, since their conditions are entirely opposed—analogy of proportion says that the form is intrinsic in one and extrinsic in another, whereas analogy of proportionality says that it is intrinsic in both—and being is intrinsic in all analogates, not in only one and denominative in the others, the reply is that the two analogies are not both present formally, but one is present virtually. For being is found intrinsically in every analogate; nevertheless, it is the foundation such that, if, impossibly, a creature were not intrinsically a being or an accident, it would be a being by attribution and denomination, because a creature is a being from another and an accident in another. In this way the different passages of St. Thomas can be reconciled. In Summa theologiae I, q. 16, art. 6, he recognizes an analogy of attribution between created and uncreated truth, though not entirely absolutely. But in On Truth, q. 2, art. 11¹⁰, he recognizes only an analogy of proportionality between God and creature, because in fact there is an analogy of proportionality according to intrinsic participation. Yet because what is in a creature is participated in and derived from God as the principal analogate, this provides a sufficient foundation for saying that, if intrinsic denomination were absent, the creature would be said to be such by attribution and denomination alone, insofar as it is something of God.

You will object: The Philosopher continually recognizes an analogy of attribution between substance and accident, as with “healthy” said of an animal and of medicine, as is clear in Metaphysics IV, chapter 2¹¹, and VII, chapter 1¹², and chapter 4¹³, as well as in St. Thomas there and in the same On Truth, q. 2, art. 11¹⁴. Therefore at least with respect to these things an analogy of attribution actually exists together with actual intrinsic participation. The reply is drawn from St. Thomas, Metaphysics IV, lecture 1¹⁵: “Every being is said with reference to one first thing. But this first thing is not an efficient cause or an end, as in the examples given above of health and medicine; rather, it is a subject.” But what is first in the mode of a subject does not produce attribution by extrinsic denomination, as an end or efficient cause does, but by inherence of the form.

TO THE SECOND PROOF of the principal argument, the reply is that precisely because analogates of attribution have only a relation to some term, from the attribution of which they are denominated as from an extrinsic term, they cannot be denominated by an intrinsic character.

TO THE THIRD PROOF the reply is that a herb has an intrinsic relation to health because of its power to heal, and therefore it is intrinsically said to regard health, but it is not denominated healthy intrinsically. Thus health in an animal has the character of a form, while in relation to the herb it has the character of an extrinsically denominating term.

To the foundations for the second part: To the first, the reply from the authority of St. Thomas is that in that general statement St. Thomas is speaking not of all analogies absolutely, but restrictively of analogies of attribution alone. For in that place, Summa theologiae I, q. 13, he treats analogy more dialectically than metaphysically—that is, from the side of names, not things, since he was discussing the names of God. Just as metaphysics attends to inequality on the side of things when considering analogy, so dialectical consideration of analogy attends to inequality in the mode of signifying and naming. This is clear from the examples St. Thomas himself gives: “healthy” with respect to an animal and urine, and things said metaphorically of God and creatures, in which the signified character is found more principally in creatures. Speaking of other perfections of God, which are also found intrinsically in creatures, such as being good and being wise, he says that on the side of the thing signified they are said of God earlier, because they flow from him into creatures; he does not say that they are said with reference to God as extrinsically denominating them. Therefore he did not intend the rule previously stated in general to be understood of these cases in the same way—as though in every analogy all things are said with reference to one first thing from which they are denominated—but intended it to apply only to analogies of attribution. In the passage from q. 16, however, he does not speak universally of all analogies, and so it does not compel this conclusion.

To the second proof it is said that a comparison of proportions, or proportionality, if made only to explain a comparison of complete likeness, does not remove univocity. But when it presupposes no other unity or agreement than proportional unity, it is analogy. Hence the fact that proportionality is exercised among univocals does not prove the argument that it cannot constitute analogy, even if the form is intrinsic to both analogates, provided it presupposes no unity greater than proportionality.