Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Secunda Pars Artis Logicae

THIS DIFFICULTY PRESUPPOSES that nature, while actually being predicated of many, still remains universal, at least metaphysically. For if it loses universality through predication, there is no place for the question by which we inquire what it is, in the universal itself, to be predicated and to be in many.

Some have indeed doubted this, thinking that precisely when a universal is actually predicated of many, the relation of universal is removed from the nature. They attribute this view to Scotus, question 9 on Porphyry, and to the Coimbra commentators, question 6 on the Universal, no. 4. First, nature is not predicated as indifferent and undetermined, but as applied to the individual of which it is predicated and as one with it; otherwise it would not truly be predicated. Therefore it does not remain universal, since when indifference is removed, all universality collapses. Again, nature has universality only under simple supposition. For when one says “Man is a species” or “Man is universal,” the term “man” supposits simply, in such a way that it does not descend to supposits under the formality of species and universal. But when it is actually predicated of individuals, it does not have simple but personal supposition, for it is verified of persons and individuals. Therefore in actual predication it does not have universality.

Nevertheless, as I said, the opposite must be presupposed. For it is proper to universal nature to be predicable of many. Therefore predication of many is not incompatible with the universal; when the universal is predicated, then, the predication does not remove its universality. Nor can one say that universality is destroyed through predication, even though it is predicable, just as a quantity of ten spans is divisible into ten spans, and yet, if actually divided, it is no longer divisible into them. I say that this cannot be said, because it is one thing for a quantity actually divided, as a completed fact, no longer to be divisible into those parts; it is another for the very act of dividing to remove divisibility. The latter is false. Division falls upon divisibility and is not incompatible with it, although once the division is completed it destroys that divisibility. Likewise, actual corruption is not incompatible with what is corruptible, but belongs to it; once corruption is completed, however, the thing is no longer corruptible but corrupted. In the same way, predication of many belongs to what is predicable; but when predication is completed and the nature contracted to individuals, it is no longer divisible or predicable of many, but multiplied in them. Thus in the predication “Peter is a man,” the term “man” remains universal, because it does not supposit with singular supposition but with common supposition; otherwise the sense would be “Peter is this man,” and thus nothing common to Peter and Paul in nature would ever be predicated of Peter. As a second intention, universality need not be considered in actual predication, and in this respect it does not remain in act.

The opposing foundations are answered as follows. To the first, when nature is predicated, it is intrinsically universal and indifferent, but extrinsically applied to a determinate individual. When I say “Peter is a man,” the term “man” does not lose universality, since for it to lose universality the common concept would have to change into a singular one. Therefore, so long as that common concept is not corrupted, it is not made singular intrinsically, even though it is extrinsically applied to a singular subject in forming the proposition “Peter is a man.”

To the second, a term retains universality even under personal supposition, because metaphysical universality remains as long as the intrinsic representation of universal nature is not removed. Although there is application and predication of the represented nature—not with respect to a second intention—the supposition is not simple. Simple supposition occurs only when a second intention is predicated of the thing itself, an intention that cannot be communicated or belong to the inferiors themselves, as was said in the Summulae, chapter on Supposition, book 2, chapter 10.¹

With these points presupposed, WE INQUIRE what it means for a nature to be in many. Is it the very relation of universality to many, an aptitude to exist in them, or contraction to those inferiors?

Some think that a nature's being in many is nothing other than being included in them, and that this inclusion requires abstraction from the differences themselves. For something to be included in something else, it must be conceived as distinct from it, at least by reason; nothing is included in itself. Yet it is identified with the whole itself, which is the inferior; it abstracts only from the inferior's differences, not from the inferior itself. Thus this inclusion is a relation to the inferiors in which the nature is included. So Martinez, disputation 1 on Porphyry, question 2.

NEVERTHELESS, IT MUST BE SAID that a nature's being in many consists neither in the very relation of universal to many nor in the inclusion that the reported opinion requires for such a relation. If “being in many” is taken potentially, it pertains to the very aptitude by which a nature is made capable of being in many through identification and multiplication in them. If it is taken actually, then actually being in many is not a relation of universal to inferiors, but identification and contraction to them, not positive abstraction, as that opinion maintains.

THE REASON FOR THE CONCLUSION is drawn from what was said in the preceding question. The potency to be in many precedes actual being, or actually belonging to many, just as potency precedes its act; but this potency to be in many is nothing other than the universal's aptitude to be in many, as has often been said. Nor is something said to be actually in many through the very relation of universality, because this relation is the respect of the aptitude, insofar as the common nature positively regards inferiors by way of potency, in which it can be. Therefore this relation does not reduce that potency or aptitude to the act of existing, and consequently is not the act of such an aptitude, but the very respect by which that aptitude regards the things in which it can be. Being in many, however, is the reduction of such an aptitude or potency to act. When this reduction occurs, that aptitude is dissolved, because abstraction is dissolved through contraction; the respect of the aptitude, however, remains with the aptitude and abstraction and does not dissolve them.

It remains, then, that being in many must be explained in the same way as the potency itself to be in many. For just as a universal is said to be capable or apt to be in many because it is not incompatible with being identified with many, in which it is multiplied, so it will be said to be actually in many when this potency or aptitude is reduced to act. Hence if the aptitude was to be in many through essential or accidental identification or multiplication, the very identification multiplied in many is actually being in them. And if we call this identification “inclusion,” inclusion occurs in such a way that it does not formally consist in abstraction, even positive abstraction, but in contraction and conjunction. For how could the formal account of inclusion be abstraction from the things in which it is included?

If you ask how this contraction, inclusion, or being in many differs from being predicated of many, the answer is that being in many is explained through identification with many, which can also occur through a simple representation by which a nature is understood to be identified with and to be in an inferior to which it belongs. Predication, however, occurs through the application of one thing to another in the second operation of the intellect, which composes and predicates, as will be said in the next article. Thus predication is a property of universality: from the fact that a universal is in many through identification, it follows that it can truly be predicated of them.

THE FOUNDATION OF THE OPPOSING VIEW has often been answered: inclusion of a superior in an inferior is indeed required for the constitution of the inferior itself, whose nature and quiddity includes the superior predicates. However, this inclusion does not occur through positive abstraction, but through contraction. For contraction is not something's being related to itself, but its being related to something else, or through something else, at least distinct by reason. Inferiors, however, do include the superior itself in reality, but they are not inferiors insofar as they include it; rather, they are inferiors insofar as they are subjects and lesser things.

FOUR things are to be noted in this article: First, what predication is, taken formally and fundamentally; second, what is required for the verification of predication; third, how a higher predicate must be a whole in relation to a lower one in order to be predicated of it; fourth, how many kinds of predication there are.

Concerning the first, it should be noted that predication pertains to the second operation, in which one thing is enunciated of another; thus predication is the attribution of one thing to another by denying or affirming. Hence St. Thomas says in chapter 4 of On Being and Essence, at the end,¹ that “predication is something completed through the action of the intellect composing and dividing, yet having in the thing as its foundation the very unity of those things, one of which is said of the other.” There he explains the formal character of predication, which is the attribution itself, or the joining of the extremes in the manner of attribution; but joining is a relation. The foundation of this relation or attribution is the identity or agreement of the extremes, if the predication is affirmative, or their disagreement, if it is negative.

St. Thomas explains this more fully in 1. p. q. 13. art. 12., where he shows that in every affirmative proposition it is required that subject and predicate signify something that is in some way the same in reality and diverse in account. This is clear in both accidental and substantial predications. For example, when I say “A man is white,” it is evident that they are the same in subject but differ in account, because the account of white is one thing and that of man another. Likewise, when I say “A man is an animal,” the very thing that is a man is truly an animal. Thus predicate and subject are the same in supposit but diverse in account. Therefore, the intellect identifies the identity of the extremes through the very composition and copula, and their diversity through the distinct concepts of predicate and subject.

The same doctrine is drawn from On Interpretation 1, lect. 3². Thus it is clear what predication is and on what it is founded. How the identity of the extremes differs from an intrinsic or extrinsic connection will be said below, in treating the fourth point.

Concerning the second: The verification of predication is founded on the identity and agreement of the extremes in such a way that this must be considered not only on the part of the thing signified but also on the part of the mode of signifying. For the intellect, since it is naturally disposed to compose things that are separate and divide things that are united, sometimes apprehends and signifies one and the same thing in such a way that, from the mode of signifying itself, it cannot be applied or united to another; at other times it conceives it in such a way that it can be applied and united. Hence St. Thomas, in 1. p. q. 39. art. 4. and 5., warns that in the properties of expressions and their truth one must consider not only the things signified but also the mode of signifying. This mode is especially evident in whether something is signified abstractly or concretely, in the manner of a whole or a part. Since every whole is greater than its part, a part and a whole cannot be equally matched and attributed. Hence St. Thomas, in opusculum 69, on the second text of Boethius³, says: “What is considered abstractly has this truth: that it does not have within itself anything extraneous, namely, anything beyond its essence, as humanity and whiteness and whatever is said in this way. The reason is that humanity is signified as that by which something is a man, and whiteness as that by which something is white. For, formally speaking, something is a man only through that which pertains to the account of man. Likewise, something is formally white only through that which pertains to the account of white. Therefore, abstracts of this sort cannot have anything alien within themselves. But it is otherwise with things signified concretely. For man is signified as one who has humanity, and white as that which has whiteness. But from the fact that a man has humanity or whiteness, he is not prevented from having something else that does not pertain to the account of these, except only what is opposed to them. Therefore man and white can have something other than humanity or whiteness. This is why whiteness or humanity is signified in the manner of a part and is not predicated of concrete things, just as neither is a part predicated of its whole.” So St. Thomas.

From this doctrine you may gather that an abstract term in relation to a concrete one abstracts by formal abstraction, not total abstraction. Formal abstraction is that by which form is abstracted from matter, act from potency, and what is essential and proper from what is extraneous and alien. Total abstraction, however, is that by which a higher term is abstracted from a lower one and the common from individuals, because it is related as a whole to the lower, virtually and implicitly including them. A formal abstract, however, is not related as a whole to a concrete term, but as a part and, as it were, form and act in relation to potency and subject.

Second, it follows how the commonly stated claim is true: when something belongs to a thing per se, its opposite cannot belong to it even accidentally, that is, it cannot be found in the same subject. For, as St. Thomas says, a subject having some form is not prevented from having anything else except only what is opposed to that form. Therefore the opposite of a form cannot be found in the very subject that has the form; that is, it cannot belong to it even accidentally, through something else and by reason of the subject.

Concerning the third point, namely, how such a higher predicate is a whole in relation to a lower one: its explanation is taken from St. Thomas in the place cited above and in chapter 3 of On Being and Essence⁴, and from Cajetan's explanation there of how genus has the character both of a part and of a whole. For a generic predicate (and the same applies to a specific or differential predicate) contains both something it explains and something it implies or includes. For example, “animal” expresses sensitive nature, and “body” expresses corporeal nature; that is, each expresses what actually constitutes the sensitive or corporeal. But it includes everything from which such a character of sensitive or corporeal can proceed, or in which it can be found, whether or not it includes something beyond the account of sensitive. As regards what it expresses, there is no doubt that a genus, for example animal, states only a part of the nature and not the whole. Hence, if the word “animal” included nothing more than what it explains, it could not be predicated of anything in which something more than the very account of sensitive nature is found. But because it signifies every form from which the character of animal proceeds, and in which it is found, whether only that character or something else proceeds from such a form, it follows that “animal” in that concept virtually includes whatever has the character of animal, and “man” whatever has the character of man.

From this doctrine it is gathered that, for something to be a genus and universal, it must signify its signified object not with formal precision but only with total precision. That is, it must not signify some account or form in such a way as to exclude what can be joined or connected with it; rather, it signifies everything in which such a perfection is found, even if it involves a further perfection without explaining it. Thus being signified in the manner of a whole or of a part is not the same as being a part or a whole. For even what is a part can be signified in the manner of a whole in relation to another part in which it is included, as animality is in relation to humanity, since it is predicated of it. To be signified in the manner of a whole consists in signifying something in relation to another as including it. Something is signified in the manner of a part when it signifies something by way of exclusion, although in reality it is joined to what it excludes. And because in reality no nature or form is given that constitutes some grade while excluding a further perfection or grade, but several grades proceed from the same substantial form, we said above, following St. Thomas, that metaphysical grades in the same thing are distinguished only in account.

Concerning the fourth point: There are many divisions and differences of predication, resulting from the diverse ways of having identity and diversity of account, in which, as we said following St. Thomas, the whole foundation of predication lies.

FIRST, it is divided into direct and indirect. Direct predication occurs when that which functions in the manner of a form is placed on the side of the predicate; indirect predication occurs, conversely, when that which functions in the manner of a subject is placed on the side of the predicate. By “subject” and “form” we understand not only what is physically related as form and matter, but whatever in any way functions as actualizing and actualizable, or as higher and lower. For the higher is called the form of the lower, not because the higher grade is more actual in being and perfection, but because it is contractible; and everything that is contracted is, as it were, received in that to which it is contracted. If the predicates are equal, as “man” and “rational” or “capable of laughter,” then what actualizes functions as form and what is actualized as subject. Hence this is direct predication: “A man is rational,” “a man is capable of laughter”; indirect predication is “The rational is a man.”

If you ask whether predication is direct when a higher grade is individuated as predicate, as when you say “A man is this animal,” the answer is that, for predication to be direct, the individuated genus must be placed on the side of the subject. Thus, if you say “This animal is a man,” the words “this animal” point out an individual man, or that animal which is in a man. For precisely because the higher grade is individuated through a mode of signifying it individually, it functions as a recipient of the very account of the species, since it stands for the animal that is an individual of man. Therefore it regards man as higher and consequently as a formal predicate. Thus “This animal is a man” is direct predication, whereas “A man is this animal” is indirect. The case is different if you say “A man is a certain animal,” provided “a certain” does not point out an individual, but the generic account of animal as vaguely contracted.

DIRECT PREDICATION is divided into essential and accidental. Essential predication occurs when the predicate belongs to the intrinsic account of the subject; accidental predication occurs when it lies outside that account. Here one must distinguish the identity of the extremes from their connection. Identity pertains to the union, agreement, and adequation of the extremes, which every predication requires; connection pertains to the relation by which the extremes are ordered either essentially and intrinsically or accidentally and extrinsically.

DISPARATE PREDICATION is that which consists of terms that are disparate in their relation and have no relation of agreement with one another. Note carefully that disparate or identical predication is one thing, and a disparate or identical proposition another. A proposition regards truth and falsity; predication regards the relation of the terms. A predication can be disparate while the proposition is true, and a proposition between identical terms can be false, as is clear in negatives: “A man is not a stone” is a true proposition and a disparate predication; the proposition “A man is not a man” is false, but its predication is identical, that is, between identical terms, although negative. In affirmative propositions, however, if the predication is disparate, it is always false; and if the predication is identical, the proposition is true.

IDENTICAL PREDICATION is either materially identical or formally identical. It is formally identical when, by the force of the terms' signification, one signifies the same as the other, as when it is said “A man is a man.” It is materially identical when the significations are indeed diverse, but the reality or entity is the same, as when it is said “Action is passion” or “The white is substance or body.” These are disparate on the part of the form signified, but identical on the part of the matter or subject, which is body or substance, if they agree in the same subject. Likewise, when two accidents are predicated by reason of their agreement in the same subject, as “The white is sweet,” and when one attribute is predicated of another in God, as “Mercy is justice,” all these predications are materially identical.

WE PRESUPPOSE that it is not the same for a term or the thing it signifies to be common and to be universal, as St Thomas expressly teaches in Sentences I, To Hannibald, d. 19, q. 4, a. 2, ad 2¹: “Universal is not the same as common. They differ because common, of itself, does not determine whether what is communicated to many is numerically the same or not; but universal does determine this, because it is never numerically the same in many.” Likewise, in Summa theologiae I, q. 30, a. 4, ad 3, he says that “in God there is no particular and universal, genus and species”; nevertheless, in q. 13, a. 9, he counts God among common terms.

This is clear in the vague individual, which is a common term, as “some man.” It has supposition not singular but common and determinate; yet it is not universal, because it cannot be distributed, and the thing signified does not wholly abstract from individuating conditions. Rather it signifies a common nature together with a mode of individuation that is not perfectly singularized, which prevents it from being universal although it is common. Hence St Thomas says in De potentia, q. 9, a. 2, ad 1², that just as a name signifying a nature is common and definable, so is a name signifying a nature with a certain mode of existing, such as “some man.”

THE ANSWER TO THE PROPOSED DIFFICULTY, THEN, IS that for something to be common to many, it is not required that many individuals actually or possibly exist in reality. It is enough that from the mode of conceiving it be conceived as communicable to many; a term signifying that nature in this way is called common.

That a plurality of actually existing individuals is not required is plainly taught by St Thomas in Metaphysics VII, lect. 13³, explaining Aristotle’s definition of universal, “what is naturally apt to be in many.”⁴ He notes that it says “naturally apt to be in many,” not “is in many,” because there are universals that contain beneath them only one singular, such as the sun and the moon. “This,” St Thomas says, “is not because the nature of the species is not of itself naturally apt to exist in many, but because something else prevents it, such as the whole nature of the species being comprised in one individual.” This teaching also applies to natures for which a plurality of individuals is impossible, as Thomists commonly hold of angels; we shall discuss this below in the question on species.⁵

That the mode of knowing suffices to constitute something as common is taken from St Thomas himself, Summa theologiae I, q. 13, a. 9. He teaches that if we knew simple forms as they are in themselves, we would not apprehend them as common or communicable either through or by reason of them. But because they are apprehended in the manner of composite things, and not adequately as they are in themselves, they are apprehended as communicable insofar as the mode of signifying and knowing is concerned, even if they are not communicable in reality. For this reason we said in book I of the Summulae, ch. 7, with many others, that a common term is one that signifies many distributively, that is, communicably in many, either by reason of the thing signified or by the mode of conceiving. In this way the name “God” is a common term by its mode of signifying.

When reality itself contains a plurality of things sharing a likeness in some common aspect, something is taken as common on the side of the thing signified. But when reality contains neither plurality nor likeness among many, the thing signified itself directly and per se provides no foundation for conceiving a common nature. It does so indirectly, however, since it is not impossible to conceive such a nature inadequately and imperfectly, without apprehending its singularity but only its nature, as one does with things in which the nature is multiplied. By this mode of conceiving, that nature and the term signifying it are called common.

Does this alone suffice for a nature to be called universal, as genus or species, especially with predicable, logical universality? We shall answer below in the question on species, where this will be discussed more fully in connection with angels. For now it is enough to say that for something to be universal and predicable of many, it is not enough to conceive it as common by setting singularity aside negatively. It must abstract from inferiors in such a way that it can also be contracted to them by adding an inferior difference to a superior nature. This cannot occur without some potentiality in what is conceived as contractible to what is conceived as contracting. For a created nature to be apprehended with potentiality is not repugnant to it, but altogether fitting; consequently logical universality is not repugnant to it. The divine nature, however, cannot be conceived with any potentiality, even if its perfections are conceived inadequately. It can therefore be conceived as common without singularity, but not as contractible and universal.

AND IF YOU SAY that it is also repugnant to pure act to be conceived without singularity and as common to many: a concept representing only the nature and not singularity is conceived as multiplicable by its mode of signifying, and therefore as contractible and in potency to singularity.

The answer is to deny the antecedent. For the divine nature to be conceived without singularity, it is not required that it be conceived with some potentiality; it is enough that we conceive it inadequately, as its quiddity alone and not its mode or singularity. So we conceive the nature without the persons and one attribute without another—not because we conceive it as in potency to them, since it actually includes them, but because it does not actually express them. But for the same nature to be conceived as contractible and multiplicable into many singulars, it must be conceived not only as not expressing singularity, but also as not including singularity, or as existing in potency to it. This is repugnant to the concept of pure act. Although it is conceived as common to many by its mode of signifying, it is not conceived as multiplicable by contraction and the addition of a contracting difference. It is conceived as common to many by its mode of signifying without expressing a mode of multiplication through potentiality. Universality requires indifference to many things that contract and add to the common concept; addition presupposes that what is added is lacking in the thing to which it is added, and this implies potentiality. To leave singularity unexpressed and so remain common, it is enough that our concept is limited and does not represent everything.

BUT IF YOU INSIST: then analogues would not be called universals, because they cannot abstract perfectly from their inferiors so that the latter are not actually included in their differences, as we shall say below in treating analogy.⁶

It is confirmed because the complex term “Peter and Paul” has the force of a common term when “and” is taken distributively, as we said in the Summulae⁷, and functions like a distributing universal, since it distributes the following term in a proposition, as when I say “Peter and Paul is an animal.” Yet it does not abstract from those individuals. Therefore abstraction of this kind is not required for the nature of a universal.

The answer is that analogues with two concepts behave like equivocal terms, which are not universals because they lack unity of concept. If they have one concept, because they do not abstract perfectly from their inferiors, they are not perfectly universal, since they lack perfect unity; rather, their unity is proportional, and they are reduced to the universal. For the universal is adequately divided into the five predicables, and an analogue is neither genus nor species nor any other predicable; therefore it is not per se a universal. Still, it does not contain its inferior differences actually in the way God contains singularity and attributes: it contains them confusedly and imperfectly, not in pure act as God does.

To the confirmation, that complex term has the force of a common term with respect to its component parts, insofar as it applies the predicate said of it distributively to those parts, or to each of them. Because it supposes for each, it is said to have the nature of a common term and a distributing universal, as it were by its mode of signifying. It does not, however, have all the conditions of a universal term, much less of a thing taken universally, which abstracts one nature from many. The complex term does not signify this nature; nevertheless, in its own way it abstracts complexly from many, insofar as the complex whole signified abstracts confusedly from the parts signified determinately and without composition.

FINALLY, YOU WILL INSIST: It is repugnant for the true God to be common to many, even by the mode of signifying. If the mode of signifying is true, it must conform to the mode of being; but it is repugnant for there to be a true God who is not one and singular. Therefore it is repugnant that he be taken as common by a true mode of signifying.

It is confirmed because Peter can never be conceived as common, since he is essentially and intrinsically singular. But God is much more intrinsically singular than Peter; therefore it is still more repugnant for him to be conceived as common. For although one attribute in God can be apprehended without another, it cannot be apprehended with an opposite attribute: he may be considered without mercy, but not with cruelty. Therefore, although he may be considered without singularity, he cannot be considered with commonness to many.

The answer is that God, as adequately known and in the mode in which he is in himself, cannot be conceived as common. But when known inadequately and in the manner of a composite thing, he is conceived as common by the mode of knowing, although not as communicable in reality. The mode of signifying and knowing does conform to the mode of being as regards affirmation and negation, so as to be true or false; but as regards the mode of representation it does not follow the mode of being that exists in things, but the mode in which a thing is presented to cognition. Thus if the intellect conceiving God in a common mode judged that God is common, it would be mistaken; but in representing and apprehending him without singularity, in the manner of a common thing, it is not mistaken. Hence St Thomas says in Summa theologiae I, q. 13, a. 9, ad 2, that “names follow the mode of being that is in things, but the mode of being insofar as it is in our cognition; and yet, according to the truth of the thing, that name is incommunicable.” For in representing, the mode of knowing does not always conform to the mode of being, except when it conceives the thing as it is in itself; in judging, however, it always conforms to the mode of being if the judgment is true. Thus God is represented in a common mode, but is not affirmed to be communicable.

To the confirmation, singularity is more essential to God than to Peter on the side of the thing known, but not on the side of the mode of signifying. Peter signifies only the singularity of a nature, so by the force of that name he cannot be conceived as common. God, however, does not directly signify singularity but the divine nature, to which singularity belongs essentially, as do the other attributes, from which an inadequate concept nevertheless abstracts. Hence St Thomas says in Summa theologiae I, q. 13, a. 9, ad 2, that “God is an appellative name and not a proper one”; and in a. 8 he says it is a name of the nature. It is therefore not a name of singularity, although that nature is singular in itself. Nor is this to apprehend the nature together with something opposed to it, since commonness, which is opposed to singularity, is not attributed to it; rather, by the mode of knowing, it is represented without singularity in the manner of a common thing. Cruelty cannot follow from the mode of knowing in God; if it is apprehended in him, it is by attribution of that form, which is always false.

At present THREE THINGS ARE CERTAIN among the authors:

First, in both substantial and accidental concrete terms, a concrete is rightly predicated of a concrete, as “Man is an animal” and “Man is white.”

Second, abstract terms are not truly predicated of concrete terms, nor concrete terms of abstract terms, by virtue of their mode of signifying, as St. Thomas teaches at length in chapter 3 of On Being and Essence¹, and this is taken from Summa theologiae I, q. 3, art. 3. Sometimes, however, they are verified identically, as in divine things Godhead and God are the same, as are Fatherhood and Father; and among the transcendentals, unity and one, entity and being are the same. Hence St. Thomas says in question 21 of On Truth, art. 4, ad 4,² that general forms are not spoken of in just one way. For “being” is said not only of that which is, but also of that by which something is. Thus being and the transcendent forms are predicated both abstractly and concretely, of both concrete and abstract terms.

Third, in the case of accidents, higher predicates are predicated abstractly of lower ones, as “Whiteness is a color,” “is a quality,” and so on, because in accidents the abstract terms signify the whole essence and intrinsic notion; for accidents in themselves are nothing but forms. Hence St. Thomas says in chapter 7 of On Being and Essence³ that accidents stated concretely, such as white or musical, are not placed in a category as species or genera except by reduction; they are placed there only insofar as they are signified abstractly, as whiteness and music. See also opusc. 42, chapter 19,⁴ and question 3 of On Truth, art. 7, ad 2.⁵

The basis of all these points depends only on this: predication must be made by applying whole to whole. For when one thing is affirmed to be another, the predicate, insofar as its mode of signifying is concerned, must contain no less than the subject, or conversely. Therefore, when both are concrete, each signified as a whole, they are rightly identified through predication. An abstract term, by contrast, stands to a concrete as a part, since it abstracts from it not as a higher term from a lower, but as the formal from the material and the form from the subject. Hence no adequation can obtain between an abstract and a concrete, since every part is less than the whole—unless, perhaps, the term is a transcendental, for then it is imbibed in every whole and every part, and so does not stand to the concrete as a part. Only quantity is excepted from this rule of predication: the abstract term “quantity” is predicated of “quantified.” For quantity is said to be quantified, or extended. This is because quantity, even when separated from a subject, has parts, as is clear in the Eucharist; but what has parts is called extended and quantified. Thus it is rightly predicated of quantity that it is quantified.

Finally, from the same basis it is clear that abstract terms of accidents are rightly predicated of similar abstract terms, because accidental abstracts express the whole notion found in accidents, and are thus predicated as wholes.

Thus, only TWO DOUBTS REMAIN. First, whether in the substantial order the predication of an abstract term of a concrete is true in itself, and false only because of a defect in the mode of signifying. Second, whether among substantial abstract terms a higher term is truly and formally predicated of a lower, as when one says, “Humanity is animality.”

As to the first: SOME think that a substantial predicate in the abstract is truly predicated of lower terms, though not completely and adequately, and thus, considered in itself, is truly predicated of them in the concrete. So says Martinez, disputation 3 on Porphyry, question 1. The basis is that although the abstract is signified as a part, in reality it is nevertheless the same as the whole; but the truth of predication has as its sole object the unity and identity on the side of the thing, which is found in the extremes themselves. Therefore, by virtue of the terms, such predication is true. However, it is not predicated completely and adequately, because predication is complete and adequate when the predicate says or does not exclude whatever is in the subject. But the abstract says the whole that is in the subject, although it is signified as a part, whereas the concrete is signified as a whole. Therefore, it is not predicated completely. Thus, they say, this predication, “Man is humanity,” is not verified for the substitute—that is, for the supposit itself, the subject which is man—but for the constituted item, that is, the very nature identified with man.

THE OPPOSITE VIEW, however, follows from St. Thomas, who requires for the truth of propositions not only identity on the side of the thing signified, but also on the side of the mode of signifying, as is clear in Summa theologiae I, q. 39, arts. 4 and 5. He expressly excludes the predication of humanity of man in Summa theologiae I, q. 3, art. 3, in On Being and Essence, chapter 3, at the end,⁶ and in opusc. 69, lecture 2,⁷ always using the same reason: the concrete term “man” includes something that “humanity” does not. For humanity states precisely that by which man is man, whereas the concrete term “man” states that which has humanity. But it is not impossible for that which has humanity to have something else of which humanity is not predicated, and therefore something of which humanity is not predicated. Thus these extremes do not ground the truth or predication.

They say that St. Thomas denies only formal and, as it were, complete predication, not fundamental predication based on the identity of the extremes; for that alone, they say, is considered by the judgment of truth. But against this presses St. Thomas’s own reason: the basis of truth requires identity with everything of which something is predicated. For if there is identity with one thing and not another, the predication is incongruous and unsuitable with respect to the part for which there is no identity, and consequently false; for falsity, as an evil and defect, is sufficiently established by a defect on one side. Therefore St. Thomas said in the cited Summa theologiae I, q. 3, that man and humanity are not altogether the same, and consequently predication is deficient in the respect in which they are not the same.

To understand this more fully, observe that the basis of truth is not identity as it is found somehow or other in the thing; rather, when the thing is presented to the intellect, it must be presented under the aspect in which the extremes are identified, not under the aspect in which they are not. Otherwise appellation and precision vary. We see that animal and man are identical in reality, yet animal is called a genus and man is not called a genus, because this predicate belongs to them not insofar as they are identified, but insofar as they are virtually distinguished and presented to the intellect under precision. Similarly, we say that the Father generates and the divine essence does not generate, although Father and essence are identical. Therefore, for humanity to be truly predicated of man, it is not enough that humanity and man be identified in some way; they must be presented for predication as identified, and not under a precision by which one abstracts from the other. But as signified by the abstract term “humanity,” it is presented under abstraction and precision from man in the concrete, as a part of him, and is not altogether identical with everything included in the concrete term “man.” Therefore, on the side of the thing there is no basis for true predication, just as there is no basis for saying truly, “The essence generates,” although it is identical with the Father who generates. And just as one cannot admit in any way that the essence generates when “generates” is explained as applying to the substitute or supposit, but not to the constituted item—that is, the nature—even though in reality the supposit of the essence generates, because this is not said by virtue of the mode of signifying; so, conversely, it does not follow that humanity is man when explained as applying to the constituted item, that is, the nature, but not to the substitute, that is, the supposit, because by its mode of signifying “man” does not signify only the nature.

Hence the contrary basis is resolved. Although humanity and man are the same on the side of nature, they nevertheless abstract and differ according to their mode of signifying and conceiving. Therefore, while they stand under that mode of signifying, they have no basis for being predicated, as was said of the proposition “The divine essence generates.”

As to the second doubt: SOME think that those predications in which one substantial abstract is predicated of another substantial abstract are false, because they believe an abstract term abstracts not only from the concrete but from every other notion that is not formally the abstract form itself. For humanity states precisely that by which man is man; hence it does not even implicitly include anything other than what it expresses under this precision. Thus it does not contain another abstract term of which it could be predicated: where there is formal abstraction, it in no way includes what it abstracts from, but instead makes, as it were, an appellation and reduplication of the abstract form.

NEVERTHELESS, the reply is made by distinguishing: abstract forms may be taken either specifically or reduplicatively. In the first way, they express only the nature, together with every formal constituent, under abstraction as a mode of being. In the second way, they express and reduplicate the function of formal abstraction.

In the first way, one abstract form can be predicated more universally of a less universal one, even in the abstract, as when one says, “Humanity is animality,” or in the Philosopher’s example in Metaphysics VII,⁸ lecture 12 in St. Thomas’s commentary,⁹ that splitting a foot is a kind of footness. If, however, the term is taken in the second way, predication of one abstract term of another cannot be verified.

The reason for the first part is that these forms in the abstract are predicated of something; for this is true: “This animality is animality,” and “This humanity is humanity.” Therefore this too will be true: “Humanity is animality.”

The antecedent is clear, because the divine Word assumed some singular humanity. Therefore, it is true to say that this humanity of the Word is humanity, and that this animality which he assumed is animality.

The consequent is clear as well: if it is true to say, “Some animality is animality,” then by descending under that term one can show some animality that is humanity. For one animality is humanity and another is equinity. Therefore, just as some animality is animality, so too a certain humanity is animality. For the animality that is in man is the nature of man and, consequently, humanity. We say the same of this proposition, “Peterhood is a certain humanity,” provided that by “Peterhood” one understands not supposithood but the singularity of humanity; for the supposit is distinct from the nature.

This is confirmed, because humanity and every abstract form have certain essential predicates of which they are constituted; for humanity signifies that by which man is man. But man is man by essential predicates. Therefore humanity includes them, and therefore they must be verified of it and predicated of it, since they belong to it; otherwise there would be predicates that truly belong to something but could not be predicated of it.

The second part of the conclusion is plainly established, because where appellation and precision intervene, predication does not follow, however much identity there may be in reality. Thus, although animal and man are the same, animal under the precision of animal is a genus, and man is not. And although in God justice is mercy, it is not true to say that the attribute of justice, reduplicatively, is the attribute of mercy. Likewise, although humanity is animality, the notion of one, taken reduplicatively, is not the notion of the other. For it is false to say that the notion by which something is man is animality; otherwise, wherever there was animality, there would be man. The same can be found in abstract terms for accidents, if they abstract with this precision.

This makes clear the answer to the opposing basis, which confirms this second part. When it is said that an abstract form does not even implicitly include what it abstracts from, the reply is that this is true; nevertheless, an abstract form abstracts only from its concrete term and material subject, not from its essential predicates, which are also considered abstractly.

AND IF YOU PRESS THE POINT: This is a good inference: “Humanity is that by which man is man, and humanity is animality; therefore animality is that by which man is man.” The conclusion is false, so one of the premises must be false. It is not the major premise, because it is the definition of humanity, which states only that by which man is man. Therefore, the minor premise must be false.

The reply is that appellation varies: the minor premise is verified only specifically and without any appellation, whereas the major premise is verified under appellation and precision—not of the definition itself, but of what is defined. For when one says, “That by which man is man,” humanity is signified under its own concept and reduplication of precision, that is, under the aspect in which it regards precisely its formal constituent. For man is man by humanity, but by humanity he is not an animal, although animal and man are the same. Thus, when one says, “Humanity is that by which man is man,” the sense is: The notion of humanity, as distinct from animality, is that by which man is man, that is, insofar as it regards man under the formality that constitutes him as man. Although animality is included in this, it does not constitute him under the notion of animality.

BUT IF YOU STILL OBJECT, St. Thomas denies that the nature signified in the manner of a part, such as humanity, has the notion of a species or difference, as is clear in chapter 4 of On Being and Essence.¹⁰ In general, he teaches that only what has a complete nature is directly in a genus; thus a hand and other parts are not in a genus, as is clear in Sentences III, dist. 6, q. 1, art. 1, solution 1, ad 1.¹¹ But it is clear that humanity and the other abstract terms are signified as parts. Finally, he expressly says that humanity is neither a genus nor a species in Sentences I, dist. 23, q. 1, art. 1, in the body of the article.¹² Therefore, we falsely say that it is predicated of anything, since it is not a universal.

The reply is that in the first passage St. Thomas means only that abstract terms do not have the nature of genus and species with respect to their concrete terms, of which they are not predicated. St. Thomas did not, however, deny that abstract terms can be predicated of other abstract terms as higher of lower. Although we could explain the other two passages in this way as well, we add that St. Thomas means only that parts and other incomplete beings are not directly in a category; he does not deny that they can be in it by reduction. In the same way, humanity, insofar as it is signified in the manner of a part, is not directly a genus or species, but is so by reduction. Or, in the third passage, he takes humanity under reduplication and precision, as was said in the second part of the conclusion; for in this way it is not a genus or species that is predicated, or of which anything is predicated.

We shall discuss at greater length in Question 7, On Genus, what must be said about the definition of accidental concretes. For now, we need indicate only what these concrete and abstract terms for accidents are, and how they are predicated.

In accidental concretes, then, we consider three things: namely, the subject, which receives the form and is denominated by it (some call this the substitute); the form, which is received in the subject, affects it, and denominates it; and finally the composite or compound, that third thing resulting from them, which some call the constituted. For example, in “white” we can take the subject itself, which is denominated, or the compound constituted from subject and form, which also includes the form itself, whiteness.

Some, then, understand these accidental concretes in a very different, even reversed, order from the common way of thinking. For authors commonly hold that the abstract of an accident is the accidental form itself, taken without any connotation or signification of a subject possessing it; while the concrete is the accident itself as connoting a subject that possesses it. Likewise, they hold that subject and accident do not yield one being per se, or one quiddity, but a being per accidens. Finally, they hold that an accidental concrete, for example “white,” does not directly signify the aggregate or constituted whole of subject and accident, but formally signifies the form itself, obliquely connoting the subject that has it.

Against this, these authors say that the accidental form itself is not properly what is abstract in relation to the subject: for example, whiteness is not the abstract; rather, that is the aspect by which whiteness is whiteness, such as “whiteness-as-such” or something similar. Thus they distinguish the physical and metaphysical concrete, and likewise the abstract. They say the physical concerns the subject in which the form exists, the metaphysical the form and the aspect of form. Second, they think that an abstract accident, even taken precisely, is truly predicated of the concrete because it is identical with it, though not completely and adequately, as was said in the preceding article about substantial abstracts. Third, they say an accidental concrete can be taken for the constituted or for the substitute. The constituted, resulting from form and subject, they say is predicated quidditatively of its inferiors, as a first or second predicable; taken for the substitute—that is, for the subject possessing the form—it is predicated denominatively of things that have the form, as a fifth predicable. But the constituted is not predicated of the subjects in which the form inheres, since that would predicate a whole of a part, given that the constituted results from form and subject. They say this constituted is definable when an accidental concrete is defined, and is not a being per accidens but per se, since it can be defined by a single definition. They also distinguish aggregate from composite. An aggregate, they say, is a being per accidens, since it says nothing beyond the parts themselves—subject and form—aggregated and joined; a composite, however, is what results from the union of the parts.

NEVERTHELESS, as to the definable character of these concretes, we shall speak in the following Question 7. That an accidental abstract cannot truly be predicated of a concrete is clear from what was said in the preceding article, since the abstract signifies by way of a part in relation to its concrete, which has the character of a whole. The distinction between physical and metaphysical concrete, however, need not concern us much. For it is indeed clear that an accidental form is signified abstractly in relation to its subject, as St. Thomas says in Summa theologiae I–II, q. 53, aa. 2–3, in ch. 7 of On Being and Essence, near the end¹, in Opusculum 42, ch. 19², and in Metaphysics VII, lect. 1³. Nothing is more familiar among authors than that whiteness is called abstract in relation to white, which is concrete: for that is called concrete which signifies a form while connoting what has it, as is most properly found in a subject physically receiving whiteness or another accidental form. To call the form itself a metaphysical concrete in relation to the aspect of form is a highly improper expression. For although an accidental form may be called composed of genus and difference, since it is placed in a category, the form itself is not called a concrete, or something possessing the aspect of form. For what is constituted in the genus or category of accident from genus and difference is a certain accidental form. It is therefore not properly a concrete possessing a form or the aspect of form; for “form,” as form, does not signify a concrete—that is properly called the thing possessing such a form.

IT REMAINS, THEN, that we consider two things here. First, whether the constituted, or result, of a physical subject and accident is a being per accidens. Second, how the predication of an accidental concrete is verified in relation both to its subject, which it denominates, and to its constituted, of which it is predicated essentially. For this predication is denominative: “The body is white”; that one, by contrast, is quidditative: “White is colored,” “this white thing is white.”

As to the first, St. Thomas’s judgment is perfectly clear: from an accident and the physical subject in which it is received there results no quiddity per se, but a being per accidens, as is clear from ch. 7 of On Being and Essence, near the beginning⁴: “From an accident,” he says, “and a subject there does not come to be one per se, but one per accidens; therefore, from their union no essence results, as it does from the union of form with matter.” He says the same expressly in Opusculum 2, the Compendium of Theology, ch. 211⁵. But what is decisive is that in Metaphysics VII, lect. 3⁶, St. Thomas, following Aristotle, poses this very question in these terms. He asks: “Just as fire is a certain composite of matter and substantial form, so there is a certain composition of substances and accidents. We must therefore investigate: since there is a definition of substances composed of forms and matter, does there also belong to any of these composites of accidents and subjects an account of what a thing is—that is, do they have a definition, an account signifying what it is to be? And further, is this very ‘what it is’ in them, which the definition signifies—that is, do they have some quiddity, or something that can answer the question ‘what is it?’ For example, this ‘white man’ is a composite of subject and accident: does a white man, as such, have a what-it-is-to-be? And because someone might perhaps say that ‘white man’ is two things and not one, he adds that what I call ‘white man’ has one name, taking ‘garment’ as an example. The question will then concern this one thing, namely, garment: does it have a what-it-is-to-be, so that we can say what it is to be a garment? For just as the name ‘man’ signifies a composite, namely rational animal, so ‘garment’ signifies a composite, namely a white man.”

Here is the question St. Thomas raises from Aristotle about a constituted or composite of subject and accident. St. Thomas resolves the difficulty from the Philosopher’s words as follows: “He says first that this which I call ‘white man,’ or ‘garment,’ which is posited as signifying this, is not one of the things said in themselves, but rather one of the things said accidentally; for ‘white man’ is one per accidens, not per se.”⁷ He develops this at length there, showing that the union of subject and accident is one per accidens. It is therefore clear in St. Thomas that it is not one per se, but per accidens, and is not definable by a single definition as one quiddity. That he speaks of a constituted, not merely an aggregate of several things, and likewise of a substitute or subject, is plain from his words: he speaks of a composite of accident and subject, not merely two things, and says this composite is one per accidens. Of the subject or substitute itself, St. Thomas adds: “What is white does not have a what-it-is-to-be, but only that of which it is said, namely man or white man.”⁸ Thus, according to St. Thomas, the subject or substitute itself—that of which it is said—signifies something and has a quiddity, but the constituted itself, of accident and subject, does not.

THE REASON FOR THIS is not difficult: the constituted of accident and subject consists of things in different categories, namely substance and accident. These cannot come together in one quiddity and definition, because definition and quiddity consist of genus and difference. Where there are several categories, there are several genera; for a category is a series of genera and species, and different categories have different genera and differences, and consequently different species or quiddities. Therefore, from things in different categories there is not composed one quiddity and one definable thing consisting of one genus and difference; therefore it is per accidens.

See more below, Question 7, article 3, on how an accident is defined in the concrete.

As to the second point, namely how the predication of an accident in the concrete is verified, the whole difficulty lies in explaining how it can have identity with that of which it is predicated, without which there is no true predication. To this, then.

I ANSWER FIRST that it is true that the constituted or composite of subject and accident is not predicated of the subject or constituted itself, but only the intrinsic accident itself. St. Thomas affirms this in Metaphysics VII, lect. 3⁹, where he says: “Not only is being white not the what-it-is of a surface, but neither is the composite of the two, namely surface and whiteness, which is to be a white surface or to be of a white surface. For the quiddity or essence of a white surface is not the quiddity or essence of a surface. If one asks why, one may answer: because this is present to it—that is, when I say ‘white surface,’ something is said which adheres to the surface as extrinsic, not as entering into its essence.” There he hints at the reason why the constituted itself cannot be predicated of the subject itself: the constituted imports something that cannot enter its quiddity or be identified with the subject, namely the accident, which is distinct from the subject. Where the predicate is not identical with the subject, predication is not true, even if both are signified in the concrete.

I ANSWER SECOND that an accident in the concrete, since it imports the form in the nominative and the subject obliquely, can be predicated of something either because it is identical with it on the side of the form, or because it is identical on the side of the connoted subject. When the identification is by reason of the form, the predication is essential, as when you say, “White is colored,” “white is what disperses sight.” But when identification is by reason of the connoted subject, the predication is accidental and denominative, as when one says, “Man is white.” The term “white” is identified with man by reason of the subject it connotes: it imports one having whiteness, and one having whiteness is identified with man. For this reason St. Thomas says in Summa theologiae I, q. 13, a. 12, that in every true affirmative proposition the predicate and subject must signify the same thing in some respect and differ in some respect¹⁰. This is evident in both essential and accidental propositions. For it is clear that man and white are the same in subject and differ in account (that is, in essence): the account of man differs from the account of white. And in Metaphysics VII, lect. 5¹¹: insofar as man is understood in white, man and white are the same; and on this account, he says, one is predicated or said of the other.

Accidental predication, then, is indeed of whole of whole, but it is grounded in the identity or unity of the subject, which is imported into the accidental concrete materially and as connoted. Thus there is sufficient identity for accidental and denominative predication, in which identity is not according to quiddity or the account of the form, but according to denomination and the account of the subject.

But if something is predicated of an accidental concrete that has a connection and identity with the form itself, then the predication is essential. Since whiteness is essentially color, when I say “White is colored,” the predication is essential because it is grounded in the connection and identity of the predicate with the form. For quidditative predicates are also found in accidents themselves; whatever is quidditative of the universal form in the abstract must also be quidditative of that form in the concrete. If the subject is sometimes placed in the definition of an accident, it is not placed there as an intrinsic quidditative predicate, but as something extrinsic to which the accident itself bears a relation. Hence this is called a definition by addition, as St. Thomas says in Metaphysics VII, lect. 4¹². We shall speak further of this in Question 7, On Genus.

THE ARGUMENTS ARE ANSWERED.

First you will object: Accidental concretes are placed by the Philosopher in the categories. Therefore they do not import something that is a being per accidens, but per se; since a being per accidens, not being one, is not placed per se in a category, as we said. Yet such a concrete cannot be placed in the categories of accidents as substitute or subject, since that is a substance affected by an accident, nor as form alone, since then it would be abstract; therefore it is placed as a third constituted of accident and subject.

The first antecedent is clear from the Philosopher in Metaphysics V, ch. 7¹³: “Those things are said to be in themselves which signify the figures of predication.” In enumerating these figures he says, “Some signify quantity, others quality, others relation, etc.”¹⁴ Therefore, according to the Philosopher, the composite of accident and subject is taken as a being per se placed in a category.

THE REPLY is that in that passage the Philosopher takes the concrete by reason of the form, as he himself says in the chapter on substance¹⁵, that “white signifies quality alone.” Hence there he lists some in the concrete, such as how much, what sort, etc., and others in the abstract, such as acting, being acted upon, where, etc. In Metaphysics VII, ch. 4¹⁶, lect. 4 in St. Thomas¹⁷, he lists the same categories in the abstract, saying that “one kind of being signifies a this-something, another quantity or quality.” In Topics III, ch. 1¹⁸, he says that “the just is not placed in a category, but justice”; and so St. Thomas teaches that accidents in the abstract are placed directly in a category, Opusculum 42, ch. 19¹⁹, and On Being and Essence, ch. 7, at the end²⁰. Therefore the constituted of subject and accident is not placed in a category; if the concrete is placed there, it is by reason of the form.

Second you will object: The form of an accident both denominates something and constitutes it; therefore from it there results something denominated and something constituted. The denominated thing is the subject or substitute itself: for it is denominated white by whiteness. But it is not constituted by whiteness, since the constitution of the subject, for example man, is not the same as that of white. Therefore what is denominated is not constituted by the accidental form; another third thing constituted by that form must be designated, and this will be white as constituted. This reasoning seems to be drawn from the Philosopher, Categories, ch. 5²¹, where he says: “Of things that are in a subject, nothing prevents the name from being predicated of the subject, but it is impossible for the account to be predicated.” Therefore the subject is denominated, not constituted, by the accident. Likewise, in Physics I, ch. 3²², he says that “if that which is properly, namely substance, is also the same as white, the essence of white is not, so that it may properly be”; therefore the essence of white is other than the substance it denominates, namely that constituted thing resulting from whiteness and the subject.

The argument is confirmed: what is truly and properly predicated is not only one with the subject but explains everything that is in the subject. But an accidental concrete taken as the constituted explains both subject and form; therefore it is truly predicated of its inferior.

THE REPLY is that the form of an accident does indeed constitute something, but not as a being per se or a “what-it-is,” as the Philosopher says, but as a being per accidens or a “what-sort-of-thing,” as is said in Metaphysics VII, ch. 4²³, lect. 3²⁴ in St. Thomas. Therefore, in relation to the subject in which it inheres, it confers denomination, but not the account itself or quiddity. Hence the Philosopher says that the name (that is, the denomination), not the account (that is, the quiddity), is predicated of the subject. Thus with the subject it constitutes not a quiddity or one being that is a “something,” but a being qualified in some way. Hence it does not follow that it constitutes a third thing per se, but a third thing that is a quality or being per accidens, as was said.

The reply to the Philosopher’s text from Physics I is that its sense is plain: white is not that which truly is—that is, its quiddity is not the substance, which truly is that which it is—but its essence is a quality, which is a “such.” It does not follow, however, that white is a third thing constituted per se from subject and whiteness; rather, it is the subject itself as qualified, which is a being per accidens.

The reply to the confirmation is that the whole constituted of subject and accident, since it is per accidens, can be predicated of another being per accidens; it is not this predication that we are discussing here. If predication per se sometimes occurs between accidental concretes, as when you say “White is colored,” that per se character is considered by reason of the form, which has quidditative predicates, not by reason of a third constituted thing.

The final argument is as follows: Accidental concretes are rightly defined through things in different categories, as when one says, “White is a body that disperses sight”; for such a definition correctly explains its definiendum. Therefore such a concrete is definable, and the subject is placed there in the position of genus and the accidental form in the position of difference, as when one says, “The snub is a curved nose.” Therefore it is either a being per accidens or per se. If per accidens, then it is definable by a single definition; if per se, then there is already a being per se composed of things from different categories, provided one functions as subject and the other as act and form. Indeed, the accident itself in the abstract is also defined through things in different categories, namely by the subject obliquely and the form in the nominative, as when one says, “Snubness is curvature of the nose,” as St. Thomas often says in the cited passages from Metaphysics VII.

The argument is confirmed: a being per accidens is that which cannot be generated by a single generation, but by several. Yet white, hot, or another accident in the concrete can be generated by a single generation. Therefore such a concrete is not a being per accidens.

The inference is sound. The major premise and the minor premise, however, are expressly stated by the Philosopher in Metaphysics VI, ch. 2²⁵, lect. 2 in St. Thomas²⁶. Therefore only an aggregate of several things, such as a heap of stones, will be a being per accidens.

THE REPLY, from St. Thomas, Metaphysics VII, lect. 4²⁷, and On Being and Essence, ch. 7, at the beginning²⁸: When accidents are defined through the subject, whether in the abstract or in the concrete, they are defined by addition—that is, by something added from outside the concept of the essence, namely the subject, since accidents depend on it. But such a definition, which includes things from different categories, is not one per se, that is, explanatory of one quiddity; rather it is one by addition, including something outside its proper genus.

When it is said that it perfectly explains its definiendum, the reply is that it explains it perfectly by addition, not by an essential and quidditative definition alone. Thus a being per accidens is definable by one definition by addition, but not by one definition simply.

Or, secondly, one may say that such a concrete, if defined per se, is defined by reason of the form alone. Then the subject, considered in itself and absolutely, does not enter the definition, but enters as formed by the accidental form itself according to that form’s generic grade in relation to itself according to its specific grade. Thus, when one says “White is a body that disperses sight,” body is not understood absolutely, but as colored, and so it explains the account of the genus; the term “body” is placed as a support, not as entering the quiddity of white. The two solutions should be applied proportionately to the definition of an accident in the abstract when the subject is placed obliquely in its definition. Therefore, things from different categories cannot make up one definition as intrinsic components, though they can as things that terminate or cause it extrinsically, just as potency and act are defined by their order to an object. Yet what results from accident and subject is not definable per se, as was said.

The reply to the confirmation is that “being per accidens” is said in several ways, as in Metaphysics V²⁹, lect. 9 in St. Thomas³⁰, and Metaphysics VI³¹, lect. 2³². Sometimes it is by an accidental concurrence on the side of the subject, or material and formal cause, because the form is an accident; sometimes it is by accidental concurrence on the side of the agent. An example of the first is a white man; of the second, a builder’s being a doctor. What is per accidens on the agent’s side is therefore not brought about by one generation, but by several, because several disparate forms are presupposed in the agent; the Philosopher speaks literally of these. But what is per accidens only on the side of subject and form, if there is one form, can come to be by one generation, though accidentally and in a qualified sense, not simply one—as when something white or musical comes to be by one accidental generation.