Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Secunda Pars Artis Logicae

BY THE TERM “metaphysical grades,” as said above, we understand nothing other than higher and lower predicates that are predicated of something. They are called grades because, one being more universal and higher than another, in knowing them we seem to ascend and descend, as when “human being” is predicated of Peter, “animal” above that, and “body” above that, and so on. We ask whether these predicates or grades are distinguished from one another in the same subject by the nature of the thing, prior to every operation of the intellect, or only through its operation.

Since there is a rather celebrated CONTROVERSY on this point between the school of St. Thomas and that of Scotus, and it depends chiefly on what was said above about distinction and identity of reason, we must briefly recall what was said there about the threefold distinction recognized by Scotus: absolute real distinction, which admits separation of the extremes; formal distinction from the nature of the thing, which does not admit separation but does deny formal identity, so that one notion by its own nature is not included in the concept of the other; and, finally, distinction of reason, which depends on reason alone as it forms a concept and is not found in the thing. St. Thomas, by contrast, recognizes only two kinds of distinction, real and of reason, because every reason and cause for distinguishing is either in the thing or not in the thing but in reason. Each of these distinctions is twofold: real distinction is either of one thing from another or of a thing from a mode; distinction of reason is either reasoned reason or reasoning reason, as was explained in the preceding question.

We are now asking whether essential predicates found in the same subject have the distinction that Scotus calls “from the nature of the thing,” or only a distinction of reason. All agree that there is no real distinction as between two things or entities, since they belong to one and the same entity, as in one human being, and proceed from the same form, even in a composite substance, in which there is only one form, as must be shown expressly in the books on the soul.¹ We proceed more universally in this question, because it is clear that in the remaining categories apart from substance there is no entity composed of several forms, but accidents are simple forms. Yet metaphysical grades, or higher and lower predicates, are found in them; and even in the category of substance there are simple forms, such as angels, in which these grades must be taken from the same form. Consequently, it is manifest that in them these grades cannot be really distinct as one thing from another.

Hence THE WHOLE DIFFICULTY comes down to whether a formal distinction from the nature of the thing is to be admitted among these grades.

LET THERE BE A SINGLE CONCLUSION: No formal distinction from the nature of the thing actually exists outside the intellect between these metaphysical grades; only a virtual and fundamental distinction exists, which is made actual by the intellect.

This conclusion is drawn from the Philosopher in Metaphysics VII, chs. 12 and 13², where one may consult St. Thomas, lects. 12 and 13³, On Being and Essence, ch. 3⁴, and opusc. 72, ch. 9.⁵ In these places he shows how genus does not differ in reality from difference and lower things, but only in reason. See also the question On Spiritual Creatures, a. 1, ad 9⁶, where he likewise says that the forms by which species are distinguished are not, in reality, other than the form of the genus. The disciples of St. Thomas commonly follow him, as may be seen in Cajetan at the cited place in On Being and Essence and in ch. 6, q. 12; Master Soto, q. 3 On Universals; and others one may consult in the Carmelite Course, disp. 3 On Universals, q. 4.

The FOUNDATION of this conclusion is drawn from two points: first, from the general rejection of that formal distinction from the nature of the thing; second, from the special character of essential predicates, which proceed from the same form.

As to the first point, in the preceding question, a. 3, we rejected that distinction. I add now only that this distinction must necessarily actually remove some identity in reality, if it is actually a distinction prior to the intellect’s operation. For distinction essentially removes identity in that in which the distinction is found. This formal distinction does not remove identity in the entity and reality itself; for then it would truly and properly be a real distinction, not a formal one, since it would have the formal effect of real distinction, which is to remove real identity. It would then lack nothing that would prevent it from being a real distinction. According to Scotus’s position, therefore, it removes only the identity of the concept or formal notion: that is, one thing in reality is not part of the concept and formal notion of the other or of its constitution. But actual distinction is not required for this; a virtual and fundamental distinction suffices, since it provides the basis for conceiving one under a distinction from the other and representing it without the other. Thus distinction shines forth actually where identity has actually been removed. In reality, however, all that is found is that one is not the formal constituent of the other, and therefore is not essentially connected with the other formally or constitutively, although it is so identically.

But this is not to have a distinction actually in reality; it is only not to be identified in every respect in reality. It is one thing to say, “This is not actually the same as that, but distinct”; it is another to say, “This is not the same as that in this particular way, although it is absolutely the same.” For the latter requires only that there be no essential relation and connection between certain extremes formally, and therefore that they not be the same in an essential way. But for there to be an actual distinction, they must not remain the same absolutely, and not merely in a certain respect. So too one can say that nature remains negatively common in individuals by itself, but not absolutely and actually; and just as it remains one formally in a negative, not positive, way, so a formal distinction is given negatively, not positively. That is, one might say: by virtue of the formal concept, this is not the same as that, or is distinct from it, just as by virtue of the species’ principles it is one, or not distinct; and nature in itself is not singular. None of this amounts to positing an actual negative commonness or formal unity in the thing. Therefore neither is that formal distinction actually present in the thing.

This is confirmed: something is said to be actually given in a thing when it exists actually in the thing. If it does not exist actually, it is only in potency and virtually; it will be actual when it is known or posited as existing. But for it to be actual in a thing, it does not suffice that it be said to be given on one side, if it is not given on the other; it must be given absolutely and without qualification. Therefore it does not suffice to say that one thing is not the same as another by virtue of the formal concept, and so claim that it is simply actually not the same, or distinct, in reality. It is so only in a certain respect and negatively: that is, insofar as it does not have the same constitution and formal concept, just as a thing by itself is not singular in reality, though it would not be said actually not to be singular in reality.

The second principle for not distinguishing these grades by the nature of the thing is often taken by St. Thomas from the fact that they proceed from the same simple form, as is clear in I, q. 76, a. 3, ad 4, and in Metaphysics VII, lect. 12, § Solvit, at the end.⁷ Separate substances and accidents are simple entities; and in one substantial composite there is only one form, as we now assume and will prove in the books on the soul.⁸ Therefore all the grades or predicates that belong to a thing by virtue of such a form are not actually distinguished in reality.

The consequence is clear: they have the identity of the same form, so they are not distinguished in the form itself. But if they are actually distinguished in reality because one predicate or grade is not part of the concept of another, why are they not distinguished as different forms? For they are actually distinct notions and consequently distinct principles by which; but this is what it means for forms to be actually distinct in reality.

Someone might hesitate only about the individual grade. For it does not seem to be taken from the form, but from designated matter through material principles, which are outside the specified essence, as is commonly said in the Thomistic view. Similarly, genus is said to be taken from matter and difference from form; therefore not all the grades are taken from the same entity.

To the first point, the answer is that in things composed of matter and form, individuation, although taken from designated matter, does not exclude form, because the designation of matter itself comes from quantity, and quantity differs according to the different forms, as is clear from St. Thomas, I, q. 7, a. 3, and II, dist. 30, q. 2, a. 1, where he says: “Determinate quantities and all other accidents are received in matter according to the requirement of the form.”⁹ This is clear because, although quantity has material parts only by reason of matter, as is clear in a human being whose form is spiritual and has no parts, nevertheless that quantity is formed in this or that way comes from form. Hence the notion of form also contributes to the individual grade, although dependently on the incommunicability of matter and its designation and division through quantity, which is a condition required for individuation. As for substances that are not composed of matter and form, it is clear that individuation is not taken from matter, although in accidents it signifies a relation to a subject. We will speak about these matters more fully below, when treating the individual,¹⁰ and in the books on Generation, when treating the principle of individuation.¹¹

To the second point, the answer is drawn from St. Thomas, On Being and Essence, ch. 3¹² and ch. 6¹³, and opusc. 42, ch. 5¹⁴: genus is not taken from matter insofar as matter is a physical part distinct from form, but because it is taken from what is material and potential in each thing. And because, in composite substances that are better known to us, matter is a more potential principle than form, that proposition was adopted: genus is taken from matter and difference from form.

THE ARGUMENTS ARE ANSWERED.

Scotus’s principal arguments for proving that formal distinction from the nature of the thing, set out in the preceding question, a. 3, reduce to this principal foundation: before every operation of the intellect there are certain formalities, one of which does not include another, and there is actual opposition among them; therefore there is also actual distinction.

The consequence is valid, because every distinction is grounded in some opposition and exclusion of one thing from another. Therefore, if this opposition exists actually before the intellect’s operation, so does the distinction. The antecedent is proved as follows. “Rational” is not part of the concept of “animal,” nor is it defined by the same definition, since there is animal without rationality. Therefore one is not included in the concept of the other. Likewise, contradictories are actually true of animal and rationality; therefore some actual opposition is found. For it belongs to the formality of animal to be that in which human beings and nonrational animals agree, but not to rationality; and it belongs to the formality of rationality to reason or understand, but not to the formality of animal. Therefore these contradictories are true of these formalities on the side of the thing; consequently, they are not the same on the side of the thing, since contradictories are not true of the same thing on the side of the thing. Precisely the same argument is made about action and passion, and about the persons and the divine essence: the essence is communicable, the person is not communicable, and these are contradictories.

WE ANSWER that all these points are preserved with only virtual distinction; an actual division between the extremes is not required. And if these arguments prove anything, they prove real distinction as well, not merely formal distinction, since contradictories cannot belong to the same reality either. Nor does the denial that one thing is included in the concept and definition of another, if it actually effects a division, explain why it should not actually constitute distinct realities.

We therefore say that one thing can be the same as another in two ways. In one way, they are the same adequately and in every respect. Wherever one is found, the other is found, and the other enters into the concept of one. In another way, things are one and the same inadequately: although one is identified with the other simply, it is not identified in every way or with every restriction to it. Thus being is identified with a mode, whether in itself or in another, in such a way that not everything that is a being has being in itself determinately or in another determinately. The divine essence is identified really and entitatively with paternity, as Scotus too admits; yet whatever belongs entitatively to the divine essence does not for that reason belong entitatively to paternity, as in the case of the Son. What Scotus is compelled to admit in entitative and real identity, we say about formal identity: although one thing is not part of the concept of the other, it is still not distinct from it on the side of the thing. For although the essential relation required for intrinsic and essential identity is lacking, there is no actual division that actually removes the identity and unity found on the side of the thing, since in reality and identically they are one. Thus they remain simply one, but not in every way or adequately. They can therefore have distinct definitions on account of their virtual distinction, because they can be conceived as distinct and so defined. For definition is made through an act of the intellect, which actually distinguishes concepts. In the thing, however, they differ only fundamentally; because of this virtual distinction, the names “animal” and “human being” and the others that signify these distinct formal notions are not synonymous, as St. Thomas teaches in I, q. 13, a. 4, and On the Power of God, q. 7, a. 6.¹⁵

We answer in the same way concerning the points raised from opposition and contradiction. We say that contradictories can be true of the same thing according to diverse notions, and that opposition can occur in this way, especially when the contradiction arises by reason of some reduplication, appellation, or special mode of conceiving. This is the explicit teaching of St. Thomas, I, q. 39, a. 1, ad 2, where he says that, because essence and person in God differ according to the notion of the intellect, it follows that something can be affirmed of one and denied of the other. The opposing argument proves nothing against this, because we are not saying that contradictories are true of the same thing on the side of the thing; rather, we deny that an actual distinction on the side of the thing is required, and say that a virtual distinction suffices, by reason of which some things are not the same altogether and adequately. Thus contradiction occurs concerning the same thing, but not under the same notion or in the same mode. Actual opposition causes actual distinction in the extremes between which it occurs, for example between being and nonbeing or between contraries, but not in the subject to which the contraries or contradictories belong and of which they are predicated. It suffices for the subject to be virtually diverse and to admit contradictories under different notions.

Second argument: A metaphysical whole and its grades correspond to a physical whole and the physical parts from which the metaphysical whole is taken. But a physical whole is composed of really distinct parts, as body and soul. Therefore, in the same way, a metaphysical whole is composed of grades distinct by the nature of the thing.

The antecedent is clear, because a metaphysical composite is not a mere composition of reason, since otherwise it would belong to God. Therefore some composition in reality corresponds to it. The consequent is clear for two reasons. First, the physical and metaphysical whole are the same in reality; therefore they admit the same distinction in their components. Second, St. Thomas says in ch. 3 of On Being and Essence¹⁶ that a human being is composed of body and soul as two things into a third thing. But “body” does not mean matter alone; it means the grade of corporeity. Therefore one grade can be really distinct from another with which it is composed.

This is confirmed: if these grades are not absolutely distinct, genus and difference would also be predicated in the abstract, because one notion would be the other. Thus it would be true that rationality is animality and vice versa, which is inadmissible. Therefore they have some distinction on the side of the thing.

WE ANSWER that a metaphysical whole is not composed of parts, but of predicates of the same whole; nor does it correspond to the very composition of matter and form, since a metaphysical composite is also found in things not composed of matter and form, such as angels and accidents. In things that are composite, metaphysical composition is superimposed on the physical whole itself, taking that whole as more or less determinate and thus composing not from parts but from concepts. Hence this composition is of reason, but with a foundation in the thing. That foundation is not found in God, however, because, being pure act, he has nothing less determinate and actualizable and nothing more determinate that actualizes or contracts it. Therefore, although the metaphysical and physical wholes are the same in reality, they are not composed in the same way. When St. Thomas says that a human being is composed of body and soul, either he takes “body” to mean matter, not a body informed by a form, but only matter disposed and organized, and so he is speaking of physical composition; or he takes “body” to mean what precedes the infusion of the soul and exists under the form of an embryo. When the soul comes to it and excludes the embryo’s form, a human being is made from it as a third thing from two things.

To the confirmation, the answer is that although rationality and animality are indistinct on the side of the thing, because of their mode of signifying it is not true in the formal sense that rationality is animality, or conversely. These abstract terms signify only the formality itself, precisely as such. In that sense it is not true that rationality is formally animality, since one is not included in the concept of the other or regarded as its constituent; rather, each is signified under a certain precision. This is like saying “humanity is animality,” since animality is part of the concept of humanity. They are, however, identified in the sense that rationality is the thing that is animality, and conversely. But we will speak further about these matters below, q. 5.