Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Secunda Pars Artis Logicae

The common understanding and conception of everyone is that by the name “universal” we understand something that bears some relation to many things. It is set against the singular, which cannot be communicated to many. But because something can stand in relation to many things and be disposed toward them in several ways, “universal” can likewise be taken in several senses. All its senses are reduced to three: a universal in signifying, a universal in causing, and a universal in being or predicating.

A universal in signifying is a sign that signifies the universal itself, or can be applied universally to many things. Such are common names or terms, which signify a thing in common and can be applied to many things, as “human being” and “animal.”

A universal in causing is that whose power extends to many effects, whether it is an efficient cause or a cause in another genus, as the heavens or God. Note that causal universality bears upon its effects in such a way that it reaches in them not only universal and common accounts or predicates, but also particular ones. Indeed, the more universal a power is in causing, the more deeply it penetrates its effect and reaches and causes all the particular accounts of that effect, since all of them participate in that common account; thus a power that can act upon that whole account can consequently act upon all the things that participate in it. For example, the heavens, which are the universal cause of these bodies, reach every corporeal account down to individual differences; and God, who is the most universal cause of being insofar as it is being, causes every account that in any way participates in entity. This principle serves many theological difficulties, especially for understanding how, on the part of an inferior cause, nothing is presupposed for acting—whether as to the substance of the work or its mode—that is not anticipated by the superior cause, insofar as it is participated in and descends from that cause.

Finally, a universal in being or predicating is that which bears upon many things, in which it has being and of which it is predicated, as animal is found in all animals and human being in all human beings. A universal taken in this last sense is defined as “one in many and of many.” Or, as Aristotle defines it in Metaphysics VII, ch. 13¹: “A universal is what is naturally apt to be in many.” There St. Thomas notes, lect. 13², that the Philosopher did not say that a universal is what is in many, but what is apt to be in many, because there are many universals that in fact exist only in one singular thing, such as the sun and the moon.

That first definition explains everything that contributes to the account of a universal: namely, its subject, foundation, relation to its term, and proper attribute. The subject and foundation are explained by the word “one,” for it refers to a thing that is one; and it explains unity as separated from many things and communicable to them. The Philosopher's definition expresses this communicability more explicitly, saying “what is apt to be in” many. Unity separated from many and aptitude to be in them are the foundation of the universal relation, just as the power to generate is the foundation of the relation of fatherhood. The relation itself, in which formal universality consists, is explained by its order to its term, namely, “in many”; for these are related as inferiors, which the universal directly regards. It is said to be in many by identity with them, because through communication and contraction to inferiors the universal becomes the same as the singular or inferior. It is said to be “of many” by predication: nothing, however, is predicated of another unless it is the same as it, not different; this explains predicability, which is the attribute of universality.

From what has been said, two things follow. FIRST, we see how to explain the distinction between the two kinds of universal, one physical, the other logical. The metaphysician considers natures chiefly, whereas the logician considers intentions or relations of reason. The nature itself, or the subject abstracted from many things, is therefore called a metaphysical universal, because nature is considered in it directly and chiefly, while abstraction or universality is considered as a condition. Universality itself is a condition required for every science, since no science treats of singulars. A logical universal, by contrast, chiefly regards the intention or form by which something is denominated universal; this is a second intention and a relation of reason. The logician considers this especially, while presupposing nature as that in which universality is founded: for the logician treats of second intentions as founded in first intentions. Thus we understand that the metaphysician and logician treat of the same thing in different ways, as is said in Metaphysics IV, lect. 4³ according to St. Thomas: the metaphysician treats chiefly of nature, the logician of intention.

SECOND, it follows that universality and particularity belong to the account of the state of nature itself, which can be denominated universal or singular. Hence three states are usually assigned to any nature, as is clear from St. Thomas's teaching in ch. 4 of On Being and Essence and Cajetan's commentary there.⁴

The first is the state of nature considered in itself, since in it only those things are considered that constitute the nature and quiddity itself. It is therefore also called the state of indifference, because nature in itself is indifferent to accidental predicates.⁵ It is also called the state of solitude, because nature stands alone, apart from every extrinsic predicate. It is also called “common” negatively, because nature is not understood as multiplied.

The second state is the being that nature has in singular things; this is the state of singularity.

The third, finally, is the being that nature has in the intellect's abstraction. This abstraction may also be called a state of solitude, not in the sense of solitude from every extrinsic predicate, but only of solitude or separation from individuals. Neither of these two states belongs to nature considered in itself, because neither is an essential predicate of nature. For if nature in itself were universal, it could never be singular; and if it were singular in itself, it could never be found as universal. Therefore, in the state of nature considered in itself, every predicate that is not quidditative is denied of it. This is why what appear to be extremes that are contradictory are denied of nature in that first state when the phrase “in itself” is added. For we say that nature in itself is neither one nor many, neither white nor not white; that is, it is not essentially one, not essentially many, but is capable of either. Do not infer from this, however, that two contradictories are verified of nature considered in itself. That is never possible: one is always true and the other false. If you say, “Human being in itself is not white” and “Human being in itself is white,” the second is false and the first true, because the sense is “Human being is not essentially white,” which is true, and “Human being is essentially white,” which is false. Thus this inference is invalid: “In itself, it is not white; therefore, in itself, it is nonwhite,” because the supposition changes on account of the phrase “in itself.”

From one principle there have flowed in this matter TWO EXTREME OPINIONS.

For there was an ancient opinion of Heraclitus and Cratylus around the time of Socrates, as Aristotle reports in Metaphysics I¹, lecture 10, according to St. Thomas²: they said that there can be no science of sensible things, because these are in continuous flux and motion. Hence Cratylus reached such madness (as Aristotle says in Metaphysics IV³, and St. Thomas there, lecture 12⁴) that he thought one ought to say nothing, since the truth of a thing passed away before a speech could be completed. Plato took occasion from this opinion to posit natures separate from singular things, which he called Ideas: seeing that singulars are in continuous flux and motion, he denied (rightly) that firm and certain science can be had of them. But wishing to avoid Cratylus’s madness—that there be no science or truth—he invented a nature existing apart from singulars, which would exist in reality without singularity, so that science could be predicated of it.

On the other extreme, the Nominalists, agreeing with Plato and Cratylus that singulars are not objects of certain truth because of their contingency and perpetual motion, but denying against Plato that natures exist separate from singulars, said that only significant words remain as universals, without the things signified. St. Anselm gravely warns that this opinion must be wholly avoided in his book On the Incarnation of the Word, ch. 2⁵: “Since all must be cautioned to approach questions of Sacred Scripture with the greatest care, those dialecticians of our time—indeed, heretics in dialectic—must certainly be cautioned, for they think universals are nothing but a breath of the voice, etc.”

I SAY, THEREFORE, FIRST: To universal words and concepts there truly and simply corresponds as object some entity or nature, which is called universal—not one existing in reality under that state of universality and abstraction, but one which, through the intellect’s abstraction, so attains the nature as object that it does not attain singularity, or so attains higher predicates that it does not attain lower ones.

No falsity is found on the intellect’s part in this abstraction, just as sight is not false because it attains the color in an apple without attaining its taste—not by separating the color in reality from the taste, but by not joining both in cognition. So the intellect apprehends a human being without singularity, although in reality it is not without it.

The Philosopher teaches this conclusion⁶, continually attacking Plato’s opinion and consequently condemning that of the Nominalists. See especially St. Thomas, Metaphysics I, lecture 10⁷, where he says of Plato’s opinion: “Anyone who carefully considers Plato’s arguments will see that he erred in his position because he believed that the mode of a thing’s being when understood is the same as the mode in which the thing exists. Thus, because he found that our intellect understands abstract things in two ways—first, universals abstracted from singulars, and second, mathematics abstracted from sensibles—he posited a corresponding abstraction in the essences of things for both kinds of intellectual abstraction. Hence he posited both mathematical objects and species as separate. This is not necessary. For although the intellect understands things by being made like them through the intelligible species by which it is actualized, that species need not exist in the intellect in the same mode in which it exists in the thing understood; for whatever is in something is there according to the mode of that in which it is. Therefore, because the nature of the intellect differs from the nature of the thing understood, the mode by which the intellect understands and the mode by which the thing exists must differ.” Thus far St. Thomas. See also ch. 4 of On Being and Essence⁸, and opuscula 55 and 56⁹, and Summa theologiae I, q. 15, art. 1.

From this passage and St. Thomas’s words we gather that Plato’s and the Nominalists’ opinion must be rejected, because they did not distinguish the mode of being from the mode of knowing. If a thing existed in reality in the same mode in which it is known abstracted from singulars, then either that thing existing in this mode would be produced by God or it would not. If it were not produced by God, it would be nothing or would be God himself, who is supremely singular. If it were produced by God, then it would be produced by some singular action—for from God, who is singular, only a singular action can proceed—and so it would have a singular term or effect. Therefore this mode of universality can in no way exist in things themselves; it results solely from the mode of knowing a nature without singularity.

This also refutes the Nominalists’ opinion that denies anything real corresponds to a concept abstracting in this way, on the ground that this mode of abstraction is not found in the thing. Whenever several things are joined in something in reality, the intellect need not always apprehend them together; it can attain one without the other. What is apprehended with the other removed is nevertheless a true and proper being, although it does not exist in reality without the other, as is clear from the example above: sight attains the apple’s true and real color, though not its taste. Therefore to apprehend one thing and omit another is not to form a false concept, but an inadequate one. Something therefore corresponds to it on the side of the known object, although not with every mode in which it is found in reality; for not everything with which it is joined is understood.

This is clearer in the intellect’s composition and division. When I affirm of a subject something that belongs to it, without affirming something else joined to it—as when I say “A human being is an animal,” without affirming that the human being is a body, or “God is merciful,” or “an apple is colored,” and the like—the affirmation is either true or false. It cannot be false, since something is affirmed that is not repugnant to the subject but belongs to it. If it is true, then something on the side of reality corresponds to that concept; for if nothing corresponded to it, it could not be true. Thus something on the side of the object can correspond to an inadequate and precise concept, although it is not precise in reality but exists together with something else. In this way the abstraction of the universal is understood very well through the distinction between an adequate and inadequate concept: it occurs when the whole that is in the object—both nature and singularity—is not conceived, but one aspect, namely nature, is attained inadequately while the other, namely singularity, is omitted.

BUT THE NOMINALISTS OBJECT that a universal concept signifying, for example, a human being or an animal is like a collective name: it signifies not one thing but a collection, namely all human beings or everything to which the character of human being belongs. Thus when I say “A human being is an animal,” the sense is “Everything that is a human being, or all human beings, are animals.” For this reason some seem to hold, regarding the analogous concept of being, that what corresponds to it is the whole collection of beings under a certain confusion.

This evasion is excluded for two reasons. First, when we place a universal name on the predicate side, as when we say “Peter is a human being,” the sense would be that Peter is all human beings or everything that is a human being, which is plainly false. Second, if a common term is placed on the subject side without distribution, as in “A human being runs,” the sense would be that all human beings or everything that is a human being runs; and thus all indefinite propositions would be false. The Catholic proposition “The divine essence does not beget” would likewise be made false, because its sense would be “Everything that is the divine essence does not beget,” which is plainly false, since the Father is something that is the divine essence and begets.

Therefore a universal name can in no way be a collective name; it signifies one thing, though abstracted from singularity. What is added about the concept of being—how it abstracts from or includes inferiors—will be discussed below, q. 14. It must nevertheless remain settled that the name “being” is not collective, because it signifies not an aggregation of all inferiors but an agreement in an analogous character. Yet because this is not simply one but only proportionally one, it does not simply abstract from inferiors, but only in a qualified way; hence it is said to include them implicitly and confusedly, not explicitly, as will be shown there.

I SAY, SECOND: The universal taken as substrate or materially can be something real—that is, a nature that can be found in reality—although not with the state of universality. Taken formally, that is, as universality and abstraction, it is found only in cognition.

This is clear from what has been said. See the Philosopher in the Categories, chapter on Substance¹⁰, where he says that secondary substances, which are genera and species, subsist in primary substances; and in Metaphysics VII, ch. 13¹¹, where St. Thomas, lecture 13¹², says: “The universal can be taken in two ways. In one way, for the nature itself to which the intellect attributes the intention of universality; in this way universals, such as genera and species, signify the substances of things and are predicated in answer to what. For ‘animal’ signifies the substance of that of which it is predicated, and so does ‘human being.’ In another way, the universal can be taken insofar as it is universal, and insofar as the predicated nature is subject to the intention of universality—that is, insofar as animal or human being is considered as one in many. In this way the Platonists held that animal and human being, in their universality, are substances, etc.” Thus St. Thomas. As he shows there through several arguments, universality is not a substance or anything real, but an accident of reason pertaining to the state of the thing known, which it acquires by being known with a certain precision, abstracted from individuation. For the nature which does not exist in reality without individuating conditions is left bare of them in intellectual cognition. This pertains to the state of the nature in cognition, since the same nature, placed outside cognition in reality, loses that mode of being universal while retaining its quiddity.

THE ARGUMENTS ARE ANSWERED.

Plato’s opinion was based almost entirely on the perpetuity of science and of the truths belonging to sciences, which are necessary and eternal truths. These are not found in singulars, since singulars are corruptible and contingent. Therefore they are found outside singulars, or else the objects known would not be real and true but inventions of the intellect.

Likewise, there are exemplary causes from which singulars receive their essence: Peter is human by participation in humanity and an animal by participation in animality. Therefore there is a separate human being and animal from which these participations derive.

THE REPLY is that the objects of sciences and the truths attained by them are called perpetual and eternal, not on account of some eternal existence they really possess in a subject outside the divine intellect, but objectively and negatively: that is, because the connection of essential truths, which are the objects, does not depend on any temporal foundation or existence brought about in time, but always has truth in itself, attainable by an intellect, however eternal that intellect may be, and is in no way founded on a free or contingent character. Therefore the truth attained by science need not exist subjectively outside singulars; it need only be attained objectively without them.

To the point about exemplary causes, the reply is that there are indeed exemplary causes by participation in which created things have their natures, but these exemplary causes are divine Ideas, not created natures separate from singulars.

A second argument: Assuming the opinion of Scotus, to be treated below¹³, that prior to the intellect’s operation and by the nature of the thing higher grades are distinct from lower ones—for example, animal from human being and human being from individuals—therefore a higher grade exists in reality outside the intellect without including the lower one. But precisely because it does not include that lower grade, it is universal, being of itself abstracted from lower things. Therefore nature is abstracted in reality from singularity, and a higher predicate from a lower one.

THE REPLY is that this opinion of Scotus is far removed from Plato’s fiction, since Scotus expressly affirms that these higher and lower grades are distinguished according to their formal characters, yet one cannot exist separately from the other, even by absolute power. Scotus’s subtle point is that, by the nature of the thing and before the intellect’s operation, the formality taken as the concept of the higher grade does not include in its essential concept the formality serving as the lower grade. Scotus never dreamed that it could exist separately from it, as Plato held.

A third argument for the Nominalists’ opinion: the objective concept of a universal is either one thing or many. If many, the intended conclusion follows: a universal word or concept will be only a collective name immediately signifying an aggregate of many things. If it is one, then insofar as it is one it is not something real; rather, insofar as it is one, it is the object of that universal concept. Therefore, insofar as it is the object of that concept, it is not something real.

The major premise is clear, because insofar as it is one it does not exist and cannot exist outside the intellect; yet a real being is one capable of existence.

This is confirmed: if such a universal nature abstracted from many individuals exists, several absurdities follow:

First: All those individuals are that one universal; therefore they are identical with one another. For things identical with a third are identical with one another. But Peter and Paul are identical with a third, namely the human being, which is something real; therefore they are really identical with each other.

Second: Either the whole universal nature descends to each individual, or one part descends to one individual and another part to another. The second cannot be said, for then Peter would be part of a human being, not a whole human being. If the first is said, we admit the mystery of the Trinity among creatures: the one human nature, being one and something real, is communicated wholly to one individual and wholly to another.

Third: Is that human being in the universal corruptible or not? If not, then corruptibility is not its proper attribute, which is false, since every human being is corruptible. If it is corruptible, then it is generable as well; generation and existence can therefore terminate in it, which is to posit Plato’s Ideas.

THE REPLY is that this objective concept is one, not by real unity, but by unity of reason and precision. To the proof it is said that this one thing is something real materially, taken as the subject of unity, but not formally, taken as the very unity of precision and relation of universality. Thus, although it does not exist in reality under that precise state of unity, that nature does exist under another state. This suffices for it to be called a real being and absolutely capable of existence in itself, although not in every state.

To the confirmation, the reply is that the first absurdity does not follow, because the maxim is understood of things identical with a third that is so one that it is not virtually many. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 28, art. 3, ad 1, calls this being identical with a third in reality and account—that is, identical with a third that is one in both reality and account, not virtually many, meaning not only one entitatively but also not multiple in its relations and communication. A universal nature, however, is virtually many, because it is communicable to many; hence the individuals’ identity with it does not entail their identity with one another. —Or, second, all individuals are said to be one in the common nature not by real unity but by unity of likeness and agreement, which the intellect takes as unity. Thus it does not follow that they are one with one another entitatively, but only that they are similar and agree; by reason, however, they are taken as one.

To the second absurdity it is said that the communication of universal nature to singulars is not like the communication of an integral whole to its integral parts, but like that of a predicable whole to subjective parts. In this latter relation there is no division into parts, but a diverse multiplication of the nature in different individuals. In integral division, therefore, no part is equal to the whole; but in the communication of a universal to particulars, each subjective part is equal to the whole with respect to the nature communicated, though not with respect to its extension and multiplicability. This is very far from the mystery of the Trinity, in which a universal thing is not communicated through multiplication of the nature, but through the identity of the same singular nature with three really distinct persons.

To the third absurdity it is said that human being in common is called corruptible and generable with respect to the root and agreement of corruptibility, not with respect to its exercise. For corruptibility belongs to the nature, but is exercised in individuals, just as risibility belongs to it, while the exercise of laughing belongs not to nature in common but to the individual. Thus this is found in all proper attributes: their connection and belonging are with respect to the common nature, but their exercise with respect to individuals.

Because the universal, as was said in art. 1, is defined as what is one in many, or apt to be in many, it is necessary to explain how unity belongs to it and how aptitude to be in many belongs to it. In this article we shall treat unity, and in the next, aptitude.

Two things, then, must be noted for the present difficulty: First, what we understand by the term “formal unity.” Second, wherein lies the point of difficulty and controversy between the school of St. Thomas and that of Scotus concerning the distinction of this formal unity from individual unity according to the nature of the thing.

Generally speaking, unity formally signifies an absence of division, and denotes something positive on the side of entity and something negative on the formal side, which it adds to entity, as may be gathered from St. Thomas, Ia, q. 9, art. 2, ad 2; and in I, dist. 19, q. 4, art. 1, ad 2¹, and dist. 24, q. 1, art. 3². Hence a different mode of unity usually results from a different way of denying division. For there to result, however, not merely a different mode of unity but an absolutely different unity, not only must the mode of denying division vary, but the very nature of the positive entity must also be made different, since absolute diversity of unity produces multitude: for several unities are a multitude. Where there is no multitude, however, there is no absolutely different unity, although there may be a different respect in which division is denied. For multitude is composed not of negations but of entities as regards the positive element included in unity, as St. Thomas teaches in the cited place, q. 11 of the First Part.

When, therefore, we here distinguish in the same thing formal, individual, and universal unity, and formal unity is in turn distinguished into generic and specific, we are not distinguishing several unities absolutely and on the side of positive entity, as though they constituted some multitude; we are distinguishing only different respects in which division is denied.

For when formal principles, which constitute quiddity, and material principles, which pertain to individuation, concur in some thing, if the formal principles are undivided—that is, division does not occur according to the formal principles—then the respect of lacking division, insofar as it is on the side of such principles, is called formal unity. This can still vary according to variation in the formal principles, for some formal principles are generic and others specific. If the lack of division is according to generic principles alone, it is called generic formal unity; if the lack of division is according to specific principles, it is called specific formal unity.

When, however, there is a lack of division not only on the side of formal principles but also on the side of material principles, which pertain to individuation, then that unity is numerical or individual. And since quiddity and individuation concur together in one individual, it is not incompatible for formal unity also to be found conjoined with the unity of individuation. But if it is separated by the intellect from all individuation, and that formal unity then remains as abstracted, it is called universal unity or unity of abstraction.

Second, we must note that the point of controversy and difficulty between the school of St. Thomas and that of Scotus in this matter does not consist in formal unity's being found in the thing so distinct from singular unity that it either exists separated from it (for that would be to posit Plato's Ideas), or is positively found common to numerical unities—for Scotus never said this. His view consists only in two claims:

First, that there is found on the part of the thing a true and proper unity accompanying the nature considered in itself, which is neither numerical nor universal, but less than numerical, because it is not undivided to the same degree as numerical unity. Hence this unity, since it belongs to nature considered in itself, is found in every state. In the state of abstraction it remains conjoined with universal unity; in the state of singularity it remains conjoined with numerical unity. Nevertheless, it is a true and proper unity even when considered in itself, and not merely by reason of the numerical unity or abstraction conjoined to it. Rather, in each individual there is numerical unity and, in addition, formal unity; and in each universal there is that same formal unity together with unity of abstraction.

Second, this formal unity, which belongs to nature in itself, can be called universal negatively, that is, non-singular, because of itself that nature, and consequently its unity, is neither singular nor positively universal, as St. Thomas also holds in ch. 4 of On Being and Essence³. For the nature's quiddity-predicates and proper attributes, one of which is unity, belong to it only in that state. See Scotus, II, dist. 3, q. 1, § But against and § To the question.

This formal unity is said to belong by the nature of the thing because it follows upon the principles of the nature in itself, and not through the intellect's contribution.

Some, however, wrongly interpreting Scotus, said that this unity belongs to nature in the state of isolation and in itself in such a way that it does not descend to individuals nor occur in them, but that, once that state of isolation is excluded, this unity vanishes. Others, by contrast, wished this formal unity to be found in singulars in such a way that it retains there something of universality, at least imperfectly and incipiently, insofar as it exists actually in many, though not according to an aptitude by which it can be predicated of many. On this, see the Coimbra commentators, q. 4, On the Universal, art. 3.

NEVERTHELESS, FOR THE RESOLUTION I SAY FIRST: No unity belongs to nature in itself that is positively and absolutely a unity less than numerical unity, and that is found on the part of the thing conjoined with numerical unity; rather, only negative formal unity belongs to it, that is, a negation of division according to formal principles.

Thus, in the thing there is found the agreement and likeness of one nature with another in quiddity-predicates, which the intellect takes up under the aspect of unity; and consequently, in each nature there is found a negation of division according to formal principles. Nearly the whole equivocation in this matter lies here: it is thought that the negation of division occurs only through true and positive unity, although it can also occur through agreement alone. For things that agree are not divided by virtue of the principles according to which they agree. This is taken from Cajetan, ch. 4 of On Being and Essence, q. 6. There⁴ St. Thomas himself teaches this, saying that nature in itself is neither one nor many. “If it is asked,” he says, “whether this nature can be called one or many, neither should be granted, because either is outside the concept of humanity, and either can accrue to it. For if plurality were of its nature, it could never be one, although it is one insofar as it is in Socrates. Likewise, if unity were included in its understanding and nature, then the nature of Socrates and Plato would be one and the same and could not be multiplied in many.” So St. Thomas.

From his words is taken the BASIS of this conclusion: Positive unity is absolutely and simply unity when it not only denies division on one side, but leaves the subject or entity undivided on every side and determinately reduced to unity. For if it leaves room on some side for division or plurality, it is one only in a qualified respect, not simply. To remove unity simply, it suffices that division or plurality has not been removed on some side. But nature considered in itself does not have division removed on every side, nor does it remove all principles of plurality. Therefore it does not have positive and simple formal unity.

The minor premise is proved: nature considered in itself is indifferent to plurality or unity and claims determinately neither for itself, as St. Thomas's reasoning proves. For if it had plurality, it could never be one; and if it had unity, it could never be multiplied, because what belongs to nature under that state belongs to it essentially: it is the only state in which quiddity-predicates are considered, and whatever belongs there belongs quidditatively. Therefore, in that state nature is indifferent to being determinately one or determinately many, since by its quiddity it is incompatible with neither. Therefore it does not yet have a state in which it removes and is incompatible with every principle of multiplication and division; therefore it does not yet have positive unity.

Nor is it an objection that it has a negation of division according to formal principles, because this proves only that it has negative unity. For this reason St. Thomas says in Opusculum 42, ch. 7⁵, that “in nature itself, taken absolutely, there is a certain unity, since its definition is one.” This unity is not simple and positive unity, but unity as regards the negation of division according to formal principles, which pertain only to the definition. But concerning positive and simple unity, St. Thomas adds there what he had said in the cited place of On Being and Essence: “no unity, nor even plurality, belongs to the understanding of nature taken absolutely, because either can accrue to it.” This is further shown because that negation of division according to formal principles affects nature considered in itself in such a way that, when nature is multiplied in the state of individuation, the negation itself is also multiplied and does not remain one in all individuals. This is a sign that it did not make nature one simply, since the negation of formal division is found there in such a way that there is still indifference as to whether that very negation is multiplied or remains one. But how can a negation of indivision that is itself not yet one make nature simply one? Nature therefore does not have every kind of unity on the side of the subject until such a nature is found in some state, either of singularity or of universality.

I SAY SECOND: Although nature in itself is negatively common, and the negation of formal division that belongs to it is also negatively common, that is, non-singular, nevertheless this unity, whether positively or negatively common, is never found absolutely and actually in the thing outside the intellect.

THE REASON FOR THE CONCLUSION IS that, by the very fact that nature is posited outside the intellect, it takes on the state of singularity, since nature cannot be found without singularity; otherwise a Platonic nature would be posited outside the intellect. But when singularity is posited, not only is positive commonality removed, which nature acquires in the intellect (this Scotus too admits), but negative commonality is removed as well. First, because one negation does not remain in those singularized natures. For just as the specific nature itself is multiplied, so too is the negation of formal indivision that accompanies nature. Second, because to be negatively common is not to be divided in many. But once singularity is posited, it remains divided in many, since nature is truly and positively multiplied; this is to have the opposite of that negation by which it is negatively common, namely, not divided. Therefore it does not remain negatively common—just as, once light is posited, the air does not remain negatively dark, because the very illumination expels the absence of light.

YOU WILL SAY: That singular nature outside the intellect still does not have that multiplication of itself, but from the added state of singularity. Therefore, in itself, that nature always remains negatively common, and formal unity belongs to it as negatively common, insofar as it is of itself, notwithstanding the multiplication.

We answer that it does not suffice for a nature not to have some form or accidental predicate of itself in order to say simply that it does not have it, when in fact it belongs to it absolutely, even if it does not belong to it through what is proper and intrinsic to it. For whiteness does not belong to man through what is proper to him, nor luminosity to air; yet when a man is white and air is illuminated, we cannot say that he or it is absolutely not such, on the ground that it does not have this intrinsically. So, although nature in itself is not multiplied and divided, and consequently is negatively common, that is, non-singular, nevertheless, if it is actually singularized and multiplied, it no longer remains negatively common, although by what is proper to it it is neither common nor singular—and this is always the case for it. Thus it must never be granted absolutely that nature in itself is negatively common in the thing; rather, it does not have singularity and multiplication in the thing through what is proper and essential to it—and this is true—although absolutely it does have them. For a thing to be denominated negatively common in the thing, it does not suffice that it not be singular of itself, where “of itself” pertains to its mode of not being; it must lack singularity itself.

BUT YOU WILL OBJECT, because St. Thomas says in ch. 4 of On Being and Essence⁶ that nature in itself is what is predicated of individuals; but this is proper to universality. Therefore nature in itself is universal.

We answer that, as Cajetan rightly observes there in the third doubt, in nature there is a difference between the thing that is predicated and the condition or state by which it is predicated. The thing that is predicated is nature in itself, for its quiddity is communicated to its inferiors. But the condition or state by which it is communicated is superiority; this does not belong to nature in itself. That it is the thing predicated of singulars is what belongs to nature in itself; St. Thomas says no more than this.

I SAY, FINALLY: Once the intellect has abstracted from singulars, nature and its formal unity have the character of determinate and positive unity, insofar as it is made a unity common to many—which is unity of abstraction—and, in like manner, when contracted to singulars it is made one by numerical unity. Hence formal unity is never found simply and positively unless it is unity of universality or singularity.

This conclusion is established by what has been said. Concerning this unity, St. Thomas says in the cited Opusculum 42, ch. 7⁷, that “there is another unity of nature, which it has from the intellect, in which all supposits agree.” He therefore holds that the nature to which formal unity belongs from the intellect receives determinate unity of reason. Likewise, in Opusculum 55⁸ St. Thomas says that “that nature which is universal insofar as it is in the soul is one in number,” that is, it is conceived under the aspect of positive unity, as though it were numerically one. And in Opusculum 29⁹ he says that “unity of reason remains to nature in its communication”; therefore it is not a unity on the part of the thing.

AND THE REASON is clear: nature conceived in this way represents only that in which all inferiors agree, as though it were one nature separated from them all. But if this nature existed on the part of the thing as it is conceived—just as Plato said it did—it would have positive unity on the part of the thing. Therefore it has that unity in the intellect, since it is conceived under unity. This unity is attributed to the nature known, although it has its foundation in the thing itself, because the inferiors resemble and agree in some one aspect. Nevertheless, that common aspect is made one “insofar as it has a uniform character in relation to all the individuals outside the soul,”¹⁰ and by reason of this uniformity “many men are one man,”¹¹ as St. Thomas says. Hence this concept, being thus uniform, does not represent all individuals immediately and formally; rather, it directly represents one aspect in which they agree, and represents the inferiors themselves materially and mediately, insofar as they are those to which that aspect belongs and in which it is multiplied, the unity of abstraction having been dissolved.

From this you must not mistakenly infer that some explain the unity of the universal as nothing other than the essence of many, or the many themselves conceived in relation to some common operation, attribute, or accident. This is not true. For if the unity of common nature were nothing other than several things ordered to one operation, I ask: how are that operation, accident, or attribute one? If they are one only through likeness, they are just as much many as the things of which they are attributes, for things or natures too are alike. But if on account of this likeness the intellect takes the operation or attribute as one, why does it not do the same with nature itself, which has that same likeness?

THE ARGUMENTS ARE ANSWERED.

First, it is argued by the common argument: Peter and Paul are not formally distinct on the part of the thing as Peter is distinct from a horse; therefore they are formally one on the part of the thing. This is not numerical unity, because they are not one in numerical unity but distinct. Therefore there is on the part of the thing a formal unity distinct from numerical unity.

It is confirmed: as many ways as one of a pair of opposites is said, so many ways is the other said. But there is a formal distinction on the part of the thing, different from numerical distinction, just as man and horse are formally or specifically distinct in the thing. Therefore there is also in the thing a formal unity distinct from numerical unity.

WE ANSWER that the argument proves Peter and Paul have formal unity on the part of the thing fundamentally and as regards negative unity, but not formally and according to positive unity. We call agreement or likeness fundamental unity, for this is found on the part of the thing, since Peter and Paul are alike in nature. But this agreement is not unity, since agreement rather presupposes distinction between the terms. Likewise, when we say that there is a formal negative unity, we do not mean that the same negation is in two individuals, since their subjects are different and consequently there are two negations; rather, each negation has one effect, namely that the nature is not divided according to formal principles. In the same way, two individuals of different species are less one than individuals of the same species—that is, they agree and resemble one another less—not that either is more or less one by a real and positive unity.

To the confirmation we answer similarly: it proves that just as there is a formal distinction in the thing, so there is a formal unity in the thing. But in the thing it is always conjoined with numerical unity, not apart from it. It suffices, however, that there be in the thing a negative or fundamental unity, which is only agreement and likeness, for this too is opposed to formal division.

Second, it is argued: Nature in itself, as distinguished from individuation, is a true entity; therefore it has a true and formal unity, which is a property of being. Agreement or likeness does not suffice, since a property of being is not agreement or likeness but unity. Therefore unity belongs to nature in itself. It is clear that numerical unity does not belong to it; therefore formal or specific unity does.

It is confirmed: likeness and agreement themselves are relations founded upon unity, not upon the unity of agreement and likeness, for then agreement would be founded upon agreement. Therefore they are founded upon true and proper unity. Not numerical unity, since this is not found between Peter and Paul; therefore they are founded upon formal unity.

WE ANSWER that unity is found in nature in the same way as nature itself is found. For if nature is considered without any determinate state, but only according to its essential principles, it is not considered as having unity determinately and positively, but only negatively, that is, it is not different according to those formal principles. In the thing, however, because it has a singular state, it also has determinate positive unity—not a unity by which several singularized natures are said to be one, but one by which each nature has its own unity, and, in the specific and formal aspect, agreement and a negation of division according to those same formal principles.

But if you insist: In nature in itself there is positive entity, and there is a negation of division with respect to formal principles; therefore there is full and perfect unity, since this consists in nothing other than entity together with a negation of division.

We answer that in such a nature there is not a negation of division absolutely and determinately, such that the negation of division is by the positing of unity—for in this way it is called an absolute negation of division—but only under that reduplication, “insofar as it is according to the formal principles”: that is, it is not divided on that side, although it does not yet positively have unity. And because this leaves it indifferent to having plurality or unity absolutely and according to material principles, it does not remain perfectly and simply one, but only negatively, that is, under the reduplication just described. In this way some unity, at least negative unity, always follows upon being in whatever state.

To the confirmation we answer that likeness and agreement, as relations, are founded upon agreement and likeness as their foundation. Thus agreement is not founded upon agreement, but the relation of agreement is founded upon unity itself, that is, upon the very uniformity of the agreement, which is the foundation of such a relation. It is not founded upon unity simply, for this is rather incompatible with agreement, which is a conformity of many.

Third, it is argued: Formal unity is that by which something is said to be formally one, or one in species. But an individual without another's company is not said to be one in species; for we do not admit that Peter is one in species unless we add “Peter together with Paul or Francis.” Therefore formal unity is not multiplied in each individual, but makes several individuals one with one another. Hence St. Thomas, IIIa, q. 2, art. 5, ad 2, says that human nature does not have the character of a species insofar as it is in one individual, but insofar as it is abstracted from every individual or insofar as it is in all. Therefore St. Thomas holds that the unity of the species is found in all individuals, and not in each separately.

WE ANSWER: I distinguish the minor: An individual without another's company is not said to be one in species with respect to likeness and agreement, I grant; with respect to indivision and specific unity, I deny. For the nature that is in one individual, even insofar as it is in that individual, has a negation of specific division according to formal principles. But without the company of another individual it does not have agreement and likeness with another individual. Thus the formal unity found in each individual is said to make several individuals one with one another because it makes them agree in one thing, or have likeness and agreement in nature.

To the passage of St. Thomas we answer that human nature has the character of a species insofar as it is in all individuals in the way in which the universal is said to be in many: either fundamentally, because one nature is abstracted from many, in which it is found one not through identity and unity simply, but through agreement and likeness; or because it is in many through predication and aptitude to be in them. But this it has through the intellect, and not in the thing through a unity common to many.

Finally, it is argued: Nature in the state of isolation has everything required for it to be free of singularity, since it is neither contracted nor determined nor, in itself, incommunicable. Therefore in itself it is communicable, not singular and contractible; therefore the unity it has is a unity common to many.

WE ANSWER that, once that reduplication “in itself” is posited, one cannot infer from a negative to an affirmative by changing the predicate from finite to infinite; nor can one infer from the absolute negation of one to the positing of the other. Thus this inference is invalid: Nature in itself is neither singular nor determined nor incommunicable; therefore in itself it is communicable or universal, etc. For in itself it is neither one nor the other, but capable of either. It would be a contradiction, however, to say: Man in itself is not communicable; man in itself is communicable. But the second proposition is false, while the first negative proposition is true; from the removal of one, the positing of the other follows, provided the same reduplication or reference of the particle “in itself” is preserved throughout. Nevertheless, affirmative statements must never be made determinately of that nature in itself, so as to say that it is communicable or that in itself it is incommunicable; rather, the negative is always true: in itself and essentially, it is neither one nor the other.

The controversy in this question is almost the same as in the preceding one. For those who admit a formal unity common by nature of the thing likewise admit, by nature of the thing, that indifference and aptitude for many belong to it.

Moreover, the authors who hold this assertion labor considerably to free this aptitude and indifference of unity from the universality posited by Plato. Scotus, in Sentences II, dist. 3, q. 1, § Ad quaestionem and § Sed contra, only admits that nature in the state or priority in which it is considered in itself has unity, neither singularized nor universalized, but indifferent to either. This indifference therefore does not suffice for universality in act, because it is indifferent to having it; it does not have that universality by which it is indifferent to predication and existence in many. Others think that in nature itself, considered in itself, there is truly a unity of precision from its inferiors, and consequently a proximate aptitude for existing in many singulars, on the assumption that there is an actual distinction between higher and lower grades, which we discuss in the next article, art. 6. Yet they do not say that universality is found in the thing, because this indifference does not belong to nature as an intrinsic predicate, but by reason of that state of solitude, which is dissolved by descending to individuals. On this see Fonseca, Metaphysics V, chapter 28, q. 5, section 3, and Suárez, Metaphysical Disputations 5, section 2, no. 9 at the end, although he rejects this view. See others in the Coimbra commentators, q. 4, On Universals, art. 3, section 2. Still others, finally, have said even worse that aptitude for many is found even in individuals, but by way of act, not potency. For they think that contracted and singular nature, insofar as it is nature, remains apt for many, although this aptitude is impeded by the singular difference from being predicated of others, just as prime matter, when under one form, retains an aptitude for having another, although impeded while it is under the first form. They say that nature contracted in this way is an actual, not potential, universal in many—that is, it has the act of existing in many, not a potency made precise from them. Against them see the Coimbra commentators, q. 4, On Universals, art. 4.

For the solution, however, we should note that by “aptitude” or “indifferent potency for many” we do not here mean a positive potency for acting on or receiving something, since the universal we are now discussing does not regard its inferiors as effects: it is not a universal in causing. Rather, we mean a potency in the sense of capacity or non-repugnance for being multiplied in many and existing in them by identity and, consequently, by predication, insofar as universal and particular, higher and lower, signify a certain whole: the universal as indeterminate and abstract, the particular as determinate and contracted. Because the indeterminate can become determinate, it is said to have an aptitude to be in it and be predicated of it.

This aptitude can indeed be considered formally and positively, insofar as it regards inferiors, or fundamentally, as the very capacity or non-repugnance to regard inferiors and descend to them. For that regard is grounded in this non-repugnance. When taken positively, or by way of a relation, it is the formal intention itself, or universality in act. Scotus also denied that this is given in the thing, admitting only a negative community by nature of the thing, which is nothing other than nature's not being singular of itself.

Hence the POINT OF THE DIFFICULTY here is whether, by reason of this negative community, there is in nature taken in itself some non-repugnance or capacity to be in many and be predicated of them.

We do not here distinguish aptitude for being in many from aptitude for being predicated of many. Although universality and predicability are distinct relations (for predicability is a property of universality, as will be said below¹), the capacity or non-repugnance is the same for being in many and for being predicated of many, because these two—being and being predicated—are coordinated so essentially that when one is posited the other follows. When two acts are ordered essentially, the aptitude or non-repugnance for one and the other is the same. Thus the capacity or non-repugnance of matter grounds both the form's being united to matter and matter's receiving being from that form.

LET THERE BE ONE CONCLUSION, THEN: This aptitude or non-repugnance, which is the proximate foundation of universality, is in no way found in nature considered in itself, nor as contracted in individuals, but in nature abstracted and made precise by the intellect. Thus this non-repugnance for being in many follows nature by reason of its state, not by reason of its quiddity.

This conclusion belongs to St. Thomas and is common among Thomists. See Cajetan, chapter 4 of On Being and Essence, q. 7. It is drawn from St. Thomas in opusc. 56², where he says: “The aptitude for being in many is not of the essence of human being, for then the human being who is in Socrates would be apt to be participated in by many, which is impossible.” And in chapter 4 of On Being and Essence³: “It cannot,” he says, “be said that the character of universal belongs to nature so taken” (namely, in itself), “because unity and community belong to the character of universal. Neither of these belongs to human nature according to its absolute consideration. For if community were included in the understanding of human being, wherever humanity were found, community would be found. It remains, therefore, that the character of species accrues to human nature according to the being it has in the intellect, etc.” St. Thomas goes on to show how nature has unity in the intellect because it has a uniform character with respect to all the individuals outside the soul, insofar as it is an image of them.

AND THE one effective argument for the conclusion is drawn from this: this aptitude, which is the proximate foundation of universality, is not merely negative community, or the negation of having singularity; rather, it is a capacity or non-repugnance for one nature, existing as one, to be multiplied in many. Therefore, in a state in which nature is neither one nor many, or in a state in which it is contracted to individuation, it does not have a capacity for unity's multiplication. In the state of singularity it is repugnant to this multiplication. In the state of solitude, or of nature considered in itself, it does not yet have a unity that can be multiplied into many, but only quidditative predicates, among which this capacity or non-repugnance of unity for multiplication cannot be counted. Otherwise, wherever nature existed, this capacity would belong to it, which is plainly false, since in the thing itself it is incapable of existing in many.

It is not enough to say that, absolutely speaking, nature is incapable in the thing itself, but not incapable by virtue of its essential principles. This is not enough, I say, because although nature considered in itself is not incapable either of existing in many or of singularity in one, one cannot say that it has there a capacity of unity for many of the kind required to ground universality. That capacity is absolute, not merely a matter of its not being incapable in some respect. A stone, likewise, is simply incapable of understanding and consequently has no foundation of intellectuality, although merely insofar as it is a substance it is not incapable of intellectuality. Thus it is one thing to say that nature considered in itself is not incapable of unity for many, and another to say that it is determinately and positively capable of this in itself and has this non-repugnance, when it does not yet have the unity itself that can be multiplied in many.

This is confirmed because nature considered in itself and in singulars is not capable of a positive intention and relation to many; therefore neither is it capable of the proximate foundation of this relation, such as the aptitude of unity for many. Thus this aptitude is given neither in nature considered in itself nor in individuals. It must instead be said that this aptitude necessarily presupposes a unity capable of multiplication in many. Hence, so long as such a unity is not found in nature, neither is the aptitude found. This unity, however, is only abstract unity, not real unity or the unity of nature considered in itself.

YOU WILL SAY: The foundation St. Thomas gives is not sound: things that belong to a thing in itself do not always belong to it. A continuum is divisible into parts in itself, yet cannot be divided in the heavens. Every quantity is divisible to infinity in itself, yet a quantity in a natural thing cannot be divided in this way.

THE REPLY is that these are said to belong in themselves not positively and absolutely, but negatively: that is, they are not repugnant, and they belong only for some state, not actually in every state. In the same way, insofar as its essential principles are concerned, nature considered in itself is not repugnant to having universality or particularity. If, however, a capacity to be predicated of one by many belonged to it positively and absolutely in itself, it would belong to it in every state. St. Thomas's argument effectively proves this.

THE ARGUMENTS ARE ANSWERED.

Several arguments that are brought forward for Scotus's view, or rather attributed to him, rest on the equivocation resolved in the preceding article: the move from a negative to an affirmative by means of an infinite predicate. For example: nature considered in itself is not singular; therefore it is common in itself. It is not incapable, by its essential principles, of being in many; therefore it is capable.

Second, this rests on properties of universal nature that belong to nature considered in itself, such as being an object of the intellect, being a truth for all time, having one definition, and the like. These do not belong to nature in an individual, yet belong to nature considered in itself and prior to the intellect's operation, because the object precedes its act. If, then, the intellect's act is about a universal, the universal exists before that act.

Finally, these two are not repugnant: nature may be singular and contracted by its material principles, yet indeterminate by its formal and specific principles, and consequently apt to exist in many, although this is impeded by singularity. Prime matter, for example, has an aptitude for many forms, although it is impeded from being informed by them so long as it is under one form. And according to the Thomists, angelic nature is apt to exist in many, although absolutely speaking it is repugnant for it to exist in them.

ALL THESE ARGUMENTS remain resolved by what was said in the preceding article. As for the first proof, it is clear that, when the phrase “in itself” is posited, those things that do not belong to the subject essentially can be denied of it. But to affirm that something belongs to it—even if it is something negative—it must belong according to an essential connection. Otherwise, it does not belong in any way when “in itself” is posited, since that phrase signifies that something belongs by virtue of the quiddity. Thus from the negation of what belongs accidentally, one cannot infer the affirmative opposite of an infinite predicate. So this does not follow: nature considered in itself is not singular; therefore it is non-singular in itself; still less does this follow: therefore it is universal.

To the second objection, it is said that being an object of the intellect and being a truth for all time are found objectively, with respect to the very objective character on the part of the thing known, even if the thing does not always exist really; in this way they precede the intellect objectively. But with respect to the condition of universality that accompanies the object in the cognition itself, this does not precede the intellect's act; rather, it results in the object from that act. Thus a definition is one with a fundamental unity on the part of the thing defined, but positively formal on the part of the intellect. The object is similarly one and universal in this respect.

To the third objection, it is said that the aptitude of matter and the aptitude of universality are of different kinds. Matter by its own nature has a capacity for many forms, and its aptitude and potency for them is its entity. Hence, wherever its entity is preserved, this aptitude is preserved too, because it belongs to matter in itself. But the aptitude for being and being predicated of many follows nature by reason of its state and abstract unity. Its aptitude is not just any aptitude, but one for a single nature to be multiplied in many; this unity does not belong to nature before the intellect's operation. As for what is added about angelic nature, we will discuss it more fully below, q. 8. For now it is enough to say that, if an angel is conceived perfectly and adequately, aptitude for being in many is repugnant to it, because it is repugnant to be conceived without individuation. If, however, it is conceived without individuation on account of an imperfect and inadequate concept of the angel, then, just as it has a unity of abstraction from such an imperfect concept, it likewise has an aptitude and non-repugnance for being in many, insofar as concerns nature conceived in this imperfect way.

Second it is argued: The act of this aptitude is real; therefore this aptitude itself belongs to the thing considered in itself, or to the thing as it is in reality.

The consequence is clear, because potency takes its specification from act. In this way it is true that potency and act are in the same genus when the act per se specifies the potency. Therefore, if the act is real, so is the potency. The antecedent is clear, because the act of this aptitude is existing in many singulars, which is something real. For being particular is something real; therefore its correlative, being universal, is real as well.

This is confirmed because this aptitude is the foundation of universality. Therefore it is not a second intention, but a first, since a second intention is founded on a first. But if you say that it is the proximate foundation, which must be of the same character as the intention and relation founded on it, against this there are two objections: First, if this aptitude is made by the intellect, then the object is known before this aptitude results; thus fundamental universality is not required for something to be an object of the intellect. Second, if it is made by the intellect, then it is something singular, since it results from a singular act; therefore it cannot formally constitute the universal.

THE REPLY is that the act of this aptitude is not something real. For the act of the universal aptitude is not the existence of many individuals, but the predication or contraction of one nature to many individuals, which is something of reason. The existence of many individuals can only be the foundation from which universal unity is abstracted and made apt for this predication. The particular is not the correlative of the universal unless it is taken as a second intention. If it is taken as particular as found in the thing, or as a first intention, then it is not the correlative of the universal, but its foundation.

To the confirmation, the reply is that a second intention has a first intention as its remote foundation, but as its proximate foundation it states something of reason—not a relation of second intention, but some negation or extrinsic denomination. Thus universality presupposes that the thing is known and abstracted from individuals. From this abstraction follows the unity of precision, which is a negation and non-repugnance to many, namely, an aptitude for them; from this, in turn, follows the relation.

To the first reply, it is said that the object is known by the intellect before this aptitude results. Thus universality is not required for the object of the intellect as an antecedent, but as a consequent, because there cannot be an actually known object unless this universality follows. Or, if universality is understood to be required before the intellect's act, this means universality fundamentally, not formally.

To the second reply, it is said that what is made by the intellect as an effect is something singular. But what results as something known or follows from cognition is universal, or an intention and form of universality. This is universal formally and as that by which it is universal—that is, formally making nature universal—but denominatively and as that which is universal it is singular, insofar as it is attributed to a determinate object through a determinate cognition.

This difficulty will be explained more fully from what must be said in the next question, where we treat the act through which universality results in an object from the intellect’s apprehension. But so that we may touch in this question on everything that pertains to the universal in itself, we must briefly consider it.

As we noted above in art. 1, a universal is either logical or metaphysical. The difference between them is this: although each regards or connotes inferiors, the metaphysical universal regards them as the terminus from which it is left behind, while the logical universal regards them as the terminus toward which it is compared. That is, metaphysics considers natures stripped of individual conditions; it does not belong to metaphysics to consider their relation to those same natures, so that they may be predicated of them. That belongs to logic.

There has, however, been disagreement among authors about assigning the form or account by which these universalities, or their denominations, are constituted, and about where precisely the very quiddity of universality is to be placed. Some, such as Martinez, in his commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge, disp. 1, q. 2, distinguish the constitution of universality as such from the constituent of universality insofar as it is metaphysical or logical. They say that the universal as such is constituted by a unity of account resulting from precision, and that this unity is a radical aptitude for many things. They say that the metaphysical universal is constituted by negative abstraction, insofar as it is considered without differences—that is, by omitting or negating them. The logical universal, by contrast, is constituted by positive abstraction, insofar as inferiors are not merely omitted negatively but are considered positively by separating and comparing one with another. Thus, through positive abstraction, the nature is, as it were, positively distinguished from the inferior differences and placed outside their concepts, but it remains in the inferiors by being included in them. For to be in many is to be included in them; nothing is included in another except as in something distinct, at least according to an account, since nothing is included in itself. A universal—for example, animal—is not abstracted from the inferiors, that is, horse and human, even according to an account, but only from some aspect of them, namely their differences. Since it is therefore outside the differences but included in the inferiors, it is called a logical universal, because it is then one in many. In sum, this opinion says that the universal precisely as universal (not yet logical or metaphysical) is one by a unity of account that includes an aptitude—not a proximate but a radical one, since a proximate aptitude is not apprehended without an act. The metaphysical universal, as a universal, is one; as metaphysical, it is without the many. The logical universal, as a universal, is one; as logical, it is not only without the many but also in the many. But being in many is a relation to those many. This relation cannot exist unless the nature is included in them, since it cannot be understood to regard another thing unless that other thing is thought of. What it regards is the inferiors; therefore, the inferiors must be thought of. They are not thought of without the inclusion of the superior; therefore, relation to the inferiors requires inclusion in them. Others say without qualification that a metaphysical universal is formed by both positive and negative abstraction, making no distinction here, as Father Merinero discusses in On Universals, disp. 2, q. 3, against Martinez. The common opinion of many who teach without qualification that the universal is formed by abstraction likewise does not distinguish positive from negative abstraction. Father Suárez, Metaphysics disp. 6, sect. 6, nn. 8 and 11, teaches that the absolute universal, which is metaphysical, is formed by any kind of abstraction, following the second opinion he reports about a universal formed by abstraction; but he teaches that the relative universal, which is logical, is formed by comparison.

As for the logical universal, authors commonly hold that it consists in a relation to inferiors. But there are three such relations: first, an aptitude to be in inferiors; second, an aptitude to be predicated, or predicability itself, taken positively and relatively, since predicability follows upon being universal; third, the relation of actual predication itself, by which something is a predicate and not merely predicable.

Three OPINIONS are divided according to these three relations. Some place the essence of the universal in the relation of aptitude to be in many, and hold that the relation of predicability is a property of it. Others, conversely, hold that predicability is prior and the relation of being in many posterior. Still others hold that the relation of actual predication is universality, because it indicates that one thing belongs to many. See Father Merinero, On Universals, disp. 2, q. 2, on these opinions.

NEVERTHELESS, FOR THE RESOLUTION I SAY, FIRST: In the universal there are only three things that pertain to its complete account: the material, foundational, and formal universal.

That is to say: the nature or subject denominated universal, which is called the material universal; the proximate foundation of the universal relation, which is a unity made precise from inferiors, together with an aptitude or non-repugnance to be in them; and the relative form itself, by which it is compared with and regards those many things.

The REASON is that the logician considers universality as a certain second intention, which is a relation of reason. In every relation, however, these three concur and suffice: the subject, the foundation, and the form of the relation itself. Therefore these alone suffice for and concur in universality.

I SAY, SECOND: For universality as foundation (we set aside the material universal, since this is the thing denominated, not the account that denominates it universal), it is required that the nature itself be denominated metaphysically universal. This consists in an absolute unity of precision and an aptitude not yet taken relatively, but as a non-repugnance to being in many.

The REASON is that a metaphysical universal is not said to be such through the addition of some mode to universality as such. If that mode is of reason, it does not pertain to metaphysics, which considers natures, but to logic, which treats modes or relations of reason. If it is a real mode, it will pertain to the nature itself, not to universality, since it will also be found in singulars. Hence a thing or nature taken metaphysically is nothing other than the very things or natures (which metaphysics considers, since it regards a real object) together with separation from individuals, because no science considers natures in singulars. Separation or precision alone necessarily provides the foundation of universality, since by making precise a nature from individuals it makes that nature one with a unity of abstraction or precision: that precision considers the nature in the mode of one. Likewise, it makes the nature apt to be in many, because the nature thus considered agrees with those things from which it has been abstracted and, consequently, is not repugnant to being in them, since to be in them is to agree with them. Therefore it remains one and apt to be in many, and this is prior to relation to the many, because such precision does not regard those many as the terminus toward which the nature tends and is ordered, but as that from which it is separated. A terminus from which is not a terminus of a relation insofar as it exercises the character of a terminus from which. Therefore it is not yet taken relatively, but precisely; and this is the foundation of the relation.

I SAY, THIRD: This foundational universality is obtained through both negative and positive abstraction.

There is no doubt about negative abstraction, since it consists in the mere negation or omission of inferiors, taking the nature as one. Positive abstraction is proved in this way: it is nothing other than abstraction made with positive cognition of the terminus from which something is left behind and of the nature that is taken away from it. This produces the same effect as negative abstraction, though not in the same way, because it regards the inferiors only as the terminus from which; it does not turn the nature toward them as toward a terminus to which. Therefore it does not yet posit a relation, but only precision, all of which pertains to the metaphysical universal. Thus negative and positive abstraction alike leave the nature bare or stripped. Negative abstraction does not consider the individual conditions from which it strips the nature, but omits and simply negates them; positive abstraction considers those conditions in order to strip the nature from them. Yet both produce the same effect: leaving the nature without those conditions.

I SAY, FOURTH: The logical universal, or universal as a second intention, does not consist in a comparison of attribution or predication, but in a simple relation or order, without actual inclusion in inferiors. Thus the very aptitude to be predicated of many, as it positively regards inferiors, is the logical universal.

This conclusion will be clearer below, where we shall show from St. Thomas and from reason how the logical universal is formed through a comparative act. For now it suffices to indicate its FOUNDATION. It is settled that logical universality, or a second intention, is a relation of reason to many; this is taken from the definition of the universal as “one in many and predicated of many.” But this relation of one to many is found before the relation of actual predication, since before actual predication the nature itself is found without singulars, as predicable of many: for the potency by which it can be predicated precedes the act of predication. Therefore there is an account of the predicable in relation to many; therefore, before actual predication, there is a relation of one to many by way of potency and aptitude. Indeed, if unity and aptitude for many exist before actual predication, as is clear in the metaphysical universal, this aptitude can be considered as regarding the many to which it is capable of applying, just as every potency can be considered as ordered toward and regarding its terminus, of which it is capable. Therefore, before actual predication there is a relation of aptitude to many, and this is universality.

Indeed, when something is actually predicated, it may be applied to only one singular, as in “Peter is a human being” and “Paul is a human being.” Then the term “human being” is universal, but the actual application in predication is only to one, not to many. Therefore the relation to many does not arise from determinate predication.

NOR IS THERE AN OBJECTION in saying that the universal is conceived in relation to many when it is indicated to belong to many, which happens through predication. Rather, it is conceived when an aptitude ordered to many is apprehended as able to be predicated of them. This occurs before actual predication, since potency precedes act.

That actual inclusion is not required is clear, because this inclusion is being in many and being identified with many. But the universal is apt to be in and identified with many before it is actually identified, since the universal aptitude is for both: for it to be and to be predicated in many and of many. Therefore universality exists before actual inclusion, because there is an aptitude, with a relation and order, to being in many. Moreover, actual inclusion in many cannot be understood without actual contraction in them. For something is actually included in singulars only in the way it is in them as contracted and determined in each singular, with which it is identified; it is not in each singular as indifferent to many. Therefore it is identified with and included in them through contraction. But the universal is contractible in many before it is actually contracted; therefore it is prior to actual inclusion.

NOR IS THERE AN OBJECTION from the contrary foundation, namely, that the inferiors themselves exist only through the inclusion of the superior in them. The answer is that before actual inclusion the inferiors are themselves potential includers, insofar as they are inferiors, just as the superior is potential to be included. In this way they terminate the relation of the superior before actual inclusion is considered. Thus something is actually superior when the aptitude to be included and to be in many actually belongs to it, not merely when it is actually included. Likewise, inferiors are actually inferiors under the formal aspect of inferiors when they are considered as actually capable of including and contracting their superior, not when they actually include it; for then the distinction between superior and inferior is dissolved. In reality, however, inferiors actually include the superior; but they have this identically with the superior, not formally insofar as they are inferiors.

I SAY, FINALLY: Predicability, or the relation to many under the account of predicating, is, as it were, a property of universality, which is the relation to being in many.

This is against Father Merinero, On Universals, disp. 2, q. 2, chap. 1.

The REASON is that the foundation and root of predicability is the identity of the extremes that can be predicated, as we shall say in q. 5. This is clear in itself, because what is not the same as another is not truly predicated of it, but is removed from it. Therefore the aptitude to be identified is the foundation or root of the aptitude to be predicated, and predicability thus stands as a property consequent upon that aptitude. Therefore the relation to many in being, or in being identified, is prior to the relation to many in predicating: the former is universality, the latter predicability.

NOR IS THERE AN OBJECTION that the aptitude to be is merely non-repugnance, not a positive relation; hence, in the genus of positive relations, predicability is first. For positive aptitude is an aptitude to be through an operation of the intellect, which occurs by predication, not an aptitude to be in reality outside the operation of the intellect.

The answer is that this aptitude to be is also considered positively and relatively by the intellect before predication, insofar as the abstracted nature is considered contractible and identifiable with many—not only through non-repugnance, but also through a positive relation. For it is truly identified in reality with those many things; and because it is identifiable, it is predicable. Hence it is apt not only to be predicated through an operation of the intellect, but also to be understood as contracted and identified, since before the intellect’s second operation, in which predication occurs, the common nature is understood as identifiable with singulars. Sometimes, through a simple concept, it can be understood as identified by virtue of the prior contraction, before predication.

BY THE TERM “metaphysical grades,” as said above, we understand nothing other than higher and lower predicates that are predicated of something. They are called grades because, one being more universal and higher than another, in knowing them we seem to ascend and descend, as when “human being” is predicated of Peter, “animal” above that, and “body” above that, and so on. We ask whether these predicates or grades are distinguished from one another in the same subject by the nature of the thing, prior to every operation of the intellect, or only through its operation.

Since there is a rather celebrated CONTROVERSY on this point between the school of St. Thomas and that of Scotus, and it depends chiefly on what was said above about distinction and identity of reason, we must briefly recall what was said there about the threefold distinction recognized by Scotus: absolute real distinction, which admits separation of the extremes; formal distinction from the nature of the thing, which does not admit separation but does deny formal identity, so that one notion by its own nature is not included in the concept of the other; and, finally, distinction of reason, which depends on reason alone as it forms a concept and is not found in the thing. St. Thomas, by contrast, recognizes only two kinds of distinction, real and of reason, because every reason and cause for distinguishing is either in the thing or not in the thing but in reason. Each of these distinctions is twofold: real distinction is either of one thing from another or of a thing from a mode; distinction of reason is either reasoned reason or reasoning reason, as was explained in the preceding question.

We are now asking whether essential predicates found in the same subject have the distinction that Scotus calls “from the nature of the thing,” or only a distinction of reason. All agree that there is no real distinction as between two things or entities, since they belong to one and the same entity, as in one human being, and proceed from the same form, even in a composite substance, in which there is only one form, as must be shown expressly in the books on the soul.¹ We proceed more universally in this question, because it is clear that in the remaining categories apart from substance there is no entity composed of several forms, but accidents are simple forms. Yet metaphysical grades, or higher and lower predicates, are found in them; and even in the category of substance there are simple forms, such as angels, in which these grades must be taken from the same form. Consequently, it is manifest that in them these grades cannot be really distinct as one thing from another.

Hence THE WHOLE DIFFICULTY comes down to whether a formal distinction from the nature of the thing is to be admitted among these grades.

LET THERE BE A SINGLE CONCLUSION: No formal distinction from the nature of the thing actually exists outside the intellect between these metaphysical grades; only a virtual and fundamental distinction exists, which is made actual by the intellect.

This conclusion is drawn from the Philosopher in Metaphysics VII, chs. 12 and 13², where one may consult St. Thomas, lects. 12 and 13³, On Being and Essence, ch. 3⁴, and opusc. 72, ch. 9.⁵ In these places he shows how genus does not differ in reality from difference and lower things, but only in reason. See also the question On Spiritual Creatures, a. 1, ad 9⁶, where he likewise says that the forms by which species are distinguished are not, in reality, other than the form of the genus. The disciples of St. Thomas commonly follow him, as may be seen in Cajetan at the cited place in On Being and Essence and in ch. 6, q. 12; Master Soto, q. 3 On Universals; and others one may consult in the Carmelite Course, disp. 3 On Universals, q. 4.

The FOUNDATION of this conclusion is drawn from two points: first, from the general rejection of that formal distinction from the nature of the thing; second, from the special character of essential predicates, which proceed from the same form.

As to the first point, in the preceding question, a. 3, we rejected that distinction. I add now only that this distinction must necessarily actually remove some identity in reality, if it is actually a distinction prior to the intellect’s operation. For distinction essentially removes identity in that in which the distinction is found. This formal distinction does not remove identity in the entity and reality itself; for then it would truly and properly be a real distinction, not a formal one, since it would have the formal effect of real distinction, which is to remove real identity. It would then lack nothing that would prevent it from being a real distinction. According to Scotus’s position, therefore, it removes only the identity of the concept or formal notion: that is, one thing in reality is not part of the concept and formal notion of the other or of its constitution. But actual distinction is not required for this; a virtual and fundamental distinction suffices, since it provides the basis for conceiving one under a distinction from the other and representing it without the other. Thus distinction shines forth actually where identity has actually been removed. In reality, however, all that is found is that one is not the formal constituent of the other, and therefore is not essentially connected with the other formally or constitutively, although it is so identically.

But this is not to have a distinction actually in reality; it is only not to be identified in every respect in reality. It is one thing to say, “This is not actually the same as that, but distinct”; it is another to say, “This is not the same as that in this particular way, although it is absolutely the same.” For the latter requires only that there be no essential relation and connection between certain extremes formally, and therefore that they not be the same in an essential way. But for there to be an actual distinction, they must not remain the same absolutely, and not merely in a certain respect. So too one can say that nature remains negatively common in individuals by itself, but not absolutely and actually; and just as it remains one formally in a negative, not positive, way, so a formal distinction is given negatively, not positively. That is, one might say: by virtue of the formal concept, this is not the same as that, or is distinct from it, just as by virtue of the species’ principles it is one, or not distinct; and nature in itself is not singular. None of this amounts to positing an actual negative commonness or formal unity in the thing. Therefore neither is that formal distinction actually present in the thing.

This is confirmed: something is said to be actually given in a thing when it exists actually in the thing. If it does not exist actually, it is only in potency and virtually; it will be actual when it is known or posited as existing. But for it to be actual in a thing, it does not suffice that it be said to be given on one side, if it is not given on the other; it must be given absolutely and without qualification. Therefore it does not suffice to say that one thing is not the same as another by virtue of the formal concept, and so claim that it is simply actually not the same, or distinct, in reality. It is so only in a certain respect and negatively: that is, insofar as it does not have the same constitution and formal concept, just as a thing by itself is not singular in reality, though it would not be said actually not to be singular in reality.

The second principle for not distinguishing these grades by the nature of the thing is often taken by St. Thomas from the fact that they proceed from the same simple form, as is clear in I, q. 76, a. 3, ad 4, and in Metaphysics VII, lect. 12, § Solvit, at the end.⁷ Separate substances and accidents are simple entities; and in one substantial composite there is only one form, as we now assume and will prove in the books on the soul.⁸ Therefore all the grades or predicates that belong to a thing by virtue of such a form are not actually distinguished in reality.

The consequence is clear: they have the identity of the same form, so they are not distinguished in the form itself. But if they are actually distinguished in reality because one predicate or grade is not part of the concept of another, why are they not distinguished as different forms? For they are actually distinct notions and consequently distinct principles by which; but this is what it means for forms to be actually distinct in reality.

Someone might hesitate only about the individual grade. For it does not seem to be taken from the form, but from designated matter through material principles, which are outside the specified essence, as is commonly said in the Thomistic view. Similarly, genus is said to be taken from matter and difference from form; therefore not all the grades are taken from the same entity.

To the first point, the answer is that in things composed of matter and form, individuation, although taken from designated matter, does not exclude form, because the designation of matter itself comes from quantity, and quantity differs according to the different forms, as is clear from St. Thomas, I, q. 7, a. 3, and II, dist. 30, q. 2, a. 1, where he says: “Determinate quantities and all other accidents are received in matter according to the requirement of the form.”⁹ This is clear because, although quantity has material parts only by reason of matter, as is clear in a human being whose form is spiritual and has no parts, nevertheless that quantity is formed in this or that way comes from form. Hence the notion of form also contributes to the individual grade, although dependently on the incommunicability of matter and its designation and division through quantity, which is a condition required for individuation. As for substances that are not composed of matter and form, it is clear that individuation is not taken from matter, although in accidents it signifies a relation to a subject. We will speak about these matters more fully below, when treating the individual,¹⁰ and in the books on Generation, when treating the principle of individuation.¹¹

To the second point, the answer is drawn from St. Thomas, On Being and Essence, ch. 3¹² and ch. 6¹³, and opusc. 42, ch. 5¹⁴: genus is not taken from matter insofar as matter is a physical part distinct from form, but because it is taken from what is material and potential in each thing. And because, in composite substances that are better known to us, matter is a more potential principle than form, that proposition was adopted: genus is taken from matter and difference from form.

THE ARGUMENTS ARE ANSWERED.

Scotus’s principal arguments for proving that formal distinction from the nature of the thing, set out in the preceding question, a. 3, reduce to this principal foundation: before every operation of the intellect there are certain formalities, one of which does not include another, and there is actual opposition among them; therefore there is also actual distinction.

The consequence is valid, because every distinction is grounded in some opposition and exclusion of one thing from another. Therefore, if this opposition exists actually before the intellect’s operation, so does the distinction. The antecedent is proved as follows. “Rational” is not part of the concept of “animal,” nor is it defined by the same definition, since there is animal without rationality. Therefore one is not included in the concept of the other. Likewise, contradictories are actually true of animal and rationality; therefore some actual opposition is found. For it belongs to the formality of animal to be that in which human beings and nonrational animals agree, but not to rationality; and it belongs to the formality of rationality to reason or understand, but not to the formality of animal. Therefore these contradictories are true of these formalities on the side of the thing; consequently, they are not the same on the side of the thing, since contradictories are not true of the same thing on the side of the thing. Precisely the same argument is made about action and passion, and about the persons and the divine essence: the essence is communicable, the person is not communicable, and these are contradictories.

WE ANSWER that all these points are preserved with only virtual distinction; an actual division between the extremes is not required. And if these arguments prove anything, they prove real distinction as well, not merely formal distinction, since contradictories cannot belong to the same reality either. Nor does the denial that one thing is included in the concept and definition of another, if it actually effects a division, explain why it should not actually constitute distinct realities.

We therefore say that one thing can be the same as another in two ways. In one way, they are the same adequately and in every respect. Wherever one is found, the other is found, and the other enters into the concept of one. In another way, things are one and the same inadequately: although one is identified with the other simply, it is not identified in every way or with every restriction to it. Thus being is identified with a mode, whether in itself or in another, in such a way that not everything that is a being has being in itself determinately or in another determinately. The divine essence is identified really and entitatively with paternity, as Scotus too admits; yet whatever belongs entitatively to the divine essence does not for that reason belong entitatively to paternity, as in the case of the Son. What Scotus is compelled to admit in entitative and real identity, we say about formal identity: although one thing is not part of the concept of the other, it is still not distinct from it on the side of the thing. For although the essential relation required for intrinsic and essential identity is lacking, there is no actual division that actually removes the identity and unity found on the side of the thing, since in reality and identically they are one. Thus they remain simply one, but not in every way or adequately. They can therefore have distinct definitions on account of their virtual distinction, because they can be conceived as distinct and so defined. For definition is made through an act of the intellect, which actually distinguishes concepts. In the thing, however, they differ only fundamentally; because of this virtual distinction, the names “animal” and “human being” and the others that signify these distinct formal notions are not synonymous, as St. Thomas teaches in I, q. 13, a. 4, and On the Power of God, q. 7, a. 6.¹⁵

We answer in the same way concerning the points raised from opposition and contradiction. We say that contradictories can be true of the same thing according to diverse notions, and that opposition can occur in this way, especially when the contradiction arises by reason of some reduplication, appellation, or special mode of conceiving. This is the explicit teaching of St. Thomas, I, q. 39, a. 1, ad 2, where he says that, because essence and person in God differ according to the notion of the intellect, it follows that something can be affirmed of one and denied of the other. The opposing argument proves nothing against this, because we are not saying that contradictories are true of the same thing on the side of the thing; rather, we deny that an actual distinction on the side of the thing is required, and say that a virtual distinction suffices, by reason of which some things are not the same altogether and adequately. Thus contradiction occurs concerning the same thing, but not under the same notion or in the same mode. Actual opposition causes actual distinction in the extremes between which it occurs, for example between being and nonbeing or between contraries, but not in the subject to which the contraries or contradictories belong and of which they are predicated. It suffices for the subject to be virtually diverse and to admit contradictories under different notions.

Second argument: A metaphysical whole and its grades correspond to a physical whole and the physical parts from which the metaphysical whole is taken. But a physical whole is composed of really distinct parts, as body and soul. Therefore, in the same way, a metaphysical whole is composed of grades distinct by the nature of the thing.

The antecedent is clear, because a metaphysical composite is not a mere composition of reason, since otherwise it would belong to God. Therefore some composition in reality corresponds to it. The consequent is clear for two reasons. First, the physical and metaphysical whole are the same in reality; therefore they admit the same distinction in their components. Second, St. Thomas says in ch. 3 of On Being and Essence¹⁶ that a human being is composed of body and soul as two things into a third thing. But “body” does not mean matter alone; it means the grade of corporeity. Therefore one grade can be really distinct from another with which it is composed.

This is confirmed: if these grades are not absolutely distinct, genus and difference would also be predicated in the abstract, because one notion would be the other. Thus it would be true that rationality is animality and vice versa, which is inadmissible. Therefore they have some distinction on the side of the thing.

WE ANSWER that a metaphysical whole is not composed of parts, but of predicates of the same whole; nor does it correspond to the very composition of matter and form, since a metaphysical composite is also found in things not composed of matter and form, such as angels and accidents. In things that are composite, metaphysical composition is superimposed on the physical whole itself, taking that whole as more or less determinate and thus composing not from parts but from concepts. Hence this composition is of reason, but with a foundation in the thing. That foundation is not found in God, however, because, being pure act, he has nothing less determinate and actualizable and nothing more determinate that actualizes or contracts it. Therefore, although the metaphysical and physical wholes are the same in reality, they are not composed in the same way. When St. Thomas says that a human being is composed of body and soul, either he takes “body” to mean matter, not a body informed by a form, but only matter disposed and organized, and so he is speaking of physical composition; or he takes “body” to mean what precedes the infusion of the soul and exists under the form of an embryo. When the soul comes to it and excludes the embryo’s form, a human being is made from it as a third thing from two things.

To the confirmation, the answer is that although rationality and animality are indistinct on the side of the thing, because of their mode of signifying it is not true in the formal sense that rationality is animality, or conversely. These abstract terms signify only the formality itself, precisely as such. In that sense it is not true that rationality is formally animality, since one is not included in the concept of the other or regarded as its constituent; rather, each is signified under a certain precision. This is like saying “humanity is animality,” since animality is part of the concept of humanity. They are, however, identified in the sense that rationality is the thing that is animality, and conversely. But we will speak further about these matters below, q. 5.