Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Secunda Pars Artis Logicae

THE POINT OF THIS DIFFICULTY has often been touched upon by us, and depends on that common difficulty concerning the definition of accidents in the concrete. For since, in the concrete of an accident, we find the subject denominated by the form, the form denominating it, and a constituted thing or composite of both, it is difficult to assign a proper and per se defined thing to which the definition belongs essentially. For if, for example, we say that in this definition of genus the defined thing is the subject itself, or the nature to which the intention of genus belongs, the definition does not belong to it essentially. For animal, for example, does not have it as its essential account to be predicated of many, although it is that which is predicated of many. Nor can the defined thing be the intention itself, or generic form: for this is not that which is predicated, but that by which some nature is predicated of many. Nor can it be the thing constituted from nature and intention: for this constituted thing is not predicated of many specifically different things, since the composite of real nature and a being of reason does not descend to the species themselves; nature alone does so.

This difficulty has twisted many minds and divided them into VARIOUS OPINIONS: some say that in these definitions the defined thing is the subject, insofar as it expresses an order to the form; others, on the contrary, say that it is the form, insofar as it expresses an order to the subject; and others finally, especially among certain more recent authors, say that the thing constituted from the subject and the accidental form is defined as that to which the definition belongs essentially, while the subject itself, or supposit, is defined only denominatively.

On this point we have often rejected as contrary to Aristotle and St. Thomas the claim that a composite of subject and accident can be defined as something per se one. For the opposing authors agree in understanding by that constituted or composite thing of subject and accident a certain quiddity resulting from subject and accident as constituents of a third thing, which has the subject as a part of itself; hence it is not predicated of that subject, since a whole is not predicated of a part. And when one says, “A human being is white,” this is verified adjectivally of the supposit itself, not essentially and substantivally of that third constituted thing. We therefore say that from these two, subject and accident, there does not result something per se one and definable by a single definition, but rather a being per accidens, as we explained at length above, q. 5, following the mind of St. Thomas.

The point made there is further explained: no per se one quiddity that is neither substance nor accident can result from substance and accident. For there is no middle between substance and accident: they are divided by modes that express a contradiction, namely, being per se and being in another. Therefore, the third thing that results, since it has both substance and accident as parts of itself, cannot be a quiddity that is substance alone or accident alone; a middle between these two is impossible. It is therefore not a per se quiddity, but a being per accidens. If you say that it is not one quiddity that is neither substance nor accident, but one quiddity that is both, this is just what we intend: if that quiddity, or composite, is at once substance and accident, it cannot be so by passing into one per se quiddity distinct from both, which would be neither per se accident nor per se substance, since no such thing exists. It is therefore only substance and accident joined by an accidental union, not essentially and per se. Things accidentally united are a being per accidens, even if they coincide in the same subject; they are one not constitutively, but denominatively.

BUT SOME REPLY that the concretes of accidents can be taken either adjectivally or substantivally: adjectivally, they are subordinated to several concepts and are not a being per se; taken substantivally, they are said to be one per se, because they are conceived and presented as one, whereas adjectivally they present subject and form as several. Hence whether they are a being per accidens or per se depends on the mode of conceiving. Others say that no one per accidens results from accident and subject, because they have a true union with one another and compose something true. Others say that even if it is a being per accidens, it can be defined, as a commonwealth, an army, a people, and other similar things, which have less unity, are defined.

But the first solution makes an unsuitable distinction between a name taken adjectivally and substantivally with respect to whether it is a being per accidens or per se. For a name is taken adjectivally insofar as it is signified as applying its adjacency to another; substantivally, one thing is signified as carrying with it the supposit to which it is in reality adjacent and inheres. Whether something is a being per accidens or per se, however, depends on the unity and identity of the thing that results from combining the two. This quiddity or unity that results is not per se one, whether it is signified as applying its adjacency to another or as carrying the supposit with it. Whichever way it is signified, the quiddity resulting from that form and subject arises from the accidental conjunction of the extremes. It makes no middle quiddity between substance and accident, since that is impossible, nor a quiddity that is substance alone or accident alone. Therefore it does not make something constituted per se, but something denominated accidentally, whether the name is taken adjectivally or substantivally.

The second solution fails because it thinks that a being per se one results from an accidental union. For although the union is real, it is not a per se union, but a qualified and accidental one. Therefore what results from it is one only in a qualified sense; the unity resulting from the union of the extremes will be of the same kind as that union.

Finally, the third solution is manifestly mistaken because definition concerns quiddity alone. A definition is one to the extent that it reaches and defines one quiddity. A being per accidens does not signify one quiddity simply and per se, but several quiddities that are one only per accidens; hence it is not definable by a single definition. For a definition defines through genus and specific difference. Where there are several quiddities, there are several genera and differences, and therefore several definitions. This argument is taken from the Philosopher, Metaphysics VII,¹ lecture 12, as cited by St. Thomas.²

From these points, then, I resolve the proposed difficulty.

AND I SAY FIRST: The defined thing of genus is not a thing constituted from subject and the intention of genus, nor can the definition belong to that thing essentially.

So says Cajetan in his commentary on the chapter “On Genus,” and the Thomists commonly agree. This follows clearly from what has been said, since the intention of genus is an accidental predicate with respect to the subject, and consequently no nature or quiddity per se definable results from it and the subject.

I SAY SECOND: In this definition, and in the definitions of other accidents, the formal defined thing cannot be the nature or subject itself insofar as it is clothed with and subject to the intention.

THE REASON IS that the formal defined thing must be what is designated formally and per se by the very name. But “white,” for example, does not signify the subject formally and per se, but as connoted and consequently; therefore.

The minor is proved from St. Thomas, Metaphysics V, lecture 9,³ where he says: “Nor is what Avicenna says true: that predicates belonging to the genera of accidents signify substance principally and accident secondarily, as in what I call ‘white.’ For ‘white,’ as it is spoken of in the Categories, signifies quality alone. But this name ‘white’ signifies the white subject consequently, insofar as it signifies whiteness in the manner of an accident.” So St. Thomas. The reason is that the concrete term of an accident agrees with its abstract term in what is signified formally and per se; for it takes from the latter the form by which it is denominated and which it concerns. Therefore the concrete term signifies the same thing as the abstract term on the side of the denominating form, although applied to the denominated subject. The formal signified of the abstract term is the form; therefore the formal signified of the concrete term is also the form, although it adds the form’s mode of existing in the denominated subject. The subject, however, is imported only as sustaining and receiving the form, not as belonging to the form’s quiddity. Definition intends to explain for us the quiddity of the form received and signified in the concrete, not the subject that receives it; much less does it intend to declare the very nature of the receiving subject. For when I define “white,” I define not the nature of a body, but the account of white.

I SAY FINALLY: The formal and quidditative defined thing in this definition (and the same holds for other accidental concretes) is the second intention of genus. But that which supplies the supposit to the defined thing, or is denominated by it, is the subject of this intention, and so is imported in the defined thing itself consequently and as connoted.

This is Cajetan’s view in his commentary on the chapter “On Genus” and chapter 4 of On Being and Essence, and the Thomists commonly follow it. Thus, in these definitions, the formal defined thing is one thing, and that which supplies the supposit to the defined thing is another. In this the accident differs from substance: in substance, the defined thing has its supposit and the account of quod from itself, whereas an accident begs that from outside itself. This conclusion is evident from St. Thomas, who says that the concrete term of an accident signifies the form alone—“white,” for example, signifies quality—and does not have the subject as a part of its signification, as is clear in Metaphysics V, lecture 9,⁴ VIII, lecture 4, § Determinat,⁵ and VII, lecture 1.⁶

Nor is it enough to reply that Aristotle and St. Thomas intended the concrete term of an accident not to signify this or that subject determinately, but in a confused way, while signifying the form determinately; for it cannot be denied that the concrete term of an accident represents the subject to us, and not the form alone. But this solution cannot stand, because St. Thomas does not deny that the subject is signified by the concrete name; he says that it is not signified principally, but consequently, as is clear in Metaphysics V, lecture 9,⁷ against Avicenna, and that it is not signified on an equal footing or as a part of the signification, in Metaphysics VII, lecture 1.⁸ Therefore, whether or not it signifies the subject in common, still, according to St. Thomas, that which is imported as subject by the name “white” (and it is certain that no determinate this or that subject is signified, but a subject in a confused way) is signified not principally but consequently, as a subject sustaining the form. It is therefore not the principal and per se defined thing, but that which supplies the supposit to the defined thing and is imported consequently.

Finally, one may see how lucidly St. Thomas sets out this conclusion in chapter 7 of On Being and Essence,⁹ where he says: “Since essence is signified through definition, accidents must have essence in the same way in which they have definition. But they have an incomplete definition, because they cannot be defined unless the subject is posited in their definition; this is because they do not have in themselves an absolute being per se apart from a subject.” St. Thomas then sets out the difference between substantial and accidental form: the former, when it comes to matter, constitutes a certain essence, and therefore “form is a part of a complete essence.” Accidental form together with the subject, however, “does not make one per se, but per accidens; and therefore no essence results from their conjunction, as it does from matter and form. Hence an accident neither has the account of a complete essence nor is a part of a complete essence; but just as it is a being in a qualified sense, so it has essence in a qualified sense.” Thus, for St. Thomas, the definition of an accident is always incomplete, just as its essence is, because it is an essence dependent on something outside itself, namely, the subject that supplies a supposit to the defined thing; the subject does not belong to or enter into the quiddity of the defined thing. This is why accidents are said to be defined by addition, as the Philosopher puts it in Metaphysics VII, chapter 5,¹⁰ lecture 4 according to St. Thomas,¹¹ because they are defined through something outside the essence of the defined thing, namely, the subject. For in accidents “what it is” is distinguished from “that of which it is,” as Aristotle says in the same place, text 20,¹² and St. Thomas in lecture 5.¹³ Therefore, in concrete accidents, the formal and quidditative defined thing is one thing, and the supposit of the defined thing another.

From this is drawn the BASIS of the conclusion: the quidditative and formal predicates of an accident terminate in the accidental form itself, and the subject does not belong to the quidditative predicate, although it sustains and receives that form. Therefore the quidditative and formal defined thing in these definitions does not pass over to the subject, but terminates in the form itself; for the formal and quidditative defined thing is that in which formal quidditative predicates are included. But since such a form and its quidditative predicates are not defined in a state of separation and abstraction from the subject, but together with their mode of existing in the subject, the subject is therefore posited consequently in their definition as supplying a supposit to the defined thing, not as its quidditative predicate. Thus the quidditative and formal defined thing is one thing, and that in which this defined thing is found and which supplies its supposit is another. The latter is the subject or nature; the former is the form or intention in this definition of genus.

THE ARGUMENTS ARE RESOLVED.

First, one argues from the argument set out above in the introduction to the difficulty: the intention of genus is not that “which” is predicated essentially of many species, since it does not descend to them, but is that “by which” a nature is predicated. Therefore the definition given does not belong to it. Hence also, when I say concretely, “Peter is white,” I do not predicate whiteness of him, but predicate “having whiteness.” But what has whiteness is not quality alone, but a subject affected by a quality. Therefore that is the defined thing, just as it is what is signified by the term “white.”

THE REPLY is that the intention is not that which is predicated as the supposit of such an intention and as the thing predicated; therefore the definition belongs to it not as the supposit of the definition, but only as the account or form by which one predicates of many. Hence in definitions of concrete accidents the defined thing is not found essentially as quod, but denominatively, when the supposit is supplied to the defined thing through something extrinsic. Nor do accidents themselves carry their supposits, which is why their definitions are given by addition: in them “what it is” is one thing, and “that of which it is” another, as we said above from the Philosopher and St. Thomas.

Why, then, are these definitions given through that which is denominated such, and not through that by which it is such, when the definition belongs essentially to the latter alone, and that alone is the formal defined thing? The reason is that accidents have an incomplete being, dependent on the denominated subject and not subsisting in themselves. Hence this dependence and imperfection of an accident is better expressed by defining it through the subject, which is such denominatively, than through what is signified by itself alone as that by which. See St. Thomas, Metaphysics VII, lecture 4,¹⁴ and chapter 7 of On Being and Essence.¹⁵ A further reason is that this accords with the very mode of signifying. For when an accident is defined concretely, where the subject is signified as supplying a supposit to the defined thing, it would be less suitable to say that what is signified in this way is that by which something is such—where only the abstract account is signified—than to say that it is that which is such, even though the definition belongs to it only denominatively. When one says “Peter is white,” the term “white” does signify “having whiteness,” not whiteness in the abstract; but it does not signify both equally. Rather, it signifies whiteness formally, while the subject, which is the one having it, is connoted and taken materially. For this reason the predicate is verified accidentally of the subject to which it is applied, because it is identified with that subject in the supposit. Likewise, “having whiteness” is the defined thing, but not on an equal footing: whiteness is so formally, while “having” is so denominatively and enters the definition by addition.

Second, one argues from the argument made above, q. 5, art. 5, which some use here: “White” is well defined as “a body that disperses sight” or “that which has whiteness”; therefore not quality alone, but the thing constituted from quality and subject is definable. See the solution at the cited place, final argument.

Third, one argues: In the definition of genus, one subject cannot be imported; therefore it imports a subject neither principally nor consequently.

The consequence is clear: if the subject of the intention of genus is imported not as one but as many, then it is not properly defined in the manner of one by saying “that which is predicated”; rather, there will be many things that are predicated.

The antecedent is manifest: that which underlies the nature of genus is not one and cannot be conceived by a single concept. For both a real being and a being of reason, both an accident and a substance, underlie the intention of genus. Therefore there is not one subject.

THE REPLY is that many are troubled by this argument. Nevertheless, in my view, it must be resolved in every position, whether the subject is imported on the side of the principal defined thing or as denominatively defined and imported consequently. The same difficulty can be found in any concrete term that imports a very broad subject, such as “true,” “good,” “intelligible,” and so on, whose subject is found in real beings as well as beings of reason, in substance and in accident. I say, then, that in such a concrete term one subject is not imported by unity of nature or being, but by unity of capacity and receptivity for that form or intention. For whatever has the capacity for that form in the manner of one subject—that is, of one receptive thing—is signified, even if the natures are very diverse. Thus theologians say that in the words “This is my body,” by “this” is understood what is contained under the species, that is, whatever can be under those species, whether it is a living or dead body, bread or a human being. So, by the name “substrate of genus,” we understand whatever is capable of genericity, whether real or not, provided it agrees in this account of capacity, even if it does not agree in the quiddity and unity of nature.

Fourth, one argues: If we understand that what is defined here is the very thing constituted from subject and form, everything pertaining to the account of genus is explained essentially: both the thing predicated denominatively and the form by which it is made predicable are explained. Therefore such a composite fits better as the defined thing of the entire definition.

This is confirmed because that whole constituted thing is subordinated to a single ultimate concept; therefore it is one definable thing. The consequence is clear: a being per accidens is not definable for the reason that it is not one quiddity, but several. Conversely, then, if it is one, being subordinated to a single concept, it is definable per se. The antecedent is proved both because this concrete term, “white” for example, belongs to one concept, and so too does the thing itself constituted from whiteness and body—for no more things are found in the concrete term than in the constituted thing—and also because both that accidental concrete and the constituted thing can be ordered to a single operation: white to dispersing, hot to heating. Therefore it can be subordinated to a single concept.

THE REPLY is that the whole which is in the genus is indeed explained in that constituted thing, but not on an equal footing or as belonging essentially to the genus itself: the subject is there as denominated, and the intention as the form by which genus is constituted formally. But that one third quiddity should result from these two and be definable essentially by this definition of genus is impossible, as we have said. Nor does such a composite explain the defined thing of genus better or fit the definition better: it is neither that which is predicated, since the intention does not descend with the nature to the inferiors, nor that by which it is predicated, since the nature does not belong to the form by which something is made predicable, but to the thing predicated. Hence from nature and intention there is made neither a quiddity that is genus as that which, nor one that is genus as that by which. Both are explained, however, when one does not take them as a constituted whole, but takes the form partially and the subject denominatively.

In reply to the confirmation, one says that the concrete term of an accident is subordinated to a single concept, importing subject and form not as equally principal, but the form essentially and formally, and the subject materially and as denominated. Thus it can be defined under this concept, and it will not behave as a being per accidens, but will be defined in the manner in which it is subordinated to that concept: the form will be the formal defined thing itself, and the subject denominative. But the thing constituted from whiteness and body, from form and accident, includes both equally essentially and thereby constitutes a third thing. In this way it is a being per accidens, because it results from extremes accidentally united; no one quiddity can result that is neither substance nor accident, but it is both together. The concrete term, however, does not express some resulting quiddity, but the very formal quiddity of the accident, which has the subject not as a part or an extreme composing it, but as something material denominated by it, in which it has its mode of being not abstractly but concretely.

Finally, one argues: Nature alone is what is predicated of inferiors, or nature considered in itself, as St. Thomas says in chapter 4 of On Being and Essence.¹⁶ Therefore, although such a nature has a relation and intention of genus, nevertheless the defined thing directly will be the very substrate of the intention, since the definition belongs essentially to this alone, namely, to be predicated of many. Nor can one say that predication belongs to it denominatively, not formally and essentially; for a generic nature, “animal,” for example, is predicated essentially, not denominatively, of inferiors.

THE REPLY is that it is entirely true that nature is that which is predicated essentially of inferiors on the side of the thing predicated. Nevertheless, predicability itself and the state of universality by which it is predicated of many belong to nature denominatively. The appellation changes, however, when one says: “It is not predicated denominatively, but essentially; therefore it does not belong to it denominatively to be predicated of many.” For it is one thing how predicability belongs to nature, and another how nature is predicated of inferiors and belongs to them. Nature does not belong to the inferiors denominatively; nevertheless, predicability or universality belongs denominatively to nature itself, so that it may be predicated essentially of inferiors—not with respect to the thing predicated, but in the mode of a universal and superior, while the essence is found without that universality. With respect to the thing that is predicated, however, St. Thomas says that nature considered in itself is predicated of inferiors.