Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Secunda Pars Artis Logicae

It is clear that the powers by which a being of reason is made must be powers that operate immanently; for it is evident that powers operating transitively make something existing outside the intellect. Immanent powers, however, are some cognitive and others appetitive. Concerning the appetitive powers, some have said that beings of reason also result from the will, as Scotus does, against whom Cajetan argues, 1. p. q. 28. art. 1. Although Scotus seems to speak of a being of reason not strictly, but insofar as the word “reason” comprises intellect and will, in 3. dist. 26. q. 2. § Resp. Indeed, some extend this to any power, whence an extrinsic denomination results in the object, because they think that a being of reason consists in an extrinsic denomination; we spoke of these in the preceding article. As for the cognitive powers, however, one may doubt, at least concerning the internal senses, such as the imaginative power or phantasia, because they invent and imagine many things that are entirely fictitious beings.

Concerning the act that forms a being of reason, there can also be doubt on two points. First, whether it can be made through an absolute act, such as simple operation, or requires some comparative or compositive act. Second, whether it requires a reflex act by which the very being of reason formed is known as an object known, in order that it may exist; or whether a direct act suffices, by which something that is not a being is known after the likeness of a being.

I SAY FIRST: Neither the will nor the external senses form beings of reason in such a way that they have being by the force of their acts.

The conclusion is certain and is proved by a single REASON: both the will and the external senses do not form their object, but presuppose it as formed outside themselves. Therefore they do not invent something within themselves; rather, if they regard a fictitious object, they presuppose that it was made fictitious and formed by something else.

The antecedent is evident in the will, which presupposes an object proposed through cognition, whether it be true or apparent; therefore the will itself does not make the object, but is directed toward the object proposed. The external senses, however, are directed toward objects placed outside them, not within them; but whatever has being outside the cognitive power is not a being of reason.

Nor is it an objection that the sense seems to be deceived in many things and thus to know fictitiously. For the external sense is not deceived in itself, but is said to be deceived incidentally, because it gives the intellect occasion to be deceived. For example, sight, when seeing orichalcum, is not deceived by judging it to be gold; that judgment belongs to the intellect. Sight, however, apprehends only that appearance of the color of orichalcum, in which there is no falsity or fiction.

I SAY SECOND: The internal senses do not form beings of reason formally speaking, although they can materially represent that after whose likeness some fictitious being is formed, which is to form beings of reason materially.

By “formally speaking” we mean that they do not form them by discerning between a being of reason and a real being, and by conceiving what is not a being after the likeness of a real being. To know a being of reason materially, however, is to reach it but not to discern between what pertains to reason and what pertains to reality. For example, the imaginative power can form a golden mountain, and likewise an animal composed of a goat, lion, and serpent, which is a chimera. But in these cases it reaches only what is sensible, or representable to sense. The internal sense does not reach the fact that these have a relation to nonbeing and are called fictitious beings, or beings of reason, on account of this relation—which is to discern formally between being and nonbeing.

The REASON seems evident, because the internal sense cannot be directed toward anything except under the aspect of something sensible. But it does not pertain to the internal sense to judge that what is represented to it as sensible is opposed to a real being, since it does not conceive being under the aspect of being. To take something as a fictitious being formally consists in knowing that it has no entity in reality and yet in reaching it after the likeness of a being; otherwise one does not discern between a real being and a fictitious being, but only reaches that after whose likeness a being of reason is formed. When that likeness is something sensible, there is no incompatibility in its being known by sense; but sense reaches only what in it is sensible. Its relation to nonbeing, in whose place it is substituted and from which the fictitious thing derives its being, does not pertain to sense. Therefore the internal sense does not discern a fictitious being from a true being under the formal aspect of the fictitious.

That sense can know a fictitious being materially is manifest. This is not because even an external sense can, for example, know a fictitious or apparent color: although this color appears to be a color, it is not a fictitious being, but something true and real, namely, something resulting from light. Rather, it is proved because the internal sense combines many things that in no way are, or can be, outside it. Therefore it knows something that in itself is a fictitious being, although it does not apprehend the fiction itself, but only what presents itself in that fictitious being as sensible. Sense does not perceive the privation of its proper object, such as darkness, by inventing it after the manner of a being, but by not eliciting acts of seeing.

I SAY THIRD: The intellect needs some comparative act in order that beings of reason may be formed and be said to exist formally, and not only fundamentally.

This conclusion is drawn from St. Thomas, 1. Periherm. lect. 10,¹ where he says that “the intellect forms such intentions (he was speaking of universals) insofar as it compares them to things that come to be outside the soul.” And in q. 7. de Potentia art. 11,² he says that some relations of reason are those which the intellect finds and attributes to things understood, while others follow the mode of understanding, although the intellect does not invent that mode, but it follows from the mode of understanding. The first relations, indeed, reason discovers by considering the order of what is in the intellect to things outside, or also the order of things understood to one another; the others follow from the fact that the intellect understands one thing in relation to another. Therefore St. Thomas holds that all intentions are formed by some comparing act.

The REASON for the conclusion is that every being of reason is either a relation or some negation. If it is a relation, it must be apprehended comparatively with respect to a terminus. If it is a negation, it must be conceived positively after the likeness of a being, which is comparatively with respect to another. If this negation is conceived absolutely, it is not conceived positively, since it has nothing positive in itself. Therefore it must be conceived after the manner of a being, not only because on the part of the cognitive principle it must be conceived through a real species, but also because on the part of the term known it must be taken after the likeness of a being. This requires some comparative knowledge: for example, when I conceive Rome after the likeness of Toledo, I conceive Rome comparatively and not absolutely, because I conceive it connotatively and with reference to another. So, when I conceive a negation after the likeness of a being, I conceive it not absolutely, but relatively and comparatively. A relation of reason, however, because it is predicated positively in itself and not negatively, requires comparative cognition for another reason: namely, because a relation is a kind of comparison with respect to a terminus, and again because it is conceived after the likeness of a real relation, although it is predicated positively in itself.

By the name “comparative act” we understand not only a compositive or judgmental comparison, which pertains to the second operation, but any cognition that conceives with a connotation and order toward another; this can also occur outside the second operation, as when we apprehend a relation through its order to a terminus. A being of reason can also be made by compositive or discursive comparison. Indeed, because he affirms that blindness is, the Philosopher and St. Thomas prove in 5. Metaph. lect. 9,³ and often elsewhere, that blindness is a being of reason. Through that enunciation by which something is affirmed of a nonbeing, it is therefore conceived positively as if it were a being, namely, through connotation with the verb “is.”

I said in the conclusion, “in order that beings of reason may be said to exist formally, and not only fundamentally.” For the foundation of a relation of reason does not require this comparison, as is evident when a nature is stripped of individuating conditions by simple abstraction; yet there is no act of comparison there, but only a precision from inferiors. But then the universal is not formally a logical universal, but a metaphysical one, which is the foundation of a logical intention, as will be said below, q. 4.

Hence you will gather that in relations of reason a denomination can occur even before the relation itself is actually known through comparison, solely by positing the foundation. For example, a nature is denominated universal precisely by being abstracted, even before it is actually compared; and the letters in a closed book are a sign even if the relation of sign, which is one of reason, is not actually considered; and God is denominated Lord even if the relation of lordship is not actually considered, but by reason of the power to rule. In this they differ from real relations, because real relations denominate only when they exist: someone is not called a father unless he actually has a relation to a son, nor similar unless he has a likeness, even if he has the foundation. The reason for this is that in relations of reason their actual being consists in their being actually known objectively, which does not come from the foundation and terminus, but from the intellect. Hence many things can be said of a subject by reason of its foundation without a relation resulting, since the relation does not follow the foundation and terminus themselves, but cognition. In real relations, by contrast, since a relation naturally results from the foundation and terminus, nothing belongs by force of the foundation in order to a terminus except through a relation. We understand, however, that this denomination belongs by reason of the proximate foundation, absolutely speaking, but not in every respect: not under the formality by which something is denominated by a relation as known and existing. For God is denominated Lord before the relation, but not as related. This does not occur in real relations, because when no relation exists, they do not denominate in any way with respect to a terminus.

I SAY FINALLY: The cognition that forms a being of reason is not reflexive, looking upon it as a known thing ut quod; rather, that direct cognition which denominates as known, after the likeness of a being or real relation, what is not a real being or is not really relative, is said to form a being of reason, or a being of reason is said to result from it.

The REASON is evident, because such cognition, by which the being of reason itself is denominated as known reflexively and as quod, presupposes a being of reason already formed, since it is directed toward it as toward a known terminus. Therefore such reflexive cognition does not first form it, but presupposes it as formed and, as it were, contemplates the being of reason itself. Hence no denomination results in the knower from intentions known reflexively in this way. Thus, when an angel or God understands a man syllogizing or forming a proposition, God is not thereby said to syllogize or enunciate; yet God understands the syllogism, proposition, and logical intentions themselves as though in a reflex and signate act. The same holds when someone understands these intentions by contemplating their nature: for then the intentions contemplated are not themselves formed, but others are founded upon them, insofar as they are known universally or by way of predication, etc. And so St. Thomas says, Opusc. 42, c. 3,⁴ that a being of reason comes to be when the intellect strives to apprehend what is not, and therefore invents it as if it were a being. And in 1. Sentent. dist. 2. q. 1. art. 3,⁵ he says that intentions follow “from the mode of understanding a thing outside the soul.” Therefore it is not reflexive cognition, by which a being of reason is simply denominated as known ut quod, but cognition by which what is not is denominated as known after the likeness of a being, that formally and primarily forms a being of reason.

THE ARGUMENTS ARE ANSWERED.

First it is argued: Many powers besides the intellect deal with nonbeings, reaching them and ordering them after the likeness of a real being; therefore they too will form beings of reason.

The antecedent is proved in the will and the internal sense. For the will tends by appetite toward an apparent good that is not good in reality; it also orders one thing to another as a means to an end, which sometimes truly is not a means and is not truly ordered. Therefore it compares one thing with another by a comparison that does not exist in reality, which is to form a being of reason.

Similarly, sense, especially the internal sense, compares one thing with another by forming propositions and discourses concerning singulars, and from diverse species forms a fictitious being, as from gold and a mountain it forms a golden mountain, as St. Thomas teaches, 1. p., q. 12, a. 9, ad 2. Therefore it knows fictitious beings. And generally, from every sense there follows an extrinsic denomination of something as known, which is a being of reason.

IT IS ANSWERED: The antecedent is denied. To the proof, it is answered that the will, since it is directed toward an object known and apprehended, does not formally know it or give it being through cognition; rather, what results from an act of appetite is only some extrinsic denomination, which is indeed a being of reason fundamentally. But when it is actually known after the likeness of a form or real relation, then it exists actually. Therefore the will itself does not invent the apparent good, but presupposes it as known and proposed to it, and so does not form it. The ordering of a means to an end is also proposed to the will by the intellect; the will itself orders by appetition, not by knowing. Such ordering does indeed posit an extrinsic denomination in the thing ordered by the will, but does not formally make it a known being of reason.

As for what is added concerning sense, it is answered that the internal sense compares one thing with another by forming a proposition and discourse in such a way that it does not formally know the ordering of predicate and subject, or of antecedent and consequent, by discerning a fictitious relation from a real one. Similarly, it knows a golden mountain with respect to what is sensible in those parts represented—gold and mountain—but not with respect to the aspect of fiction as distinguished from reality. This is to know not formally what is invented under the aspect of a being, but materially that after whose likeness something is invented, which in itself is not. An extrinsic denomination, moreover, that follows from the cognition of sense, insofar as it is an extrinsic denomination, is not formally a relation of reason, but is so fundamentally; it is formal when it is known after the likeness of a relation.

Second it is argued: The intellect’s simple apprehension also does not compare or discern the aspect of the fictitious from the aspect of a true being, since otherwise it would not be simple apprehension but comparative or compositive with another. Therefore it does not form a being of reason formally speaking, just as the internal senses do not.

And it is confirmed: simple apprehension is not fiction, for fiction is subject to falsity, whereas simple apprehension is always true, because it represents a thing precisely as it is in itself or as it is proposed to it. Therefore its object is not a fictitious being and, consequently, is not a being of reason.

IT IS ANSWERED that simple apprehension does not compare one thing with another by affirming or denying, but it does discern one from another and reach the order of one to another, as when it knows relatives, reaches the definition of a thing and the aptness of terms, and distinguishes the categories. Hence, according to the Philosopher, the treatment of the categories concerns simple apprehension, as St. Thomas says, 1. Periherm. lect. 1,⁶ Therefore it has a sufficient comparison to form a being of reason. We do not deny that the internal sense forms a being of reason because it lacks comparison, but because it lacks universality in knowing: it does not know more universal aspects by discerning a true being from a fictitious one, whereas simple apprehension does so, for it discerns the categories from what is not in a category.

To the confirmation, it is said that simple apprehension is not fiction by way of enunciation, affirming or denying, in which fiction consisting in deception or falsity consists; but it can indeed be fiction by way of formation, apprehending something that is not in reality, or an impossible thing, after the manner of a being and discerning it from a true and real being. Hence it does not always apprehend a thing as it is in itself as though it never apprehended anything after the likeness of another, since we apprehend many things through proper concepts, but through connotative ones. Rather, it apprehends a thing as it is in itself—that is, without the addition of composition, by reason of which it is also said that simple apprehension is not false, because it does not formally judge or enunciate, in which alone formal truth or falsity consists. Nevertheless, it can apprehend something that is not after the likeness of what is, without affirming or denying it.

Finally it is argued: A being of reason can also exist without a comparative act; therefore it can also be formed without one.

The antecedent is proved. First, when a proposition or syllogism is formed in the very exercise of reasoning, a second intention results and the proposition itself is denominated as being; yet at that time the relation to its terminus, or its likeness to a real relation, is not comparatively known. Again, when the very being of reason is said to be known reflexively, by this fact it has being as known, since it objectively terminates cognition, which is to exist objectively. Nor is there any reason why a real nature conceived and known in common should be said to exist objectively, while a being of reason known in common should not be said to exist objectively. It is known in common when it is made known reflexively and in a signate act. Finally, the Philosopher in 5. Metaph.,⁷ and St. Thomas there, lect. 9,⁸ say that blindness and every being of reason are said to exist from the fact that the proposition by which we say “Blindness is” is true. But when this proposition is formed, privation is not considered after the likeness of a being, nor is that comparative act performed. Therefore a being of reason exists formally without such an act.

IT IS ANSWERED: The antecedent is denied. To the first proof it is said that when the proposition is formed, the second intention of the proposition is not yet formal, but is proximate fundamentally; just as when a universal nature is abstracted from singulars, there is not yet an intention of universality, but its foundation. Nevertheless, the proposition and syllogism are denominated by the very fact that they are formed in the exercise, just as something metaphysically universal is denominated by the very fact that it is abstracted. For, as we said above,⁹ a denomination by a form of reason can also be had from the proximate foundation itself, before the form of reason is formally known and exists.

To the second proof it is said that when a being of reason is known reflexively, it exists objectively as extrinsically denominated in the being of something known, not as first formed. But to terminate cognition as it were extrinsically, and as that upon which cognition falls, is not to be formed under the aspect of a being, but to be presupposed as formed and thus presupposed as denominated by reflexive cognition, which is as it were second, not first, with respect to the being of reason. When a being of reason is known in common, it is not said to be formed, because it is already presupposed as formed; rather, the very universality or commonness under which it is known is formed. When a real nature is known universally, however, it is not the nature itself that is formed, but its universality, which is then first taken after the likeness of a relation, when the object is known relatively with respect to inferiors.

To the final proof it is said that when the proposition “Blindness is” is formed, blindness is considered in the very exercise as existing and, consequently, after the likeness of a real being; and thus at that time it is formally a being of reason, and is then known comparatively both with respect to its predicate and with respect to that after whose likeness it is conceived as existing.¹⁰