Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Secunda Pars Artis Logicae

We said above that the pre-predicaments contain certain preliminary and prerequisite matters for establishing and distinguishing the coordination of the categories. Such prerequisites, then, are four distinctions or conditions that Aristotle sets out here. The first distinction, or first pre-predicament, is the division of univocals, equivocals, and denominatives. The second is the distinction between complex and non-complex things. The third pre-predicament is the distinction between things that are in a subject and things that are said of a subject. The fourth is the distinction between things that pertain to the direct line of the categories and things that are related laterally and indirectly; Aristotle explains it through two pre-predicamental rules. The division of being itself into the different categories does not belong to a pre-predicament; rather, it makes the categories known.

The reason for the first pre-predicament is that, to understand the ordering of the categories, we must consider three kinds of relation. The first is to predicates that stand above all the categories. The second is to things coordinated within the same category. The third is the relation of things in one category to things in another. We must likewise consider agreement or disagreement in names, because the logician deals with things only insofar as they are explained through names and concepts.

The relation of the categories to what stands above them is that of ANALOGOUS OR EQUIVOCAL TERMS, because the categories do not agree in any univocal superior. Their relation to the things ordered within the same category is that of UNIVOCAL TERMS, because it is according to the same account, and not merely according to the same name. A category’s relation to another category, in turn, is one of DENOMINATION, insofar as one is related accidentally to the other. For one category cannot be compared essentially with another: things that communicate essentially belong to the same category. It was therefore necessary to treat equivocal, univocal, and denominative terms as the first pre-predicament, explaining this threefold relation without which the categories cannot be coordinated and brought together.

The reason for the second pre-predicament is that the categories are coordinations of simple things, not of complex ones. Natures are placed in the categories, and these have a single definition and quiddity. For what lacks unity and quiddity in its essence is not being simply but many beings; unity is a property of being. In a coordination of essences, then, we must place incomplex natures, which alone are definable quiddities. Thus the DISTINCTION BETWEEN COMPLEX AND NON-COMPLEX THINGS had to be set out as another pre-predicament.

The reason for the third pre-predicament is that these series, or coordinations, of predicates in each category are established through being subject to and predicated of—that is, through superior and inferior subjects and predicates. To form these coordinations, then, we must distinguish what it is to BE IN A SUBJECT AND TO BE SAID OF A SUBJECT. Being in a subject pertains to something real, namely, an accident that inheres; being said of a subject pertains to something intentional, namely, a predicate said of something. Aristotle thus sets out four combinations. Some things are said of a subject but are not in a subject, such as universal substances, which are predicated of inferiors but do not inhere. Others have the opposite status: they are in a subject but are not said of a subject, as with singular accidents that inhere—for example, this particular whiteness—but are not predicated because they are not superior. Others are neither said of nor in a subject, such as singular substances, for example, this human being. Finally, others are both said of and in a subject, such as universal accidents, for example, white. In this third pre-predicament Aristotle therefore distinguishes two kinds of beings, substance and accident, and two kinds of intentions, universality and singularity. All of this greatly assists in forming the coordinations of the categories of accident and substance according to singularity and universality.

Finally, the reason for the fourth pre-predicament is that, in coordinating the categories, we must know both the connection among things placed in a direct line—which pertains to the proper placement of a category—and the connection or separation of things placed laterally, as differences. Aristotle thus gives two rules:

First is: Whenever something is predicated of a subject, whatever is said of the predicate is said of the subject. The sense is this: whenever something is said of a subject—that is, of an inferior, whether it is the absolute lowest subject, as an individual is, or is not altogether lowest, as a species is—whatever is universal relative to that inferior functions as its predicate. Thus, whatever is said of such a predicate, and is universal relative to that predicate, will also be said of and be universal relative to that inferior subject, which is contained under the predicate. This rule therefore helps us understand the DIRECT LINE of the categorial order, which consists of superior and universal predicates together with the inferiors contained under them.

Second, however, the rule is: Genera not placed under one another—that is, where one is not placed under the other—do not have the same essential differences. If, however, they are placed under one another, they can have the same differences, that is, they can share superior differences, because those differences constitute superior genera and descend with them to inferiors. Genera can be understood as placed under one another in two ways: either one is placed under the other, or both are placed under a third, as animal and plant are not placed one under the other but both are placed under living thing. Therefore, for genera to lack the same differences absolutely and in every way, they must be placed under one another in neither way and, consequently, must belong to different categories. For if they fall under one third genus, they at least share the same difference of that genus. But since one does not share the difference of the other, while both share the superior difference of the genus under which they are contained as under a third, they are not said to have the same differences as though these were communicated from one genus to another, but as derived from one superior third genus.

We must carefully observe, however, that different genera can have similar differences by which they are divided. For example, power is divided into cognitive and appetitive as two genera, and each of these into corporeal and spiritual. Conversely, spiritual power can be divided into cognitive and appetitive; quantity is divided into continuous and discrete, and each of these into successive and permanent. Likewise, a proposition is divided into categorical and hypothetical, and each of these into affirmative and negative. But if these differences are essential and formal, although they may seem similar, they are in fact distinct and cannot be of the same account. This is clear because they formally constitute diverse natures; therefore, they cannot be of the same account. Hence St. Thomas’s general rule in Summa Theologiae I–II, q. 72, a. 5: “A difference that constitutes diversity of species is never found except in diverse species,” as rational and irrational, animate and inanimate, can never be found except in diverse species. “A difference, however, that does not constitute diversity of species, but is found in diverse species, is not incompatible with its also being found in things of the same species,” as whiteness and blackness are found in both the swan and the raven, which are diverse species, and also in two human beings. Thus, if the differences just mentioned are constitutive and essential, they can be similar but are not the same. For example, corporeal and spiritual as divisions of powers are not the same corporeal and spiritual as divisions of substances. And even among qualities and powers, corporeal and incorporeal are found under different accounts: the spirituality of the appetitive power differs from that of the intellective power. Likewise, affirmation and negation differ in categorical and hypothetical propositions, although each pair divides its respective kind of proposition. Two-footed and four-footed, however, are not differences that constitute a thing per se, but are accidental, as we said above from St. Thomas. Therefore, differences that constitute per se and formally are never of the same account in diverse genera or species.

Aristotle defined equivocal things as “those things whose name is common, while the account of the substance signified is diverse.” In this definition it is clear that he intended to treat equivocated things, both because he defined equivocal things in the plural and because he says “whose name is common.” Therefore he did not define the equivocal equivocator itself, which is a name, but the things signified by the name. These are equivocated things. But since things are called equivocated only by reason of some intention, which is called equivocation, and this, as we shall say presently, belongs to the things signified only insofar as they are subject to a name, not to a completed concept, the definition is therefore given through the name, in relation to which the intention of equivocation is taken.

The PARTICLES of the definition need no lengthy explanation. It says “whose name,” that is, a significant utterance, whether it is properly a noun, a verb, or any other significant term. It says “the account signified is diverse,” taking the word “account,” as Cajetan rightly notes here, for the concept signified by the name, and especially for the objective concept. Whether the formal concept too must be diverse, we shall say presently. It also says “the account of the substance,” that is, of the quiddity or thing, because equivocal terms signify things of diverse quiddity; otherwise they would be univocal if they signified the same quiddity.

The DEFINED THING in this definition is to be explained as in other logical definitions, as we said concerning the defined thing of a genus: it is the second intention itself in the concrete, insofar as it belongs to equivocated things.

Certain difficulties nevertheless arise for a fuller explanation of what is said about equivocal things.

First, whether there is pure equivocation in the completed concept of the mind, as there is in a spoken word.

We answered this briefly in book 1 of the Summulae, chapter 6: No. The basis is that an equivocal term is one that signifies several things signified insofar as they are diverse, that is, insofar as they agree in nothing. For if it signified several things insofar as they agree in something that is simply one, or at least proportionally one, it would not be pure equivocation but univocation or analogy. A concept, however, since it is a natural likeness of things, cannot be one if its objects are many and in no way one, because its unity in the character of representation and likeness is taken from some unity of the thing represented: for it takes its specification from the object and consequently its specific unity. If, then, the objects are represented as many in such a way that they are not represented insofar as they agree in something—that is, they are represented as many insofar as they are diverse—nothing remains from which that concept can derive unity, because natural representation derives unity only from the unity of the object.

From this it is clear that the case is not the same for the spoken word itself, or for an incomplete concept, which is the concept of a significant word. For a significant word is not intrinsically significant, but is so by imposition; it is not impossible for the same word to accumulate several impositions. But it is impossible for several natural representations to belong to the same concept, since its essential character consists in representation. Nor is the case of analogy the same: analogy regards its analogates not under an altogether diverse account, but under one that is in some way one, at least proportionally, which suffices for the unity of a concept, as we shall say later; and if even that does not suffice, univocation will suffice much less. Likewise, according to the probable opinion, the subject and predicate in the same proposition are reached by a single representative quality, because they agree under some unity, at least of predication and conjunction.

The second difficulty is whether an equivocal name should be called one name or several, just as an equivocal proposition is called several propositions.

The answer is that it should simply be called one name, although it has several significations, because the unity of an accidental concrete is taken from the unity of its subject, as St. Thomas often affirms, especially in 3. p. q. 3. art. 7. ad 2. Just as a man clothed in several garments is not called several clothed persons but one clothed person, and one body with several qualities is not called several qualified things but one. For accidental concretes are counted by reason of their supposits, not by reason of their forms, which do not have being per se but through a subject. Since, then, a name or term is an accidental concrete consisting of a spoken word and a signification, it cannot be counted as several unless the subject is multiplied, and not merely the significations, which are forms. But in equivocal terms there is one and the same spoken word, for they have a common name; therefore they should not simply be called several names. This is the express opinion of St. Thomas, although some more recent authors contradict it, as can be seen in Quodlibet 4. art. 17¹, where he says that “the unity or diversity of a significant word does not depend on the unity or diversity of the thing signified, for otherwise there would be no equivocal name.” Likewise, in opusculum 39, chapter 4², he says that the appearance in the fallacy of equivocation “is the unity of the same expression simply.” This can also be seen in chapter 33 of Contra Gentiles 1 and Metaphysics 11, lect. 3³. It is also clear from the Philosopher's definition, since he says that equivocal things are those whose name is common; but if there were not one and the same name, it would not be common. Nor did the Philosopher say “whose spoken word is common,” but “whose name”; accordingly, it is not enough to say that an equivocal term is one materially by reason of the spoken word, but it must be one insofar as it is a name.

It is no objection that an equivocal proposition, that is, one consisting of an equivocal term, is called several propositions. For it is called several not vocally but mentally, because it is not subordinated to one proposition in the mind, whereas in speech there is one proposition. Hence St. Thomas says in opusculum 39, chapter 5⁴, that “just as equivocation arises from the same expression signifying several things altogether, so amphiboly arises from the same sentence signifying several things altogether”; amphiboly, however, is a sentence consisting of an equivocal term.

BUT YOU WILL SAY: An equivocal name has several forms constitutive of a name, namely significations, and has unity only of subject, which pertains to material unity, not formal unity, which is taken from the form. Yet plurality on the part of form suffices for a plurality of accidents in the concrete, even if the subject is the same. First, otherwise all the accidents in one subject would have the same unity and make one and the same concrete: for example, in a man, being white, hot, and healthy would be the same concrete, since it would be taken from the unity of the subject. Since this is absurd, it must consequently also be said that the numerical unity of an accident in the concrete can be multiplied without multiplying the subject, but by multiplying the form alone. Second, substantives are multiplied in accordance with the multiplication of their form, as St. Thomas teaches in 1. p. q. 39. art. 4.; therefore accidental things are so much the more, especially when they are also signified substantively, as the words “name” and “term” are. For less seems to be required for multiplying an accident than a substance, especially since multiplication belongs to the genus of evils, which arise from any defect whatever. Therefore, if multiplication of form suffices for the multiplication of substance, it also suffices for the multiplication of accidents.

The answer is that, in numerical plurality, one thing is what is required as the account and principle of numerical multiplication, and another is what is required as a condition. In substances, the account of multiplication is indeed taken from the diversity of form, but not just any diversity: it must be a form that brings a supposit with it, because bringing a supposit with it is connatural to a substantial form. Thus, if this is absent, no matter how much the forms are multiplied, there is no individual numbering, as St. Thomas teaches in 3. p. q. 3. art. 7. in the case where three human natures would be assumed by a Divine Person. In accidents, by contrast, what multiplies concrete forms numerically is the multiplication of supposits. Hence we say that the plurality of an accident follows the plurality of form in the way that the plurality occurs. Specific plurality follows the plurality of form absolutely and in the abstract, according to formal principles; numerical plurality follows the form insofar as it is a supposit per se, if it is a substance, or insofar as it is subjected in another, if it is an accident.

To the reply that all the accidents in a subject will be one accident numerically, it is answered that it does not follow that they are the same numerically, except insofar as they are signified within the same specific form. Thus, although a man is hot and white, he is not called several qualified things but one qualified thing, because accidents of diverse species that are in the same subject do not have the same numerical unity; each has its own unity within its own species. But concretion according to the signification of the same form is not multiplied unless the subjects are multiplied, because the forms themselves are not a concrete or supposit of themselves, but are so by reason of the subject in which they inhere.

To the second reply, that substantives are multiplied by multiplication of forms, we have already said that this is understood of multiplication of forms that bring a supposit with them. Otherwise, if the supposit remains one, the forms are multiplied only specifically and according to names signifying diverse species, not according to numerical concretion. This holds all the more for accidents, even when signified substantively, because in themselves they do not carry a supposit, but have concretion by reason of their subject. Thus less is required for the concrete multiplication of an accident than of a substance, namely, only the numbering of supposits. For the multiplication of a substance, however, multiplication of both supposit and form is required—or rather, of the form insofar as it carries a supposit with it. Nor does multiplication arise from any defect whatsoever, but this particular multiplication, namely numerical multiplication, arises from this particular defect, namely, that supposits are not multiplied.

Concerning equivocal or analogous terms, we gave two rules in book 1 of the Summulae, chapter 5. FIRST: An analogical term taken per se stands for the more famous signified thing; for example, if you say “A lion runs,” it stands for a real lion, not a metaphorical one. The rule is understood of analogues of two concepts, such as analogues of attribution or metaphor. It is found in St. Thomas, Sentences 1, dist. 9, q. 1, art. 2, ad 2⁵: “When,” he says, “something is said absolutely, it is understood of that which is simply so, just as ‘being,’ said absolutely, signifies substance.”

SECOND rule: Subjects are such as their predicates allow. This too is taken from St. Thomas, q. 7. De Veritate, art. 5, ad 3⁶, where he says that “something said simply is sometimes understood of that which is said secondarily by reason of some added feature.”

The first rule is understood of an analogue taken per se, without any restriction, whether on the part of the subject or the predicate. For by reason of union the subject too restricts it, as when you say “The meadow smiles”: “smiles” stands metaphorically by reason of its union with “meadow.” In the second rule, however, take care not to place distribution on the part of the subject. For distribution prevents alienation, which is a kind of restriction; thus, strictly speaking, it is false to say “Every being is God” or “Every man is painted,” although on the basis of usage and not logical rigor the proposition “All the kings of Spain are in this hall” is conceded, with “kings” understood of painted kings. Second, observe that when an analogue is alienated by an added particle, as in “A man is painted,” where it stands for a painted man and not a real one, its contradictory should be framed as follows: “No painted man is painted,” so that the same subject is preserved with the same alienation. For otherwise, in that distributive proposition, alienation would be blocked by distribution, just as it is blocked by negation, as when one says “A man is not painted”: “not” is applied, but the alienation is removed. Likewise, in “God does not generate,” “God” is not restricted to stand for the Father, as St. Thomas teaches in 1. p. q. 39. art. 4. ad 3.

The difficulties concerning analogy are quite metaphysical. Cajetan has discussed them so fully and subtly in his little work On the Analogy of Names that he has left us nothing further to devise.

Therefore the COMMON and widespread opinion is that analogy lies midway between pure equivocation and univocation, because the thing signified is neither wholly the same, as in univocals, nor wholly different, as in equivocals, but is different in itself and one proportionally, according to a certain relation. St. Thomas teaches this as evident in Metaphysics XI, lecture 3.¹ Some recent authors, however, think that although Aristotle distinguishes analogates from equivocals by chance, they nevertheless belong simply to equivocal terms, since analogy is a kind of equivocation. It must therefore preserve the genus of equivocation: on the side of the thing signified, there are different accounts, while there is only one name. Thus the whole account of analogy is reduced, not to the thing signified—as though it were different in each case, as with equivocals—but to the cause of the name’s signification: namely, the relation of one thing to another, or to several others, causes the name of one to be applied to another. This relation is called analogy when it is a relation of proportion; if it is some other relation, the term is called “equivocal with reference to one thing,” but not analogical.

HOWEVER, although it is true that if we attend strictly to the meaning and Greek derivation of the name “analogy,” it signifies only proportion and those things that are one by reason of a proportional relation, for which reason Aristotle in Ethics I² and St. Thomas there, lecture 7³, call those things one by analogy which are one in a relation of proportion, while those that are one according to other relations are called “of many to one” or “from one”; and although Cajetan himself, in the cited work, chapter 1, calls only analogy of proportionality true analogy and the others analogical only improperly—a usage also observed by Master Soto on the chapter on Equivocals, art. 2, corollary 1—nevertheless it cannot be denied that by the usage of schools and learned authors, “analogates” generally means things that are neither purely equivocal nor purely univocal, but have that proportional and qualified unity by some relation or other, so that the account signified is not wholly diverse. For Aristotle generally acknowledges things that are said neither equivocally nor univocally, and St. Thomas says that these are said analogically, as is clear especially from Metaphysics IV, chapter 2⁴, lecture 1 in St. Thomas⁵; Metaphysics VII, text 10⁶, lecture 4⁷; Metaphysics XI⁸, lecture 3⁹, and XII, lecture 4, at the end¹⁰; On Truth, q. 2, art. 11¹¹; On the Power of God, q. 7, art. 7¹²; and Summa theologiae I, q. 13, art. 6. St. Thomas also divides analogy itself into analogy of attribution and analogy of proportionality, or relations of many to one and from one, or into other similar names equivalent to these, as is clear especially from On Truth, q. 2, art. 11¹³, On the Power of God, q. 7, art. 7¹⁴, and Sentences I, dist. 19, q. 5, art. 2, reply 1¹⁵. He speaks of analogy distinguished from equivocals simply, that is, equivocals by chance. The reason is that these things do not signify things wholly diverse, but things one in some way; therefore they differ from pure equivocals, yet they are not univocals, since they do not signify something wholly the same. Why, then, should they not be called analogates, to express this difference?

SOME, because analogical terms abstract from none of their analogates, nor from their modes or differences, but are immersed in them, deny analogates any unity on the side of the thing and allow unity only in the signification of the word. This is the view of Father Vasquez, Commentary on the First Part, vol. 2, disp. 114, chap. 2, and disp. 121, chap. 2. We accept the first point, as will be proved below in art. 5 from St. Thomas and Cajetan. But the second is wholly impossible, since it amounts to making being purely equivocal, which Aristotle so often denies, as will be proved in the following question, art. 2. Moreover, propositions in which “being” or “to be” is predicated plainly apply to things themselves; nothing is more real than being or a being, and whatever is real is said to have reality if it has being. Therefore “being” in common, in which all real beings agree, does not express a mere name but the truth of reality. How that concept has unity will be explained below.

FROM WHAT HAS BEEN SAID, IT IS CLEAR that analogates are indeed a species of equivocals, insofar as they do not signify something wholly the same as univocals do. They are distinguished from equivocals by chance, however, because they do not signify things that are purely diverse, but diverse things that are one proportionally. This holds not only on the side of signification or of its cause, but also on the side of the thing signified. For if there were no proportion or relation of agreement on the side of the thing signified, the signification or application of the name on the side of signification would be mistaken in applying it according to such a relation.

To explain the divisions of analogy, we must first posit the common account of analogy and then divide it. From what has been said, analogates are things whose account is not wholly diverse but has some unity. Every unity in which several things agree is founded on agreement, likeness, or identity among things. Therefore, analogical unity must be distinguished from univocal unity by the differing kind of agreement or identity one thing has with another. Univocals are said to agree according to unity or agreement simply, because they are alike in one nature, whether specific or generic. Analogates, however, are said to agree according to proportional unity, since they are not things having parity or likeness in some nature, but are called the same proportionally, not equally. This is expressed more clearly in Spanish: “It is the same according to its measure,” as if one said, “in its measure and proportion.” For St. Thomas says in Ethics V, lecture 5¹⁶, that proportion is “the relation of one quantity to another,” and quantity has the character of a measure. The unity or agreement of proportion is therefore a commensurative unity, according to the measure of each term, not an absolute one. Univocals are things with accounts that are absolutely alike, that is, equal and on a par in some nature; analogates fall short of absolute unity or agreement and have agreement only in a relative mode, that is, according to proportion or commensuration.

With these points established, there are two divisions of analogates. The first is into analogy of proportion and analogy of proportionality. Analogy of proportion is called by several names. It is also usually called analogy of attribution, because denomination or attribution is usually made from one thing that is more primary to the others: for example, from the health of an animal the denomination “healthy” is attributed to urine and medicine, which are also called healthy. It is also called analogy of one to another or of many to one, for the same reason: denomination is made from one thing to several. Finally, it is called analogy of proportion because it is made by reason of some correspondence or commensuration among several things. Sometimes this proportion involves a determinate excess, as the proportion between a person’s strength and the weight that person can carry; sometimes it is merely a relation of correspondence without determination, as between creature and God, according to St. Thomas, On the Power of God, q. 7, art. 10, reply 9¹⁷, and On Truth, q. 2, art. 11¹⁸. Analogy of proportionality is also called analogy according to comparison, since it is based on equality or comparison of the proportions themselves. For, as St. Thomas teaches in Ethics V, lecture 5¹⁹, equality between proportions is called proportionality.

ANALOGATES OF PROPORTION OR ATTRIBUTION are defined as “things whose name is common, while the account signified is the same with respect to its terminus and diverse according to the relations to that terminus.” For example, “healthy” signifies the same account on the side of health, which is in the animal, but different relations in urine and an herb to the health of the animal as their terminus. This is taken from St. Thomas, Metaphysics XI, lecture 3²⁰, where he defines these analogates in this way and says that they are called analogates because they are proportioned to one thing. One may also consult Cajetan, cited work, chapters 2 and 3. ANALOGATES OF PROPORTIONALITY are defined as “things whose name is common, while the account signified is the same according to a likeness or agreement of proportions.” This is taken from St. Thomas, Ethics I, lecture 7²¹, On Truth, q. 2, art. 11²², the other places cited above, and Cajetan just cited.

It is true that St. Thomas expresses these species of analogy by other names in Sentences I, dist. 19, q. 5, art. 2, reply 1.²³ There analogy of proportion or attribution is called analogy according to intention and not according to being, because the intention or account from which the denomination is made is not in all the analogates according to being, but only in one, which is more primary. Analogy of proportionality, however, is there called according to being and according to intention, since the analogates are not on a par and do not agree in one thing from which they would derive their intention or denomination, nor in one thing that would have the same being in all of them. Rather, each must have its own intrinsic account, different from the others but in some way proportioned to them, as with “being” when said of substance and accident. Other analogates, which are there called according to being and not according to intention and which Cajetan and others call analogates of inequality, are not analogates properly, although they are called analogates by the physicist because they do not agree in matter. Examples are the corruptible and the incorruptible, as stated in Metaphysics X, text 5; yet they agree univocally in the account of body or substance.²⁴

The second division is of analogy of proportionality into proper and improper, or metaphorical, analogy. PROPER ANALOGY occurs when the account signified by the analogical term is found formally and truly in both analogates, as being is found in accident and substance. METAPHORICAL ANALOGY occurs when the account signified is found formally in one and by likeness or transference in another, as laughter is found formally in a human being and figuratively in a meadow. This division is not omitted but affirmed by St. Thomas in Ethics I, lecture 7²⁵, where he identifies metaphorical analogy in these words: they are said “according to one proportion with respect to different subjects; for sight has the same proportion to the body as intellect has to the soul.” Thus intellect is called an eye by likeness, because it is not truly an eye but is like an eye. Whatever is denominated metaphorically and by likeness from something is not denominated as being that thing but as being like it: Christ is not called a lion, but like a lion. Hence such terms do not retain the same concept in the mind, even though they have the same name, as we said in Summulae, q. 7, art. 2. Nor are the names serving metaphorical analogy analogical by their imposition; rather, they become so through transference and the usage of people who speak figuratively in this way and compare things, taking one as if it were another, as will be made clearer below in art. 5. Hence metaphorical analogy is not properly a species of analogy, but a certain comparison of one thing with another while retaining the same name. Cajetan therefore called such cases analogates improperly in chapter 3 of that work; and we discussed them in the cited place in Summulae as not analogical in the strict sense.

Finally, analogy is usually divided into analogy of two concepts and of one concept. This must be examined below in art. 5, where we shall show which analogates can be conceived through one concept and which through different concepts.

BUT YOU WILL ASK whether the transcendentals express some species of analogy distinct from these. It is answered that some think so. But in accord with Aristotle and St. Thomas, we number the transcendentals among analogates, as is clear from Metaphysics III, lecture 8²⁶. We shall examine the reason for this more fully in the next question, when treating the analogy of being. The differences in which the transcendentals are embedded have their diversity from the very account of the transcendental, not from the addition of a concept distinct from the transcendental; consequently, the transcendental account is related to unity and diversity alike by its own concept, which means that it is not simply one. We do not decide here whether the analogy of these transcendentals should be reduced to proper proportionality or to attribution, as some think; this will become clear when we treat the analogy of being in the next question, since the same account holds for the other transcendentals. Meanwhile, one may consult St. Thomas, Ethics I, lecture 7²⁷, where he asserts this of the good, one of the transcendentals; Summa theologiae I, q. 6, art. 4; On the Power of God, q. 7, art. 7²⁸, where he treats being; and the other places cited above.

YOU WILL SAY: “Being” said of Peter and Paul, or of two other individuals, is a transcendental, since it is embedded in their differences and in every aspect of them; yet it is neither analogy of proportionality nor analogy of proportion, since there is complete equality among individuals. Therefore the doctrine is false.

It is answered that the transcendental extends of itself and per se to several things that differ in species and genus, and it is with respect to these that it is analogical; thus it is not restricted to those individuals alone. With respect only to those individuals, however, it is not analogical, although it remains transcendental. This is incidental, because the transcendental account is not taken in its entirety, but with restriction to two things that have no formal inequality, only a material one, which is not unequal diversity. Therefore, with respect to those things under this restriction, the inequality and diversity proper to analogy are not exercised, even though transcendence remains; it is considered restrictively and incidentally, not according to what it has of itself.

There are two principal CONDITIONS in analogies of attribution and proportionality, from which the other accessory conditions depend. Among the many conditions usually assigned to analogies of attribution, or proportion, the chief one is that the form be found intrinsically in the principal analogate, but extrinsically and by denomination in the others. From this condition follow three others: First, the analogous form in these cases must be numerically one, since it is found only in one analogate. Second, the form of the principal analogate must be placed in the definitions of the others, which are denominated from it. Third, these analogates do not have one concept but several, with some mutual connotation, and are not like equivocal terms by chance. All these conditions can be seen in “healthy” as said of an animal, medicine, herb, and so on.

Similar conditions are found in metaphorical analogies, which also involve several concepts and are quite similar to analogies of attribution.

In proper analogies of proportionality, however, the chief condition is that some character of proportion be found intrinsically and formally in all the analogates, according to which they are likened to one another proportionally. From this follow three other conditions opposed to those of analogy of proportion: First, the analogous character must not be found formally in only one analogate and in the others by denomination, but formally in all, each in its own way. Second, one must not be placed in the definition of the others. Third, they can have one concept with imperfect and qualified unity, which is called proportional unity and belongs to the object.

Therefore, regarding the two principal conditions on which the others depend, THE DIFFICULTY IS whether they are necessarily required to constitute these analogies. Some recent authors think that in analogies of attribution it can be maintained that the signified character is found not only intrinsically in the principal analogate but also in the other analogates, although dependently on that first analogate. Conversely, they say that an element of attribution or metaphor is always required for analogy of proportionality. This follows from the first claim, for they think that analogy of attribution exists precisely when one form is found earlier in one thing and later in another, even if it is intrinsic to both. This is the view of Father Suárez, Metaphysical Disputations 32, section 3, whom others follow; see also Cabero, treatise 4, disputation 2, doubt 3.

The foundation of the first part is that in being and other things said of inferiors by intrinsic denomination, there can be an analogy of attribution; therefore that condition is not required.

The antecedent is established first from St. Thomas, who recognizes an analogy of attribution in good and true with respect to divine and created truth, as is clear in Summa theologiae I, q. 16, art. 6, and q. 6, art. 4. He teaches the same concerning being with respect to God and creatures in Against the Gentiles I, chapter 32. He also teaches in On Truth, q. 2, art. 11¹, that “being” is said of God and creatures, substance and accident, earlier and later, which is proper to an analogy of attribution. Second, the definition of analogy of attribution requires only that the analogates depend on one first and principal thing, not that the form be in them extrinsically and denominatively. For the definition says that analogates of attribution are the same according to their term and different according to their relation to it. How, then, is it established that this relation must consist in a form that is extrinsic in some and intrinsic in one? Third, this is clearly apparent in the analogous term “healthy,” which is an analogy of proportion with respect to an animal and a herb; yet in the herb there is not an extrinsic denomination, but an intrinsic relation—the very character by which it is denominated healthy. For that relation is grounded in something intrinsic, namely, the production of health, as is drawn from St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 16, art. 6.

The foundation of the other part is first from St. Thomas, who teaches generally that in every analogy all things must be said with reference to one thing, and that this one thing must be placed in the definition of them all, as is clear in Summa theologiae I, q. 13, art. 6, and q. 16, art. 6. But this is proper to analogy of proportion or metaphorical analogy; therefore it is also necessary for analogy of proportionality. Second, proportionality, absolutely speaking, can be found among univocals. For we can say that just as a human being is related to its being an animal, so a horse is related to its own; nevertheless, this does not exclude univocity. Therefore, for proportionality to exclude univocity and constitute analogy, some dependence of one analogate on another is required in addition to proportional comparison. But where one analogate is principal and the others, less principal, depend on it and are denominated from it, there is an analogy of attribution or a metaphor, which removes complete equality from proportions or comparisons, since such equality is directly opposed to analogy.

NEVERTHELESS, we must maintain both points against these opposing views. As to the first part, we say that an analogy of attribution, and likewise a metaphorical analogy, which is very close to it as regards the form that denominates analogically, must necessarily be intrinsic in one analogate and extrinsic and denominative in the others. Some intrinsic relations can nevertheless be presupposed in those less principal analogates—not relations by which they are denominated analogically and constituted under the analogous form, but relations by which they regard the principal analogate, so that they may afterward be denominated analogically and extrinsically by it.

This is drawn from St. Thomas, who teaches both points. That the analogous form in these analogies of attribution must be found intrinsically in only one and denominatively in the others is clear from Summa theologiae I–II, q. 20, art. 3, ad 3; Summa theologiae I, q. 16, art. 6; Metaphysics IV, lecture 1²; and Metaphysics XI, lecture 3³. There he says that the form must be found in only one of the analogates according to its proper character, and that the others are denominated from it. Therefore he holds that it is not found formally in all, since he says that it is found according to its proper character in only one, and is numerically one, something not formally communicated to the others. That the less principal analogates nevertheless have something intrinsic—not by which they are denominated analogically, but by which they intrinsically regard the principal analogate—is clear from the same St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 16, cited art. 6, when he says: “Although health is not in medicine and urine, in each there is something by which the one produces health and the other signifies it.” Thus, according to St. Thomas, the form that denominates analogically is only numerically one, existing in one analogate, namely, the principal one. Likewise, there is something in these analogates that regards the principal analogate, so that they may afterward be denominated from its form. For example, in a herb the power to produce health does not denominate it healthy, but as looking toward health; in urine, the character of signifying health denominates it as signifying health, but not as healthy, except through the extrinsic health of an animal.

AND THE REASON FOR THIS IS that if an intrinsic denominating form exists in both analogates, one is not denominated by a form existing in the other, but by the form it has intrinsically in itself. Thus it does not need to be denominated extrinsically from the other, which destroys analogy of attribution. This can be explained further: if a denominating form is intrinsic in both analogates, even if it is more principal and perfect in one, either both forms are similar and identically one, proportionally one, or wholly different. If wholly different, the result is equivocation, not analogy. If wholly similar and of the same character, the result is univocity. If they are one proportionally and are found intrinsically in both analogates, nothing is lacking for them to constitute an analogy of proportionality, as is clear from its definition. Therefore, for an analogy of attribution distinct from these to exist, denomination must occur not through a form existing intrinsically in each, but through a form intrinsic in one and denominating extrinsically in the others. Thus health is intrinsic in an animal, but in a herb or medicine the form of health is not present intrinsically, but extrinsically.

As to the second part, the foundation is also drawn from St. Thomas and from reason. From ST. THOMAS, because he entirely distinguishes analogy of proportionality from analogy of attribution and metaphor, as is clear in On Truth, q. 2, art. 11⁴, and at the end of Ethics I, lecture 7⁵. Indeed, in On the Power of God, q. 7, art. 7⁶, he admits that even if, impossibly, goodness in God and creatures were of the same character—that is, if one were not derived from the other—univocity would still be prevented by their different relations to being. Therefore, once all attribution or extrinsic and metaphorical denomination is removed, there is still room for analogy, and univocity is prevented by the different modes of being in God and creatures. In Sentences I, dist. 19, q. 5, art. 2, ad 1⁷, he says that analogates according to being and intention, which are analogates of proportionality, must be found intrinsically in the analogates. In Metaphysics III, lecture 8⁸, being and the other transcendentals lose the character of genus and univocity because they are imbibed in the differences themselves, as we will consider more fully in the next article and question. Therefore true analogy is preserved without any character of metaphor or attribution, since there is neither attribution nor metaphor in transcendentals; otherwise they would not be transcendentals.

The reason for this is very simple. Among things having complete and univocal likeness, a comparison of proportion and equality can be made: for example, one can say that just as a human being is an animal, so too is a horse. Yet there is not only this unity of equality and proportion; there is a greater unity, namely, univocal likeness, on which the unity of proportion is founded, and this does not remove univocity. But when there is only a unity of proportions and no complete likeness, however much it is found to arise according to intrinsic forms, it cannot constitute univocity. Since it is not a unity simply and completely, it is a lesser unity, univocal only in a qualified sense, and this is analogical. For example, we compare the proportion between the heart in an animal and the foundation in a house, and name both “principle.” This does not signify one nature or a complete likeness participated in by both, but the proportion of each form, so that just as the heart is related to an animal, so the foundation is related to a house. Accordingly, these two retain some unity in the very character of principle, but not a unity or likeness of things or natures—only of proportions. Therefore there is analogy without any attribution or metaphor, through proportional unity alone, when this has no other unity of likeness and agreement joined to it on which a comparison of proportions could be based, but consists in the bare comparison of proportion and in a form intrinsic to both, not in a denomination or metaphor derived from what exists in only one. For the heart truly, not metaphorically, is a principle, and the foundation is a principle; nevertheless the heart and foundation are named analogically by the term “principle.” We will show in the next article and question that similar cases are found among transcendentals, in which there is no univocity.

To the opposing foundations for the first part, the reply is as follows. To St. Thomas: we say that he attributes an analogy of proportion to those analogates under one consideration, but does not deny an analogy of proportionality under another. Thus in the same Summa theologiae I, q. 6, art. 4, where he says that all things are called good by divine goodness exemplarily and efficiently, he adds: “Each thing is called good by the likeness of the divine goodness inhering in it, which is formally its own denominating goodness.” The holy Doctor therefore holds that the analogy of goodness between God and creature is spoken of according to an intrinsic form in both, not by reason of attribution and metaphor. He says explicitly at the end of Ethics I, lecture 7⁹, that the analogy of good is spoken of more in terms of the goodness inhering in things; and he prefers this analogy to the others he had listed there according to proportion or attribution. St. Thomas therefore does not attribute the claim that things are said according to inherent forms to analogy by attribution, but rather to analogy of proportionality, although the same analogates can also fall under an analogy of proportion according to another consideration.

If you ask how both analogies can belong to the same thing, for example being, since their conditions are entirely opposed—analogy of proportion says that the form is intrinsic in one and extrinsic in another, whereas analogy of proportionality says that it is intrinsic in both—and being is intrinsic in all analogates, not in only one and denominative in the others, the reply is that the two analogies are not both present formally, but one is present virtually. For being is found intrinsically in every analogate; nevertheless, it is the foundation such that, if, impossibly, a creature were not intrinsically a being or an accident, it would be a being by attribution and denomination, because a creature is a being from another and an accident in another. In this way the different passages of St. Thomas can be reconciled. In Summa theologiae I, q. 16, art. 6, he recognizes an analogy of attribution between created and uncreated truth, though not entirely absolutely. But in On Truth, q. 2, art. 11¹⁰, he recognizes only an analogy of proportionality between God and creature, because in fact there is an analogy of proportionality according to intrinsic participation. Yet because what is in a creature is participated in and derived from God as the principal analogate, this provides a sufficient foundation for saying that, if intrinsic denomination were absent, the creature would be said to be such by attribution and denomination alone, insofar as it is something of God.

You will object: The Philosopher continually recognizes an analogy of attribution between substance and accident, as with “healthy” said of an animal and of medicine, as is clear in Metaphysics IV, chapter 2¹¹, and VII, chapter 1¹², and chapter 4¹³, as well as in St. Thomas there and in the same On Truth, q. 2, art. 11¹⁴. Therefore at least with respect to these things an analogy of attribution actually exists together with actual intrinsic participation. The reply is drawn from St. Thomas, Metaphysics IV, lecture 1¹⁵: “Every being is said with reference to one first thing. But this first thing is not an efficient cause or an end, as in the examples given above of health and medicine; rather, it is a subject.” But what is first in the mode of a subject does not produce attribution by extrinsic denomination, as an end or efficient cause does, but by inherence of the form.

TO THE SECOND PROOF of the principal argument, the reply is that precisely because analogates of attribution have only a relation to some term, from the attribution of which they are denominated as from an extrinsic term, they cannot be denominated by an intrinsic character.

TO THE THIRD PROOF the reply is that a herb has an intrinsic relation to health because of its power to heal, and therefore it is intrinsically said to regard health, but it is not denominated healthy intrinsically. Thus health in an animal has the character of a form, while in relation to the herb it has the character of an extrinsically denominating term.

To the foundations for the second part: To the first, the reply from the authority of St. Thomas is that in that general statement St. Thomas is speaking not of all analogies absolutely, but restrictively of analogies of attribution alone. For in that place, Summa theologiae I, q. 13, he treats analogy more dialectically than metaphysically—that is, from the side of names, not things, since he was discussing the names of God. Just as metaphysics attends to inequality on the side of things when considering analogy, so dialectical consideration of analogy attends to inequality in the mode of signifying and naming. This is clear from the examples St. Thomas himself gives: “healthy” with respect to an animal and urine, and things said metaphorically of God and creatures, in which the signified character is found more principally in creatures. Speaking of other perfections of God, which are also found intrinsically in creatures, such as being good and being wise, he says that on the side of the thing signified they are said of God earlier, because they flow from him into creatures; he does not say that they are said with reference to God as extrinsically denominating them. Therefore he did not intend the rule previously stated in general to be understood of these cases in the same way—as though in every analogy all things are said with reference to one first thing from which they are denominated—but intended it to apply only to analogies of attribution. In the passage from q. 16, however, he does not speak universally of all analogies, and so it does not compel this conclusion.

To the second proof it is said that a comparison of proportions, or proportionality, if made only to explain a comparison of complete likeness, does not remove univocity. But when it presupposes no other unity or agreement than proportional unity, it is analogy. Hence the fact that proportionality is exercised among univocals does not prove the argument that it cannot constitute analogy, even if the form is intrinsic to both analogates, provided it presupposes no unity greater than proportionality.

This is the chief and most difficult point to understand in analogues, in which their unity is explained—the unity that separates them from equivocal terms but does not bring them to univocal terms. We are speaking of a concept abstracted or segregated from the lower analogates, since it is clear that the concept is multiplied in them. Hence, unless it is segregated from them, it has no unity; and thus the unity of an analogical concept cannot be investigated without investigating its abstraction from the lower analogates. This unity is founded on agreement, and a different unity is taken according to the different mode of agreement. In univocals, agreement and unity are given in one way, namely, through unity simply speaking. But in analogues, since unity is qualified and proportional, or consists in a relation and comparison, it is not found in the same way in all cases. They must therefore be distinguished one by one, and the mode of unity proper to each assigned to it.

I SAY, THEN, FIRST: Analogues of attribution and metaphorical analogues cannot have one concept, either objective or formal, but have several, with unity of comparison and connotation; by this alone they differ from purely equivocal terms. This is why these analogues are commonly called “of several concepts,” by Master Soto in his question on equivocal and analogical terms, and by other Thomists.

THE REASON FOR THIS IS that the unity of these analogates does not consist in something found intrinsically in all of them, either absolutely and simply or relatively and proportionally, that is, in their own way. Rather, it consists in the order of one or several things to one term, from which they receive their denomination because they connote or are related to it. Since such unity is a unity of order and relation of one or several things to another, it necessarily requires several concepts joined to that order and needed to exercise such connotation and relation. This is further made clear because such analogues are not analogical from their primary imposition, but through the transference and usage of people, as we hinted in our Summulae, q. 6, on supposition, a. 2. There we did not explain the matter fully, because that was not the place to do so; therefore we said that there are no true analogues in transfers and metaphors, but that proper names themselves are taken up for metaphorical transfer. And this is indeed so: these analogues of attribution and metaphorical proportionality are not such by their imposition, as Master Soto rightly notes in his commentary on the chapter on equivocal terms, single question, a. 2, corollary 2, but through the transfer and usage of people. For the names “healthy,” “laughter,” “lion,” and many like them are univocal by their imposition and directly signify the formal health that is in an animal, laughter that is in a human being, and a real lion. But through the usage of people, who compare one thing with another on account of a likeness or connotation they assert, the name of one is applied to the other, under which name they, as it were, conceal the comparison or connotation and explain it by circumlocution. Such a name, however, does not have as even a secondary signified object the thing with which it is compared and to which it is metaphorically transferred. Rather, what it signifies is only that to which such a thing can be compared and to which it bears a relation as to a term. From the fact that something can be the term of others’ comparison or relation, it does not signify all those things directly or indirectly by imposition or by the natural representation of the concept. We instead use that name abusively to name the things compared with it: thus, seeing that a medicine which is in an animal is healthy, we call food healthy; seeing a flowery meadow to be a cause of joy, we say that it laughs; and seeing that Christ has strength like a lion, we call him a lion.

St. Thomas expressed this in Prima Pars, q. 13, a. 6, saying that “the name ‘lion,’ said of God, signifies nothing other than that God is disposed to act powerfully in his works, as a lion is in its own.” Hence it is clear that the concept of lion, insofar as it corresponds to the name “lion,” which is univocal, cannot be extended to signify God or anything else compared with a lion, because the lion serves only as the term of that comparison and likeness, not as something having God for a less principal signified object. Therefore, in the cited place in our Summulae, we warned that, whatever the case may be, analogues that are truly analogues do secondarily signify their less principal analogates; nevertheless, even in the univocal name itself, improper supposition must be allowed when it is transferred to signify something else. This doctrine was presented there fully and briefly: improper supposition and metaphorical analogy (for they are the same) can belong to a univocal name which, by its imposition or direct signification, signifies something univocal, but is extended by transfer to something else. Thus, for example, the concept of lion signifies Christ neither directly nor indirectly, whereas analogues that are such from their first signification or imposition signify their less principal analogates. The name “lion,” however, is univocal by its imposition and is applied to Christ only by transfer. These analogues therefore cannot be reduced to one concept, because they have only a unity of comparison and connotation, which requires several concepts, even though they are compared with one term. This is the basis for saying that these analogues, taken per se—that is, left to their imposition and with the transfer removed—stand for the most familiar signified object, since they return to univocity.

I SAY, SECOND: Proper analogues of proportionality can have one concept with respect to all their analogates, but it is inadequate and imperfect. It does not abstract from the lower analogates by including them potentially and excluding them actually; rather, it does not explain them actually, while actually including them, or implicating them.

This is taken from Cajetan in a short work on the concept of being and in his work on the analogy of names, ch. 4, from Ferrariensis, Summa contra Gentiles I, ch. 34, and from the Thomists generally. We are speaking of both an objective and a formal concept, for each corresponds to the other as representing to represented.

The FOUNDATION of this is that the intellect, on hearing an analogous name—for example, “being” (which we shall show in the following question to be analogous)—usually gathers itself into one concept and is not divided into several. This is a sign, as it were a posteriori and by induction, that it can have one concept. We also say of that being that unity, goodness, and so on are its properties; therefore it must be one thing, for otherwise how could unity be its property? How could metaphysics treat it as one object and demonstrate its properties? The a priori reason is that there is a sufficient foundation in these analogates for forming one concept. The agreement of the analogates does not consist in their regard for one term or in their connotation of another, since such connotation or regard requires several things among which that regard and connotation are exercised. Rather, they agree in the mode of having a form, because each analogate has its own form, not in the same way, but proportionally, “in its own measure.” There is therefore something there that can terminate one concept, namely, this proportional agreement in something that belongs to them intrinsically and does not require several concepts to be explained. In sum, this analogue must not have a wholly diverse concept, as things equivocal by chance do, or it would not be an analogue; therefore it must have some unity. This is not a unity of comparison and connotation to one thing, for then it would be an analogue of attribution, which requires several concepts. It is instead a unity of agreement only in the mode of having its own form; but the unity of agreement serves a single concept.

That this one concept is imperfect and inadequate, and does not abstract from the lower analogates in such a way as to remain in potency to them and be contractible by the addition of a differential concept, is inferred from the fact that otherwise it would be a univocal concept. For animal is univocal with respect to all species because it is conceived as one in act, with the differences that divide it held only in potency, and is divided by their addition. Therefore an analogue that lacks such unity and has unity only in a qualified sense must not include the diversity of its lower analogates only potentially. For then it would remain simply one in act, which is to be univocal, and merely multiple or diverse in potency. To prevent it from remaining simply one, it must include diversity actually, although it does not explain that diversity actually. Again, this analogue, and especially the transcendentals, are included in the differences and imbibed in them; they are not merely contracted by their extrinsic addition, as univocals are. Therefore the analogue itself gives rise not only to the unity and agreement found in the lower analogates, but also to their difference and diversity, since division is not made by something extraneous in which the transcendental is not included. If, then, an adequate and perfect concept is given that explains the whole content of the analogue, it will represent not only its unity but also its diversity. When it is conceived under unity alone, it is conceived inadequately and imperfectly, without explaining everything that actually belongs to it.

But since some find it difficult to understand how that concept can contain the diversity of the lower analogates only implicitly and yet include it actually—for a concept seems to contain something in act when it actually represents it, and in potency when it represents nothing actually but needs another concept added for representation to occur—we must carefully observe what is especially useful for explaining the concept of analogy, of the transcendentals, and of the divine attributes. The intellect’s abstraction, distinction, or separation can occur in two ways. In one way, one thing is simply segregated from another by a concept, so that it does not include what it is separated from; distinction is made by including one thing and excluding another, as when animal is separated from human being. In another way, abstraction is not simple and is not made by excluding one account from another, but according to what is more confused or more explicit about the same thing. This does not vary the things conceived, but the modes of conceiving, just as seeing a thing from far off in a confused way or nearby distinctly does not vary the things seen.

These abstractions are better understood through their opposite, which is contraction. When an abstract concept, for example animal or human being, needs to be contracted by adding something extrinsic—that is, something of which the abstract concept is not predicated—then the abstraction was made by excluding that contracting item. For example, animal needs to be contracted by “rational,” of which animal is not predicated. This contraction takes place by addition, and consequently abstraction from that item takes place by exclusion. But when an abstract concept does not need to be contracted by adding something extrinsic, but by adding something of which the abstract concept itself is predicated, that abstraction is not made by excluding it, but by not explaining it, even though it actually includes it, albeit confusedly. For example, being needs something in order to be contracted to substance, accident, living thing, or body, but that something is also being, of which being is predicated, and consequently is not extrinsic to being. Such contraction does not occur by addition, and consequently the abstraction of being does not occur by exclusion; rather, it occurs only by not explaining the lower analogate, while nevertheless including it actually and confusedly.

FROM THIS YOU GATHER, FIRST, that the distinction of attributes in God and the abstraction of analogues and transcendentals are not properly made by abstraction from different things, but according to a different explanation or confusion of the same concept. One attribute cannot exclude another from its concept so that it remains in potency to the other and is perfected by it through addition, since God is pure act and thus excludes all potentiality. Therefore the concept of divine mercy, insofar as it is divine mercy and pure act, necessarily includes justice actually, not potentially. But because our mind does not explain in that concept everything that belongs to it as divine, but rather as mercy in God, it is distinguished from justice not by separation but by non-explanation. Likewise, since transcendentals such as being express an account that is imbibed in the differences and modes themselves—for all things are beings—the concept of being in general cannot be separated from something extraneous to being, as animal is segregated from rational as something extraneous to it insofar as it is animal. Rather, the concept of being is separated from its contractors because what is divided among the lower analogates is known confusedly and not explicitly.

This is the doctrine of St. Thomas when he teaches that being cannot be contracted by addition, but by modes that explain and express something not expressed by the name “being,” as is clear in De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1,¹ and likewise In I Sent., d. 22, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2.² From the Philosopher, he teaches in Metaphysics VIII, text 16.³ final lecture⁴ “that being does not await something added in order to become this—that is, substance, quantity, or quality—but from the beginning is substance, quantity, quality, etc.” These very modes that contract being are concepts of being as regards the account of entity, but are diverse as regards the expression of modification.

SECOND, it follows how that analogous concept is reduced to unity precisely by confusedly regarding its analogates, and is contracted and multiplied by regarding them explicitly. For the unity of the analogue is not the unity of some third thing that remains one as a form or higher account and is contractible through the lower analogates. If what is taken in common is one in itself, formed by abstraction itself, and contractible by the addition of contractors, then either it includes these contractors and dividers actually or potentially. If potentially, it has a concept that is one in itself and in potency to many, which is univocal. But if it actually includes the contractors themselves, which divide and contract it by addition, that concept will remain actually divided and contracted; how, then, is it abstract and one? The unity and diversity of analogues is therefore not to be sought in their union in some single abstract form, where the contractors are then understood to be present actually; for in this way that account would remain actually abstract and contracted. Unity must instead be understood in another way: not because one form is taken separately and differences then accrue to it, but because the analogates themselves are taken in a confused manner, without being distinctly expressed. It is like seeing a multitude from afar without discerning anything one by one: the analogates touched confusedly are the unity of the analogue, while their explicit grasp is their diversity. Nor is that common concept a concept of the proportion itself insofar as proportion is a relation; otherwise it would be a concept of a relation. Rather, it is a concept of that which grounds the proportion, insofar as it is taken confusedly and not explicitly in the diverse things. For example, bone and spine are taken confusedly if they are known according to the account of supporting flesh; substance and accident are taken confusedly if they are known as having being; and foundation and heart, if they are known as having a principle and giving origin.

You may ask: Why not say that the concept “supporting flesh,” “having being,” or “giving origin” is simply one, because it is then contracted by the account of such a mode of supporting flesh or having being? The response is that the concept does not signify a form that is simply one in account and quiddity as a form, but one in its mode of having being—being such in its own way and proportionally, not simply. For example, the account of principle in a foundation and in a heart does not express some form constituting the account of foundation and heart, but wholly diverse forms that nevertheless have the character of principle in their own way. Being, moreover, is not one form, because it is transcendental and is imbibed in the differences; thus it is no less an account or principle of diversity than of unity. It is therefore not a form simply one, but partly the same and partly diverse, as will be said in the following question.

LASTLY, IT IS UNDERSTOOD how this concept of an analogue of proportionality can stand for each of its analogates, whereas the concept of an analogue of attribution or metaphorical proportionality cannot. For the concept of the first kind of analogue regards all the analogates under a unity of confusion in their having proportional unity in their forms, without explaining their diversity. Hence each analogate can be made a suppositum for that concept, because it is contained there as having such a form proportionally. Thus being stands for substance when we say, “Being subsists,” and for accident when we say, “Being inheres,” because this confusion of being is determined by “subsists” or “inheres.” In analogues of attribution or metaphor, however, since the concept is directly univocal and the word is transferred, the thing signified has a different concept with a connotation toward itself. Therefore, since it serves only as the term of a relation and connotation, it needs another concept in order to stand for that which connotes it and regards itself as the term of a relation; for supposition is not for that which is connoted as if obliquely, but for what is directly signified as contained in itself and as the that which.

THE ARGUMENTS ARE ANSWERED.

First, an argument is made to prove that analogues of attribution can have one concept. For wherever likeness and agreement among several things are found, one concept can be formed of that agreement, distinct from the concept in which disagreement and diversity are found. But analogates of attribution have some agreement and likeness. Therefore they can have one concept.

The major is clear, because the intellect derives the unity of a common concept only from the agreement and likeness of many things, leaving aside what is dissimilar and taking up what is in agreement. The minor is clear, because those analogues are not wholly diverse; otherwise they would be equivocal. Therefore they have some likeness, though with diversity. What, then, prevents the intellect from separating what is likeness from what is diversity and representing it by a single concept, leaving aside what is diverse, as it does in other analogues of proper proportionality?

This is confirmed because this analogue is truly and properly a universal with respect to its lower analogates; therefore it is one in many and abstracted from many. It therefore does not include those many things—or, if it does include them, it is not a universal.

THE RESPONSE is that wherever there is likeness, there is unity of concept according to the mode of likeness and agreement. If the likeness is simple and absolute, the abstract unity will also be simple unity. But if the likeness is only qualified and proportional, the unity cannot be purified of all diversity; it will be partly the same and partly diverse, which is a proportional unity, not something simply the same, for that would be univocal.

In analogues of attribution and metaphorical analogues, however, the likeness is even less, because they have agreement not in some form that they participate in, as univocals do, nor in the mode of having their forms proportionally, as analogues of proper proportionality do, but in the unity of a term that they regard or connote extrinsically, and from that connotation, relation, or comparison they receive their denomination. They therefore differ from purely equivocal terms not by having one concept—they have several—but because they join them under some one relation, comparison, or connotation, whereas equivocal terms separate them completely.

In answer to the confirmation, it is said that an analogue is a universal in a qualified sense, just as it is one in a qualified sense and abstracted in a qualified sense: it does not exclude the lower analogates, but only fails to explain them, taking them confusedly and imperfectly. In its own way it is thus one in many, has lower analogates, and is superior to them—namely, in a qualified sense and by reason of explaining or confusing those same analogates, as we said.

You will insist: An analogue can be the object simply speaking of one science, as being is the object of metaphysics; therefore it is simply a universal and simply one. The response is that just as it has one formal concept, so too it has one science. It is entirely possible for there to be unity in a qualified sense in the being of being, but for it to be simply one in the formal account of being representable, in the being of an object: that is, insofar as this confusion of being is representable as one species and this connection of being with its properties can be illuminated by one light.

A SECOND ARGUMENT: The analogue taken in common in no way represents the lower analogates or their contracting modes; therefore it in no way includes them, but separates them by exclusion.

The consequent is clear, because the intellect’s abstraction by exclusion is made only by representing one thing in a concept and not another. Therefore whatever it does not represent, it excludes and abstracts from. The antecedent is proved as follows. The analogue either has several concepts or one. It does not have several, because we are speaking of an analogue of proper proportionality, which is an analogue of one concept, as we admit. If it has one, then in that one concept several things are not represented—for example, substance, quantity, quality, etc.—immediately and per se; otherwise there would be equivocation in the mind, that is, a representation of several things as several. Second, it would follow that when I make the predications “A stone is being” and “A human being is being,” if the concept of being as predicate actually includes all the analogates, namely, substance, quantity, etc., the sense would be “A human being is substance, quantity, quality, etc.,” which is plainly absurd. Third, it would follow that infinite things are actually contained and represented by that concept, because there are infinitely many analogates of being.

This is confirmed: Are all the analogates contained in that one and imperfect concept as some aggregate, or as some disjunction of them, or is one contained in another and assimilated to it? The last cannot be maintained, since one thing is not like another unless they agree in something common; but, as was said, the analogates do not agree in anything common as in a third thing. Rather, they are many things that are one confusedly and proportionally. The first and second alternatives are wholly false. For when I say, “A human being is being,” the sense is not “A human being is substance or accident,” for I am not predicating a disjunction; rather, I am predicating something simple. Much less do I mean, “A human being is substance and accident,” as an aggregate or conjunction, for that would be false.

THE RESPONSE is that an analogue in the abstract represents its analogates confusedly and actually, not explicitly. To the first proof it is said that many things can be represented by one concept confusedly, not distinctly and as many. For example, when I see a thousand people or a mountain of sand from afar and do not discern the individuals, I see the whole multitude in one vision; nevertheless, they are many and, in the manner of one, terminate one vision. Yet there are not several things in these concepts only potentially, but actually, although they are grasped confusedly. The confused concept of being stands in the same way with respect to all its analogates: it immediately represents them all under the confused account of having being, but explains only this common account, not each analogate distinctly. It does not follow that there is equivocation in the ultimate concept, because an equivocal term signifies several things as several—that is, as agreeing in no way, neither in proportion nor in a mode of confusion that reaches several things, but as explicitly diverse. A concept that reaches several things confusedly, however, unites them by that very confusion, and merely explains their unity as a unity of those many things not by abstraction but by confusion. The unity of confusion requires an actual plurality of the things taken confusedly, just as a multitude is seen as one under a single confusion.

To the second proof it is answered that, in the predication “A human being is being,” the predicate “being,” although it actually regards all the analogates confusedly, does not express some determinate account that contains the lower analogates potentially. Rather, what it predicates is not all the things it contains materially and implicitly, but the account in which they are all confused, namely, having being. This is an account that does not abstract but confuses everything, and it alone is explained—just as weakness of light and distance confuse a multitude seen from afar, and the eye alone reaches it explicitly. A clear example is the predication “The Father is God.” For the term “God” includes actually, not potentially, everything that is in God, including the three persons—not as constitutive, but as terminative and modifying itself. Yet because it does not say them explicitly but includes them implicitly, it does not predicate all three persons of the Father, but only the Deity in which they are contained. In the same way, “being” predicates only that in which all things are confused, namely, having being. For these words, “signifies,” “predicates,” and the like, which imply an act of the soul, imply a naming imposed on the object as formally signified and predicated, not on what is included and confused materially.

To the third proof it is answered that, although infinitely many things are contained under being, they are nevertheless reduced to one common account under which they are confused, namely, having being, and to a finite number of genera or categories.

In answer to the confirmation, it is said that these many things correspond to that concept not as an aggregate or a disjunction, but as proportionally alike—not in some third thing as in an account simply one in which they agree, but in having their forms, not in the same way, but each in its own way, yet proportionally. Thus they are many confusedly, not many explicitly, nor simply one.

A THIRD ARGUMENT: An analogous concept is contracted by adding another distinct concept, and not by a greater explanation of the same concept; therefore that concept abstracts simply from the lower analogates.

The consequent is clear, because a concept is simply abstracted if it needs something added to it in order to be contracted; for when it is abstracted in this way, it excludes that thing. The antecedent is proved as follows: The analogates differ from one another entitatively—for example, substance and quantity—and are not distinguished in the concept of being itself, in which they agree; therefore they differ by something superadded. For everything in which they differ is superadded to that in which they agree. Therefore what we say is not explained there would better be called superadded.

This is confirmed because, if that concept actually contained all the analogates, someone who comprehensively penetrated the concept of being would actually see all beings. This is false, since one proceeds from an analogue—for example, being—to its analogates from potency to act, and therefore cannot see all of them actually. Again, that concept would have the lower analogates as actual and integral parts, not as subjective parts, because it includes them actually and not potentially. Thus, once the concept is penetrated, they would be seen actually and not potentially, and would stand as its actual parts; anyone who saw that concept with the confusion removed would see all the parts actually. The falsity of the consequent is clear from the reason by which St. Thomas, Prima Pars, q. 14, a. 6, proves that God does not know all things only under the account of being, for in that case he would know things most imperfectly and most potentially. Therefore the concept of being cannot manifest its analogates actually and determinately, since it stands indifferently to them.

THE RESPONSE is to deny the antecedent of the principal argument. To the proof it is answered that the analogates differ entitatively by differences contained under the same analogous account in which they agree, not by differences extraneous to it. Consequently, what contracts being is not superadded to being, but is contained under being; it merely explains in a different way what the common account implicates. The analogates also differ in that in which they agree, although under another respect. For this is what characterizes an analogue, especially a transcendental: it has unity and diversity, and is not only an account of agreement but also of difference. Therefore the account in which they differ is not superadded to the analogue, but explains the analogue in another way. This does not mean that the analogates are distinguished only modally and not entitatively; rather, the difference by which they differ entitatively is also contained under being. Nevertheless, an analogue is said to be contracted by modes and not by differences, not because modes are superadded, or because being is in potency to modes but not to real differences—for that would be a childish understanding—but because the analogates express some mode over and above being that is not expressed by the name “being,” as St. Thomas explicitly teaches in De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1.⁵ The mode is therefore in the expression, not in an addition.

In answer to the confirmation, it is said that someone who penetrated the concept of being in general would see nothing more contained there than all beings confusedly. Hence he would not penetrate all beings distinctly and determinately, because they are not contained there in that way. If he removed the confusion, he would destroy that concept of being in general, which is essentially confused, and form another distinct concept of a determinate being. St. Thomas therefore rightly proved that if God saw creatures only under the account of being, he would see them imperfectly, because he would know them as confused in being, not as distinguished and determined among themselves and according to the explanation of their proper modes. For the confusion of that concept is opposed to the explanation of determinate beings. Thus from the mere cognition and penetration of that concept the plurality of beings cannot be explained determinately, but must remain confused; if the confusion is removed, that concept is destroyed. One who proceeds from being to its analogates therefore proceeds from a more potential cognition, because it is more confused and indistinct. The cognition that proceeds from a concept representing all things confusedly is more confused and imperfect, even though it does not represent anything that contains several things potentially, than cognition that proceeds from the representation of something containing several things potentially and not actually; for at least the latter touches distinctly what is potential and contains the lower things potentially. For example, one who conceives animal touches all animal species potentially and confusedly, but conceives animal distinctly. But one who grasps being confusedly grasps nothing distinctly, but only what has being proportionally.

To the other part of the argument it is said that the analogates should not be called actual integral parts simply speaking, nor subjective parts, since they are parts only in a qualified sense, as was said. They are called subjective parts, however, because they are actually contained in the superior and joined or confused in that concept—not by way of aggregation, but by proportionality in being. Nor does it follow that the abstraction of being is actual, that is, formal, even though it is the most potential of all. For formal abstraction occurs by segregating potentiality and matter, and the more universal it is, the purer and more perfect it is. Thus formal abstraction of being is pure act if it abstracts in complete universality. But the abstraction of being in general as an analogue is most confused; and although it actually includes all things confusedly, it is not a formal abstraction, because it is not made by segregating the imperfect, but by including all things under a certain confusion and obscurity.