Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Secunda Pars Artis Logicae

This difficulty is theological for the most part; but because it depends on logical principles and contributes not a little to a perfect understanding of the formation of beings of reason, it is commonly treated at this point by more recent authors. Although, then, the opinions of authors on this difficulty vary, one point must nevertheless be assumed as certain, and the whole hinge of the difficulty seems to lie in the other two.

WE ASSUME that God knows the beings of reason which we form, however chimerical and groundless they may be—a point which some groundlessly deny, such as Vazquez, 1. p. disp. 118. cap. 2. and 3., and others. Against them St. Thomas teaches, 1. p. q. 14. art. 9., since it is evident that God knows most perfectly our acts by which we imagine and invent these beings of reason. And this is clearly inferred from that passage in Wisdom 8. 8.: “He knows the subtleties of speech and the dissolutions of arguments; he knows signs and portents before they come to be.” And how would God know what we think unless he saw the objects thought, especially so many useless thoughts by which we form so many things that are fictions and beings of reason?

The DIFFICULTY, however, concerns two questions: First, whether beings of reason thus formed by us, simply because they are known by God, are thereby denominated as existing from God’s very cognition, just as they are denominated known, since their being is to be known. Second, whether all beings of reason are so grounded in an imperfect mode of understanding that God can in no way form them by himself.

I SAY, THEN, FIRST: From the fact that God understands beings of reason as formed by our intellect, he is not said to form them; nor, by virtue of that cognition, are such beings of reason said to exist formally and in themselves.

This conclusion follows manifestly from what was said in the preceding article. For we said that a being of reason neither exists nor is formed through the cognition by which it is known as that which and as a known terminus: for in this way it is only rendered known denominatively, as other things are when they are known. But when God knows beings of reason formed by me, he presupposes that they exist through such formation and knows them as an already formed object, presupposed as that which; therefore he renders them known only extrinsically, and does not form them formally and in themselves.

This is confirmed because that which is known as existing outside its own power cannot have the being of vital cognition; for a being of reason cannot exist outside the power that forms it. But when a being of reason is known as formed by another, it is known outside the power, namely, in another’s cognition. Therefore, by virtue of such cognition, that being of reason does not receive being and formation; and accordingly that cognition is not formative of a being of reason, but cognizant of what has been formed. Hence God knows it as dependent on my intellect, not his own.

I SAY, SECOND: Those beings of reason which, by their intrinsic character, are formed and known through an imperfect apprehension of a thing, God cannot in any way form immediately by himself.

Such are pure fictions, such as chimeras; logical intentions, which result from cognition that combines and reasons discursively; and distinctions of reason, which are grounded in a limited cognition of some object, such as the distinction of the divine attributes.

This conclusion can be denied by no one, assuming that there are such beings of reason as require imperfect cognition for their formation; for no one attributes imperfect cognition to God. Some, however, deny that this assumption is true—those who allow God to form beings of reason, as may be seen in P. Merinero, disp. 3. de Univers. q. 6. Nevertheless, it is taken from St. Thomas, in 1. dist. 2. q. 1. art. 2.,¹ where he traces the distinction of the divine attributes to the imperfection of the knower and the supereminence of what is known, since our intellect, that is, cannot equal all that is in the very form of the Godhead.

It is likewise manifest that certain relations of reason and logical intentions are grounded in imperfect cognition, because these relations are grounded in things known through abstraction, predication, composition, or reasoning: for they are relations of a universal abstracted from its inferiors, of predicate to subject, and of antecedent to consequent. Therefore God’s intellect, lacking abstraction, composition, and reasoning, cannot form such beings of reason immediately by itself, just as neither does external sense form them, since it lacks this mode of knowing.

Finally, the intellect that forms them is denominated from them through its immediate cognition: for an intellect that forms the intention of a syllogism is said to syllogize, and one that forms the intention of a proposition is said to enunciate, and so on. But God is not said to syllogize or enunciate. Therefore he does not form these relations immediately through his cognition, but only knows that they are formed by us. This pertains to the first conclusion, not to this second one, in which we speak of cognition that forms immediately, not cognition that knows what has been formed by another.

I SAY, THIRD: There are some relations of reason that are not grounded in imperfect cognition; these are caused by the divine intellect as it were proximately and fundamentally, not formally in the way in which they follow from and are caused by our cognition.

For an understanding of this conclusion, note that some relations or distinctions of reason are not grounded in an imperfect mode of knowing God, but rather in a mode of perfect cognition, insofar as he is known under every mode in which he is participable and imitable by creatures. This cannot be known without comparison with creatures; and this comparison is a certain relation of reason, because God is not really related to creatures, being wholly independent of and absolute from them.

Nevertheless, this comparison can be understood to belong to God in two ways. In one way, because it is considered after the likeness of a formal relation and a real relation, although it is not in itself a real relation. In another way, it can be understood not as a formal comparison of God to creatures, but rather as ordering creatures to himself and making them participants in and imitators of himself; hence a foundation is taken whereby God himself too is considered as compared to creatures. I understand St. Thomas in this second way when he says that ideal relations, which are relations of reason, belong to God from eternity and are caused by the divine intellect comparing its essence to creatures, as in 1. p. q. 15. art. 2. ad 3. and 4., where he teaches that “these relations are caused not by things, but by the divine intellect comparing its essence to things.” Moreover, these relations of reason are said to be caused by the divine intellect, that is, grounded by it, and to be understood by God fundamentally, as seems to be inferred from St. Thomas himself, in 1. dist. 36. q. 2. art. 2. ad 2.,² where he says that these relations “are in God according to reason and intellect, because the divine intellect from eternity understood its essence as imitable in diverse ways by creatures; and for this reason there was from eternity a plurality of ideas in the divine intellect, not in his nature.” Thus St. Thomas attributes to the divine intellect only cognition of its essence as it is diversely imitable by creatures. St. Thomas does not say that he understands this imitability after the manner of a comparison and relation. Therefore, if to cause these relations means only to understand one’s essence as diversely imitable, and this imitability is the foundation of a relation of reason, not the relation of reason itself formally (for that God is imitable and participable is not formally to be compared and ordered to creatures, which is what that relation formally does, rendering him compared and ordered), we must explain St. Thomas as speaking of fundamental causation when he says that these relations are caused by the divine intellect.

AND THE REASON for this conclusion, thus explained, is as follows: A relation of reason is formed when it follows from a mode of knowing, such that the intellect strives to apprehend as a being what is not a being; and when what is not a relation in the thing is understood after the manner of a relation, a relation of reason is formed. All this is imperfect knowing, attributing to something, as it were connotatively, what it does not have in itself; and this certainly cannot belong to God.

Therefore, that relation of reason can be known by God only either through his essence as the principle of knowing, from which it would be participated; or after the likeness of a real relation; or as formed by our intellect; or through the opposite form which it removes, as with a negation. It cannot be conceived by God in the first way, because a relation of reason is not a participation of God, nor is it caused by him; nor can it be formed after his likeness, since there is nothing real that stands after the likeness of God. Nor in the second way, because then God would know a being of reason in the way we apprehend it, that is, by attributing to it a beingness it does not have, as when we know a nonbeing after the likeness of a being. This does not belong to God, because whatever he apprehends, he apprehends so perfectly that he can also judge it as he apprehends it; for if he judged otherwise than he apprehends, he would be imperfect. But if he judged to be a relation what he apprehends after the likeness of a relation, when it is not one, he would judge falsely. Nor in the third way, because then a being of reason is not formed immediately by God, but is understood as formed by us. We have already spoken of this in the first conclusion; here, however, we speak of formation made immediately by God. Nor in the last way, because then it is not taken as a being of reason, but as a negation of this sort given in reality by way of a removed form, not after the likeness of a positive form. Nor is it the same to know a negation through an opposite form and after the likeness of something; for it is not understood after the likeness of its opposite when its removal is known through it. It is altogether ridiculous to say, as some do, that God can know something otherwise than it is, provided he also knows it as it is. This is the same as saying that God can have some imperfection, provided he also has a perfection.

THE ARGUMENTS ARE ANSWERED.

First it is argued to prove that God, speaking absolutely, forms beings of reason, because he knows that we form them. A being of reason consists in being known, and to be known is its being. But beings of reason are known by God simply because he knows us to form them; therefore they have objective being through such cognition, since they are an object of cognition.

It is confirmed: To effect a being of reason is nothing other than to know a nonbeing after the manner of a being. But when God knows my fiction, he knows those fictions there after the manner of a being, because they are contained there in this way. Therefore, while he knows fictions, he makes fictions. The major is evident, and the minor is proved: For when God apprehends my fiction, he makes my fiction present to his cognition; therefore he gives it objective being, because objective being is presence to cognition.

I ANSWER that a being of reason does not consist in being known as it were denominatively and extrinsically (for this is common to real beings and beings of reason alike), but in being known as it were consequentially, that is, when from the very being known it follows that a nonbeing has the status of a being. But when from cognition there follows precisely the denomination “known”—that is, only that the object is known—there is no formation of a being of reason; rather, what has been formed is presupposed, because it is known as formed. Hence from the fact that it is known as thus formed, it does not have objective being formally, but only denominatively. It is said to have being formally when it has no being other than being known. But if it is known after it has been formed, it is already presupposed to have being; consequently, such cognition does not make being follow, but the being it has is denominated known. Therefore, in order to receive being formally and first, the intellect must know what is not a being, and from the mode of knowing—because it is known after the likeness of a being—it must follow that in the very being known there is a being, rather than its already being presupposed as formed and having being.

To the confirmation: The minor is distinguished. That God knows a fiction formally and immediately after the manner of a being is denied; that he knows it presuppositionally and mediately, that is, as formed and contained in my cognition, is granted.

To the proof it is said that, by thus knowing a fiction and a being of reason, God makes it objectively present to himself as formed by another intellect and known as that which—this is denied; as formed by himself—this is denied. Hence he does not give it objective being formally, as was said, but denominatively, because he knows it as formed by another; he does not form it first and in himself.

Second it is argued: God knows objects in the mode in which they are knowable. But beings of reason do not have their own intelligibility in themselves; they are knowable only after the manner of a real being. Therefore, they are also known by God in this way. But a being of reason is formed when it is known as a being of reason after the likeness of a real being; therefore, it is formed by God.

The major is from St. Thomas, 1. p. q. 14. art. 9., where he says, “God knows all things whatever they are, in whatever way.”

It is confirmed, because if God does not form beings of reason, this is chiefly on account of the perfection of his act, which reaches its object through apprehension in such a way that it also judges it through assent. But it is quite possible for God to understand a nonbeing after the manner of a being and yet judge that such a being is a fiction. For the formation of a being of reason does not consist in the judgment itself, but in the cognition expressing a nonbeing after the manner of a being; for we form a being of reason through simple apprehension, even before judgment. Therefore, a being of reason can be formed even though God judges it not to be a true being. Finally, it is consistent with the perfection of the divine act that God know privations and nonexistent creatures and affirm of them that they are not beings; therefore, through such cognition those privations and nonbeings are rendered known. But being known in them is not a real being; therefore, it is a being of reason.

I ANSWER that God knows all knowables in whatever way they are knowable on the part of the thing known, but not in every way on the part of the mode of knowing; otherwise one could prove that God knows by reasoning, because things are knowable to us in that mode. And so “in whatever way” should not be construed with “knows,” but with “are”: that is, God knows whatever things are, in whatever way they are.

To say that it is no problem for God to know something after the likeness of another, provided he also knows it in itself, we have already said, is altogether impossible, because knowing after the likeness of another is an imperfection. But on the part of the thing known, it is no problem for God to know a being of reason in the mode in which it is knowable to us, insofar as he knows it as formed by us.

As for what is added concerning the borrowed knowability by which a being of reason is knowable, we say that although a being of reason is known by borrowed knowability on the part of the thing known and as it is in our intellect, if it is nevertheless known as formed, such borrowed knowability neither forms nor constitutes it, but only denominates it extrinsically as known, because it finds it already formed.

To the confirmation it is answered that the formation of a being of reason is not incompatible with God because he apprehends and judges at the same time; rather, the reason is that he cannot apprehend one thing after the likeness of another—which is to apprehend in a connotative mode—unless he also judges in the way he apprehends. He does, however, know us to apprehend one thing after the likeness of another, and he sees and judges beings of reason formed in our concept.

And to the other part of the confirmation it is answered that God understands privations through the form of which they are privations, as St. Thomas says, 1. p. q. 14. art. 9. and 1. Contra Gent. cap. 71., but not after the likeness of the opposite form; for being after its likeness is incompatible with its being opposite. He knows things that do not exist but are possible through his essence. The being-known that results from such cognition is an extrinsic denomination, which is not formally a being of reason, but is so fundamentally, as said above.³ And when he affirms of negations, privations, and other fictions that they are not or are impossible, he apprehends the negations and privations themselves, insofar as they are negations, through the form denied; insofar as they are beings of reason or fictions, he apprehends them as formed by us, not by himself, and affirms of them, thus formed by us, that they are impossible.

Third it is argued against the final conclusion: Ideal relations are eternal not in some created intellect but in the divine intellect, as St. Thomas teaches in the places cited in the conclusion; therefore they are in the divine intellect formally, and not only fundamentally.

The consequent is evident, first, because relations as understood are actual and not merely fundamental, since their formal being is to be understood. Second, because St. Thomas grants to the divine intellect what he denies to the human; but in the human intellect those understood relations have being formally and not merely fundamentally; therefore, they do so in the divine intellect as well. Finally, for on this reasoning one would also say that the distinction of the attributes exists from eternity, because it exists fundamentally from eternity, although formally it is only in a created intellect.

It is confirmed because St. Thomas says “that those relations are caused by the divine intellect comparing its essence to things.” But they are not caused as to their foundation (for this is presupposed by the intellect, not caused); therefore, they are caused as to the formal aspect of that relation and distinction of reason. Likewise, he does not compare his essence except by understanding the comparison itself; therefore the comparison is rendered known and has objective being, which is formally to be a being of reason.

I ANSWER that those ideal relations are eternal proximately and fundamentally, not formally according to that formal character by which they are conceived after the likeness of a relation.

To the first proof of the consequent it is answered that those relations are understood by God not formally in themselves,⁴ but in their foundation, that is, in the essence known as imitable by creatures, as St. Thomas himself teaches in the passage cited above. The comparison of the divine essence, however, is not known after the likeness of a relation, and therefore is not formally in the divine intellect as a relation. Rather, creatures are understood as subject to the imitability of the divine essence and as participating in it; those relations are grounded in this, and thus the relation of comparison is said to be known proximately and fundamentally. Therefore those relations are said to be understood in the way in which the essence is said to be compared: namely, by knowing God’s imitability in many ways, not by forming a comparison after the likeness of a relation.

To the second proof it is said that St. Thomas grants to the divine intellect what he denies to the human as regards knowing from eternity that imitability of the divine essence which it compares to creatures; for the human intellect cannot know this from eternity. But St. Thomas does not grant to the divine intellect that this imitability and comparison is known formally after the likeness of a relation and a real distinction.

To the third proof it is said that there is a great difference between the foundation of the distinction of attributes and that of the distinction of ideas. For the attributes ground their distinction in the very eminence of the divine nature, which contains all perfections—not as known by God, but as knowable by us—so that both are required: on the part of the divine nature, such eminence, and on the part of the knower, such limitation. But the distinction of ideas is not grounded in divine eminence as limitedly knowable, but as diversely imitable; and knowing those diverse modes of imitability pertains to the highest perfection of divine cognition.

To the confirmation it is answered that those relations are caused by the divine intellect, that is, grounded by it. The intellect does not cause a remote foundation, but it can cause the proximate foundation of certain relations of reason, just as some logical intentions are grounded in a nature as known. The relations of ideas, however, are not grounded in the divine nature in itself, but as known through the mode of diverse imitability. For it is not set before God as an exemplar except insofar as it is known; and by reason of this known imitability, ideal relations are said to pertain to the completion of ideas, namely, so that ideas are known as distinct. Moreover, the very imitability and comparison of the divine essence to creatures is not known by God after the likeness of a relation that inheres on God’s side; rather, he is said to compare his essence only by knowing it as imitable by a creature. But when the comparison itself and imitability are known after the likeness of a relation, then those relations are said to exist formally in the cognition.