Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Secunda Pars Artis Logicae

I presuppose that Porphyry DEFINES species in both ways. As subjectible, it is said to be “that which is placed under a genus and of which the genus is predicated in answer to what it is.” As predicable, it is defined as “that which is predicated of many things differing in number, in answer to what it is”; here its one relation is explained—not to what is above it, but to its inferiors, in relation to which it is superior. Note in passing that there is no vicious circle in Porphyry’s definitions, when he defines genus by reference to species, of which it is predicated, and species by reference to genus, under which it is subjectible. First, because between mutual correlatives such as genus and species there must necessarily be this mutual relation, without a vicious circle, precisely because they are mutual; and consequently each must be included in the definition of the other, as we shall say below, q. 17, art. 6. Second, species is not defined only by that definition, namely by its relation of subjectibility to genus, but also by another, namely its predicability to inferiors, and so it is not made known precisely through genus, but in another way. Whenever something is presupposed to be made known and defined by another definition and in another way than through that with which it is defined circularly, no formal circle is committed, but only a material one, which is not vicious: the same is not made known by the same alone; rather, what has been made known from elsewhere manifests its own knower and definer in another way, as we shall explain further in the Posterior Analytics, q. 25.

Since this second predicable involves both of these intentions, predicability and subjectibility, THE DIFFICULTY HAS TWO PARTS: First, which of these intentions formally constitutes the second predicable. Second, how one stands in relation to the other—whether they are wholly disparate, or whether one is a proper attribute and something consequent on or modifying the other.

It is certain that these relations or intentions are distinct relations, since they have distinct terms and foundations. The term of subjectibility is the very superior under which it is subjectible; its foundation, however, is inferiority or dependence on that superior. But the terms of predicability or universality are the very inferiors of which it is predicated, while the foundation is taken from the community of nature itself, in which those inferiors agree and which is communicable and superior to them. Therefore, the foundations and terms of these relations are distinct; a relation takes its unity or diversity from its foundation and term. Although the very character or intention of species is constituted not by several relations but by one, it can nevertheless have several properties or required conditions, just as predicability is also a property of universality. We are asking which relation is essential to and constitutive of species.

As for this difficulty, some judge that predicable species does not belong to species as species, but that it is constituted as a species by its subjectibility to genus, from which its predicability and universality follow. This is because the proper character of species is to be correlative to genus; it has this character of a correlative not by reference to the inferiors of which it is said, but by reference to the genus under which it is placed. This is taken from Cajetan in the chapter “On Species.” Others, at the opposite extreme, think that species is constituted by universality in such a way that subjectibility to genus also belongs to it insofar as it is universal and by reason of its universality. This is attributed to Toledo, On Species, single question. Others say that subjectibility and predicability are disparate relations and that neither arises from the other as an attribute from an essence. See the Carmelite Course, here, disp. 6, q. 3; Magister Cabero, disp. 3, dub. 2; and Merinero, disp. 3, dub. 2.

Authors also differ on the second point. Some, such as Cajetan in the chapter “On Species,” think that subjectibility to genus is the first character of species and that predicability to individuals arises from it. This is said of atomic species, in which one of these intentions sprouts from the other. For from the fact that a species is placed immediately and directly under a genus, it follows that the species is predicable. In a subaltern species, however, the character of species found in it is properly subjectible species; for its predicability is not only of many things differing in number, but also of things differing in species. Others, by contrast, think that the intention of predicability and universality is so primary in species that subjectibility arises from it.

NEVERTHELESS, I SAY FIRST: The intrinsic and essential constitutive principle of species, insofar as it is the second predicable divided off from the other predicables, is a universality of such a kind that it signifies a relation and predicability to many things differing only in number.

THE REASON IS that species is one of the five predicables insofar as it shares in the character of a universal, since these five predicables are certain species of universal, as was proved above.¹ Therefore, its constitutive principle must fall within the breadth and character of universal; hence it is constituted not by subjectibility but by superiority.

The consequence is evident, because it is inconsistent for a relation in general to signify a tendency toward one term, while a relation that is its species and contained under it tends toward the opposite term. For example, if the relation of a father in general regards a son, a particular relation of father cannot regard a grandfather, but must also regard a particular son. It is clear, however, that the relation of universality in general, which is the genus of the five predicables, regards inferiors as its proper term. Therefore, such a universal relation as species cannot, formally speaking, regard and be constituted by a relation to superiors, but to inferiors. Therefore, it cannot be formally constituted as the second predicable by subjectibility, but by such universality or predicability as regards these inferiors. Cajetan considered this argument so difficult in the chapter “On Species” that he left it unanswered.

I SAY SECOND: In the second predicable, predicability and subjectibility cannot concur accidentally and be disparate; rather, either in themselves or through their foundations, one determines and modifies the other.

THE REASON IS that the second predicable is not universal in just any way, but is a subordinated universal and less than another, namely, genus. Therefore, what conduces to its being a universal less broad than another cannot be disparate from the constitution of such a universal, since it belongs to its intrinsic character to be a subordinated and lower universal. It is like the fact that subordination to a first cause is not disparate from what constitutes a secondary cause; and in political order, it is not accidental or unrelated to the constitution of an inferior minister that he is subordinated to a superior, and the superior minister to the king, since this is part of the character of such a minister by reason of the subordination of an agent. Thus species is essentially predicated of inferiors, but it is not accidental or disparate to it; rather, it is required of itself that it be subordinated to a superior universal under which it is contained, insofar as it is a less universal.

Nor is it enough to say that being subject to a genus belongs to the specific nature itself, while another intention, subjectibility, is joined to it accidentally. For subjectibility and predicability are not the same relation and intention. This, I say, is not enough. For although predicability and subjectibility are two relations, precisely because the predicability that belongs to the character of species is not supreme but inferior predicability, it requires of itself, and not as something disparate, that on the part of its foundation it ground a relation of subjectibility, without which the character of inferiority cannot be understood; for every inferior is subjectible. Therefore, on the part of their foundation, predicability and subjectibility are united of themselves and are also connected to one another; they do not concur accidentally in the character of species. Likewise, universality and predicability are two distinct intentions or relations: one regards inferiors as superior in being, the other in predicating, that is, in verifying that one thing is another through the application of one to the other. Nevertheless, one follows upon the other and is connected to it of itself. It is true that, because their being consists in being known, one can be known without the other and can actually exist without the other in the very act of knowing. For this connection of intentions is not with respect to actual existence, as though one followed upon the other in being, since being belongs to them not through a consequent relation but through cognition. Rather, it is a connection by reason of their foundation, because the foundation founds one in such a way that, by virtue of that very thing, it also calls for the founding of the other.

I SAY FINALLY: Subjectibility does not flow from universality taken precisely, much less does predicability arise from subjectibility. Rather, the prior and more essential intention in the second predicable is a restricted and contracted universality; from this universality, insofar as it is thus restricted and modified, immediate subjectibility to genus arises.

THE REASON for this conclusion is taken from what has been said: the second predicable is essentially and of itself a certain universal, since universal is divided as a genus into these five predicables. Therefore, the intention of universality as thus determined must essentially belong to it: namely, a universality that regards only inferiors distinct in number. From universality in the line and relation of universality that regards only inferiors, however, only what belongs to superiority can follow, not what belongs to inferiority and subjection. Therefore, the intention of subjectibility does not follow from universality. But because universality is restricted and contracted, subjectibility can follow by reason of its being restricted, as certain attributes in a creature follow from its being a created being, or from its being a certain kind of being, for example a substance or body; others follow from its being from nothing, for example its being defeasible, capable of sin, capable of annihilation, and so on. Likewise, in a cause, subjection to another cause does not follow from its being causal, or from the line of causality; rather, it follows from the fact that the cause is limited, dependent, and inferior in causing. In the same way, subjectibility does not follow as a proper attribute from universality as such, or from its relation and line—even from specific universality—but follows from a universality that is dependent, limited, and subordinated to another, or less than another: a universal above it, which is genus.

From this conclusion it is understood how these two intentions, subjectibility and predicability, are connected in the second predicable within one form of universality. Since they do not concur accidentally in this second predicable, they must follow of themselves from some form and belong of themselves by reason of that form. Thus subjectibility follows from limited and subordinated universality on the side of subordination and limitation, while predicability follows on the side of universality; just as an inclination to virtue follows from a human being insofar as he is rational, while the capacity for sin follows insofar as he is defeasible and from nothing. It is likewise clear how species is intrinsically and essentially correlative to genus insofar as it is subject to it and inferior to it; but this belongs to species insofar as it is a limited and subordinated universal.

From this it is evident that the division of species into predicable and subjectible is not a division into different things, but into different attributes or modes of the same thing, by which it has different relations, namely to superiors and inferiors.

THE ARGUMENTS ARE ANSWERED.

The first argument is as follows: Most formally, insofar as it is species, species has being only as correlative to genus. But insofar as it is a correlative, it is not predicable but subjectible. Therefore, formally, insofar as it is species, it is not predicable.

The major is certain, because genus is defined of itself relatively to species as its proper correlative; therefore, formally, species as species is correlative to genus. The minor is clear, because as a correlative it regards that of which it is correlative; but it is formally correlative to genus; therefore, formally, as species it regards genus. But insofar as it regards genus, it is not predicable but subjectible; therefore, it is essentially constituted by subjectibility rather than by predicability.

The argument is confirmed: a subaltern genus is more universal than the lowest species, since it is predicated of it; but it is not constituted in the character of a subaltern genus by predicability. Therefore, much less is the lowest species constituted in that way.

The minor is proved: a subaltern genus is not constituted as such either by predicability of many things differing in species or by predicability of many things differing in number; therefore, it is constituted by no predicability. It is not constituted by predicability of many things differing in species, because this also belongs to the highest genus and so is not the proper character of a subaltern genus. Nor is it constituted by predicability of many things differing in number, because this also belongs to the lowest species. Therefore, it is constituted by no predicability, but by subjectibility.

I ANSWER: There are various opinions about the proper and per se correlative of genus; you can see them in the Coimbra commentary, q. 2, “On Species,” art. 1. Some think that genus as genus alone and adequately refers to species, and does not refer to individuals in the manner of a genus. Others say that the adequate correlative of genus is something abstracted from individual and species, which they call “subjectible in complete quid,” because both individual and species agree under this character. Still others, and better, think that the immediate and formal correlative of genus is species, but not in every way and not adequately. For an individual is also subject to genus, but not formally as species is; it does not contract genus by formal division as species does, but materially, namely through material and individuating conditions in which species is sustained and through species genus is sustained. Therefore, we say that species is indeed correlative to genus, but formally so—that is, it formally contracts genus through a difference that makes it differ formally and specifically, not numerically. From this it is correlative and subjectible to genus, but it is also properly and of itself relative to individuals, because it is not the immediate formal correlative of genus unless it is also universal in itself, although limited and contracted or dependent, since it is subject to genus. Thus being correlative to genus is not the whole essence of species, but rather its condition. Directly and of itself, species is universal and predicable of an individual, with the dependence of subjectibility to genus.

In answer to the confirmation, there is a disparity between the lowest species and a subaltern species, because a subaltern species is not universal in the character of species but in the character of genus. For it has universality and predicability only “in answer to what it is, incompletely,” while it has subalternation in the character of subjectible species, insofar as it is subject to a superior genus and contracts it by a difference, thereby making a species that is not the lowest but a subaltern species, which is also called a subaltern genus. In truth, however, subalternation belongs to it insofar as it is a certain species. Thus it has universality under one character, namely as genus, and subjectibility under another, namely as species. The lowest species, by contrast, does not have universality in the character of genus, but in the character of the second predicable, “in answer to what it is, completely”; and therefore universality is prior in it, so that it is constituted as the second predicable, to subjectibility in that same lowest species.

The second argument is as follows: A subjectible species can be given that is not predicable, such as an angelic species, on the opinion that it has only one individual, which we shall prove below.² Conversely, a predicable species can be given that is not subjectible, such as substance when it is predicated of this and that substance as individuals, although substance is not subject to another superior, since there is no other grade above substance. Therefore, that some species is both subjectible and predicable is accidental concurrence.

The argument is confirmed: subjectibility to genus does not conduce or proportion species to be predicated of individuals, nor does predicability of individuals conduce to its being subject to genus; for one of these relations is not derived from the other, nor does one ground the other. Therefore, they are accidental and purely concomitant.

I ANSWER by denying the antecedent, if we are speaking of species properly so called, which is the second predicable. As for angelic species, we shall show below that it is not only subjectible but also predicable, for it is universal, not as a genus, but as signifying the whole quiddity completely. As for substance, we say that even in relation to this and that individuated substance it is not species as the second predicable, since it is predicated in answer to what something is incompletely; rather, it is a generic predication, though mediated, because genus is predicated mediately of individuals, as we showed in the preceding question when explaining how genus is predicated of generic individuals; this will be explained further in the next question.

In answer to the confirmation, subjectibility to genus does not conduce to predicability of individuals considered absolutely, but it does conduce to predicability as limited and dependent, and insofar as it is the lowest predicability; for this cannot exist without such subjectibility. It is like obscurity: it does not of itself conduce to cognition, but it does conduce to cognition of a certain kind, namely faith, which is imperfect and limited cognition that calls for that modification of obscurity.

The final argument is as follows, to prove that subjectibility is found prior to predicability in species: subjectibility of species is that by which it is made immediately subjectible to genus. But immediate subjectibility is prior to universality. Therefore.

The minor is proved: it is prior for a specific nature to be a nature contracted with respect to genus than to be contractible with respect to individuals; for it is constituted in itself by contracting genus. But being constituted is prior to being contracted by others. By contracting genus, however, it is subject to genus; by being contractible to individuals, it is universal to them. Therefore subjectibility is prior to predicability.

I ANSWER by denying the minor. In answer to the proof, we say that the contraction of genus, insofar as it pertains to the very constitution of a nature, which occurs through genus and difference, is not subjectibility; for the constitution of a nature pertains to the nature in itself and to the first intention, whereas subjectibility signifies the relation by which species is coordinated with genus, and so pertains to the second intention of the nature, not to its constitution. In this order of intention, universality and predicability are prior in constituting the second predicable, which is species, to subjectibility. This is so even though, with respect to the nature in itself, the contraction of genus—which is the foundation of subjectibility—is understood before contractibility to individuals, which is the foundation of universality. But in constituting species, this is prior to that.