Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Secunda Pars Artis Logicae

The controversy in this question is almost the same as in the preceding one. For those who admit a formal unity common by nature of the thing likewise admit, by nature of the thing, that indifference and aptitude for many belong to it.

Moreover, the authors who hold this assertion labor considerably to free this aptitude and indifference of unity from the universality posited by Plato. Scotus, in Sentences II, dist. 3, q. 1, § Ad quaestionem and § Sed contra, only admits that nature in the state or priority in which it is considered in itself has unity, neither singularized nor universalized, but indifferent to either. This indifference therefore does not suffice for universality in act, because it is indifferent to having it; it does not have that universality by which it is indifferent to predication and existence in many. Others think that in nature itself, considered in itself, there is truly a unity of precision from its inferiors, and consequently a proximate aptitude for existing in many singulars, on the assumption that there is an actual distinction between higher and lower grades, which we discuss in the next article, art. 6. Yet they do not say that universality is found in the thing, because this indifference does not belong to nature as an intrinsic predicate, but by reason of that state of solitude, which is dissolved by descending to individuals. On this see Fonseca, Metaphysics V, chapter 28, q. 5, section 3, and Suárez, Metaphysical Disputations 5, section 2, no. 9 at the end, although he rejects this view. See others in the Coimbra commentators, q. 4, On Universals, art. 3, section 2. Still others, finally, have said even worse that aptitude for many is found even in individuals, but by way of act, not potency. For they think that contracted and singular nature, insofar as it is nature, remains apt for many, although this aptitude is impeded by the singular difference from being predicated of others, just as prime matter, when under one form, retains an aptitude for having another, although impeded while it is under the first form. They say that nature contracted in this way is an actual, not potential, universal in many—that is, it has the act of existing in many, not a potency made precise from them. Against them see the Coimbra commentators, q. 4, On Universals, art. 4.

For the solution, however, we should note that by “aptitude” or “indifferent potency for many” we do not here mean a positive potency for acting on or receiving something, since the universal we are now discussing does not regard its inferiors as effects: it is not a universal in causing. Rather, we mean a potency in the sense of capacity or non-repugnance for being multiplied in many and existing in them by identity and, consequently, by predication, insofar as universal and particular, higher and lower, signify a certain whole: the universal as indeterminate and abstract, the particular as determinate and contracted. Because the indeterminate can become determinate, it is said to have an aptitude to be in it and be predicated of it.

This aptitude can indeed be considered formally and positively, insofar as it regards inferiors, or fundamentally, as the very capacity or non-repugnance to regard inferiors and descend to them. For that regard is grounded in this non-repugnance. When taken positively, or by way of a relation, it is the formal intention itself, or universality in act. Scotus also denied that this is given in the thing, admitting only a negative community by nature of the thing, which is nothing other than nature's not being singular of itself.

Hence the POINT OF THE DIFFICULTY here is whether, by reason of this negative community, there is in nature taken in itself some non-repugnance or capacity to be in many and be predicated of them.

We do not here distinguish aptitude for being in many from aptitude for being predicated of many. Although universality and predicability are distinct relations (for predicability is a property of universality, as will be said below¹), the capacity or non-repugnance is the same for being in many and for being predicated of many, because these two—being and being predicated—are coordinated so essentially that when one is posited the other follows. When two acts are ordered essentially, the aptitude or non-repugnance for one and the other is the same. Thus the capacity or non-repugnance of matter grounds both the form's being united to matter and matter's receiving being from that form.

LET THERE BE ONE CONCLUSION, THEN: This aptitude or non-repugnance, which is the proximate foundation of universality, is in no way found in nature considered in itself, nor as contracted in individuals, but in nature abstracted and made precise by the intellect. Thus this non-repugnance for being in many follows nature by reason of its state, not by reason of its quiddity.

This conclusion belongs to St. Thomas and is common among Thomists. See Cajetan, chapter 4 of On Being and Essence, q. 7. It is drawn from St. Thomas in opusc. 56², where he says: “The aptitude for being in many is not of the essence of human being, for then the human being who is in Socrates would be apt to be participated in by many, which is impossible.” And in chapter 4 of On Being and Essence³: “It cannot,” he says, “be said that the character of universal belongs to nature so taken” (namely, in itself), “because unity and community belong to the character of universal. Neither of these belongs to human nature according to its absolute consideration. For if community were included in the understanding of human being, wherever humanity were found, community would be found. It remains, therefore, that the character of species accrues to human nature according to the being it has in the intellect, etc.” St. Thomas goes on to show how nature has unity in the intellect because it has a uniform character with respect to all the individuals outside the soul, insofar as it is an image of them.

AND THE one effective argument for the conclusion is drawn from this: this aptitude, which is the proximate foundation of universality, is not merely negative community, or the negation of having singularity; rather, it is a capacity or non-repugnance for one nature, existing as one, to be multiplied in many. Therefore, in a state in which nature is neither one nor many, or in a state in which it is contracted to individuation, it does not have a capacity for unity's multiplication. In the state of singularity it is repugnant to this multiplication. In the state of solitude, or of nature considered in itself, it does not yet have a unity that can be multiplied into many, but only quidditative predicates, among which this capacity or non-repugnance of unity for multiplication cannot be counted. Otherwise, wherever nature existed, this capacity would belong to it, which is plainly false, since in the thing itself it is incapable of existing in many.

It is not enough to say that, absolutely speaking, nature is incapable in the thing itself, but not incapable by virtue of its essential principles. This is not enough, I say, because although nature considered in itself is not incapable either of existing in many or of singularity in one, one cannot say that it has there a capacity of unity for many of the kind required to ground universality. That capacity is absolute, not merely a matter of its not being incapable in some respect. A stone, likewise, is simply incapable of understanding and consequently has no foundation of intellectuality, although merely insofar as it is a substance it is not incapable of intellectuality. Thus it is one thing to say that nature considered in itself is not incapable of unity for many, and another to say that it is determinately and positively capable of this in itself and has this non-repugnance, when it does not yet have the unity itself that can be multiplied in many.

This is confirmed because nature considered in itself and in singulars is not capable of a positive intention and relation to many; therefore neither is it capable of the proximate foundation of this relation, such as the aptitude of unity for many. Thus this aptitude is given neither in nature considered in itself nor in individuals. It must instead be said that this aptitude necessarily presupposes a unity capable of multiplication in many. Hence, so long as such a unity is not found in nature, neither is the aptitude found. This unity, however, is only abstract unity, not real unity or the unity of nature considered in itself.

YOU WILL SAY: The foundation St. Thomas gives is not sound: things that belong to a thing in itself do not always belong to it. A continuum is divisible into parts in itself, yet cannot be divided in the heavens. Every quantity is divisible to infinity in itself, yet a quantity in a natural thing cannot be divided in this way.

THE REPLY is that these are said to belong in themselves not positively and absolutely, but negatively: that is, they are not repugnant, and they belong only for some state, not actually in every state. In the same way, insofar as its essential principles are concerned, nature considered in itself is not repugnant to having universality or particularity. If, however, a capacity to be predicated of one by many belonged to it positively and absolutely in itself, it would belong to it in every state. St. Thomas's argument effectively proves this.

THE ARGUMENTS ARE ANSWERED.

Several arguments that are brought forward for Scotus's view, or rather attributed to him, rest on the equivocation resolved in the preceding article: the move from a negative to an affirmative by means of an infinite predicate. For example: nature considered in itself is not singular; therefore it is common in itself. It is not incapable, by its essential principles, of being in many; therefore it is capable.

Second, this rests on properties of universal nature that belong to nature considered in itself, such as being an object of the intellect, being a truth for all time, having one definition, and the like. These do not belong to nature in an individual, yet belong to nature considered in itself and prior to the intellect's operation, because the object precedes its act. If, then, the intellect's act is about a universal, the universal exists before that act.

Finally, these two are not repugnant: nature may be singular and contracted by its material principles, yet indeterminate by its formal and specific principles, and consequently apt to exist in many, although this is impeded by singularity. Prime matter, for example, has an aptitude for many forms, although it is impeded from being informed by them so long as it is under one form. And according to the Thomists, angelic nature is apt to exist in many, although absolutely speaking it is repugnant for it to exist in them.

ALL THESE ARGUMENTS remain resolved by what was said in the preceding article. As for the first proof, it is clear that, when the phrase “in itself” is posited, those things that do not belong to the subject essentially can be denied of it. But to affirm that something belongs to it—even if it is something negative—it must belong according to an essential connection. Otherwise, it does not belong in any way when “in itself” is posited, since that phrase signifies that something belongs by virtue of the quiddity. Thus from the negation of what belongs accidentally, one cannot infer the affirmative opposite of an infinite predicate. So this does not follow: nature considered in itself is not singular; therefore it is non-singular in itself; still less does this follow: therefore it is universal.

To the second objection, it is said that being an object of the intellect and being a truth for all time are found objectively, with respect to the very objective character on the part of the thing known, even if the thing does not always exist really; in this way they precede the intellect objectively. But with respect to the condition of universality that accompanies the object in the cognition itself, this does not precede the intellect's act; rather, it results in the object from that act. Thus a definition is one with a fundamental unity on the part of the thing defined, but positively formal on the part of the intellect. The object is similarly one and universal in this respect.

To the third objection, it is said that the aptitude of matter and the aptitude of universality are of different kinds. Matter by its own nature has a capacity for many forms, and its aptitude and potency for them is its entity. Hence, wherever its entity is preserved, this aptitude is preserved too, because it belongs to matter in itself. But the aptitude for being and being predicated of many follows nature by reason of its state and abstract unity. Its aptitude is not just any aptitude, but one for a single nature to be multiplied in many; this unity does not belong to nature before the intellect's operation. As for what is added about angelic nature, we will discuss it more fully below, q. 8. For now it is enough to say that, if an angel is conceived perfectly and adequately, aptitude for being in many is repugnant to it, because it is repugnant to be conceived without individuation. If, however, it is conceived without individuation on account of an imperfect and inadequate concept of the angel, then, just as it has a unity of abstraction from such an imperfect concept, it likewise has an aptitude and non-repugnance for being in many, insofar as concerns nature conceived in this imperfect way.

Second it is argued: The act of this aptitude is real; therefore this aptitude itself belongs to the thing considered in itself, or to the thing as it is in reality.

The consequence is clear, because potency takes its specification from act. In this way it is true that potency and act are in the same genus when the act per se specifies the potency. Therefore, if the act is real, so is the potency. The antecedent is clear, because the act of this aptitude is existing in many singulars, which is something real. For being particular is something real; therefore its correlative, being universal, is real as well.

This is confirmed because this aptitude is the foundation of universality. Therefore it is not a second intention, but a first, since a second intention is founded on a first. But if you say that it is the proximate foundation, which must be of the same character as the intention and relation founded on it, against this there are two objections: First, if this aptitude is made by the intellect, then the object is known before this aptitude results; thus fundamental universality is not required for something to be an object of the intellect. Second, if it is made by the intellect, then it is something singular, since it results from a singular act; therefore it cannot formally constitute the universal.

THE REPLY is that the act of this aptitude is not something real. For the act of the universal aptitude is not the existence of many individuals, but the predication or contraction of one nature to many individuals, which is something of reason. The existence of many individuals can only be the foundation from which universal unity is abstracted and made apt for this predication. The particular is not the correlative of the universal unless it is taken as a second intention. If it is taken as particular as found in the thing, or as a first intention, then it is not the correlative of the universal, but its foundation.

To the confirmation, the reply is that a second intention has a first intention as its remote foundation, but as its proximate foundation it states something of reason—not a relation of second intention, but some negation or extrinsic denomination. Thus universality presupposes that the thing is known and abstracted from individuals. From this abstraction follows the unity of precision, which is a negation and non-repugnance to many, namely, an aptitude for them; from this, in turn, follows the relation.

To the first reply, it is said that the object is known by the intellect before this aptitude results. Thus universality is not required for the object of the intellect as an antecedent, but as a consequent, because there cannot be an actually known object unless this universality follows. Or, if universality is understood to be required before the intellect's act, this means universality fundamentally, not formally.

To the second reply, it is said that what is made by the intellect as an effect is something singular. But what results as something known or follows from cognition is universal, or an intention and form of universality. This is universal formally and as that by which it is universal—that is, formally making nature universal—but denominatively and as that which is universal it is singular, insofar as it is attributed to a determinate object through a determinate cognition.