Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Secunda Pars Artis Logicae

Aristotle defined equivocal things as “those things whose name is common, while the account of the substance signified is diverse.” In this definition it is clear that he intended to treat equivocated things, both because he defined equivocal things in the plural and because he says “whose name is common.” Therefore he did not define the equivocal equivocator itself, which is a name, but the things signified by the name. These are equivocated things. But since things are called equivocated only by reason of some intention, which is called equivocation, and this, as we shall say presently, belongs to the things signified only insofar as they are subject to a name, not to a completed concept, the definition is therefore given through the name, in relation to which the intention of equivocation is taken.

The PARTICLES of the definition need no lengthy explanation. It says “whose name,” that is, a significant utterance, whether it is properly a noun, a verb, or any other significant term. It says “the account signified is diverse,” taking the word “account,” as Cajetan rightly notes here, for the concept signified by the name, and especially for the objective concept. Whether the formal concept too must be diverse, we shall say presently. It also says “the account of the substance,” that is, of the quiddity or thing, because equivocal terms signify things of diverse quiddity; otherwise they would be univocal if they signified the same quiddity.

The DEFINED THING in this definition is to be explained as in other logical definitions, as we said concerning the defined thing of a genus: it is the second intention itself in the concrete, insofar as it belongs to equivocated things.

Certain difficulties nevertheless arise for a fuller explanation of what is said about equivocal things.

First, whether there is pure equivocation in the completed concept of the mind, as there is in a spoken word.

We answered this briefly in book 1 of the Summulae, chapter 6: No. The basis is that an equivocal term is one that signifies several things signified insofar as they are diverse, that is, insofar as they agree in nothing. For if it signified several things insofar as they agree in something that is simply one, or at least proportionally one, it would not be pure equivocation but univocation or analogy. A concept, however, since it is a natural likeness of things, cannot be one if its objects are many and in no way one, because its unity in the character of representation and likeness is taken from some unity of the thing represented: for it takes its specification from the object and consequently its specific unity. If, then, the objects are represented as many in such a way that they are not represented insofar as they agree in something—that is, they are represented as many insofar as they are diverse—nothing remains from which that concept can derive unity, because natural representation derives unity only from the unity of the object.

From this it is clear that the case is not the same for the spoken word itself, or for an incomplete concept, which is the concept of a significant word. For a significant word is not intrinsically significant, but is so by imposition; it is not impossible for the same word to accumulate several impositions. But it is impossible for several natural representations to belong to the same concept, since its essential character consists in representation. Nor is the case of analogy the same: analogy regards its analogates not under an altogether diverse account, but under one that is in some way one, at least proportionally, which suffices for the unity of a concept, as we shall say later; and if even that does not suffice, univocation will suffice much less. Likewise, according to the probable opinion, the subject and predicate in the same proposition are reached by a single representative quality, because they agree under some unity, at least of predication and conjunction.

The second difficulty is whether an equivocal name should be called one name or several, just as an equivocal proposition is called several propositions.

The answer is that it should simply be called one name, although it has several significations, because the unity of an accidental concrete is taken from the unity of its subject, as St. Thomas often affirms, especially in 3. p. q. 3. art. 7. ad 2. Just as a man clothed in several garments is not called several clothed persons but one clothed person, and one body with several qualities is not called several qualified things but one. For accidental concretes are counted by reason of their supposits, not by reason of their forms, which do not have being per se but through a subject. Since, then, a name or term is an accidental concrete consisting of a spoken word and a signification, it cannot be counted as several unless the subject is multiplied, and not merely the significations, which are forms. But in equivocal terms there is one and the same spoken word, for they have a common name; therefore they should not simply be called several names. This is the express opinion of St. Thomas, although some more recent authors contradict it, as can be seen in Quodlibet 4. art. 17¹, where he says that “the unity or diversity of a significant word does not depend on the unity or diversity of the thing signified, for otherwise there would be no equivocal name.” Likewise, in opusculum 39, chapter 4², he says that the appearance in the fallacy of equivocation “is the unity of the same expression simply.” This can also be seen in chapter 33 of Contra Gentiles 1 and Metaphysics 11, lect. 3³. It is also clear from the Philosopher's definition, since he says that equivocal things are those whose name is common; but if there were not one and the same name, it would not be common. Nor did the Philosopher say “whose spoken word is common,” but “whose name”; accordingly, it is not enough to say that an equivocal term is one materially by reason of the spoken word, but it must be one insofar as it is a name.

It is no objection that an equivocal proposition, that is, one consisting of an equivocal term, is called several propositions. For it is called several not vocally but mentally, because it is not subordinated to one proposition in the mind, whereas in speech there is one proposition. Hence St. Thomas says in opusculum 39, chapter 5⁴, that “just as equivocation arises from the same expression signifying several things altogether, so amphiboly arises from the same sentence signifying several things altogether”; amphiboly, however, is a sentence consisting of an equivocal term.

BUT YOU WILL SAY: An equivocal name has several forms constitutive of a name, namely significations, and has unity only of subject, which pertains to material unity, not formal unity, which is taken from the form. Yet plurality on the part of form suffices for a plurality of accidents in the concrete, even if the subject is the same. First, otherwise all the accidents in one subject would have the same unity and make one and the same concrete: for example, in a man, being white, hot, and healthy would be the same concrete, since it would be taken from the unity of the subject. Since this is absurd, it must consequently also be said that the numerical unity of an accident in the concrete can be multiplied without multiplying the subject, but by multiplying the form alone. Second, substantives are multiplied in accordance with the multiplication of their form, as St. Thomas teaches in 1. p. q. 39. art. 4.; therefore accidental things are so much the more, especially when they are also signified substantively, as the words “name” and “term” are. For less seems to be required for multiplying an accident than a substance, especially since multiplication belongs to the genus of evils, which arise from any defect whatever. Therefore, if multiplication of form suffices for the multiplication of substance, it also suffices for the multiplication of accidents.

The answer is that, in numerical plurality, one thing is what is required as the account and principle of numerical multiplication, and another is what is required as a condition. In substances, the account of multiplication is indeed taken from the diversity of form, but not just any diversity: it must be a form that brings a supposit with it, because bringing a supposit with it is connatural to a substantial form. Thus, if this is absent, no matter how much the forms are multiplied, there is no individual numbering, as St. Thomas teaches in 3. p. q. 3. art. 7. in the case where three human natures would be assumed by a Divine Person. In accidents, by contrast, what multiplies concrete forms numerically is the multiplication of supposits. Hence we say that the plurality of an accident follows the plurality of form in the way that the plurality occurs. Specific plurality follows the plurality of form absolutely and in the abstract, according to formal principles; numerical plurality follows the form insofar as it is a supposit per se, if it is a substance, or insofar as it is subjected in another, if it is an accident.

To the reply that all the accidents in a subject will be one accident numerically, it is answered that it does not follow that they are the same numerically, except insofar as they are signified within the same specific form. Thus, although a man is hot and white, he is not called several qualified things but one qualified thing, because accidents of diverse species that are in the same subject do not have the same numerical unity; each has its own unity within its own species. But concretion according to the signification of the same form is not multiplied unless the subjects are multiplied, because the forms themselves are not a concrete or supposit of themselves, but are so by reason of the subject in which they inhere.

To the second reply, that substantives are multiplied by multiplication of forms, we have already said that this is understood of multiplication of forms that bring a supposit with them. Otherwise, if the supposit remains one, the forms are multiplied only specifically and according to names signifying diverse species, not according to numerical concretion. This holds all the more for accidents, even when signified substantively, because in themselves they do not carry a supposit, but have concretion by reason of their subject. Thus less is required for the concrete multiplication of an accident than of a substance, namely, only the numbering of supposits. For the multiplication of a substance, however, multiplication of both supposit and form is required—or rather, of the form insofar as it carries a supposit with it. Nor does multiplication arise from any defect whatsoever, but this particular multiplication, namely numerical multiplication, arises from this particular defect, namely, that supposits are not multiplied.

Concerning equivocal or analogous terms, we gave two rules in book 1 of the Summulae, chapter 5. FIRST: An analogical term taken per se stands for the more famous signified thing; for example, if you say “A lion runs,” it stands for a real lion, not a metaphorical one. The rule is understood of analogues of two concepts, such as analogues of attribution or metaphor. It is found in St. Thomas, Sentences 1, dist. 9, q. 1, art. 2, ad 2⁵: “When,” he says, “something is said absolutely, it is understood of that which is simply so, just as ‘being,’ said absolutely, signifies substance.”

SECOND rule: Subjects are such as their predicates allow. This too is taken from St. Thomas, q. 7. De Veritate, art. 5, ad 3⁶, where he says that “something said simply is sometimes understood of that which is said secondarily by reason of some added feature.”

The first rule is understood of an analogue taken per se, without any restriction, whether on the part of the subject or the predicate. For by reason of union the subject too restricts it, as when you say “The meadow smiles”: “smiles” stands metaphorically by reason of its union with “meadow.” In the second rule, however, take care not to place distribution on the part of the subject. For distribution prevents alienation, which is a kind of restriction; thus, strictly speaking, it is false to say “Every being is God” or “Every man is painted,” although on the basis of usage and not logical rigor the proposition “All the kings of Spain are in this hall” is conceded, with “kings” understood of painted kings. Second, observe that when an analogue is alienated by an added particle, as in “A man is painted,” where it stands for a painted man and not a real one, its contradictory should be framed as follows: “No painted man is painted,” so that the same subject is preserved with the same alienation. For otherwise, in that distributive proposition, alienation would be blocked by distribution, just as it is blocked by negation, as when one says “A man is not painted”: “not” is applied, but the alienation is removed. Likewise, in “God does not generate,” “God” is not restricted to stand for the Father, as St. Thomas teaches in 1. p. q. 39. art. 4. ad 3.