Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Secunda Pars Artis Logicae

The explanation of these terms is especially useful for many matters treated in the discussion of universals concerning the distinction of higher and lower degrees, and it also serves many metaphysical and theological questions. Hence the exact resolution of this difficulty must be reserved for those discussions. Here, however, even with a rougher Minerva, we must at least explain the TERMS themselves.

We must therefore note that these names—distinction, plurality, division, separation, diversity, and difference—although sometimes taken indiscriminately for the same thing, do not signify under the same formal aspect. For distinction, or plurality or multitude, is opposed to unity or identity, whereas division or separation is opposed to union or continuity. Diversity and difference signify distinction with the inclusion or exclusion of agreement: for things are diverse when they agree in nothing; things differ when they agree in one respect and are distinguished in another, but are not wholly diverse. On this see the Philosopher¹ and St. Thomas, 5. Metaph. lect. 12.²

Speaking generally, then, authors commonly agree that just as there are only two genera of being, namely, real being and being of reason, so too there is only a twofold distinction, namely, real distinction and distinction of reason. For unity and distinction must follow the order and account of being; and just as there are not more genera of beings, and it is impossible for there to be a being intermediate between real being and being of reason, so neither are there more genera of distinctions.

Generally speaking, real distinction is the removal or absence of identity, which obtains on the part of the thing, without apprehension or a fiction of the intellect. Distinction of reason, by contrast, comes about through the intellect and does not obtain in the thing.

This distinction of reason is customarily divided into the distinction of reason of the reasoning reason and that of the reasoned reason. The first is usually called a distinction that is feigned by the intellect without a foundation in the thing, and is therefore a distinction only as to the mode of signifying and understanding, as when something is apprehended as predicated of itself and as distinct from itself. The second is said to be formed by the intellect with a foundation in the thing, as when we distinguish the attributes in God, or degrees or essential predicates in the same form or nature, although they have the same entity.

Real distinction is divided into real distinction without qualification, as between two things—for example, Peter and Paul, quantity and quality—and real distinction modal or formal, as between a thing and a mode, for example, between a human being and sitting or being somewhere; or between two modes that are really identified with their subject—that is, do not really differ from it—but are distinguished modally. That modal entities are lesser than real things must be proved in metaphysics; it is assumed here.

Moreover, NOT EVERYONE admits this twofold distinction between the reasoning reason and the reasoned reason. Some reject the distinction of the reasoning reason and admit only the one that has some foundation in the thing; they hold that the distinction of the reasoning reason, as a mere fiction, is only a repetition of the same concept, without any distinction resulting in the objective concept. See Suarez, in Metaph. disp. 7. sect. 1., and Vazquez, 1. p. dist. 117. cap. 3. Others, however, think that some distinction is also transferred into the objective concepts by this feigned distinction, although it is not founded in them.

Yet those seem to proceed to the opposite extreme who admit only the distinction of the reasoning reason, because they assign as the foundation of distinction of reason nothing that is one on the part of the thing with a virtual distinction, but consider virtual distinction to be in reality actual by the nature of the thing and apart from the intellect’s operation. Here Scotus’s subtlety and his entire school dispute with St. Thomas. For Scotus considers that, besides real or modal distinction, which obtains in the thing between things or modes at least separable by God’s power, and distinction of reason, which consists in and is derived from diverse concepts, there is another distinction: by its very nature and essence, and before any operation of the intellect, one thing is not included in the intrinsic and formal concept of another; thus they are not identified in the formal sense and consequently are formally divided, although they agree in the same reality and entity—and agree in such a way that they cannot be separated even by absolute power. He therefore calls this distinction formal distinction from the nature of the thing: that is, a denial of identification in the formal sense arising from the thing’s own nature, by reason of which opposites or contradictories can be verified of these formalities. Thus distinction of reason does not presuppose a foundation of virtual distinction in the thing; rather, simply because the thing itself has accounts that ground diverse concepts—that is, one is not included in the concept of the other—it has by its nature an actual division, or denial of identity. Thus only the distinction of the reasoning reason remains.

Those who admit the distinction of the reasoned reason, that is, one with a foundation in the thing, do not assign this foundation in the same way. Some think that no actual or virtual distinction need be presupposed in the thing itself that is distinguished by reason; it is enough for some thing to be knowable after the fashion of things that are really distinct, and with a certain connotation toward them, though the thing is attained and known imperfectly. Vazquez holds this view, as cited above, and Torrejon explains it, tract. 2. disp. 1. q. 1. Others, seeing that the imperfection of knowing one and the same thing after the fashion of things that are really distinct can also be preserved when I distinguish, without any foundation, what is formally one and the same and included in its own intrinsic concept, merely because I fashion it in the likeness of diverse things, have said that the foundation of distinction of reason requires in the very thing distinguished some eminence uniting diverse perfections or formalities. This is called virtual distinction, because the same form, by its power alone, does whatever diverse forms would do, as may be inferred from Cajetan, 1. p. q. 39. art. 1. § Ad secundam. There must also be added the imperfect mode of understanding, which cannot attain that whole eminence in a single act but does so through diverse concepts, although some do not require even this.

I SAY FIRST: The distinction of the reasoning reason is that which removes no identity, on the object’s part, between the extremes it distinguishes, either materially (that is, in entity) or formally; accordingly, it presupposes no virtual distinction, but the entire distinction lies in the very mode of signifying and conceiving. The distinction of the reasoned reason, by contrast, is one that leaves material identity on the object’s part, but not formal or virtual identity.

We call that formal identity which is expressed by a proper and formal concept, or by which something is formally constituted. Hence things are said to differ formally when they differ in definition or proper account. We call identity material, or identity in the identical sense, when things are the same in entity and reality itself, but not in the account that is signified per se and primarily. On this distinction see Cajetan, De Ente et Essentia, cap. 3. littera E. It is taken from St. Thomas, 1. p. q. 13. art. 4. and q. 7. de Potentia art. 9.³ Contra Gent. cap. 35., where he says “that although names said of God signify the same thing, they are not synonyms, because they do not signify the same account.” Finally, at 1. p. q. 41. art. 4. ad 3. he says near the end that between understanding and the understood in God there is only a distinction arising from the mode of signifying, which is indeed a distinction of the reasoning reason. These two distinctions therefore stand in this relation: one removes less of the identity of the extremes than the other, since it is evident that the distinction of the reasoning reason is less than that of the reasoned reason. The former is so called because it originates solely from the one understanding or reasoning; the latter also has a foundation supplied by the object itself. Therefore, if it leaves every identity in the object, both in the identical and in the formal sense, the distinction originates in no way from the object itself, but only from the one understanding. But if the object is one, though not in every sense, then, although it has identity in reality, it will ground a distinction with respect to the one understanding.

I SAY SECOND: The distinction of the things after whose likeness the distinction is made is not sufficient for the foundation of the distinction of the reasoned reason; rather, a foundation of distinction is required in the object itself.

The REASON is clear: either there is some proportion or foundation in the very object being distinguished, such that it is conceived after the likeness of those distinct things, or there is not. If the first, then the entire account of distinguishing is no longer taken from the things after whose likeness it is conceived, but from the object itself, which has this proportion and foundation. If the second, then it follows that we can conceive this thing, without any foundation, in relation to things that are distinct, and thus distinguish without a foundation. That is to be a distinction of the reasoning reason, as when you distinguish the same thing from itself by conceiving it in relation to diverse things.

I SAY THIRD: The distinction of the reasoned reason does not presuppose any actual distinction on the object’s part by the nature of the thing, nor is such a distinction present. But when this distinction is actually made by the intellect, diverse objective concepts result from the intellect’s concepts—not in the being of the thing, but in the being of the object and of what is represented.

We shall speak of the FIRST PART of the conclusion in the next question, art. 6. It is common among Thomists and among many who deny that formal distinction from the nature of the thing, intermediate between real and reason, is found. See Cajetan, 1. p. q. 39. art. 1. and De Ente et Essentia, cap. 6. q. 12.; Soto, q. 3. Univers.; Cursus Carmel., disp. 3. Univers. q. 4.

Briefly, we say that although Scotus and his school do not deny that this distinction truly exists on the part of the thing and is real in this respect, they affirm that it consists only in this: one thing is indeed really the same as another, yet the one is not really included in the concept of the other. From this very point, however, a basis is taken for denying that this distinction is true and actual on the part of the thing before the intellect’s operation, because this formal non-identity is nothing other than the denial of an intrinsic relation and connection of one with the other. But this denial is not enough to constitute the extremes as actually distinct and to make the distinction itself real. Therefore, etc.

The major premise is certain, because for one thing to be included in the formal concept of another is nothing other than for it to have an essential and intrinsic connection or relation to the other. Therefore, the denial of this identity is only the denial of this relation and connection. The minor premise is proved: once only that denial of an essential relation is posited, the extremes do not remain so distinct that they can ground between themselves the relation of this distinction, as is evident in the divine attributes, which Scotus holds to be distinguished in this way; and yet there are no real relations between one and another, for theologians recognize only four real relations of origin. Nor is there a real relation in the same human being, insofar as he is human, to himself insofar as he is an animal; therefore neither is there a distinction, since distinction is a kind of relation. If, then, the relation does not exist in reality, neither does the distinction.

The SECOND PART of the conclusion is explained by the fact that apprehension causes nothing in the object apprehended in the order of the thing, but only in the order of what is known. In this respect both the distinction of the reasoning reason and that of the reasoned reason agree. They differ, however, in this: the distinction of the reasoned reason distinguishes the extremes themselves in such a way that not everything manifested with respect to one concept is also manifested with respect to the other; rather, some account or formality shines forth in one that does not shine forth in the other, because the object is not manifestable in every respect or formality by such light and cognition. Where there is diverse manifestation and something diverse that can be manifested, a diverse account of the object results in the being of the object—that is, in its being knowable or manifestable—not in the being of the thing. Thus a diverse object corresponds to the concepts of this distinction of the reasoned reason. The distinction of the reasoning reason, by contrast, does not concern diverse manifestation in the object, as though one extreme were manifested by one concept and the other by another; rather, the same extreme or object is manifested by both concepts as regards the object’s intrinsic account. For if a diverse formality were represented by one concept and the other, they would not have identity according to their formal accounts, but would differ in them, and hence in the being of the object.

On this basis, some, such as Suarez and Vazquez cited above, seem to have been moved to say that the distinction of the reasoning reason is not properly a distinction on the part of the objective concept, but only a repetition of the formal concept concerning exactly the same object. They are mistaken, however, because conceiving or knowing the same object twice does not suffice for a distinction of the reasoning reason; otherwise, the external sense would also be said to make this distinction by seeing Peter twice. For the intellect to make it, then, it must apprehend some comparison or relation in the object itself, by which it takes that object as if it were two—not according to diverse accounts intrinsic to the object and grounded on its part, but according to accounts that result from this extrinsic comparison. For example, when the same thing is predicated of itself, as “Peter is Peter,” a certain comparison of the same thing with itself takes place, by reason of which I conceive Peter as if doubled. Thus the distinction comes about not as though it were intrinsic to the object itself considered according to its own properties, but as though it were extrinsic and according to an added comparison or relation.

In the distinction of the reasoned reason, although it concerns the same thing, each concept that regards a distinct account in the object itself forms a distinct account of the object as if intrinsic, since it takes one of the things that belong intrinsically to the object and leaves another. Thus this distinction comes about as if intrinsically in the being of the object, because it is founded on the accounts found in the object. St. Thomas explains this distinction in this way in 1. Sentent. dist. 2. q. 1. art. 3.⁴ It is also taken from the passages cited above, where he says that diverse concepts or names of God signify the same thing, but not the same account. And in 1. dist. 22. q. 1. art. 3.⁵ he says: “We say that God is truly wise and good, and not only in the intellect of the one reasoning; from this come the diverse names of the attributes, all of which, although they signify one thing, do not signify it according to one account.”

Nor does St. Thomas’s statement constitute an objection in Opusc. 9, at the beginning⁶ that the distinction among the divine attributes is not on God’s part, but is in the intellect’s conceptions, in which this diverse account is signified subjectively. Here St. Thomas teaches only that this distinction is actually had solely through the intellect’s conceptions, and not beforehand on God’s part. St. Thomas does not deny that a distinction results from the intellect’s conception in the object in the being of the object, or is founded in it, insofar as one account is manifested on the object’s part and another is not; indeed, in the other passages cited he expressly affirms it.

I SAY FINALLY: On the object’s part, the foundation of the distinction of the reasoned reason is some virtual distinction or eminence of the thing, which, being one, contains several accounts or perfections in some mode of being; on the part of our intellect, it is the intellect’s imperfection, since it does not conceive all those accounts of the object adequately, but attains or compares them by diverse concepts.

See St. Thomas on this conclusion in the cited place, 1. Sentent. dist. 2. q. 1. art. 2., where he treats and teaches it lucidly, and Cajetan, 1. p. q. 39. art. 1.

The REASON is that a higher and more eminent thing unites more perfections than an inferior thing. Hence, in one entity, in a simpler mode, are found accounts that would constitute diverse entities in inferior things. Therefore, if the intellect does not manifest all those accounts by its light, but attains one by one concept and another by another, it distinguishes them in the being of the object, although they are not distinct in the being of the thing but are one. The foundation of this distinction, then, consists in the eminence or unity of the thing containing several accounts, together with the intellect’s inadequate attainment of it, whereby the intellect divides and abstracts one account from another through several concepts. For this reason our intellect distinguishes the divine attributes, which are one in the one form of divinity. Yet because our intellect does not attain that form adequately, but divides it according to diverse concepts after the fashion of created things, it explains one account without explaining another. In this way too, the metaphysical degrees—that is, higher and lower predicates, such as being an animal and being a living thing—are distinguished by a distinction of the reasoned reason in the same individual, as will be explained more fully below.⁷ Thus in each distinction of the reasoned reason it will be found that they all have their root and principle in some form which, through some unity or eminence of form, contains several accounts, and these are divided by the intellect as it attains them inadequately. See St. Thomas in the passages cited above and the book De Ente et Essentia, cap. 3.⁸ The logician need only touch briefly on these distinctions.

THE ARGUMENTS ARE RESOLVED.

The first argument is made to prove that the distinction of the reasoned reason is founded on some distinction by the nature of the thing: before the intellect’s operation, all the principles sufficient for actual distinction concur, since before the intellect’s operation two contradictories are verified, which cannot be verified of the same thing in the same respect, but only of distinct things, since every opposition is a kind of distinction. If, then, opposition is verified in the thing, distinction is verified there too.

It is true to say before the intellect’s operation: “An animal is not the proper and specific nature of a human being, but the rational is”; “the divine essence is communicated, but the person is not communicated”; “the Son proceeds through the intellect, but not through the will.” Therefore these accounts have some distinction by the nature of the thing. Similarly, diverse definitions are verified before the intellect’s operation, for animal is defined in one way, human being in another, nature in another, the divine person in another, and likewise the attributes. But things that have diverse definitions also have diverse constitutive principles. Thus, if they are defined in diverse ways on the thing’s part, they are also distinguished by the nature of the thing. Finally, the formal concepts concerning these objects are distinct; therefore they presuppose that the objective concepts themselves are distinct. Otherwise a circle would result: the formal concepts would be distinguished by the objective concepts, and the objective ones by the formal.

THE REPLY is that all these are not sufficient indications of an actual distinction by the nature of the thing; a virtual distinction suffices, such as is found in the eminence of a form that does not actually separate but unites diverse accounts. For contradictories can be verified of the same thing conceived under diverse accounts, but not under the same account—especially when the contradictories are stated with some reduplication or at least virtual qualification, as when they explain an act, or an account pertaining to an act of the soul, or the signification of some formality: for example, that the essence is communicated, the person is not communicated, the Son proceeds through the intellect, not through the will. For first the notional act of proceeding, communicating, or not communicating is explained; consequently those contradictories apply to the nature or person under the proper concept of person or nature.

In response to the objection that these contradictories are verified in the thing and every opposition produces distinction, the reply is that the contradictories are verified in the thing by diverse virtual accounts, diverse fundamentally rather than actually. Opposition produces distinction when it induces a limitation that separates the forms themselves. But if it occurs in some more eminent form that unites several accounts, it produces a virtual, not an actual, distinction. Likewise, “an animal is not the specific nature of a human being” takes animal under abstraction from the human being, insofar as it is common to the human being, whereas the rational belongs to the proper nature of the human being as distinguished from animal. These, then, are not contradictories, because they are not predicated of the same thing of the same thing—that is, not of it as it stands under the same concept and manifestation.

To the point made about definition, the reply is that when something is defined insofar as it is apprehended, it is not incompatible that, if diverse formal accounts are apprehended and abstracted from the same thing, it should also be defined and explained in diverse ways.

To the last point, we say that no circle is committed, because the formal concepts are distinguished by objective concepts that are diverse not actually but virtually, although they are made actually diverse in apprehension.

The second argument is made to prove that a distinction of reason is not found in the objects themselves, but only in the concepts and in the extrinsic denomination of the objects. This distinction posits nothing actually in the objects in the order of things so as to make them distinct, except a denomination of reason by which the object is made known in this or that way. Therefore this distinction is found formally only in the concepts, and in the object only according to an extrinsic denomination.

It is confirmed that these formalities are not represented as distinct as though they were distinct by their nature, as we said against Scotus; nor because they are objectively distinct, such that one and not the other is represented, since this is not enough for them to be called many. For unless the intellect makes a distinction, plurality does not result. But if the distinction is made and no division by the nature of the thing corresponds to it on the object’s part, then the intellect does not truly divide. Therefore, this can be called a distinction only because there are diverse concepts denominating the object, not because any distinction on the objects’ part corresponds to that distinction of concepts.

THE REPLY is that this distinction of concepts posits no distinction in the object in the being of the thing, but in the being of the object as manifestable, insofar as the object itself is attained inadequately and manifested with respect to one account and not another. This is not merely an extrinsic denomination by which the thing is said to be known, but one by which it is said to be manifested in a diverse way. From this there results a distinction of reason, not indeed in the formal concepts themselves, which are really distinct, but in the object itself as manifested in the being of the object.

To the confirmation, the reply is that an actual division on the object’s part outside the intellect need not correspond to that distinction of reason resulting from diverse concepts; it suffices that a virtual distinction correspond, insofar as the object is inadequately manifestable or comparable to diverse concepts, and thus that cognition which distinguishes is verified. For it does not affirm that the things are distinct on the thing’s part, but, without affirmation, regards⁹ the thing as virtually distinct, which grounds diverse manifestation and concept; for “of those who abstract, there is neither falsehood nor falsity.” Hence St. Thomas says, 1. Contra Gent. cap. 35., that the intellect conceiving many things of one is not false, “because that simple divine being is of such a kind that some things can be assimilated to it according to multiple forms.”