Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Secunda Pars Artis Logicae

This difficulty will be explained more fully from what must be said in the next question, where we treat the act through which universality results in an object from the intellect’s apprehension. But so that we may touch in this question on everything that pertains to the universal in itself, we must briefly consider it.

As we noted above in art. 1, a universal is either logical or metaphysical. The difference between them is this: although each regards or connotes inferiors, the metaphysical universal regards them as the terminus from which it is left behind, while the logical universal regards them as the terminus toward which it is compared. That is, metaphysics considers natures stripped of individual conditions; it does not belong to metaphysics to consider their relation to those same natures, so that they may be predicated of them. That belongs to logic.

There has, however, been disagreement among authors about assigning the form or account by which these universalities, or their denominations, are constituted, and about where precisely the very quiddity of universality is to be placed. Some, such as Martinez, in his commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge, disp. 1, q. 2, distinguish the constitution of universality as such from the constituent of universality insofar as it is metaphysical or logical. They say that the universal as such is constituted by a unity of account resulting from precision, and that this unity is a radical aptitude for many things. They say that the metaphysical universal is constituted by negative abstraction, insofar as it is considered without differences—that is, by omitting or negating them. The logical universal, by contrast, is constituted by positive abstraction, insofar as inferiors are not merely omitted negatively but are considered positively by separating and comparing one with another. Thus, through positive abstraction, the nature is, as it were, positively distinguished from the inferior differences and placed outside their concepts, but it remains in the inferiors by being included in them. For to be in many is to be included in them; nothing is included in another except as in something distinct, at least according to an account, since nothing is included in itself. A universal—for example, animal—is not abstracted from the inferiors, that is, horse and human, even according to an account, but only from some aspect of them, namely their differences. Since it is therefore outside the differences but included in the inferiors, it is called a logical universal, because it is then one in many. In sum, this opinion says that the universal precisely as universal (not yet logical or metaphysical) is one by a unity of account that includes an aptitude—not a proximate but a radical one, since a proximate aptitude is not apprehended without an act. The metaphysical universal, as a universal, is one; as metaphysical, it is without the many. The logical universal, as a universal, is one; as logical, it is not only without the many but also in the many. But being in many is a relation to those many. This relation cannot exist unless the nature is included in them, since it cannot be understood to regard another thing unless that other thing is thought of. What it regards is the inferiors; therefore, the inferiors must be thought of. They are not thought of without the inclusion of the superior; therefore, relation to the inferiors requires inclusion in them. Others say without qualification that a metaphysical universal is formed by both positive and negative abstraction, making no distinction here, as Father Merinero discusses in On Universals, disp. 2, q. 3, against Martinez. The common opinion of many who teach without qualification that the universal is formed by abstraction likewise does not distinguish positive from negative abstraction. Father Suárez, Metaphysics disp. 6, sect. 6, nn. 8 and 11, teaches that the absolute universal, which is metaphysical, is formed by any kind of abstraction, following the second opinion he reports about a universal formed by abstraction; but he teaches that the relative universal, which is logical, is formed by comparison.

As for the logical universal, authors commonly hold that it consists in a relation to inferiors. But there are three such relations: first, an aptitude to be in inferiors; second, an aptitude to be predicated, or predicability itself, taken positively and relatively, since predicability follows upon being universal; third, the relation of actual predication itself, by which something is a predicate and not merely predicable.

Three OPINIONS are divided according to these three relations. Some place the essence of the universal in the relation of aptitude to be in many, and hold that the relation of predicability is a property of it. Others, conversely, hold that predicability is prior and the relation of being in many posterior. Still others hold that the relation of actual predication is universality, because it indicates that one thing belongs to many. See Father Merinero, On Universals, disp. 2, q. 2, on these opinions.

NEVERTHELESS, FOR THE RESOLUTION I SAY, FIRST: In the universal there are only three things that pertain to its complete account: the material, foundational, and formal universal.

That is to say: the nature or subject denominated universal, which is called the material universal; the proximate foundation of the universal relation, which is a unity made precise from inferiors, together with an aptitude or non-repugnance to be in them; and the relative form itself, by which it is compared with and regards those many things.

The REASON is that the logician considers universality as a certain second intention, which is a relation of reason. In every relation, however, these three concur and suffice: the subject, the foundation, and the form of the relation itself. Therefore these alone suffice for and concur in universality.

I SAY, SECOND: For universality as foundation (we set aside the material universal, since this is the thing denominated, not the account that denominates it universal), it is required that the nature itself be denominated metaphysically universal. This consists in an absolute unity of precision and an aptitude not yet taken relatively, but as a non-repugnance to being in many.

The REASON is that a metaphysical universal is not said to be such through the addition of some mode to universality as such. If that mode is of reason, it does not pertain to metaphysics, which considers natures, but to logic, which treats modes or relations of reason. If it is a real mode, it will pertain to the nature itself, not to universality, since it will also be found in singulars. Hence a thing or nature taken metaphysically is nothing other than the very things or natures (which metaphysics considers, since it regards a real object) together with separation from individuals, because no science considers natures in singulars. Separation or precision alone necessarily provides the foundation of universality, since by making precise a nature from individuals it makes that nature one with a unity of abstraction or precision: that precision considers the nature in the mode of one. Likewise, it makes the nature apt to be in many, because the nature thus considered agrees with those things from which it has been abstracted and, consequently, is not repugnant to being in them, since to be in them is to agree with them. Therefore it remains one and apt to be in many, and this is prior to relation to the many, because such precision does not regard those many as the terminus toward which the nature tends and is ordered, but as that from which it is separated. A terminus from which is not a terminus of a relation insofar as it exercises the character of a terminus from which. Therefore it is not yet taken relatively, but precisely; and this is the foundation of the relation.

I SAY, THIRD: This foundational universality is obtained through both negative and positive abstraction.

There is no doubt about negative abstraction, since it consists in the mere negation or omission of inferiors, taking the nature as one. Positive abstraction is proved in this way: it is nothing other than abstraction made with positive cognition of the terminus from which something is left behind and of the nature that is taken away from it. This produces the same effect as negative abstraction, though not in the same way, because it regards the inferiors only as the terminus from which; it does not turn the nature toward them as toward a terminus to which. Therefore it does not yet posit a relation, but only precision, all of which pertains to the metaphysical universal. Thus negative and positive abstraction alike leave the nature bare or stripped. Negative abstraction does not consider the individual conditions from which it strips the nature, but omits and simply negates them; positive abstraction considers those conditions in order to strip the nature from them. Yet both produce the same effect: leaving the nature without those conditions.

I SAY, FOURTH: The logical universal, or universal as a second intention, does not consist in a comparison of attribution or predication, but in a simple relation or order, without actual inclusion in inferiors. Thus the very aptitude to be predicated of many, as it positively regards inferiors, is the logical universal.

This conclusion will be clearer below, where we shall show from St. Thomas and from reason how the logical universal is formed through a comparative act. For now it suffices to indicate its FOUNDATION. It is settled that logical universality, or a second intention, is a relation of reason to many; this is taken from the definition of the universal as “one in many and predicated of many.” But this relation of one to many is found before the relation of actual predication, since before actual predication the nature itself is found without singulars, as predicable of many: for the potency by which it can be predicated precedes the act of predication. Therefore there is an account of the predicable in relation to many; therefore, before actual predication, there is a relation of one to many by way of potency and aptitude. Indeed, if unity and aptitude for many exist before actual predication, as is clear in the metaphysical universal, this aptitude can be considered as regarding the many to which it is capable of applying, just as every potency can be considered as ordered toward and regarding its terminus, of which it is capable. Therefore, before actual predication there is a relation of aptitude to many, and this is universality.

Indeed, when something is actually predicated, it may be applied to only one singular, as in “Peter is a human being” and “Paul is a human being.” Then the term “human being” is universal, but the actual application in predication is only to one, not to many. Therefore the relation to many does not arise from determinate predication.

NOR IS THERE AN OBJECTION in saying that the universal is conceived in relation to many when it is indicated to belong to many, which happens through predication. Rather, it is conceived when an aptitude ordered to many is apprehended as able to be predicated of them. This occurs before actual predication, since potency precedes act.

That actual inclusion is not required is clear, because this inclusion is being in many and being identified with many. But the universal is apt to be in and identified with many before it is actually identified, since the universal aptitude is for both: for it to be and to be predicated in many and of many. Therefore universality exists before actual inclusion, because there is an aptitude, with a relation and order, to being in many. Moreover, actual inclusion in many cannot be understood without actual contraction in them. For something is actually included in singulars only in the way it is in them as contracted and determined in each singular, with which it is identified; it is not in each singular as indifferent to many. Therefore it is identified with and included in them through contraction. But the universal is contractible in many before it is actually contracted; therefore it is prior to actual inclusion.

NOR IS THERE AN OBJECTION from the contrary foundation, namely, that the inferiors themselves exist only through the inclusion of the superior in them. The answer is that before actual inclusion the inferiors are themselves potential includers, insofar as they are inferiors, just as the superior is potential to be included. In this way they terminate the relation of the superior before actual inclusion is considered. Thus something is actually superior when the aptitude to be included and to be in many actually belongs to it, not merely when it is actually included. Likewise, inferiors are actually inferiors under the formal aspect of inferiors when they are considered as actually capable of including and contracting their superior, not when they actually include it; for then the distinction between superior and inferior is dissolved. In reality, however, inferiors actually include the superior; but they have this identically with the superior, not formally insofar as they are inferiors.

I SAY, FINALLY: Predicability, or the relation to many under the account of predicating, is, as it were, a property of universality, which is the relation to being in many.

This is against Father Merinero, On Universals, disp. 2, q. 2, chap. 1.

The REASON is that the foundation and root of predicability is the identity of the extremes that can be predicated, as we shall say in q. 5. This is clear in itself, because what is not the same as another is not truly predicated of it, but is removed from it. Therefore the aptitude to be identified is the foundation or root of the aptitude to be predicated, and predicability thus stands as a property consequent upon that aptitude. Therefore the relation to many in being, or in being identified, is prior to the relation to many in predicating: the former is universality, the latter predicability.

NOR IS THERE AN OBJECTION that the aptitude to be is merely non-repugnance, not a positive relation; hence, in the genus of positive relations, predicability is first. For positive aptitude is an aptitude to be through an operation of the intellect, which occurs by predication, not an aptitude to be in reality outside the operation of the intellect.

The answer is that this aptitude to be is also considered positively and relatively by the intellect before predication, insofar as the abstracted nature is considered contractible and identifiable with many—not only through non-repugnance, but also through a positive relation. For it is truly identified in reality with those many things; and because it is identifiable, it is predicable. Hence it is apt not only to be predicated through an operation of the intellect, but also to be understood as contracted and identified, since before the intellect’s second operation, in which predication occurs, the common nature is understood as identifiable with singulars. Sometimes, through a simple concept, it can be understood as identified by virtue of the prior contraction, before predication.