Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Secunda Pars Artis Logicae

At present THREE THINGS ARE CERTAIN among the authors:

First, in both substantial and accidental concrete terms, a concrete is rightly predicated of a concrete, as “Man is an animal” and “Man is white.”

Second, abstract terms are not truly predicated of concrete terms, nor concrete terms of abstract terms, by virtue of their mode of signifying, as St. Thomas teaches at length in chapter 3 of On Being and Essence¹, and this is taken from Summa theologiae I, q. 3, art. 3. Sometimes, however, they are verified identically, as in divine things Godhead and God are the same, as are Fatherhood and Father; and among the transcendentals, unity and one, entity and being are the same. Hence St. Thomas says in question 21 of On Truth, art. 4, ad 4,² that general forms are not spoken of in just one way. For “being” is said not only of that which is, but also of that by which something is. Thus being and the transcendent forms are predicated both abstractly and concretely, of both concrete and abstract terms.

Third, in the case of accidents, higher predicates are predicated abstractly of lower ones, as “Whiteness is a color,” “is a quality,” and so on, because in accidents the abstract terms signify the whole essence and intrinsic notion; for accidents in themselves are nothing but forms. Hence St. Thomas says in chapter 7 of On Being and Essence³ that accidents stated concretely, such as white or musical, are not placed in a category as species or genera except by reduction; they are placed there only insofar as they are signified abstractly, as whiteness and music. See also opusc. 42, chapter 19,⁴ and question 3 of On Truth, art. 7, ad 2.⁵

The basis of all these points depends only on this: predication must be made by applying whole to whole. For when one thing is affirmed to be another, the predicate, insofar as its mode of signifying is concerned, must contain no less than the subject, or conversely. Therefore, when both are concrete, each signified as a whole, they are rightly identified through predication. An abstract term, by contrast, stands to a concrete as a part, since it abstracts from it not as a higher term from a lower, but as the formal from the material and the form from the subject. Hence no adequation can obtain between an abstract and a concrete, since every part is less than the whole—unless, perhaps, the term is a transcendental, for then it is imbibed in every whole and every part, and so does not stand to the concrete as a part. Only quantity is excepted from this rule of predication: the abstract term “quantity” is predicated of “quantified.” For quantity is said to be quantified, or extended. This is because quantity, even when separated from a subject, has parts, as is clear in the Eucharist; but what has parts is called extended and quantified. Thus it is rightly predicated of quantity that it is quantified.

Finally, from the same basis it is clear that abstract terms of accidents are rightly predicated of similar abstract terms, because accidental abstracts express the whole notion found in accidents, and are thus predicated as wholes.

Thus, only TWO DOUBTS REMAIN. First, whether in the substantial order the predication of an abstract term of a concrete is true in itself, and false only because of a defect in the mode of signifying. Second, whether among substantial abstract terms a higher term is truly and formally predicated of a lower, as when one says, “Humanity is animality.”

As to the first: SOME think that a substantial predicate in the abstract is truly predicated of lower terms, though not completely and adequately, and thus, considered in itself, is truly predicated of them in the concrete. So says Martinez, disputation 3 on Porphyry, question 1. The basis is that although the abstract is signified as a part, in reality it is nevertheless the same as the whole; but the truth of predication has as its sole object the unity and identity on the side of the thing, which is found in the extremes themselves. Therefore, by virtue of the terms, such predication is true. However, it is not predicated completely and adequately, because predication is complete and adequate when the predicate says or does not exclude whatever is in the subject. But the abstract says the whole that is in the subject, although it is signified as a part, whereas the concrete is signified as a whole. Therefore, it is not predicated completely. Thus, they say, this predication, “Man is humanity,” is not verified for the substitute—that is, for the supposit itself, the subject which is man—but for the constituted item, that is, the very nature identified with man.

THE OPPOSITE VIEW, however, follows from St. Thomas, who requires for the truth of propositions not only identity on the side of the thing signified, but also on the side of the mode of signifying, as is clear in Summa theologiae I, q. 39, arts. 4 and 5. He expressly excludes the predication of humanity of man in Summa theologiae I, q. 3, art. 3, in On Being and Essence, chapter 3, at the end,⁶ and in opusc. 69, lecture 2,⁷ always using the same reason: the concrete term “man” includes something that “humanity” does not. For humanity states precisely that by which man is man, whereas the concrete term “man” states that which has humanity. But it is not impossible for that which has humanity to have something else of which humanity is not predicated, and therefore something of which humanity is not predicated. Thus these extremes do not ground the truth or predication.

They say that St. Thomas denies only formal and, as it were, complete predication, not fundamental predication based on the identity of the extremes; for that alone, they say, is considered by the judgment of truth. But against this presses St. Thomas’s own reason: the basis of truth requires identity with everything of which something is predicated. For if there is identity with one thing and not another, the predication is incongruous and unsuitable with respect to the part for which there is no identity, and consequently false; for falsity, as an evil and defect, is sufficiently established by a defect on one side. Therefore St. Thomas said in the cited Summa theologiae I, q. 3, that man and humanity are not altogether the same, and consequently predication is deficient in the respect in which they are not the same.

To understand this more fully, observe that the basis of truth is not identity as it is found somehow or other in the thing; rather, when the thing is presented to the intellect, it must be presented under the aspect in which the extremes are identified, not under the aspect in which they are not. Otherwise appellation and precision vary. We see that animal and man are identical in reality, yet animal is called a genus and man is not called a genus, because this predicate belongs to them not insofar as they are identified, but insofar as they are virtually distinguished and presented to the intellect under precision. Similarly, we say that the Father generates and the divine essence does not generate, although Father and essence are identical. Therefore, for humanity to be truly predicated of man, it is not enough that humanity and man be identified in some way; they must be presented for predication as identified, and not under a precision by which one abstracts from the other. But as signified by the abstract term “humanity,” it is presented under abstraction and precision from man in the concrete, as a part of him, and is not altogether identical with everything included in the concrete term “man.” Therefore, on the side of the thing there is no basis for true predication, just as there is no basis for saying truly, “The essence generates,” although it is identical with the Father who generates. And just as one cannot admit in any way that the essence generates when “generates” is explained as applying to the substitute or supposit, but not to the constituted item—that is, the nature—even though in reality the supposit of the essence generates, because this is not said by virtue of the mode of signifying; so, conversely, it does not follow that humanity is man when explained as applying to the constituted item, that is, the nature, but not to the substitute, that is, the supposit, because by its mode of signifying “man” does not signify only the nature.

Hence the contrary basis is resolved. Although humanity and man are the same on the side of nature, they nevertheless abstract and differ according to their mode of signifying and conceiving. Therefore, while they stand under that mode of signifying, they have no basis for being predicated, as was said of the proposition “The divine essence generates.”

As to the second doubt: SOME think that those predications in which one substantial abstract is predicated of another substantial abstract are false, because they believe an abstract term abstracts not only from the concrete but from every other notion that is not formally the abstract form itself. For humanity states precisely that by which man is man; hence it does not even implicitly include anything other than what it expresses under this precision. Thus it does not contain another abstract term of which it could be predicated: where there is formal abstraction, it in no way includes what it abstracts from, but instead makes, as it were, an appellation and reduplication of the abstract form.

NEVERTHELESS, the reply is made by distinguishing: abstract forms may be taken either specifically or reduplicatively. In the first way, they express only the nature, together with every formal constituent, under abstraction as a mode of being. In the second way, they express and reduplicate the function of formal abstraction.

In the first way, one abstract form can be predicated more universally of a less universal one, even in the abstract, as when one says, “Humanity is animality,” or in the Philosopher’s example in Metaphysics VII,⁸ lecture 12 in St. Thomas’s commentary,⁹ that splitting a foot is a kind of footness. If, however, the term is taken in the second way, predication of one abstract term of another cannot be verified.

The reason for the first part is that these forms in the abstract are predicated of something; for this is true: “This animality is animality,” and “This humanity is humanity.” Therefore this too will be true: “Humanity is animality.”

The antecedent is clear, because the divine Word assumed some singular humanity. Therefore, it is true to say that this humanity of the Word is humanity, and that this animality which he assumed is animality.

The consequent is clear as well: if it is true to say, “Some animality is animality,” then by descending under that term one can show some animality that is humanity. For one animality is humanity and another is equinity. Therefore, just as some animality is animality, so too a certain humanity is animality. For the animality that is in man is the nature of man and, consequently, humanity. We say the same of this proposition, “Peterhood is a certain humanity,” provided that by “Peterhood” one understands not supposithood but the singularity of humanity; for the supposit is distinct from the nature.

This is confirmed, because humanity and every abstract form have certain essential predicates of which they are constituted; for humanity signifies that by which man is man. But man is man by essential predicates. Therefore humanity includes them, and therefore they must be verified of it and predicated of it, since they belong to it; otherwise there would be predicates that truly belong to something but could not be predicated of it.

The second part of the conclusion is plainly established, because where appellation and precision intervene, predication does not follow, however much identity there may be in reality. Thus, although animal and man are the same, animal under the precision of animal is a genus, and man is not. And although in God justice is mercy, it is not true to say that the attribute of justice, reduplicatively, is the attribute of mercy. Likewise, although humanity is animality, the notion of one, taken reduplicatively, is not the notion of the other. For it is false to say that the notion by which something is man is animality; otherwise, wherever there was animality, there would be man. The same can be found in abstract terms for accidents, if they abstract with this precision.

This makes clear the answer to the opposing basis, which confirms this second part. When it is said that an abstract form does not even implicitly include what it abstracts from, the reply is that this is true; nevertheless, an abstract form abstracts only from its concrete term and material subject, not from its essential predicates, which are also considered abstractly.

AND IF YOU PRESS THE POINT: This is a good inference: “Humanity is that by which man is man, and humanity is animality; therefore animality is that by which man is man.” The conclusion is false, so one of the premises must be false. It is not the major premise, because it is the definition of humanity, which states only that by which man is man. Therefore, the minor premise must be false.

The reply is that appellation varies: the minor premise is verified only specifically and without any appellation, whereas the major premise is verified under appellation and precision—not of the definition itself, but of what is defined. For when one says, “That by which man is man,” humanity is signified under its own concept and reduplication of precision, that is, under the aspect in which it regards precisely its formal constituent. For man is man by humanity, but by humanity he is not an animal, although animal and man are the same. Thus, when one says, “Humanity is that by which man is man,” the sense is: The notion of humanity, as distinct from animality, is that by which man is man, that is, insofar as it regards man under the formality that constitutes him as man. Although animality is included in this, it does not constitute him under the notion of animality.

BUT IF YOU STILL OBJECT, St. Thomas denies that the nature signified in the manner of a part, such as humanity, has the notion of a species or difference, as is clear in chapter 4 of On Being and Essence.¹⁰ In general, he teaches that only what has a complete nature is directly in a genus; thus a hand and other parts are not in a genus, as is clear in Sentences III, dist. 6, q. 1, art. 1, solution 1, ad 1.¹¹ But it is clear that humanity and the other abstract terms are signified as parts. Finally, he expressly says that humanity is neither a genus nor a species in Sentences I, dist. 23, q. 1, art. 1, in the body of the article.¹² Therefore, we falsely say that it is predicated of anything, since it is not a universal.

The reply is that in the first passage St. Thomas means only that abstract terms do not have the nature of genus and species with respect to their concrete terms, of which they are not predicated. St. Thomas did not, however, deny that abstract terms can be predicated of other abstract terms as higher of lower. Although we could explain the other two passages in this way as well, we add that St. Thomas means only that parts and other incomplete beings are not directly in a category; he does not deny that they can be in it by reduction. In the same way, humanity, insofar as it is signified in the manner of a part, is not directly a genus or species, but is so by reduction. Or, in the third passage, he takes humanity under reduplication and precision, as was said in the second part of the conclusion; for in this way it is not a genus or species that is predicated, or of which anything is predicated.