Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Secunda Pars Artis Logicae

THERE ARE TWO THINGS in this fourth predicable, insofar as it is a universal, that require explanation. The first is whether the account of the fourth predicable belongs only to a property in the fourth mode, or also to other things. The second is with respect to which inferiors this universality of the fourth predicable belongs to it.

With regard to the first, not a few DOCTORS think that the intention of the fourth predicable belongs not only to a property in the fourth mode, but also to a property in the second mode, or even to all properties. The entire basis seems to reduce to this: these properties, at least what is a property in the second mode, are predicated in “what kind” accidentally and in a way distinct from the fifth predicable, which says only that something can be present and absent; and they belong necessarily, because what is a property in the second mode, such as a human being’s being two-footed, belongs to it necessarily, although not to it alone. Therefore it pertains to the fourth predicable.

This is confirmed because there is no accident that does not flow from some substance, although it can also belong to other subjects from which it does not flow. Hence St. Thomas in chapter 7 of On Being and Essence¹ teaches without qualification that all accidents flow from substance. This is clear because every accident is a certain participation in substance. Therefore, under the aspect in which it flows from substance, it ought to pertain to the fourth predicable, although insofar as it is communicated to others from which it does not flow, it falls short of the perfect account of a property.

NEVERTHELESS, the opposite must be held. And I say: Only a property in the fourth mode, or what is reduced to it, is the substratum of the intention of the fourth predicable.

This is the more common opinion among Thomists; on this one may consult Soto, Masius, Araujo, and others, together with the Carmelite Course, disputation 8, question 1.

THE REASON is taken from what the Philosopher establishes in Posterior Analytics I, chapter 4² and lecture 10 in St. Thomas’s commentary³: when he assigns the four modes of per se and explains the second, namely, when the subject is placed in the definition of the predicate, he says that this is the difference between a proper and a common accident: when the subject is placed in the definition of some predicate, it is a proper accident. But if some predicate is not placed in the definition of the subject, nor the subject in the definition of the predicate, such things are common accidents and are predicated accidentally. Now, when something is not signified as proper in the fourth mode, which belongs to all, to it alone, and always, the subject is not placed in the definition of that accident; for example, man is not placed in the definition of two-footed, nor swan in the definition of white. Therefore it is not a property, as distinguished from the fifth predicable. That the subject is not placed in the definition of such a predicate is clear because the predicate is found outside that subject: although it belongs to all of the subject, it does not belong to it alone.

You will say: On this reasoning it would be proved that being capable of laughter is not a property in the fourth mode with respect to Peter and other individuals, because Peter too is not placed in the definition of being capable of laughter, just as man is not placed in the definition of two-footed.

It is answered that Peter is placed in the definition of being capable of laughter not by reason of his singularity, but by reason of the specific nature that is in Peter. For everything that pertains to Peter’s specific nature is placed in the definition of being capable of laughter, but not what pertains to Peter’s singularity; whereas the whole nature of man is not placed in the definition of two-footed. This is why generic properties are more often properties in the second mode with respect to species than specific properties are.

Then, as St. Thomas very well notes in opusculum 48, chapter On Property⁴, common accidents have a relation to their subject only as to a material and receptive cause, since a material cause as such does not posit a necessary connection with an accidental form. A property, however, regards its subject not only as a receptive cause, but as a principle from which it flows, because it has a cause of connection with it. St. Thomas also observes this in the cited place in Posterior Analytics I. Therefore, for something to be a property as fourth predicable, as distinguished from the fifth, its subject must not only be capable of receiving it, but must also be the root of that accident and have a necessary connection with it. But if it does not belong to that subject alone, it does not have a necessary connection with it, since it is common to others and cannot have diverse essences as its essential and radical principle, inasmuch as those essences are diverse. Therefore, to be a fourth predicable, it must belong to all, to it alone, and always. Hence St. Thomas says in Sentences I, d. 8, q. 1, art. 1, ad 1⁵, that “when something is said to belong properly on the part of the subject, what is extraneous to the subject’s nature must be excluded by the property, as when being capable of laughter is said to be proper to man, because it belongs to nothing extraneous to human nature.” What belongs to all but not to it alone, then, belongs to what is extraneous to the subject’s nature, and so does not belong properly.

TO THE GROUNDS OF THE OPPOSING OPINION it is answered that other properties, including those that are properties in the second mode, are not predicated necessarily by a necessity that is, as it were, formal and intrinsic to a connection, but by a necessity that is, as it were, material, or a necessity of the individual matter, as is inferred from St. Thomas, opusculum 48, chapter On Property⁶, as we shall say of an inseparable accident in the following question. But what is predicated necessarily by a necessity that is, as it were, formal, from the principles of the nature and not only from individual principles and the necessity of matter, is a property as fourth predicable. The fifth predicable, however, is said to be what can be present and absent because it has no intrinsic connection or root in the principles of the nature, although, as regards existence, it cannot be separated because of some extrinsic cause.

In a human being, being two-footed, if it is a property in the fourth mode with respect to some subordinate degree, will be a fourth predicable with respect to that degree; and it will be in the second mode of property only in a qualified sense, insofar as it is not said convertibly with respect to man.

To the confirmation it is answered that all accidents are caused by substance, as St. Thomas says there, but some are caused by formal principles, and these are proper attributes, because they have a connection of formal necessity; others are caused by material principles, and are common accidents or accidents of individuals, as St. Thomas says there. Those caused by formal principles, if communicated to another subject, will be common accidents with respect to the subject to which they are communicated, as heat with respect to water or wood, but properties with respect to that from which they are caused.

As for the second point, namely, with respect to which subjects the account of the fourth predicable belongs: whether with respect to the species with which the property is convertible, or with respect to the inferiors of which it is said.

THE REASON FOR DOUBT is that a property in the fourth mode belongs to individuals neither necessarily nor convertibly; therefore with respect to them it is not predicable as a property. The antecedent is clear: a property does not belong to an individual alone, but to others too; therefore it does not have a necessary connection with the individual insofar as it is this individual. Nor is it convertible with the individual, because there is no mutual consequence between individuals and the property: although “He is Peter, therefore he is capable of laughter” follows, “He is capable of laughter, therefore he is Peter” does not. Therefore it is not related convertibly to individuals.

This is confirmed because the properties of a genus with respect to its inferiors do not function as properties in the fourth mode, but in the second; therefore they are not called fourth predicables with respect to inferiors, but with respect to the nature with which they are convertible. The antecedent is proved as follows: two-footed is a proper attribute of animal, distinguished from quadrupeds—which is an unnamed genus with respect to all two-footed animals—yet with respect to man it is a property in the second mode. Indeed, all common accidents, such as whiteness, blackness, and the like, are properties in the fourth mode with respect to some subject, yet are said of singular bodies as common accidents; therefore the fourth predicable is not said to be such with respect to inferiors. Finally, an argument like that made above about difference can be made, because this predication, “Man is capable of laughter,” is of the fourth predicable, since it does not pertain to another mode of predicating, and is universal because it is predicated convertibly of a universal, namely man; therefore it is a universal of the fourth predicable with respect to the species.

I omit the arguments for proving that the inferiors of a property should not be the very properties individualized, for example, with respect to being capable of laughter, this and that instance of laughability, because in the similar case we already resolved this in the preceding question on Difference.

TO THE PROPOSED DIFFICULTY, THEN, I REPLY, in accordance with what was said in the preceding question on Difference, that a property assumes the account of a fourth predicable only with respect to the individuals of the species with which it is convertible. Accordingly, with respect to the metaphysical account of a proper attribute—that is, the account of necessary connection and convertibility with that of which it is a property—it has all this with respect to the species with which it is said convertibly, and is rather a fourth predicate than a fourth predicable. But with respect to the account of a fourth logical universal, it must necessarily regard the inferiors of the species with which it is convertible.

THE REASON IS that a property with respect to its singulars—for example, laughability with respect to this and that individual instance—is indeed superior and universal, but not in “what kind”; it is “in what,” like species and individuals. For a proper accident too has its own quiddity and nature, which it predicates of its inferiors. But with respect to the species or nature from which the property flows, taken in common, it is predicated in “what kind,” but not as something superior: it is equal and convertible. Hence it will be a concomitant universal, but not formally universal with respect to that species, since it is not something superior to it. Hence, although a property is predicated per se and of all, it is said per se with respect to the subject or nature from which it flows, and of all with respect to the things contained under such a nature, as St. Thomas aptly observed in Posterior Analytics I, lecture 9, § “He interposes,” etc.⁷

TO THE OPPOSING GROUNDS it is answered. To the first: The antecedent is denied. In response to the proof, it is said that a property has a necessary connection with individuals mediately and by reason of the nature from which it flows, not by reason of the individuation to which it is communicated. Likewise, it is mutually convertible with them by reason of their nature, not their individuation. The fact that it is common to many does not remove the account of a property with respect to the nature, because this commonality is not shared with extraneous things, but with individuals of the proper nature. Nor must the necessary connection be founded on something by reason of all the things that are in it or contained under it; it need only be founded by reason of the nature, root, and principle. Hence there need not be mutual consequence between a property of some nature and each individual; it suffices that there be mutual connection and consequence between the nature itself and the property.

To the confirmation it is answered that those which are truly properties of a genus belong to all its inferiors as properties in the fourth mode, no less than specific properties belong to the individuals of such a species—for example, the tactile faculty, which is a property of animal, and quantity with respect to body, provided that it follows upon the form of body and not only upon matter. For that quantity is a property of body is sufficiently indicated by St. Thomas in Quaestiones disputatae de spiritualibus creaturis, art. 3, ad 18.⁸ Others doubt this; see Cajetan, On Being and Essence, chapter 7, question 16, ad 1. This, however, does not pertain to the present matter.

As for what is said about being two-footed, it is not altogether clear that it is a property in the fourth mode; for St. Thomas lists it among essential differences in Metaphysics V, lecture 16, at the beginning⁹, yet lists it absolutely among accidental differences in On the Soul I, lecture 1, at the end¹⁰. It is said to be taken as an essential difference because we use accidental differences, which are better known to us, in place of essential ones.

In response to what is said about other accidents, it is answered that not all are proper attributes, because they do not all arise from the formal principles of a nature; some arise from material principles, as we said above on the authority of St. Thomas in chapter 7 of On Being and Essence¹¹. He says the same in Sentences I, d. 17, q. 1, art. 2, ad 2.¹² And some are not proper attributes of any nature, although from an extrinsic cause they may be inseparable in some subject, as blackness in a crow.

To the argument about predicating a property of a species it is answered that this is indeed a predication of a universal thing, but one that does not have universality with respect to the species, which is equal to it, not inferior to it; universality formally obtains only with respect to inferiors.

Finally, note that sometimes a proper attribute is not a determinate accident, but a disjunctive one, such as even or odd with respect to number, male and female with respect to animal. Then each of these is a determinate accident, whereas the disjunctive is what belongs per se. On this see St. Thomas, Posterior Analytics I, lecture 10, at the end¹³.