Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Secunda Pars Artis Logicae

From one principle there have flowed in this matter TWO EXTREME OPINIONS.

For there was an ancient opinion of Heraclitus and Cratylus around the time of Socrates, as Aristotle reports in Metaphysics I¹, lecture 10, according to St. Thomas²: they said that there can be no science of sensible things, because these are in continuous flux and motion. Hence Cratylus reached such madness (as Aristotle says in Metaphysics IV³, and St. Thomas there, lecture 12⁴) that he thought one ought to say nothing, since the truth of a thing passed away before a speech could be completed. Plato took occasion from this opinion to posit natures separate from singular things, which he called Ideas: seeing that singulars are in continuous flux and motion, he denied (rightly) that firm and certain science can be had of them. But wishing to avoid Cratylus’s madness—that there be no science or truth—he invented a nature existing apart from singulars, which would exist in reality without singularity, so that science could be predicated of it.

On the other extreme, the Nominalists, agreeing with Plato and Cratylus that singulars are not objects of certain truth because of their contingency and perpetual motion, but denying against Plato that natures exist separate from singulars, said that only significant words remain as universals, without the things signified. St. Anselm gravely warns that this opinion must be wholly avoided in his book On the Incarnation of the Word, ch. 2⁵: “Since all must be cautioned to approach questions of Sacred Scripture with the greatest care, those dialecticians of our time—indeed, heretics in dialectic—must certainly be cautioned, for they think universals are nothing but a breath of the voice, etc.”

I SAY, THEREFORE, FIRST: To universal words and concepts there truly and simply corresponds as object some entity or nature, which is called universal—not one existing in reality under that state of universality and abstraction, but one which, through the intellect’s abstraction, so attains the nature as object that it does not attain singularity, or so attains higher predicates that it does not attain lower ones.

No falsity is found on the intellect’s part in this abstraction, just as sight is not false because it attains the color in an apple without attaining its taste—not by separating the color in reality from the taste, but by not joining both in cognition. So the intellect apprehends a human being without singularity, although in reality it is not without it.

The Philosopher teaches this conclusion⁶, continually attacking Plato’s opinion and consequently condemning that of the Nominalists. See especially St. Thomas, Metaphysics I, lecture 10⁷, where he says of Plato’s opinion: “Anyone who carefully considers Plato’s arguments will see that he erred in his position because he believed that the mode of a thing’s being when understood is the same as the mode in which the thing exists. Thus, because he found that our intellect understands abstract things in two ways—first, universals abstracted from singulars, and second, mathematics abstracted from sensibles—he posited a corresponding abstraction in the essences of things for both kinds of intellectual abstraction. Hence he posited both mathematical objects and species as separate. This is not necessary. For although the intellect understands things by being made like them through the intelligible species by which it is actualized, that species need not exist in the intellect in the same mode in which it exists in the thing understood; for whatever is in something is there according to the mode of that in which it is. Therefore, because the nature of the intellect differs from the nature of the thing understood, the mode by which the intellect understands and the mode by which the thing exists must differ.” Thus far St. Thomas. See also ch. 4 of On Being and Essence⁸, and opuscula 55 and 56⁹, and Summa theologiae I, q. 15, art. 1.

From this passage and St. Thomas’s words we gather that Plato’s and the Nominalists’ opinion must be rejected, because they did not distinguish the mode of being from the mode of knowing. If a thing existed in reality in the same mode in which it is known abstracted from singulars, then either that thing existing in this mode would be produced by God or it would not. If it were not produced by God, it would be nothing or would be God himself, who is supremely singular. If it were produced by God, then it would be produced by some singular action—for from God, who is singular, only a singular action can proceed—and so it would have a singular term or effect. Therefore this mode of universality can in no way exist in things themselves; it results solely from the mode of knowing a nature without singularity.

This also refutes the Nominalists’ opinion that denies anything real corresponds to a concept abstracting in this way, on the ground that this mode of abstraction is not found in the thing. Whenever several things are joined in something in reality, the intellect need not always apprehend them together; it can attain one without the other. What is apprehended with the other removed is nevertheless a true and proper being, although it does not exist in reality without the other, as is clear from the example above: sight attains the apple’s true and real color, though not its taste. Therefore to apprehend one thing and omit another is not to form a false concept, but an inadequate one. Something therefore corresponds to it on the side of the known object, although not with every mode in which it is found in reality; for not everything with which it is joined is understood.

This is clearer in the intellect’s composition and division. When I affirm of a subject something that belongs to it, without affirming something else joined to it—as when I say “A human being is an animal,” without affirming that the human being is a body, or “God is merciful,” or “an apple is colored,” and the like—the affirmation is either true or false. It cannot be false, since something is affirmed that is not repugnant to the subject but belongs to it. If it is true, then something on the side of reality corresponds to that concept; for if nothing corresponded to it, it could not be true. Thus something on the side of the object can correspond to an inadequate and precise concept, although it is not precise in reality but exists together with something else. In this way the abstraction of the universal is understood very well through the distinction between an adequate and inadequate concept: it occurs when the whole that is in the object—both nature and singularity—is not conceived, but one aspect, namely nature, is attained inadequately while the other, namely singularity, is omitted.

BUT THE NOMINALISTS OBJECT that a universal concept signifying, for example, a human being or an animal is like a collective name: it signifies not one thing but a collection, namely all human beings or everything to which the character of human being belongs. Thus when I say “A human being is an animal,” the sense is “Everything that is a human being, or all human beings, are animals.” For this reason some seem to hold, regarding the analogous concept of being, that what corresponds to it is the whole collection of beings under a certain confusion.

This evasion is excluded for two reasons. First, when we place a universal name on the predicate side, as when we say “Peter is a human being,” the sense would be that Peter is all human beings or everything that is a human being, which is plainly false. Second, if a common term is placed on the subject side without distribution, as in “A human being runs,” the sense would be that all human beings or everything that is a human being runs; and thus all indefinite propositions would be false. The Catholic proposition “The divine essence does not beget” would likewise be made false, because its sense would be “Everything that is the divine essence does not beget,” which is plainly false, since the Father is something that is the divine essence and begets.

Therefore a universal name can in no way be a collective name; it signifies one thing, though abstracted from singularity. What is added about the concept of being—how it abstracts from or includes inferiors—will be discussed below, q. 14. It must nevertheless remain settled that the name “being” is not collective, because it signifies not an aggregation of all inferiors but an agreement in an analogous character. Yet because this is not simply one but only proportionally one, it does not simply abstract from inferiors, but only in a qualified way; hence it is said to include them implicitly and confusedly, not explicitly, as will be shown there.

I SAY, SECOND: The universal taken as substrate or materially can be something real—that is, a nature that can be found in reality—although not with the state of universality. Taken formally, that is, as universality and abstraction, it is found only in cognition.

This is clear from what has been said. See the Philosopher in the Categories, chapter on Substance¹⁰, where he says that secondary substances, which are genera and species, subsist in primary substances; and in Metaphysics VII, ch. 13¹¹, where St. Thomas, lecture 13¹², says: “The universal can be taken in two ways. In one way, for the nature itself to which the intellect attributes the intention of universality; in this way universals, such as genera and species, signify the substances of things and are predicated in answer to what. For ‘animal’ signifies the substance of that of which it is predicated, and so does ‘human being.’ In another way, the universal can be taken insofar as it is universal, and insofar as the predicated nature is subject to the intention of universality—that is, insofar as animal or human being is considered as one in many. In this way the Platonists held that animal and human being, in their universality, are substances, etc.” Thus St. Thomas. As he shows there through several arguments, universality is not a substance or anything real, but an accident of reason pertaining to the state of the thing known, which it acquires by being known with a certain precision, abstracted from individuation. For the nature which does not exist in reality without individuating conditions is left bare of them in intellectual cognition. This pertains to the state of the nature in cognition, since the same nature, placed outside cognition in reality, loses that mode of being universal while retaining its quiddity.

THE ARGUMENTS ARE ANSWERED.

Plato’s opinion was based almost entirely on the perpetuity of science and of the truths belonging to sciences, which are necessary and eternal truths. These are not found in singulars, since singulars are corruptible and contingent. Therefore they are found outside singulars, or else the objects known would not be real and true but inventions of the intellect.

Likewise, there are exemplary causes from which singulars receive their essence: Peter is human by participation in humanity and an animal by participation in animality. Therefore there is a separate human being and animal from which these participations derive.

THE REPLY is that the objects of sciences and the truths attained by them are called perpetual and eternal, not on account of some eternal existence they really possess in a subject outside the divine intellect, but objectively and negatively: that is, because the connection of essential truths, which are the objects, does not depend on any temporal foundation or existence brought about in time, but always has truth in itself, attainable by an intellect, however eternal that intellect may be, and is in no way founded on a free or contingent character. Therefore the truth attained by science need not exist subjectively outside singulars; it need only be attained objectively without them.

To the point about exemplary causes, the reply is that there are indeed exemplary causes by participation in which created things have their natures, but these exemplary causes are divine Ideas, not created natures separate from singulars.

A second argument: Assuming the opinion of Scotus, to be treated below¹³, that prior to the intellect’s operation and by the nature of the thing higher grades are distinct from lower ones—for example, animal from human being and human being from individuals—therefore a higher grade exists in reality outside the intellect without including the lower one. But precisely because it does not include that lower grade, it is universal, being of itself abstracted from lower things. Therefore nature is abstracted in reality from singularity, and a higher predicate from a lower one.

THE REPLY is that this opinion of Scotus is far removed from Plato’s fiction, since Scotus expressly affirms that these higher and lower grades are distinguished according to their formal characters, yet one cannot exist separately from the other, even by absolute power. Scotus’s subtle point is that, by the nature of the thing and before the intellect’s operation, the formality taken as the concept of the higher grade does not include in its essential concept the formality serving as the lower grade. Scotus never dreamed that it could exist separately from it, as Plato held.

A third argument for the Nominalists’ opinion: the objective concept of a universal is either one thing or many. If many, the intended conclusion follows: a universal word or concept will be only a collective name immediately signifying an aggregate of many things. If it is one, then insofar as it is one it is not something real; rather, insofar as it is one, it is the object of that universal concept. Therefore, insofar as it is the object of that concept, it is not something real.

The major premise is clear, because insofar as it is one it does not exist and cannot exist outside the intellect; yet a real being is one capable of existence.

This is confirmed: if such a universal nature abstracted from many individuals exists, several absurdities follow:

First: All those individuals are that one universal; therefore they are identical with one another. For things identical with a third are identical with one another. But Peter and Paul are identical with a third, namely the human being, which is something real; therefore they are really identical with each other.

Second: Either the whole universal nature descends to each individual, or one part descends to one individual and another part to another. The second cannot be said, for then Peter would be part of a human being, not a whole human being. If the first is said, we admit the mystery of the Trinity among creatures: the one human nature, being one and something real, is communicated wholly to one individual and wholly to another.

Third: Is that human being in the universal corruptible or not? If not, then corruptibility is not its proper attribute, which is false, since every human being is corruptible. If it is corruptible, then it is generable as well; generation and existence can therefore terminate in it, which is to posit Plato’s Ideas.

THE REPLY is that this objective concept is one, not by real unity, but by unity of reason and precision. To the proof it is said that this one thing is something real materially, taken as the subject of unity, but not formally, taken as the very unity of precision and relation of universality. Thus, although it does not exist in reality under that precise state of unity, that nature does exist under another state. This suffices for it to be called a real being and absolutely capable of existence in itself, although not in every state.

To the confirmation, the reply is that the first absurdity does not follow, because the maxim is understood of things identical with a third that is so one that it is not virtually many. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 28, art. 3, ad 1, calls this being identical with a third in reality and account—that is, identical with a third that is one in both reality and account, not virtually many, meaning not only one entitatively but also not multiple in its relations and communication. A universal nature, however, is virtually many, because it is communicable to many; hence the individuals’ identity with it does not entail their identity with one another. —Or, second, all individuals are said to be one in the common nature not by real unity but by unity of likeness and agreement, which the intellect takes as unity. Thus it does not follow that they are one with one another entitatively, but only that they are similar and agree; by reason, however, they are taken as one.

To the second absurdity it is said that the communication of universal nature to singulars is not like the communication of an integral whole to its integral parts, but like that of a predicable whole to subjective parts. In this latter relation there is no division into parts, but a diverse multiplication of the nature in different individuals. In integral division, therefore, no part is equal to the whole; but in the communication of a universal to particulars, each subjective part is equal to the whole with respect to the nature communicated, though not with respect to its extension and multiplicability. This is very far from the mystery of the Trinity, in which a universal thing is not communicated through multiplication of the nature, but through the identity of the same singular nature with three really distinct persons.

To the third absurdity it is said that human being in common is called corruptible and generable with respect to the root and agreement of corruptibility, not with respect to its exercise. For corruptibility belongs to the nature, but is exercised in individuals, just as risibility belongs to it, while the exercise of laughing belongs not to nature in common but to the individual. Thus this is found in all proper attributes: their connection and belonging are with respect to the common nature, but their exercise with respect to individuals.