Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Secunda Pars Artis Logicae

The difficulties concerning analogy are quite metaphysical. Cajetan has discussed them so fully and subtly in his little work On the Analogy of Names that he has left us nothing further to devise.

Therefore the COMMON and widespread opinion is that analogy lies midway between pure equivocation and univocation, because the thing signified is neither wholly the same, as in univocals, nor wholly different, as in equivocals, but is different in itself and one proportionally, according to a certain relation. St. Thomas teaches this as evident in Metaphysics XI, lecture 3.¹ Some recent authors, however, think that although Aristotle distinguishes analogates from equivocals by chance, they nevertheless belong simply to equivocal terms, since analogy is a kind of equivocation. It must therefore preserve the genus of equivocation: on the side of the thing signified, there are different accounts, while there is only one name. Thus the whole account of analogy is reduced, not to the thing signified—as though it were different in each case, as with equivocals—but to the cause of the name’s signification: namely, the relation of one thing to another, or to several others, causes the name of one to be applied to another. This relation is called analogy when it is a relation of proportion; if it is some other relation, the term is called “equivocal with reference to one thing,” but not analogical.

HOWEVER, although it is true that if we attend strictly to the meaning and Greek derivation of the name “analogy,” it signifies only proportion and those things that are one by reason of a proportional relation, for which reason Aristotle in Ethics I² and St. Thomas there, lecture 7³, call those things one by analogy which are one in a relation of proportion, while those that are one according to other relations are called “of many to one” or “from one”; and although Cajetan himself, in the cited work, chapter 1, calls only analogy of proportionality true analogy and the others analogical only improperly—a usage also observed by Master Soto on the chapter on Equivocals, art. 2, corollary 1—nevertheless it cannot be denied that by the usage of schools and learned authors, “analogates” generally means things that are neither purely equivocal nor purely univocal, but have that proportional and qualified unity by some relation or other, so that the account signified is not wholly diverse. For Aristotle generally acknowledges things that are said neither equivocally nor univocally, and St. Thomas says that these are said analogically, as is clear especially from Metaphysics IV, chapter 2⁴, lecture 1 in St. Thomas⁵; Metaphysics VII, text 10⁶, lecture 4⁷; Metaphysics XI⁸, lecture 3⁹, and XII, lecture 4, at the end¹⁰; On Truth, q. 2, art. 11¹¹; On the Power of God, q. 7, art. 7¹²; and Summa theologiae I, q. 13, art. 6. St. Thomas also divides analogy itself into analogy of attribution and analogy of proportionality, or relations of many to one and from one, or into other similar names equivalent to these, as is clear especially from On Truth, q. 2, art. 11¹³, On the Power of God, q. 7, art. 7¹⁴, and Sentences I, dist. 19, q. 5, art. 2, reply 1¹⁵. He speaks of analogy distinguished from equivocals simply, that is, equivocals by chance. The reason is that these things do not signify things wholly diverse, but things one in some way; therefore they differ from pure equivocals, yet they are not univocals, since they do not signify something wholly the same. Why, then, should they not be called analogates, to express this difference?

SOME, because analogical terms abstract from none of their analogates, nor from their modes or differences, but are immersed in them, deny analogates any unity on the side of the thing and allow unity only in the signification of the word. This is the view of Father Vasquez, Commentary on the First Part, vol. 2, disp. 114, chap. 2, and disp. 121, chap. 2. We accept the first point, as will be proved below in art. 5 from St. Thomas and Cajetan. But the second is wholly impossible, since it amounts to making being purely equivocal, which Aristotle so often denies, as will be proved in the following question, art. 2. Moreover, propositions in which “being” or “to be” is predicated plainly apply to things themselves; nothing is more real than being or a being, and whatever is real is said to have reality if it has being. Therefore “being” in common, in which all real beings agree, does not express a mere name but the truth of reality. How that concept has unity will be explained below.

FROM WHAT HAS BEEN SAID, IT IS CLEAR that analogates are indeed a species of equivocals, insofar as they do not signify something wholly the same as univocals do. They are distinguished from equivocals by chance, however, because they do not signify things that are purely diverse, but diverse things that are one proportionally. This holds not only on the side of signification or of its cause, but also on the side of the thing signified. For if there were no proportion or relation of agreement on the side of the thing signified, the signification or application of the name on the side of signification would be mistaken in applying it according to such a relation.

To explain the divisions of analogy, we must first posit the common account of analogy and then divide it. From what has been said, analogates are things whose account is not wholly diverse but has some unity. Every unity in which several things agree is founded on agreement, likeness, or identity among things. Therefore, analogical unity must be distinguished from univocal unity by the differing kind of agreement or identity one thing has with another. Univocals are said to agree according to unity or agreement simply, because they are alike in one nature, whether specific or generic. Analogates, however, are said to agree according to proportional unity, since they are not things having parity or likeness in some nature, but are called the same proportionally, not equally. This is expressed more clearly in Spanish: “It is the same according to its measure,” as if one said, “in its measure and proportion.” For St. Thomas says in Ethics V, lecture 5¹⁶, that proportion is “the relation of one quantity to another,” and quantity has the character of a measure. The unity or agreement of proportion is therefore a commensurative unity, according to the measure of each term, not an absolute one. Univocals are things with accounts that are absolutely alike, that is, equal and on a par in some nature; analogates fall short of absolute unity or agreement and have agreement only in a relative mode, that is, according to proportion or commensuration.

With these points established, there are two divisions of analogates. The first is into analogy of proportion and analogy of proportionality. Analogy of proportion is called by several names. It is also usually called analogy of attribution, because denomination or attribution is usually made from one thing that is more primary to the others: for example, from the health of an animal the denomination “healthy” is attributed to urine and medicine, which are also called healthy. It is also called analogy of one to another or of many to one, for the same reason: denomination is made from one thing to several. Finally, it is called analogy of proportion because it is made by reason of some correspondence or commensuration among several things. Sometimes this proportion involves a determinate excess, as the proportion between a person’s strength and the weight that person can carry; sometimes it is merely a relation of correspondence without determination, as between creature and God, according to St. Thomas, On the Power of God, q. 7, art. 10, reply 9¹⁷, and On Truth, q. 2, art. 11¹⁸. Analogy of proportionality is also called analogy according to comparison, since it is based on equality or comparison of the proportions themselves. For, as St. Thomas teaches in Ethics V, lecture 5¹⁹, equality between proportions is called proportionality.

ANALOGATES OF PROPORTION OR ATTRIBUTION are defined as “things whose name is common, while the account signified is the same with respect to its terminus and diverse according to the relations to that terminus.” For example, “healthy” signifies the same account on the side of health, which is in the animal, but different relations in urine and an herb to the health of the animal as their terminus. This is taken from St. Thomas, Metaphysics XI, lecture 3²⁰, where he defines these analogates in this way and says that they are called analogates because they are proportioned to one thing. One may also consult Cajetan, cited work, chapters 2 and 3. ANALOGATES OF PROPORTIONALITY are defined as “things whose name is common, while the account signified is the same according to a likeness or agreement of proportions.” This is taken from St. Thomas, Ethics I, lecture 7²¹, On Truth, q. 2, art. 11²², the other places cited above, and Cajetan just cited.

It is true that St. Thomas expresses these species of analogy by other names in Sentences I, dist. 19, q. 5, art. 2, reply 1.²³ There analogy of proportion or attribution is called analogy according to intention and not according to being, because the intention or account from which the denomination is made is not in all the analogates according to being, but only in one, which is more primary. Analogy of proportionality, however, is there called according to being and according to intention, since the analogates are not on a par and do not agree in one thing from which they would derive their intention or denomination, nor in one thing that would have the same being in all of them. Rather, each must have its own intrinsic account, different from the others but in some way proportioned to them, as with “being” when said of substance and accident. Other analogates, which are there called according to being and not according to intention and which Cajetan and others call analogates of inequality, are not analogates properly, although they are called analogates by the physicist because they do not agree in matter. Examples are the corruptible and the incorruptible, as stated in Metaphysics X, text 5; yet they agree univocally in the account of body or substance.²⁴

The second division is of analogy of proportionality into proper and improper, or metaphorical, analogy. PROPER ANALOGY occurs when the account signified by the analogical term is found formally and truly in both analogates, as being is found in accident and substance. METAPHORICAL ANALOGY occurs when the account signified is found formally in one and by likeness or transference in another, as laughter is found formally in a human being and figuratively in a meadow. This division is not omitted but affirmed by St. Thomas in Ethics I, lecture 7²⁵, where he identifies metaphorical analogy in these words: they are said “according to one proportion with respect to different subjects; for sight has the same proportion to the body as intellect has to the soul.” Thus intellect is called an eye by likeness, because it is not truly an eye but is like an eye. Whatever is denominated metaphorically and by likeness from something is not denominated as being that thing but as being like it: Christ is not called a lion, but like a lion. Hence such terms do not retain the same concept in the mind, even though they have the same name, as we said in Summulae, q. 7, art. 2. Nor are the names serving metaphorical analogy analogical by their imposition; rather, they become so through transference and the usage of people who speak figuratively in this way and compare things, taking one as if it were another, as will be made clearer below in art. 5. Hence metaphorical analogy is not properly a species of analogy, but a certain comparison of one thing with another while retaining the same name. Cajetan therefore called such cases analogates improperly in chapter 3 of that work; and we discussed them in the cited place in Summulae as not analogical in the strict sense.

Finally, analogy is usually divided into analogy of two concepts and of one concept. This must be examined below in art. 5, where we shall show which analogates can be conceived through one concept and which through different concepts.

BUT YOU WILL ASK whether the transcendentals express some species of analogy distinct from these. It is answered that some think so. But in accord with Aristotle and St. Thomas, we number the transcendentals among analogates, as is clear from Metaphysics III, lecture 8²⁶. We shall examine the reason for this more fully in the next question, when treating the analogy of being. The differences in which the transcendentals are embedded have their diversity from the very account of the transcendental, not from the addition of a concept distinct from the transcendental; consequently, the transcendental account is related to unity and diversity alike by its own concept, which means that it is not simply one. We do not decide here whether the analogy of these transcendentals should be reduced to proper proportionality or to attribution, as some think; this will become clear when we treat the analogy of being in the next question, since the same account holds for the other transcendentals. Meanwhile, one may consult St. Thomas, Ethics I, lecture 7²⁷, where he asserts this of the good, one of the transcendentals; Summa theologiae I, q. 6, art. 4; On the Power of God, q. 7, art. 7²⁸, where he treats being; and the other places cited above.

YOU WILL SAY: “Being” said of Peter and Paul, or of two other individuals, is a transcendental, since it is embedded in their differences and in every aspect of them; yet it is neither analogy of proportionality nor analogy of proportion, since there is complete equality among individuals. Therefore the doctrine is false.

It is answered that the transcendental extends of itself and per se to several things that differ in species and genus, and it is with respect to these that it is analogical; thus it is not restricted to those individuals alone. With respect only to those individuals, however, it is not analogical, although it remains transcendental. This is incidental, because the transcendental account is not taken in its entirety, but with restriction to two things that have no formal inequality, only a material one, which is not unequal diversity. Therefore, with respect to those things under this restriction, the inequality and diversity proper to analogy are not exercised, even though transcendence remains; it is considered restrictively and incidentally, not according to what it has of itself.