Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Secunda Pars Artis Logicae

To make the POINT AT ISSUE clear, two things must be noted.

First, among natures that have only one individual, a threefold distinction can be considered. For some nature in fact has no more than one individual, yet can have more in possibility, as with the moon, the sun, and the like. These have matter that is divisible absolutely, though not naturally; from the division of matter, however, multiplication of individuals is apt to follow. Another nature can have no multiplication of individuals, either in fact or in possibility, by division of matter, because it lacks all matter, as do complete spiritual substances, such as angels. It is nevertheless disputed whether they can have numerical multiplication on some basis other than division of matter; and even if they cannot have it, those natures can still be conceived as universal, with a certain indifference and potentiality toward the one individual they have. Finally, there is another nature that not only has no several individuals in fact or in possibility through multiplication of the nature, but cannot itself be conceived with any potentiality for individuation or as contractible by singularity, because it is pure act, namely God. Thus it cannot be universal in being, although the nature itself can be conceived without its individuation being made explicit; in that way it can be signified as a common term and not a singular term, just as the name “God” is a common term in signification.

There is no difficulty here concerning the first nature, since it is clear that a nature can be predicated of many when many possible individuals exist of which it may be predicated. Nor is the present question about the third nature; we dealt with it above, q. 5, art. 3. The whole difficulty concerns the second nature. We are not now disputing whether several angels distinct only numerically are possible; that is treated in 1 p., q. 50. If several numerically distinct angels are possible, the question presents no difficulty: angelic nature should be treated like the sun, the moon, and other natures in which several individuals are possible. But if we grant that several individuals in angelic nature are impossible, the present difficulty arises: does it suffice for a species to be predicable of many that, from the mode of conceiving it, the nature is conceived as indifferent to individuation—not because it in fact has, or can have, many individuals in reality, but because such individuals are not incompatible with that nature as conceived in this indifferent way?

Second, observe that having several individuals occurs in two ways: either positively, or through nonrepugnance, at least on the part of some principle. This distinction is taken from St. Thomas, Quaest. de Spirit. creat., art. 8, ad 4.¹ To be predicated of many positively is to have a positive foundation in the thing itself for predication of many, namely because such multiplication is found in reality. From this the basis is taken for conceiving one nature predicable of them. A nature is said to be predicated of many by nonrepugnance when it is not found in many things in reality, but only in one; nevertheless, the nature is related to that one individual in such a way that it can be abstracted from it in precisely the same way as it is abstracted from several, the nature remaining indifferent and potential toward that individuation. Thus, by virtue of this abstraction the nature is not incompatible with several individuals, even though in reality it is incompatible for another reason, namely its lack of matter, without whose division individuals are not multiplied.

In this difficulty, then, it is commonly held OUTSIDE THE SCHOOL OF ST. THOMAS that, assuming St. Thomas’s view that several individuals in the same angelic species are impossible, such a species will be subjectifiable but not predicable. For it seems contrary to all reason that something be predicable of many when the very act of predication of many is incompatible with it. That this act is incompatible is clear, since the existence of those many is incompatible with it. These authors do not, however, deny that angelic nature can be conceived as universal negatively and metaphysically, since it can be conceived without any singularity or individual difference—that is, as remaining abstracted from individuation.

NEVERTHELESS, the Thomists commonly defend the opposite view and hold: Simply because a basis is given in such a nature for conceiving it as abstracted from that sole individuation, and as indifferent and potential toward it, it can be conceived as universal and as a species predicable of many. For this, however, it is necessary that angelic nature not be conceived adequately and fully as it is in itself, but inadequately and after the manner of things composed of matter and form.

This view is plainly drawn from St. Thomas’s teaching in Quaest. de Spirit. creat., art. 8, ad 4,² where he says: “Just as this whiteness is not prevented from having many individuals under it because it is whiteness, but because it is in this thing—which pertains to the notion of an individual—so the nature of this angel is not prevented from being in many because it is a nature in this order of things—which pertains to the notion of a species—but because it is not apt to be received in a subject—which pertains to the notion of an individual.” So St. Thomas. These words are too clear to need any elaboration. He says the same in Opusc. 42, ch. 5³ and 1 p., q. 13, art. 9, as do Cajetan there, De Ente et Essentia, ch. 5,⁴ q. 9, ad 2, and the commentary on the chapter “On Species” in the Logic.

THE WHOLE FOUNDATION of this view is that, although in such a nature one cannot conceive a relation positively tending toward several individuals, nor the unity of a nature collected from several individuals, since in truth they do not exist, one can nevertheless conceive the indifference of the nature and its potentiality toward one individual of such a kind that, of itself, it would suffice for several, if they were posited in reality on some other basis. Thus, by its own mode the indifference of the nature is communicable to many; but, on the part of those to which the communication would be made, that communicability cannot be exercised. The reason is that one cannot deny that an individual of angelic nature exists in a category, since the angel found in reality is a categorical substance. It is not posited immediately under a genus; therefore it is posited immediately under some lowest species. But the lowest species under which the individual is contained is superior to it, and therefore universal and predicable with respect to it. For such a species is not predicated of the individual as an equal; otherwise the species would not be predicated of Gabriel’s individual by a superior-of-inferior predication, but there would be something like an identical predication, as when one individual is predicated of another. It is therefore a predication of a superior of an inferior. Otherwise the species could not be preserved in only one individual, as we shall say in the next article, if, while having only one individual, it could not be conceived as superior. From this it clearly follows that the nature and species, conceived in this way as superior to that individual, has an indifference that of itself suffices for several individuals, although multiplication cannot in fact be exercised because a required condition is lacking, namely division on the part of matter. For the species abstracted in this way from individuation does not actually include it, but includes it potentially; consequently, just as it includes neither individual unity nor plurality, so neither does the force of that concept exclude a plurality of individuals. Therefore, if the force of that concept does not exclude plurality, the nature has by the force of its indifference an ordering toward many—not positively, but by nonrepugnance.

This is confirmed, because the incompatibility with several individuals in angelic nature does not follow from all the nature’s predicates, but from the precise character of its inability to be received in matter: it is not individuated by the designation of matter, but by lacking matter. Hence the incompatibility with plurality arises not from the nature, but from the mode of individuating the nature, since the only principle of individuation is the form’s very inability to be received. From this, and from no other source, it has incommunicability, which is the basis of individuation. Therefore, if the nature is conceived inadequately—that is, with regard to its character as a species, and not to the very mode by which it is individuated—it is not taken as incompatible with multiplication of individuals and consequently as having several individuals by nonrepugnance. Although it does not positively regard many, this is not a defect in the nature itself, but because those many do not exist.

But what some say—that angelic nature is positively common to one real individual and several fictitious ones—is futile, because to regard several fictitious things is not to regard several things in which it can exist and of which it can be predicated. For it is predicated only fictitiously of several fictitious things; to be predicated fictitiously is not to be truly predicated, nor truly conceived as predicable.

YOU WILL SAY: Then there is no difference between God and angelic nature. For God too can be conceived as a common king without singularity and signified as a common term, as we said above, q. 5.⁵ Therefore, from the mode of conceiving, God will have universality and consequently the status of superior and inferior, which cannot be admitted in God.

It is answered that the cases differ. Although God can be conceived without singularity and consequently signified in a common mode, the nature itself so conceived does not remain indifferent and potential toward individuation, since it is conceived as pure act. Though, owing to the imperfection of our concept, it does not always make singularity explicit, on its own side it does not remain indifferent to singularity. It is like conceiving one attribute without another: the one does not remain potential and indifferent to the other, but merely does not express it. Hence divine nature is common in only one respect, namely because of the imperfection of our concept; it is not common by reason of indifference and potentiality on the part of the nature. A composite nature, by contrast, is universal in three respects: from the mode of conceiving, by abstraction from singulars; from the nature’s own indifference; and from the plurality of individuals toward which the universal relation can be directed. Angelic nature is universal in only two respects: from the mode of conceiving and from the nature’s own indifference, although, because several individuals are lacking, this communicability to many cannot be exercised in reality; thus it is universality without exercise. For divine nature to be signified by a common term, it suffices that it be conceived without singularity through the mode of signifying. But to be a genus or species, it must be conceived as contractible and determinable; consequently, the contracting principle must be more determinate and more actualizing. This cannot be conceived without potentiality in what is contracted and greater actuality in what contracts. All of this is incompatible with pure act.

THE ARGUMENTS ARE ANSWERED.

The first argument is made by the argument suggested in reporting the opposing view: Angelic species is incompatible with being predicated of several, and this incompatibility is intrinsic to its nature, since multiplication of such a nature in singulars is intrinsically impossible. Therefore, it is incompatible with being a species predicable of many. For predicability does not belong to something to which predication itself is incompatible, just as the power of seeing does not belong to something to which vision is incompatible.

This is confirmed: the formal unity found in a predicable species is taken by the intellect from the similarity and dissimilarity of individuals and their agreement with one another; there is no other basis for this formal unity. Therefore, when the agreement of several individuals is lacking, nothing remains from which to derive the formal unity of a species, which is the unity of several things agreeing in some degree.

THE REPLY IS: The antecedent is distinguished. Angelic nature is incompatible with being predicated of many by reason of its mode of individuation and the incommunicability of the form: granted. It is incompatible by the force of its nature and its indifference: denied. And although the mode of individuation itself is intrinsic to angelic nature, it is not so according to the concept of nature as nature, but as unable to be received and as including the mode by which the nature is individuated. Hence, although nature conceived adequately together with that mode cannot be predicated of many, if it is conceived inadequately, without that mode and with potentiality for it, it is conceived as predicable of many—not positively, because there are not many that terminate the relation of predicability, but by nonrepugnance, so far as concerns the concept of nature as nature, conceived without that mode, even though that mode belongs to it by its own nature. Many things cannot be posited in reality absolutely and simply, yet are said not to be incompatible under the concept of some principle because they are not incompatible by the force of that principle. As St. Thomas observes, Quaest. de Spirit. creat., art. ult., ad 7,⁶ substance can be understood without some accident, although in reality no substance can be created without some accidental predicate, at least without existence itself. Thus, while angelic nature remains with its mode of individuation as it exists in reality—that is, without reception and division of matter—its individuals cannot be multiplied. Yet by the force of the nature, not as it takes on the mode of individuation but under the precise concept of nature as potential for this individuation, it is related to several by nonrepugnance. And if vision itself is intrinsically incompatible with something, the power of seeing is incompatible with it; but if vision is barred by some extrinsic mode or impediment, the power of seeing is not thereby incompatible by the force of an intrinsic principle.

And when it is objected that it cannot be universal except with respect to several fictitious individuals, since in reality they are impossible:

The answer is that those several individuals are not impossible by the force of the concept of nature, although they are not absolutely possible in reality by the force of that concept. For something to be possible in reality, it must be possible when all the factors that concur in reality are taken into account. In reality, however, the mode of individuation concurs in the nature itself, and from this they are impossible. For them to be called not impossible so far as the force of the nature is concerned, it suffices that, on that side—that is, by the force of the precise concept of nature—they are not impossible. Therefore, it is said only to regard those many by nonrepugnance, and, so far as the force of the nature is concerned, not positively in reality and absolutely.

To the confirmation, the reply is that in composite natures formal unity is taken from the positive agreement of several individuals. In simple natures, however, it is not taken from the positive agreement of several, but from the very unity of the nature conceived without individuation and with indifference—a unity that of itself is not incompatible with being communicated to many when conceived without the mode of individuation and after the manner of a composite thing. It is better to take formal unity from the indivision of the specific nature than from the agreement of several individuals.

The second argument: That mode of nonreception in matter belongs essentially to an angel, since by it the angel is distinguished from a rational soul, which is a form received in matter. Therefore, the specific nature of an angel cannot be abstracted from that mode of individuation, which consists in nonreception in matter.

The consequent is clear, because however much angelic nature is abstracted, it cannot be abstracted from what is essential to it. Otherwise it would not be abstracted but destroyed, just as if a human being were conceived without animality: that would be to conceive an essence without what is essential to it.

Nor does it help that it is conceived inadequately or after the manner of a composite thing, and so can be conceived in a mode communicable to many.

The first point is challenged as follows: otherwise Peter could be conceived as universal, and likewise divine nature. For Peter, inadequately conceived, makes explicit only the nature, not the individuation. Consequently, if an inadequate concept of a thing intrinsically singular, such as an angel, suffices for it to be called universal, why could Peter too, who is intrinsically singular, not be conceived as universal if conceived inadequately—that is, with regard to the nature and not the individuation? The same holds of divine nature, which is essentially singular.

The second point is challenged as follows: even if we conceive angels after the manner of a corporeal thing, we do not attribute the properties of corporeal things to them; rather, we remove them, because such properties are incompatible with angels. Therefore, since numerical multiplication, which belongs to corporeal things, is incompatible with spiritual things, we cannot attribute it to them.

THE REPLY IS: We grant that angelic nature is essentially incapable of reception in matter and lacks matter, and that this lack of matter can never be abstracted from it. Nevertheless, we deny that it cannot be abstracted from its singularity, because the lack of matter and its nonreceptibility are not the angel’s individuation itself, but its root. For individuation in an angel signifies not only the root and principle of incommunicability, but also the formal designation and determinate specification of the individual, which in angels also depends on, or signifies an ordering toward, extrinsic predicates—for example, subsistence and accidents. It is clear that an angel’s own personality could be separated from it, as if angelic nature were assumed by God; yet personality is the terminus of singularity. Hence singularity and individuation signify an ordering toward certain extrinsic things and do not belong purely to the angel’s essential constitution. In corporeal things, matter is considered in two ways: as composing or constituting the nature itself, and as being radically the principle of individuation and numerical multiplication—remotely in itself, but proximately as designated by quantity. Yet when nature is considered in common, the character of matter is considered as constituting it, not as the principle of individuation. The opposite obtains with the lack of matter and nonreceptibility in it, as found in an angel: two aspects can be considered, one insofar as it pertains to the constitution of a simple and purely spiritual form, the other insofar as it pertains to the mode of individuation, by making such a spiritual nature incommunicable and incapable of multiplication. These aspects are distinguished from each other. The lack of matter required for the constitution of such a nature is nothing other than the character of a simple form insofar as it is an immaterial form; as such, it does not yet ground incompatibility with multiplication. But the lack of matter insofar as it supplies a mode of incommunicability and grounds subsistence and complete singularity does supply a mode of individuation and is incompatible with multiplication. Hence, when we abstract an angel’s specific nature from its mode of individuation, we do not abstract from that nature what is essential to its lack of matter as regards the constitution of its quiddity. Rather, we abstract what pertains in that nature to the mode of individuation, which originates radically in the specific nature itself but does not formally consist in it, since its designation depends on extrinsic predicates.

To the objections raised, the reply is: To the first, Peter makes explicit individuation itself not only radically but also formally; hence he cannot be conceived without individual difference, even inadequately, unless Peter’s concept is destroyed and the concept of nature taken instead. Angelic nature, however, does not formally make individuation itself explicit, although it includes its root under the formal character that constitutes an immaterial nature, not under the formal character of producing and grounding individuation. Divine nature, for its part, can indeed be conceived as a nature without singularity, but not as universal, since it cannot be conceived as contractible by differences, being pure act and in no way in potency.

To the second objection it is said that when we conceive an angel after the manner of a corporeal thing, we do not attribute the conditions of a corporeal thing to it by way of attribution and judgment. Rather, by way of a simple representation, we apprehend it after the manner of a corporeal thing, without individuation, not making explicit everything in angelic nature—not with respect to the predicates that constitute its quiddity, but insofar as it is the root of individuation. For if it were conceived fully and adequately, making explicit what is contained radically and implicitly in the nature, it could not be conceived as universal, because this would make explicit the mode of the nature that is singularity and incapacity for multiplication. St. Thomas also affirms this in 1 p., q. 13, art. 9.

You may still object: angelic nature is not only in a category as conceived after the manner of a corporeal thing; it is also in a category in itself, since it is a finite and created being. Therefore, in itself, even if it is not conceived after the manner of a corporeal thing, it has the character of a genus and species predicable of many, since without this it would not be placed in a category.

An objection is also raised: a corporeal nature, once the root of individuation—which is designated matter—is posited, cannot be conceived as universal, because universal nature abstracts from that root. Therefore, if the species of angelic nature itself is the root of individuation by reason of its incommunicability and nonreceptibility in matter, it too cannot be conceived inadequately as universal. This is especially so because what belongs to something per se cannot belong to it oppositely even per accidens. Therefore, since incapacity for multiplication belongs to it by the very character of its nature, multiplicability into many cannot belong to it even per accidens and by reason of an inadequate concept, as is required for a species predicable of many.

The reply is that angelic nature is in a category in itself with regard to the coordination of higher and lower degrees, for in itself it is a quiddity composed of genus and difference. But for this species to have a universality predicable of many does not pertain to the reason for placing it in a category, but to a condition or mode of the thing placed in a category. It is not incompatible with angelic nature to have such a mode by being conceived inadequately and after the manner of a corporeal thing; the nature itself, however, supplies the basis for this.

To the second objection the reply is that designated matter is a determinate and designated principle of individuation, not a remote one; universal nature must abstract from this designation. Universal nature does not abstract from matter itself, which is the remote principle of individuation. So, in an angel, the lack of matter and nonreceptibility in it, insofar as it contributes to the character of spirituality and of a simple form in the angel, is not the proximate but the remote principle of individuation. But insofar as it grounds subsistence and an ordering toward extrinsic accidents that designate the nature itself in the individual, it is the proximate principle of individuation, and angelic nature, conceived universally, abstracts from this. And to the claim that if something belongs per se to a thing, its opposite cannot belong even per accidens, the reply is that not belonging is one thing, and not being incompatible in some respect is another. Multiplication in several individuals does not belong to angelic nature positively and simply in any way; nevertheless, it is not incompatible with that nature by the force of the nature conceived indifferently. Therefore, by the force of the nature as such, it can be predicable of many—not positively, but by nonrepugnance.

But if you say: then such a nature is not universal logically, but metaphysically, because logical universality comes about through a positive comparison with many; whereas angelic species is not positively universal and cannot be compared with many except fictitious ones; therefore it is not logically universal.

The reply is that angelic nature has a logical intention—not one that actually compares it positively to many by reaching them, since they are only fictitious, but one that actually reaches one individual positively and many by nonrepugnance. This suffices for the relation of a logical intention. Thus, according to St. Thomas’s view, 3 p., q. 35, art. 5, one relation of a father regards several sons if they actually exist; but if there is only one son, in fact it does not reach several. Still, the relation that positively reaches one does not incompatibly reach several, because it is such that, if several were given, it would reach them. So too that relation of the specific nature regards one individual in such a way that of itself it could reach several, if they existed, so far as the force of that concept is concerned.