Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Secunda Pars Artis Logicae

BEING OF REASON, in its whole breadth, if we attend to the signification of the name, means that which depends in some way on reason. It can depend either as an effect on a cause or as an object on a knower.

In the first way, something is found to depend on reason in two ways: either because it comes from reason as from an efficient cause, as works of art that are devised and made through reason; or because it is in reason as in a subject and material cause, as acts and habits are in the intellect. But both of these modes belong to real being, because what is called a being in this way has true and real existence, though existence that depends on the intellect.

What depends on the intellect in the second way, namely as an object, is properly called a being of reason, as relevant here, because it has no being outside reason but is said to be in reason only objectively, and so is opposed to real being. Although some have denied this, its existence is clear from the common agreement of theologians and philosophers, since all distinguish real being from fictitious or rational being: the former exists in the nature of things, while the latter has no existence in reality but is merely known and feigned. Indeed, experience itself proves this sufficiently, since we see ourselves imagine and know many things that are wholly impossible; such things are fictitious beings. They are beings because they are known in the manner of a being, but fictitious because no true being on the part of the thing corresponds to them.

From these points one can derive a definition, or explanation, of being of reason in general: “a being having objective being in reason, to which no being corresponds in reality.” This is taken from St. Thomas, On Being and Essence, ch. 1,¹ and Metaphysics V, lect. 9,² and Summa theologiae I, q. 16, art. 3, ad 2, where he says that a being of reason is what, although it posits nothing in reality and is not a being in itself, is nevertheless formed or taken as a being in reason. This way of explaining it is more fitting: since “being” is said from “to be” and by reference to existence, just as real being is defined by reference to the being it truly has in reality, so being of reason, which is opposed to it, must be explained in the opposite way: it does not have being in reality but has it objectively in cognition.

As for what some say, that being of reason consists in an extrinsic denomination by which a thing is said to be known, as Durandus says in I Sentences, dist. 19, q. 5, no. 7, the assumption is doubtful in the first place, since it is highly controversial among authors whether an extrinsic denomination is formally a being of reason, as we shall say shortly. Moreover, speaking universally, it is false that being of reason as such consists in the mere denomination “known.” For this denomination is either the form constituting a being of reason, or that which receives the formation of a being of reason. It cannot be the first, since this denomination can also apply to real beings, which are denominated known but are not thereby formed into beings of reason, because they are not made fictitious. If it is the second, it is true that an extrinsic denomination is apprehended as a being of reason, but this is not true of extrinsic denomination alone: other non-beings are apprehended this way too, such as negations, privations, and so on.

If you ask what it means to have being in cognition, I answer that this depends on what will be said later about the cause and act by which a being of reason is formed. For the present, it is enough to hear St. Thomas, Metaphysics IV, lect. 1,³ where he says: “We say that certain things are in reason because reason deals with them as though they were certain beings, when it affirms or denies something of them.” This is not to be understood as meaning that a being of reason is formed only through a proposition that denies or affirms; rather, the formation of a proposition about an object that has no being on the part of reality is a sign that the intellect takes it in the manner of a being, because it applies a copula that signifies being.

Thus the very act of the intellect, by reaching an object in the manner of a being that does not exist outside the intellect, has two aspects: insofar as it is cognition, it makes the object known and so posits in the object only the extrinsic denomination “known”; and insofar as it makes such an object known in the likeness of a being, although it is not a being in reality, it gives it being of reason, or fictitious being. Thus St. Thomas says in Opusculum 42, ch. 1,⁴ that something becomes a being of reason when the intellect endeavors to apprehend what is not and therefore feigns it as if it were a being. And in Sentences I, dist. 2, q. 1, art. 3,⁵ he says that a being of reason follows from the way of understanding a thing outside the soul, and that such are the intentions our intellect devises. There St. Thomas treats “becoming” a being of reason, “being devised,” “being apprehended,” and “following from the way of understanding” as the same thing. Hence, as we shall say below, a being of reason is not formally fictitious or objective being merely because it is made known as that which; for in that case it is already presupposed to have being, or some character, on which the denomination “known” falls. Rather, the act that regards a non-being under the character and mode of being is said to feign or form a being of reason, and not merely to denominate it. To have objective being in the intellect consists in this: through the very mode of knowing, to be apprehended as a being that is not a being.

YOU WILL OBJECT: Therefore every object that is conceived by the intellect differently from the way it is in reality is a being of reason. The consequent is false: we know many real beings in the likeness of something else, and not as they are in themselves, such as God, angels, and things we have not experienced.

The consequence is denied, because such things are presupposed to be true real beings in reality. Therefore, from the mode of knowing, no character of being is attributed to them; rather, because they are not reached in their own proper and special mode, they are said to be reached in the likeness of something else. This is not enough for them to be denominated beings formed by reason absolutely under the character of being; they are denominated as known in the mode of an alien nature, not their own, and thus receive a connotation in being known by reference to that mode in whose likeness they are known.

Having learned what being of reason is in general, we must also briefly touch on HOW MANY KINDS OF BEING OF REASON THERE ARE. It is not the logician’s task to treat the division that divides being of reason in its whole breadth; the logician treats only logical being of reason, which is one of the members into which it is divided. Still, so that we may know which member of the division it belongs to, we briefly say that St. Thomas, in De veritate, q. 21, art. 1,⁶ divides being of reason taken in the broadest sense into two mutually exhaustive members: negation and relation of reason. “What belongs to reason,” he says, “can only be of two kinds: negation or some relation; for every absolute positing signifies something existing in the nature of things.” He also includes privation under negation. For privation is a kind of negation, or absence of a form in a subject capable of receiving the opposite form; negation, by contrast, is absence in a subject that is incompatible with the form, as the absence of the power of sight in a stone is a negation, while in a human being it is a privation. Relation, too, by the force of its own concept—which is “toward another”—can be found in mere apprehension and not in reality, namely when it is related to something else that is not in anything, as St. Thomas shows in Summa theologiae I, q. 28, art. 1.

NOT EVERYONE ADMITS THE SUFFICIENCY OF THIS DIVISION, because some think that being of reason should first be divided into what has a foundation in reality and what does not; the first is called reasoned reasoning, the second reasoning reason. They say that only what belongs to reasoned reasoning is divided into negation and relation, while what belongs to reasoning reason ranges through all the categories. See Serna, Logic, disp. 1, sect. 4, q. 2, art. 3; Magister Cabero, On Universals, disp. 1, dub. 3; and Merinero, disp. 3, q. 2.

Others think that no determinate species of being of reason is given; rather, they say that every incompatibility, every impossibility, and every implicating contradiction is a species of being of reason, because each is a fictitious being. So Martinez, disp. 2 of the prologue, q. 1.

Others assign other species at will; there is no need to be concerned with these.

NEVERTHELESS, IT MUST BE SAID that this division is the best and adequate one, and the one that most directly applies to being of reason in general.

For in a being of reason we can consider THREE THINGS: First, the subject to which it is attributed; second, the very character that is conceived and attributed to another; third, that in whose likeness it is conceived and apprehended.

On the part of the subject to which it is attributed, there is sometimes a foundation for attributing something to it in this or that way, and sometimes there is not. With respect to this, then, we take the distinction between a being of reason with a foundation in reality and one without such a foundation; this is considered with reference to that to which such a being of reason is attributed.

Likewise, on the part of that in whose likeness a being of reason is conceived, it can range through all the categories without difficulty. For sometimes something can be feigned and apprehended in the likeness of substance, as a chimera or a golden mountain; sometimes in the likeness of quantity, as a vacuum; and sometimes in the likeness of quality, as when death or blindness is conceived as a blackness or a kind of obscure form, and so on.

But if we consider a being of reason on the part of the thing conceived, or on the part of that which is knowable in the mode of a real being although it is not a being in reality, it is adequately divided into those two members as the first genera of being of reason: negation and relation, under which many negations and relations are further subdivided. Since this is the formal aspect reached in a being of reason, this division is direct and formal; other divisions may also be admitted, but they are taken from conditions of being of reason, as it were, rather than directly placed under it.

This division is adequate, because the very character of being of reason formally consists in its opposition to real being, namely, that it is incapable of existence. This is either something positive or something non-positive. If it is non-positive, it is a negation—that is, something that does not posit a form but removes it. If it is positive, it can only be a relation, because every absolute positive thing, since it is not conceived as toward another but in itself, is either a substance in itself or an accident in another. Therefore, no absolute positive thing can be taken as a being of reason, since the very concept of being in itself or in another imports some reality. Relation alone, because its concept says not only “in” but also “toward,” and for this reason does not precisely signify existence in itself but an extrinsic reaching of a term, can be conceived without reality and thus as a being of reason: it is conceived not as in another or in itself, but as toward another, with the denial of existence in anything.

BUT YOU WILL OBJECT TWO THINGS: First, to prove that it is wrong to call privation and negation beings of reason. Privation and negation, even when no intellect is considering them, signify the absence of a form and denominate a subject as lacking it; therefore they are not fictitious absences or beings of reason.

The consequent is evident, because a being of reason depends on cognition both to be and to confer its formal effect. Therefore, if negation gives its denomination to things before cognition, negation is not a being of reason. The same argument applies to extrinsic denomination, for example, being seen or being known: even when no intellect is considering it, a wall is denominated seen simply because the wall’s vision occurs in an eye. Similarly, before a being of reason results, a nature can be denominated higher or lower, a predicate or a subject, and so on.

The argument is confirmed: an extrinsic denomination follows upon a real form existing in some subject; therefore it is a real form. The consequent is evident, because just as a denomination that follows on a substantial form is substantial, and one that follows on an accidental form is accidental, so one that follows on a real form must be real.

I ANSWER that negation, insofar as it signifies the absence of a form, is given negatively on the part of reality, because the form itself is not in reality. Yet it is not called a being of reason for this reason, but because, although it is not a being in reality but an absence of a form, it is taken by the intellect in the mode of a being; thus, before the intellect considers it, it denominates the subject that lacks the form. But this absence is not properly a formal effect, nor is removing a form itself some form. Rather, it is taken by the intellect in the mode of a formal effect insofar as it is taken in the mode of a form, and consequently in the mode of a formal effect, although in reality that absence is not a formal effect but the removal of one. Likewise, an extrinsic denomination is given on the part of reality with respect to the form that denominates. But because its application to the denominated thing is not really in that thing, conceiving that form as adjacent and applied to the thing denominated is something of reason. Before the intellect’s consideration, being a predicate or subject, higher or lower, is found only fundamentally, not formally under the concept of a relation, as will be said more fully when we treat universals.

In answer to the confirmation, some hold absolutely that an extrinsic denomination is something of reason, as P. Vazquez, Summa theologiae I, disp. 115, ch. 2, no. 2, and I–II, disp. 95, ch. 10. Others hold that it is absolutely something real, though real with an extrinsic rather than intrinsic reality, which supplies its effect without anything of reason being added. So Suarez, final disp. on the Metaphysics, sect. 2, and others. But the truer view seems to be that two things concur in this denomination: the form itself as the denominating character, and its adjacency or application to the thing denominated as a condition. As to the form itself, it is clearly something real; for example, the vision by which a wall is denominated seen is a real form in the eye. But its application, insofar as it touches the subject denominated, is not something real, because it posits nothing in the wall itself. Everything that is apprehended as non-real is something of reason; accordingly, in the application of the form to the denominated thing, an extrinsic denomination is something of reason. The subject is nevertheless called denominated before the intellect’s operation, not because of what is posited in it, but because of what is presupposed outside it: the form is real in itself but does not really exist in what it denominates. Thus, because it does not exist in that subject, it is taken as a being of reason; because it pre-exists in another, from which it regards the denominated thing, it is said to denominate before the intellect’s operation.

If it is asked to which member of this division an extrinsic denomination belongs when it is conceived as a being of reason, I answer that it belongs to relation, because it is not conceived as affecting something by denying and removing a form, but as ordering and depending on that from which the denomination is taken, or on that to which it is assigned and directed through cognition.

Second objection, to prove that the division is not adequate. The unity of reason, such as that attributed by the intellect to a universal, is something of reason and is neither a relation nor a negation. It is not a relation, because unity is spoken of absolutely, not relatively. Nor is it a negation: first, because unity signifies something positive and not a pure negation, as St. Thomas says in Summa theologiae I, q. 11, art. 1; second, because if it were a negation, it would have to be conceived in the mode of a being of reason, and so it would not be called a unity of reason—that is, a negation of reason—but simply a being of reason. Likewise, a duality or distinction of reason is not a negation, since it rather removes the negation of unity; nor is it a relation, because the relation between things distinguished is founded on the distinction or duality. Therefore, it is another species.

The argument is confirmed by things that are pure fictions, such as a chimera, a golden mountain, and the like. For these are neither negations nor relations, but several substances united by the intellect from mutually incompatible parts. Likewise, there can be a quality or quantity of reason, as when a vacuum is taken in the mode of quantity or darkness in the mode of quality. Therefore, not all beings of reason are reduced to those two.

I ANSWER that some hold that unity of reason is taken only from the unity of a concept, and distinction from plurality. This is true on the part of the efficient cause, or that which causes a being of reason, which we are not examining here; we are considering its objective or fundamental aspect. Hence we answer that, on the part of the object, the formal aspect of unity of reason belongs to negation or privation, because it is nothing other than the separation, from many things producing difference, of that in which they agree. To the first objection, the answer is that, according to St. Thomas in that passage, unity is materially and entitatively something positive, but formally it is the negation of division. To the second, it is not incompatible for this unity of reason also to be a being of reason, since the negation or separation of plurality and difference is taken by the intellect in the mode of a being. As for what is added about duality or distinction of reason, distinction of reason is formally a relation of reason; it is the very relation between the things distinguished. Since they are distinguished by reason alone, their distinction is a kind of relation, even though the extremes are sometimes conceived as distinct in the likeness of absolutes, for example, in the mode of two substances. This relation of distinction is founded not on another distinction formally taken but fundamentally, that is, on virtual plurality, which belongs to the object insofar as it is subject to a plurality of concepts.

In answer to the confirmation, all those fictions are beings of reason that are negations; but there is no substance or quantity of reason, because what reason forms in the likeness of a real being is not a substance or quantity, but negations of substance or quantity are conceived in the likeness of substance or quantity. What is called a being of reason is not that in whose likeness something is conceived, but that which is conceived in the likeness of a being, although it is not a being in itself. See more on this below, q. 17, on Relation, art. 2.

From this it follows that in the metaphysical universal—which says only an abstract nature conceived in the mode of one, as we shall say in the next question—something of reason is already found: namely, what belongs to the represented or known nature by virtue of abstraction, that is, unity, or aptitude or non-repugnance to be in many. For these negations are something of reason, but they are not formally second intentions, which consist in a relation founded on natures thus abstracted. Such an abstract universal is called metaphysical, not logical, because not every being of reason formally and directly belongs to Logic, but only a second intention, as we showed from St. Thomas in the preceding question, art. 3. This second intention is a relation of reason, not a negation like unity; yet it belongs to the abstract and one thing.

This is the being of reason about which the logician properly treats, insofar as such a relation is discovered through the ordering of concepts, and is considered by the logician. Thus St Thomas says in Metaphysics IV, lect. 4¹ that “being of reason is properly said of those intentions which reason discovers in the things considered, such as the intention of genus, species, and the like”; and this kind of being of reason is properly the subject of Logic.

WE MUST THEREFORE PRESUPPOSE what we said in book I of the Summulae about terms of first and second intention.² Here “intention” is taken not as an act of will, distinct from choice and directed to an end, but as an act or concept of the intellect, which is called intention in a general sense because it tends toward something else, namely an object. Just as one concept is formal and another objective—that is, the cognition itself or the thing cognized—so one intention is formal and another objective. The objective intention is the relation of reason itself attributed to the thing cognized; the formal intention is the concept by which it is formed. For example, when we conceive animal as superior to its inferiors, the universality inhering on the side of animal is called objective or passive intention, while the concept by which animal is so conceived is called formal intention. Thus formal intention, as distinguished from objective intention, is one thing; the formality of second intention, inhering on the side of the object cognized, is another. The latter is always something of reason, since it results from cognition; the former is a real act.

This is called second intention by contrast with first, as if one said a second state or condition of the object. An object can be considered in two states: first, as it is in itself, whether as to existence or quiddity; second, as it is in apprehension. This state of being in cognition is second relative to the state of being in itself, which is first, because just as knowability follows upon entity, so being known follows upon the being it has in itself. Thus the affections or formalities belonging to a thing insofar as it is in itself are called first intentions; those belonging to it insofar as it is known are called second intentions. Since it belongs to Logic to direct things insofar as they are in apprehension, Logic per se considers second intentions, which belong to things as known.

FROM THIS IT FOLLOWS FIRST that not every relation of reason is a second intention; nevertheless, every second intention, formally taken and not merely fundamentally, is a relation of reason, not a real form or an extrinsic denomination, as some wrongly think.

The first part is clear: although every relation of reason results from cognition, not every such relation denominates a thing only in the state of being known, which is the second state. Some denominate it even in the state of existence outside cognition. Thus the relation of Creator and Lord denominates God as existing, not God as known; likewise to be a teacher or judge. For a man is not a teacher or judge as known, but as existing; these relations therefore denominate in the state of existence.

Observe here that although cognition is the cause from which a relation of reason results—as is common to every being of reason—and a relation of reason therefore necessarily requires cognition in order to belong to and denominate a subject, cognition does not always make the object itself a suitable and fitting recipient of that denomination, so that it belongs to it only in the state of being known. This occurs only with second intentions. Thus the relations of Creator and Lord, judge and teacher, require cognition to cause such relations when they denominate a subject, but not cognition that constitutes the subject in a state of being known and thereby makes it capable of receiving that denomination. But being a genus or species not only presupposes cognition causing such relations; it also presupposes cognition that makes the subject abstracted from its inferiors, and the denomination falls upon the thing so abstracted.

The second part is expressly stated by St Thomas in Opusc. 42, ch. 12³, where he says that second intentions are properties belonging to things because they are in the intellect; and in De potentia, q. 7, a. 9⁴, that they “follow the mode of understanding”; and in Metaphysics IV, lect. 4⁵, that they belong to things as cognized by the intellect. They are therefore not real forms, but forms of reason.

This is evident both because the nature of genus, species, and the other universals consists in the relation of superior to inferior, which cannot be real relations, since then a universal would formally exist on the side of the thing; and because these intentions presuppose being known as their foundation. A genus, for instance, presupposes that the thing is abstracted from its inferiors, and belongs to it by reason of that abstraction. It therefore presupposes the extrinsic denomination of something known and abstracted; it is not formally that extrinsic denomination itself, much less a real form. For then these intentions would descend to the singulars, in which they would be found really, rather than only in abstraction from singulars. The act of the intellect itself is a real act, but it is not the objective second intention now under discussion; it is the formal intention from which the objective one results.

IT FURTHER FOLLOWS that although a first intention, taken absolutely, must be something real or something belonging to a thing in the state of reality—otherwise it would not be simply first, since what is real always precedes and is prior to what is of reason—it is nevertheless possible for another second intention to be founded even upon a second intention. In that case the founding second intention assumes something like the condition of a first intention relative to the other one founded upon it, not because it is simply first but because it is prior to the one it grounds.

Since the intellect can reflect upon its own acts, it can reflectively know a second intention itself and found another second intention upon it. Thus the intention of genus attributed to animal, in turn, can, as known, ground a second intention of species, insofar as the intention of genus is a kind of predicable species. The second intention founded in this way denominates the prior, founding intention, which is why genus is formally genus and denominatively species. It often happens with these second intentions that one is formally such in itself, while denominatively it is another as known. Nevertheless all are called second intentions; one is not a third or fourth intention, because all belong to the object as known, and being known is always the second state of a thing. Since one intention, insofar as it grounds another, assumes something like the condition of a first intention relative to it, the intention founded upon it is always called second.

YOU WILL SAY: A second intention regards a first as its correlative, since “second” is said by relation to “first”; therefore it regards it as a terminus, not as a foundation. Again: a second intention is predicated of its foundation, as “Man is a species,” but a second intention is not predicated of a first, since “A first intention is a second intention” is false. Therefore it is not founded upon one.

The answer to the first point is that a second intention does not regard a first as a correlative in the manner of a terminus, but in the manner of a subject to which it is attributed and which it denominates, or in which it is founded. It is thus said by reference to a first as subject, not as terminus. A relation is said to be ordered to an absolute as subject or foundation, not as correlative—unless it assumes the character of a terminus and so becomes something relative or correlative rather than a subject, as we shall say in the category of relation. Likewise the formal correlative of a second intention is always some second intention, as genus is correlative to species and vice versa.

To the second point, a second intention is predicated of a first concretely, as white is predicated of man, but not abstractly. Thus “Man is a species” is true, while “A first intention is a second intention” is false. Second intentions can also be signified by an abstract name, both commonly by the term “second intention” and particularly by terms such as “universality” and “genericity.” These signify only the form of reason in the abstract; they do not directly signify the subject or thing in which they are founded, but signify it obliquely, just as “whiteness” in the abstract implies a body obliquely, since it is a quality of a body.

IF YOU ASK how many kinds of second intention there are and how it is divided, the answer is that every relation is divided according to its proximate foundation, or the reason for its being founded, as we shall say in the category of relation.⁶ A relation of reason, formed in the likeness of a real relation, is therefore rightly divided by its foundations. Since the foundation of a second intention is a thing as known and as subject to the state of apprehension, the division of second intention is also taken according to the different ordering of what is known, for the ordering of which the second intention is formed. Since the first operation of the intellect is ordered and directed in one way, the second in another, and the third in another, second intention is divided according to the different orderings of these operations; and in each operation there is a different intention according to the different order in which it can be directed.

Thus in the first operation there is the intention of a term, ordered as a part of an enunciation and syllogism, under which are contained various intentions of parts, such as the account of a noun, verb, and other terms. There is also the intention of universality as a superior predicable, itself divided into the various modes of universality, such as genus and species, corresponding to the intention of subjecthood, as found in an individual and other inferior predicates.

In the second operation there is the intention of an utterance, divided into various modes of perfect and imperfect utterance. Again, a proposition, one of the perfect utterances, is divided into affirmative and negative and the other divisions explained in book II of the Summulae.⁷ A proposition in turn grounds other second intentions, which are its properties: opposition and conversion, pertaining to the whole proposition; and supposition, ampliation, predicate and subject, and other similar properties of the parts of a proposition, as explained in the same book.⁸

Finally, in the third operation there is the intention of consequence or argumentation, divided into induction and syllogism; induction into ascent and descent; and syllogism into its various modes and figures, discussed in the same place.⁹

The explanation of these terms is especially useful for many matters treated in the discussion of universals concerning the distinction of higher and lower degrees, and it also serves many metaphysical and theological questions. Hence the exact resolution of this difficulty must be reserved for those discussions. Here, however, even with a rougher Minerva, we must at least explain the TERMS themselves.

We must therefore note that these names—distinction, plurality, division, separation, diversity, and difference—although sometimes taken indiscriminately for the same thing, do not signify under the same formal aspect. For distinction, or plurality or multitude, is opposed to unity or identity, whereas division or separation is opposed to union or continuity. Diversity and difference signify distinction with the inclusion or exclusion of agreement: for things are diverse when they agree in nothing; things differ when they agree in one respect and are distinguished in another, but are not wholly diverse. On this see the Philosopher¹ and St. Thomas, 5. Metaph. lect. 12.²

Speaking generally, then, authors commonly agree that just as there are only two genera of being, namely, real being and being of reason, so too there is only a twofold distinction, namely, real distinction and distinction of reason. For unity and distinction must follow the order and account of being; and just as there are not more genera of beings, and it is impossible for there to be a being intermediate between real being and being of reason, so neither are there more genera of distinctions.

Generally speaking, real distinction is the removal or absence of identity, which obtains on the part of the thing, without apprehension or a fiction of the intellect. Distinction of reason, by contrast, comes about through the intellect and does not obtain in the thing.

This distinction of reason is customarily divided into the distinction of reason of the reasoning reason and that of the reasoned reason. The first is usually called a distinction that is feigned by the intellect without a foundation in the thing, and is therefore a distinction only as to the mode of signifying and understanding, as when something is apprehended as predicated of itself and as distinct from itself. The second is said to be formed by the intellect with a foundation in the thing, as when we distinguish the attributes in God, or degrees or essential predicates in the same form or nature, although they have the same entity.

Real distinction is divided into real distinction without qualification, as between two things—for example, Peter and Paul, quantity and quality—and real distinction modal or formal, as between a thing and a mode, for example, between a human being and sitting or being somewhere; or between two modes that are really identified with their subject—that is, do not really differ from it—but are distinguished modally. That modal entities are lesser than real things must be proved in metaphysics; it is assumed here.

Moreover, NOT EVERYONE admits this twofold distinction between the reasoning reason and the reasoned reason. Some reject the distinction of the reasoning reason and admit only the one that has some foundation in the thing; they hold that the distinction of the reasoning reason, as a mere fiction, is only a repetition of the same concept, without any distinction resulting in the objective concept. See Suarez, in Metaph. disp. 7. sect. 1., and Vazquez, 1. p. dist. 117. cap. 3. Others, however, think that some distinction is also transferred into the objective concepts by this feigned distinction, although it is not founded in them.

Yet those seem to proceed to the opposite extreme who admit only the distinction of the reasoning reason, because they assign as the foundation of distinction of reason nothing that is one on the part of the thing with a virtual distinction, but consider virtual distinction to be in reality actual by the nature of the thing and apart from the intellect’s operation. Here Scotus’s subtlety and his entire school dispute with St. Thomas. For Scotus considers that, besides real or modal distinction, which obtains in the thing between things or modes at least separable by God’s power, and distinction of reason, which consists in and is derived from diverse concepts, there is another distinction: by its very nature and essence, and before any operation of the intellect, one thing is not included in the intrinsic and formal concept of another; thus they are not identified in the formal sense and consequently are formally divided, although they agree in the same reality and entity—and agree in such a way that they cannot be separated even by absolute power. He therefore calls this distinction formal distinction from the nature of the thing: that is, a denial of identification in the formal sense arising from the thing’s own nature, by reason of which opposites or contradictories can be verified of these formalities. Thus distinction of reason does not presuppose a foundation of virtual distinction in the thing; rather, simply because the thing itself has accounts that ground diverse concepts—that is, one is not included in the concept of the other—it has by its nature an actual division, or denial of identity. Thus only the distinction of the reasoning reason remains.

Those who admit the distinction of the reasoned reason, that is, one with a foundation in the thing, do not assign this foundation in the same way. Some think that no actual or virtual distinction need be presupposed in the thing itself that is distinguished by reason; it is enough for some thing to be knowable after the fashion of things that are really distinct, and with a certain connotation toward them, though the thing is attained and known imperfectly. Vazquez holds this view, as cited above, and Torrejon explains it, tract. 2. disp. 1. q. 1. Others, seeing that the imperfection of knowing one and the same thing after the fashion of things that are really distinct can also be preserved when I distinguish, without any foundation, what is formally one and the same and included in its own intrinsic concept, merely because I fashion it in the likeness of diverse things, have said that the foundation of distinction of reason requires in the very thing distinguished some eminence uniting diverse perfections or formalities. This is called virtual distinction, because the same form, by its power alone, does whatever diverse forms would do, as may be inferred from Cajetan, 1. p. q. 39. art. 1. § Ad secundam. There must also be added the imperfect mode of understanding, which cannot attain that whole eminence in a single act but does so through diverse concepts, although some do not require even this.

I SAY FIRST: The distinction of the reasoning reason is that which removes no identity, on the object’s part, between the extremes it distinguishes, either materially (that is, in entity) or formally; accordingly, it presupposes no virtual distinction, but the entire distinction lies in the very mode of signifying and conceiving. The distinction of the reasoned reason, by contrast, is one that leaves material identity on the object’s part, but not formal or virtual identity.

We call that formal identity which is expressed by a proper and formal concept, or by which something is formally constituted. Hence things are said to differ formally when they differ in definition or proper account. We call identity material, or identity in the identical sense, when things are the same in entity and reality itself, but not in the account that is signified per se and primarily. On this distinction see Cajetan, De Ente et Essentia, cap. 3. littera E. It is taken from St. Thomas, 1. p. q. 13. art. 4. and q. 7. de Potentia art. 9.³ Contra Gent. cap. 35., where he says “that although names said of God signify the same thing, they are not synonyms, because they do not signify the same account.” Finally, at 1. p. q. 41. art. 4. ad 3. he says near the end that between understanding and the understood in God there is only a distinction arising from the mode of signifying, which is indeed a distinction of the reasoning reason. These two distinctions therefore stand in this relation: one removes less of the identity of the extremes than the other, since it is evident that the distinction of the reasoning reason is less than that of the reasoned reason. The former is so called because it originates solely from the one understanding or reasoning; the latter also has a foundation supplied by the object itself. Therefore, if it leaves every identity in the object, both in the identical and in the formal sense, the distinction originates in no way from the object itself, but only from the one understanding. But if the object is one, though not in every sense, then, although it has identity in reality, it will ground a distinction with respect to the one understanding.

I SAY SECOND: The distinction of the things after whose likeness the distinction is made is not sufficient for the foundation of the distinction of the reasoned reason; rather, a foundation of distinction is required in the object itself.

The REASON is clear: either there is some proportion or foundation in the very object being distinguished, such that it is conceived after the likeness of those distinct things, or there is not. If the first, then the entire account of distinguishing is no longer taken from the things after whose likeness it is conceived, but from the object itself, which has this proportion and foundation. If the second, then it follows that we can conceive this thing, without any foundation, in relation to things that are distinct, and thus distinguish without a foundation. That is to be a distinction of the reasoning reason, as when you distinguish the same thing from itself by conceiving it in relation to diverse things.

I SAY THIRD: The distinction of the reasoned reason does not presuppose any actual distinction on the object’s part by the nature of the thing, nor is such a distinction present. But when this distinction is actually made by the intellect, diverse objective concepts result from the intellect’s concepts—not in the being of the thing, but in the being of the object and of what is represented.

We shall speak of the FIRST PART of the conclusion in the next question, art. 6. It is common among Thomists and among many who deny that formal distinction from the nature of the thing, intermediate between real and reason, is found. See Cajetan, 1. p. q. 39. art. 1. and De Ente et Essentia, cap. 6. q. 12.; Soto, q. 3. Univers.; Cursus Carmel., disp. 3. Univers. q. 4.

Briefly, we say that although Scotus and his school do not deny that this distinction truly exists on the part of the thing and is real in this respect, they affirm that it consists only in this: one thing is indeed really the same as another, yet the one is not really included in the concept of the other. From this very point, however, a basis is taken for denying that this distinction is true and actual on the part of the thing before the intellect’s operation, because this formal non-identity is nothing other than the denial of an intrinsic relation and connection of one with the other. But this denial is not enough to constitute the extremes as actually distinct and to make the distinction itself real. Therefore, etc.

The major premise is certain, because for one thing to be included in the formal concept of another is nothing other than for it to have an essential and intrinsic connection or relation to the other. Therefore, the denial of this identity is only the denial of this relation and connection. The minor premise is proved: once only that denial of an essential relation is posited, the extremes do not remain so distinct that they can ground between themselves the relation of this distinction, as is evident in the divine attributes, which Scotus holds to be distinguished in this way; and yet there are no real relations between one and another, for theologians recognize only four real relations of origin. Nor is there a real relation in the same human being, insofar as he is human, to himself insofar as he is an animal; therefore neither is there a distinction, since distinction is a kind of relation. If, then, the relation does not exist in reality, neither does the distinction.

The SECOND PART of the conclusion is explained by the fact that apprehension causes nothing in the object apprehended in the order of the thing, but only in the order of what is known. In this respect both the distinction of the reasoning reason and that of the reasoned reason agree. They differ, however, in this: the distinction of the reasoned reason distinguishes the extremes themselves in such a way that not everything manifested with respect to one concept is also manifested with respect to the other; rather, some account or formality shines forth in one that does not shine forth in the other, because the object is not manifestable in every respect or formality by such light and cognition. Where there is diverse manifestation and something diverse that can be manifested, a diverse account of the object results in the being of the object—that is, in its being knowable or manifestable—not in the being of the thing. Thus a diverse object corresponds to the concepts of this distinction of the reasoned reason. The distinction of the reasoning reason, by contrast, does not concern diverse manifestation in the object, as though one extreme were manifested by one concept and the other by another; rather, the same extreme or object is manifested by both concepts as regards the object’s intrinsic account. For if a diverse formality were represented by one concept and the other, they would not have identity according to their formal accounts, but would differ in them, and hence in the being of the object.

On this basis, some, such as Suarez and Vazquez cited above, seem to have been moved to say that the distinction of the reasoning reason is not properly a distinction on the part of the objective concept, but only a repetition of the formal concept concerning exactly the same object. They are mistaken, however, because conceiving or knowing the same object twice does not suffice for a distinction of the reasoning reason; otherwise, the external sense would also be said to make this distinction by seeing Peter twice. For the intellect to make it, then, it must apprehend some comparison or relation in the object itself, by which it takes that object as if it were two—not according to diverse accounts intrinsic to the object and grounded on its part, but according to accounts that result from this extrinsic comparison. For example, when the same thing is predicated of itself, as “Peter is Peter,” a certain comparison of the same thing with itself takes place, by reason of which I conceive Peter as if doubled. Thus the distinction comes about not as though it were intrinsic to the object itself considered according to its own properties, but as though it were extrinsic and according to an added comparison or relation.

In the distinction of the reasoned reason, although it concerns the same thing, each concept that regards a distinct account in the object itself forms a distinct account of the object as if intrinsic, since it takes one of the things that belong intrinsically to the object and leaves another. Thus this distinction comes about as if intrinsically in the being of the object, because it is founded on the accounts found in the object. St. Thomas explains this distinction in this way in 1. Sentent. dist. 2. q. 1. art. 3.⁴ It is also taken from the passages cited above, where he says that diverse concepts or names of God signify the same thing, but not the same account. And in 1. dist. 22. q. 1. art. 3.⁵ he says: “We say that God is truly wise and good, and not only in the intellect of the one reasoning; from this come the diverse names of the attributes, all of which, although they signify one thing, do not signify it according to one account.”

Nor does St. Thomas’s statement constitute an objection in Opusc. 9, at the beginning⁶ that the distinction among the divine attributes is not on God’s part, but is in the intellect’s conceptions, in which this diverse account is signified subjectively. Here St. Thomas teaches only that this distinction is actually had solely through the intellect’s conceptions, and not beforehand on God’s part. St. Thomas does not deny that a distinction results from the intellect’s conception in the object in the being of the object, or is founded in it, insofar as one account is manifested on the object’s part and another is not; indeed, in the other passages cited he expressly affirms it.

I SAY FINALLY: On the object’s part, the foundation of the distinction of the reasoned reason is some virtual distinction or eminence of the thing, which, being one, contains several accounts or perfections in some mode of being; on the part of our intellect, it is the intellect’s imperfection, since it does not conceive all those accounts of the object adequately, but attains or compares them by diverse concepts.

See St. Thomas on this conclusion in the cited place, 1. Sentent. dist. 2. q. 1. art. 2., where he treats and teaches it lucidly, and Cajetan, 1. p. q. 39. art. 1.

The REASON is that a higher and more eminent thing unites more perfections than an inferior thing. Hence, in one entity, in a simpler mode, are found accounts that would constitute diverse entities in inferior things. Therefore, if the intellect does not manifest all those accounts by its light, but attains one by one concept and another by another, it distinguishes them in the being of the object, although they are not distinct in the being of the thing but are one. The foundation of this distinction, then, consists in the eminence or unity of the thing containing several accounts, together with the intellect’s inadequate attainment of it, whereby the intellect divides and abstracts one account from another through several concepts. For this reason our intellect distinguishes the divine attributes, which are one in the one form of divinity. Yet because our intellect does not attain that form adequately, but divides it according to diverse concepts after the fashion of created things, it explains one account without explaining another. In this way too, the metaphysical degrees—that is, higher and lower predicates, such as being an animal and being a living thing—are distinguished by a distinction of the reasoned reason in the same individual, as will be explained more fully below.⁷ Thus in each distinction of the reasoned reason it will be found that they all have their root and principle in some form which, through some unity or eminence of form, contains several accounts, and these are divided by the intellect as it attains them inadequately. See St. Thomas in the passages cited above and the book De Ente et Essentia, cap. 3.⁸ The logician need only touch briefly on these distinctions.

THE ARGUMENTS ARE RESOLVED.

The first argument is made to prove that the distinction of the reasoned reason is founded on some distinction by the nature of the thing: before the intellect’s operation, all the principles sufficient for actual distinction concur, since before the intellect’s operation two contradictories are verified, which cannot be verified of the same thing in the same respect, but only of distinct things, since every opposition is a kind of distinction. If, then, opposition is verified in the thing, distinction is verified there too.

It is true to say before the intellect’s operation: “An animal is not the proper and specific nature of a human being, but the rational is”; “the divine essence is communicated, but the person is not communicated”; “the Son proceeds through the intellect, but not through the will.” Therefore these accounts have some distinction by the nature of the thing. Similarly, diverse definitions are verified before the intellect’s operation, for animal is defined in one way, human being in another, nature in another, the divine person in another, and likewise the attributes. But things that have diverse definitions also have diverse constitutive principles. Thus, if they are defined in diverse ways on the thing’s part, they are also distinguished by the nature of the thing. Finally, the formal concepts concerning these objects are distinct; therefore they presuppose that the objective concepts themselves are distinct. Otherwise a circle would result: the formal concepts would be distinguished by the objective concepts, and the objective ones by the formal.

THE REPLY is that all these are not sufficient indications of an actual distinction by the nature of the thing; a virtual distinction suffices, such as is found in the eminence of a form that does not actually separate but unites diverse accounts. For contradictories can be verified of the same thing conceived under diverse accounts, but not under the same account—especially when the contradictories are stated with some reduplication or at least virtual qualification, as when they explain an act, or an account pertaining to an act of the soul, or the signification of some formality: for example, that the essence is communicated, the person is not communicated, the Son proceeds through the intellect, not through the will. For first the notional act of proceeding, communicating, or not communicating is explained; consequently those contradictories apply to the nature or person under the proper concept of person or nature.

In response to the objection that these contradictories are verified in the thing and every opposition produces distinction, the reply is that the contradictories are verified in the thing by diverse virtual accounts, diverse fundamentally rather than actually. Opposition produces distinction when it induces a limitation that separates the forms themselves. But if it occurs in some more eminent form that unites several accounts, it produces a virtual, not an actual, distinction. Likewise, “an animal is not the specific nature of a human being” takes animal under abstraction from the human being, insofar as it is common to the human being, whereas the rational belongs to the proper nature of the human being as distinguished from animal. These, then, are not contradictories, because they are not predicated of the same thing of the same thing—that is, not of it as it stands under the same concept and manifestation.

To the point made about definition, the reply is that when something is defined insofar as it is apprehended, it is not incompatible that, if diverse formal accounts are apprehended and abstracted from the same thing, it should also be defined and explained in diverse ways.

To the last point, we say that no circle is committed, because the formal concepts are distinguished by objective concepts that are diverse not actually but virtually, although they are made actually diverse in apprehension.

The second argument is made to prove that a distinction of reason is not found in the objects themselves, but only in the concepts and in the extrinsic denomination of the objects. This distinction posits nothing actually in the objects in the order of things so as to make them distinct, except a denomination of reason by which the object is made known in this or that way. Therefore this distinction is found formally only in the concepts, and in the object only according to an extrinsic denomination.

It is confirmed that these formalities are not represented as distinct as though they were distinct by their nature, as we said against Scotus; nor because they are objectively distinct, such that one and not the other is represented, since this is not enough for them to be called many. For unless the intellect makes a distinction, plurality does not result. But if the distinction is made and no division by the nature of the thing corresponds to it on the object’s part, then the intellect does not truly divide. Therefore, this can be called a distinction only because there are diverse concepts denominating the object, not because any distinction on the objects’ part corresponds to that distinction of concepts.

THE REPLY is that this distinction of concepts posits no distinction in the object in the being of the thing, but in the being of the object as manifestable, insofar as the object itself is attained inadequately and manifested with respect to one account and not another. This is not merely an extrinsic denomination by which the thing is said to be known, but one by which it is said to be manifested in a diverse way. From this there results a distinction of reason, not indeed in the formal concepts themselves, which are really distinct, but in the object itself as manifested in the being of the object.

To the confirmation, the reply is that an actual division on the object’s part outside the intellect need not correspond to that distinction of reason resulting from diverse concepts; it suffices that a virtual distinction correspond, insofar as the object is inadequately manifestable or comparable to diverse concepts, and thus that cognition which distinguishes is verified. For it does not affirm that the things are distinct on the thing’s part, but, without affirmation, regards⁹ the thing as virtually distinct, which grounds diverse manifestation and concept; for “of those who abstract, there is neither falsehood nor falsity.” Hence St. Thomas says, 1. Contra Gent. cap. 35., that the intellect conceiving many things of one is not false, “because that simple divine being is of such a kind that some things can be assimilated to it according to multiple forms.”

It is clear that the powers by which a being of reason is made must be powers that operate immanently; for it is evident that powers operating transitively make something existing outside the intellect. Immanent powers, however, are some cognitive and others appetitive. Concerning the appetitive powers, some have said that beings of reason also result from the will, as Scotus does, against whom Cajetan argues, 1. p. q. 28. art. 1. Although Scotus seems to speak of a being of reason not strictly, but insofar as the word “reason” comprises intellect and will, in 3. dist. 26. q. 2. § Resp. Indeed, some extend this to any power, whence an extrinsic denomination results in the object, because they think that a being of reason consists in an extrinsic denomination; we spoke of these in the preceding article. As for the cognitive powers, however, one may doubt, at least concerning the internal senses, such as the imaginative power or phantasia, because they invent and imagine many things that are entirely fictitious beings.

Concerning the act that forms a being of reason, there can also be doubt on two points. First, whether it can be made through an absolute act, such as simple operation, or requires some comparative or compositive act. Second, whether it requires a reflex act by which the very being of reason formed is known as an object known, in order that it may exist; or whether a direct act suffices, by which something that is not a being is known after the likeness of a being.

I SAY FIRST: Neither the will nor the external senses form beings of reason in such a way that they have being by the force of their acts.

The conclusion is certain and is proved by a single REASON: both the will and the external senses do not form their object, but presuppose it as formed outside themselves. Therefore they do not invent something within themselves; rather, if they regard a fictitious object, they presuppose that it was made fictitious and formed by something else.

The antecedent is evident in the will, which presupposes an object proposed through cognition, whether it be true or apparent; therefore the will itself does not make the object, but is directed toward the object proposed. The external senses, however, are directed toward objects placed outside them, not within them; but whatever has being outside the cognitive power is not a being of reason.

Nor is it an objection that the sense seems to be deceived in many things and thus to know fictitiously. For the external sense is not deceived in itself, but is said to be deceived incidentally, because it gives the intellect occasion to be deceived. For example, sight, when seeing orichalcum, is not deceived by judging it to be gold; that judgment belongs to the intellect. Sight, however, apprehends only that appearance of the color of orichalcum, in which there is no falsity or fiction.

I SAY SECOND: The internal senses do not form beings of reason formally speaking, although they can materially represent that after whose likeness some fictitious being is formed, which is to form beings of reason materially.

By “formally speaking” we mean that they do not form them by discerning between a being of reason and a real being, and by conceiving what is not a being after the likeness of a real being. To know a being of reason materially, however, is to reach it but not to discern between what pertains to reason and what pertains to reality. For example, the imaginative power can form a golden mountain, and likewise an animal composed of a goat, lion, and serpent, which is a chimera. But in these cases it reaches only what is sensible, or representable to sense. The internal sense does not reach the fact that these have a relation to nonbeing and are called fictitious beings, or beings of reason, on account of this relation—which is to discern formally between being and nonbeing.

The REASON seems evident, because the internal sense cannot be directed toward anything except under the aspect of something sensible. But it does not pertain to the internal sense to judge that what is represented to it as sensible is opposed to a real being, since it does not conceive being under the aspect of being. To take something as a fictitious being formally consists in knowing that it has no entity in reality and yet in reaching it after the likeness of a being; otherwise one does not discern between a real being and a fictitious being, but only reaches that after whose likeness a being of reason is formed. When that likeness is something sensible, there is no incompatibility in its being known by sense; but sense reaches only what in it is sensible. Its relation to nonbeing, in whose place it is substituted and from which the fictitious thing derives its being, does not pertain to sense. Therefore the internal sense does not discern a fictitious being from a true being under the formal aspect of the fictitious.

That sense can know a fictitious being materially is manifest. This is not because even an external sense can, for example, know a fictitious or apparent color: although this color appears to be a color, it is not a fictitious being, but something true and real, namely, something resulting from light. Rather, it is proved because the internal sense combines many things that in no way are, or can be, outside it. Therefore it knows something that in itself is a fictitious being, although it does not apprehend the fiction itself, but only what presents itself in that fictitious being as sensible. Sense does not perceive the privation of its proper object, such as darkness, by inventing it after the manner of a being, but by not eliciting acts of seeing.

I SAY THIRD: The intellect needs some comparative act in order that beings of reason may be formed and be said to exist formally, and not only fundamentally.

This conclusion is drawn from St. Thomas, 1. Periherm. lect. 10,¹ where he says that “the intellect forms such intentions (he was speaking of universals) insofar as it compares them to things that come to be outside the soul.” And in q. 7. de Potentia art. 11,² he says that some relations of reason are those which the intellect finds and attributes to things understood, while others follow the mode of understanding, although the intellect does not invent that mode, but it follows from the mode of understanding. The first relations, indeed, reason discovers by considering the order of what is in the intellect to things outside, or also the order of things understood to one another; the others follow from the fact that the intellect understands one thing in relation to another. Therefore St. Thomas holds that all intentions are formed by some comparing act.

The REASON for the conclusion is that every being of reason is either a relation or some negation. If it is a relation, it must be apprehended comparatively with respect to a terminus. If it is a negation, it must be conceived positively after the likeness of a being, which is comparatively with respect to another. If this negation is conceived absolutely, it is not conceived positively, since it has nothing positive in itself. Therefore it must be conceived after the manner of a being, not only because on the part of the cognitive principle it must be conceived through a real species, but also because on the part of the term known it must be taken after the likeness of a being. This requires some comparative knowledge: for example, when I conceive Rome after the likeness of Toledo, I conceive Rome comparatively and not absolutely, because I conceive it connotatively and with reference to another. So, when I conceive a negation after the likeness of a being, I conceive it not absolutely, but relatively and comparatively. A relation of reason, however, because it is predicated positively in itself and not negatively, requires comparative cognition for another reason: namely, because a relation is a kind of comparison with respect to a terminus, and again because it is conceived after the likeness of a real relation, although it is predicated positively in itself.

By the name “comparative act” we understand not only a compositive or judgmental comparison, which pertains to the second operation, but any cognition that conceives with a connotation and order toward another; this can also occur outside the second operation, as when we apprehend a relation through its order to a terminus. A being of reason can also be made by compositive or discursive comparison. Indeed, because he affirms that blindness is, the Philosopher and St. Thomas prove in 5. Metaph. lect. 9,³ and often elsewhere, that blindness is a being of reason. Through that enunciation by which something is affirmed of a nonbeing, it is therefore conceived positively as if it were a being, namely, through connotation with the verb “is.”

I said in the conclusion, “in order that beings of reason may be said to exist formally, and not only fundamentally.” For the foundation of a relation of reason does not require this comparison, as is evident when a nature is stripped of individuating conditions by simple abstraction; yet there is no act of comparison there, but only a precision from inferiors. But then the universal is not formally a logical universal, but a metaphysical one, which is the foundation of a logical intention, as will be said below, q. 4.

Hence you will gather that in relations of reason a denomination can occur even before the relation itself is actually known through comparison, solely by positing the foundation. For example, a nature is denominated universal precisely by being abstracted, even before it is actually compared; and the letters in a closed book are a sign even if the relation of sign, which is one of reason, is not actually considered; and God is denominated Lord even if the relation of lordship is not actually considered, but by reason of the power to rule. In this they differ from real relations, because real relations denominate only when they exist: someone is not called a father unless he actually has a relation to a son, nor similar unless he has a likeness, even if he has the foundation. The reason for this is that in relations of reason their actual being consists in their being actually known objectively, which does not come from the foundation and terminus, but from the intellect. Hence many things can be said of a subject by reason of its foundation without a relation resulting, since the relation does not follow the foundation and terminus themselves, but cognition. In real relations, by contrast, since a relation naturally results from the foundation and terminus, nothing belongs by force of the foundation in order to a terminus except through a relation. We understand, however, that this denomination belongs by reason of the proximate foundation, absolutely speaking, but not in every respect: not under the formality by which something is denominated by a relation as known and existing. For God is denominated Lord before the relation, but not as related. This does not occur in real relations, because when no relation exists, they do not denominate in any way with respect to a terminus.

I SAY FINALLY: The cognition that forms a being of reason is not reflexive, looking upon it as a known thing ut quod; rather, that direct cognition which denominates as known, after the likeness of a being or real relation, what is not a real being or is not really relative, is said to form a being of reason, or a being of reason is said to result from it.

The REASON is evident, because such cognition, by which the being of reason itself is denominated as known reflexively and as quod, presupposes a being of reason already formed, since it is directed toward it as toward a known terminus. Therefore such reflexive cognition does not first form it, but presupposes it as formed and, as it were, contemplates the being of reason itself. Hence no denomination results in the knower from intentions known reflexively in this way. Thus, when an angel or God understands a man syllogizing or forming a proposition, God is not thereby said to syllogize or enunciate; yet God understands the syllogism, proposition, and logical intentions themselves as though in a reflex and signate act. The same holds when someone understands these intentions by contemplating their nature: for then the intentions contemplated are not themselves formed, but others are founded upon them, insofar as they are known universally or by way of predication, etc. And so St. Thomas says, Opusc. 42, c. 3,⁴ that a being of reason comes to be when the intellect strives to apprehend what is not, and therefore invents it as if it were a being. And in 1. Sentent. dist. 2. q. 1. art. 3,⁵ he says that intentions follow “from the mode of understanding a thing outside the soul.” Therefore it is not reflexive cognition, by which a being of reason is simply denominated as known ut quod, but cognition by which what is not is denominated as known after the likeness of a being, that formally and primarily forms a being of reason.

THE ARGUMENTS ARE ANSWERED.

First it is argued: Many powers besides the intellect deal with nonbeings, reaching them and ordering them after the likeness of a real being; therefore they too will form beings of reason.

The antecedent is proved in the will and the internal sense. For the will tends by appetite toward an apparent good that is not good in reality; it also orders one thing to another as a means to an end, which sometimes truly is not a means and is not truly ordered. Therefore it compares one thing with another by a comparison that does not exist in reality, which is to form a being of reason.

Similarly, sense, especially the internal sense, compares one thing with another by forming propositions and discourses concerning singulars, and from diverse species forms a fictitious being, as from gold and a mountain it forms a golden mountain, as St. Thomas teaches, 1. p., q. 12, a. 9, ad 2. Therefore it knows fictitious beings. And generally, from every sense there follows an extrinsic denomination of something as known, which is a being of reason.

IT IS ANSWERED: The antecedent is denied. To the proof, it is answered that the will, since it is directed toward an object known and apprehended, does not formally know it or give it being through cognition; rather, what results from an act of appetite is only some extrinsic denomination, which is indeed a being of reason fundamentally. But when it is actually known after the likeness of a form or real relation, then it exists actually. Therefore the will itself does not invent the apparent good, but presupposes it as known and proposed to it, and so does not form it. The ordering of a means to an end is also proposed to the will by the intellect; the will itself orders by appetition, not by knowing. Such ordering does indeed posit an extrinsic denomination in the thing ordered by the will, but does not formally make it a known being of reason.

As for what is added concerning sense, it is answered that the internal sense compares one thing with another by forming a proposition and discourse in such a way that it does not formally know the ordering of predicate and subject, or of antecedent and consequent, by discerning a fictitious relation from a real one. Similarly, it knows a golden mountain with respect to what is sensible in those parts represented—gold and mountain—but not with respect to the aspect of fiction as distinguished from reality. This is to know not formally what is invented under the aspect of a being, but materially that after whose likeness something is invented, which in itself is not. An extrinsic denomination, moreover, that follows from the cognition of sense, insofar as it is an extrinsic denomination, is not formally a relation of reason, but is so fundamentally; it is formal when it is known after the likeness of a relation.

Second it is argued: The intellect’s simple apprehension also does not compare or discern the aspect of the fictitious from the aspect of a true being, since otherwise it would not be simple apprehension but comparative or compositive with another. Therefore it does not form a being of reason formally speaking, just as the internal senses do not.

And it is confirmed: simple apprehension is not fiction, for fiction is subject to falsity, whereas simple apprehension is always true, because it represents a thing precisely as it is in itself or as it is proposed to it. Therefore its object is not a fictitious being and, consequently, is not a being of reason.

IT IS ANSWERED that simple apprehension does not compare one thing with another by affirming or denying, but it does discern one from another and reach the order of one to another, as when it knows relatives, reaches the definition of a thing and the aptness of terms, and distinguishes the categories. Hence, according to the Philosopher, the treatment of the categories concerns simple apprehension, as St. Thomas says, 1. Periherm. lect. 1,⁶ Therefore it has a sufficient comparison to form a being of reason. We do not deny that the internal sense forms a being of reason because it lacks comparison, but because it lacks universality in knowing: it does not know more universal aspects by discerning a true being from a fictitious one, whereas simple apprehension does so, for it discerns the categories from what is not in a category.

To the confirmation, it is said that simple apprehension is not fiction by way of enunciation, affirming or denying, in which fiction consisting in deception or falsity consists; but it can indeed be fiction by way of formation, apprehending something that is not in reality, or an impossible thing, after the manner of a being and discerning it from a true and real being. Hence it does not always apprehend a thing as it is in itself as though it never apprehended anything after the likeness of another, since we apprehend many things through proper concepts, but through connotative ones. Rather, it apprehends a thing as it is in itself—that is, without the addition of composition, by reason of which it is also said that simple apprehension is not false, because it does not formally judge or enunciate, in which alone formal truth or falsity consists. Nevertheless, it can apprehend something that is not after the likeness of what is, without affirming or denying it.

Finally it is argued: A being of reason can also exist without a comparative act; therefore it can also be formed without one.

The antecedent is proved. First, when a proposition or syllogism is formed in the very exercise of reasoning, a second intention results and the proposition itself is denominated as being; yet at that time the relation to its terminus, or its likeness to a real relation, is not comparatively known. Again, when the very being of reason is said to be known reflexively, by this fact it has being as known, since it objectively terminates cognition, which is to exist objectively. Nor is there any reason why a real nature conceived and known in common should be said to exist objectively, while a being of reason known in common should not be said to exist objectively. It is known in common when it is made known reflexively and in a signate act. Finally, the Philosopher in 5. Metaph.,⁷ and St. Thomas there, lect. 9,⁸ say that blindness and every being of reason are said to exist from the fact that the proposition by which we say “Blindness is” is true. But when this proposition is formed, privation is not considered after the likeness of a being, nor is that comparative act performed. Therefore a being of reason exists formally without such an act.

IT IS ANSWERED: The antecedent is denied. To the first proof it is said that when the proposition is formed, the second intention of the proposition is not yet formal, but is proximate fundamentally; just as when a universal nature is abstracted from singulars, there is not yet an intention of universality, but its foundation. Nevertheless, the proposition and syllogism are denominated by the very fact that they are formed in the exercise, just as something metaphysically universal is denominated by the very fact that it is abstracted. For, as we said above,⁹ a denomination by a form of reason can also be had from the proximate foundation itself, before the form of reason is formally known and exists.

To the second proof it is said that when a being of reason is known reflexively, it exists objectively as extrinsically denominated in the being of something known, not as first formed. But to terminate cognition as it were extrinsically, and as that upon which cognition falls, is not to be formed under the aspect of a being, but to be presupposed as formed and thus presupposed as denominated by reflexive cognition, which is as it were second, not first, with respect to the being of reason. When a being of reason is known in common, it is not said to be formed, because it is already presupposed as formed; rather, the very universality or commonness under which it is known is formed. When a real nature is known universally, however, it is not the nature itself that is formed, but its universality, which is then first taken after the likeness of a relation, when the object is known relatively with respect to inferiors.

To the final proof it is said that when the proposition “Blindness is” is formed, blindness is considered in the very exercise as existing and, consequently, after the likeness of a real being; and thus at that time it is formally a being of reason, and is then known comparatively both with respect to its predicate and with respect to that after whose likeness it is conceived as existing.¹⁰

This difficulty is theological for the most part; but because it depends on logical principles and contributes not a little to a perfect understanding of the formation of beings of reason, it is commonly treated at this point by more recent authors. Although, then, the opinions of authors on this difficulty vary, one point must nevertheless be assumed as certain, and the whole hinge of the difficulty seems to lie in the other two.

WE ASSUME that God knows the beings of reason which we form, however chimerical and groundless they may be—a point which some groundlessly deny, such as Vazquez, 1. p. disp. 118. cap. 2. and 3., and others. Against them St. Thomas teaches, 1. p. q. 14. art. 9., since it is evident that God knows most perfectly our acts by which we imagine and invent these beings of reason. And this is clearly inferred from that passage in Wisdom 8. 8.: “He knows the subtleties of speech and the dissolutions of arguments; he knows signs and portents before they come to be.” And how would God know what we think unless he saw the objects thought, especially so many useless thoughts by which we form so many things that are fictions and beings of reason?

The DIFFICULTY, however, concerns two questions: First, whether beings of reason thus formed by us, simply because they are known by God, are thereby denominated as existing from God’s very cognition, just as they are denominated known, since their being is to be known. Second, whether all beings of reason are so grounded in an imperfect mode of understanding that God can in no way form them by himself.

I SAY, THEN, FIRST: From the fact that God understands beings of reason as formed by our intellect, he is not said to form them; nor, by virtue of that cognition, are such beings of reason said to exist formally and in themselves.

This conclusion follows manifestly from what was said in the preceding article. For we said that a being of reason neither exists nor is formed through the cognition by which it is known as that which and as a known terminus: for in this way it is only rendered known denominatively, as other things are when they are known. But when God knows beings of reason formed by me, he presupposes that they exist through such formation and knows them as an already formed object, presupposed as that which; therefore he renders them known only extrinsically, and does not form them formally and in themselves.

This is confirmed because that which is known as existing outside its own power cannot have the being of vital cognition; for a being of reason cannot exist outside the power that forms it. But when a being of reason is known as formed by another, it is known outside the power, namely, in another’s cognition. Therefore, by virtue of such cognition, that being of reason does not receive being and formation; and accordingly that cognition is not formative of a being of reason, but cognizant of what has been formed. Hence God knows it as dependent on my intellect, not his own.

I SAY, SECOND: Those beings of reason which, by their intrinsic character, are formed and known through an imperfect apprehension of a thing, God cannot in any way form immediately by himself.

Such are pure fictions, such as chimeras; logical intentions, which result from cognition that combines and reasons discursively; and distinctions of reason, which are grounded in a limited cognition of some object, such as the distinction of the divine attributes.

This conclusion can be denied by no one, assuming that there are such beings of reason as require imperfect cognition for their formation; for no one attributes imperfect cognition to God. Some, however, deny that this assumption is true—those who allow God to form beings of reason, as may be seen in P. Merinero, disp. 3. de Univers. q. 6. Nevertheless, it is taken from St. Thomas, in 1. dist. 2. q. 1. art. 2.,¹ where he traces the distinction of the divine attributes to the imperfection of the knower and the supereminence of what is known, since our intellect, that is, cannot equal all that is in the very form of the Godhead.

It is likewise manifest that certain relations of reason and logical intentions are grounded in imperfect cognition, because these relations are grounded in things known through abstraction, predication, composition, or reasoning: for they are relations of a universal abstracted from its inferiors, of predicate to subject, and of antecedent to consequent. Therefore God’s intellect, lacking abstraction, composition, and reasoning, cannot form such beings of reason immediately by itself, just as neither does external sense form them, since it lacks this mode of knowing.

Finally, the intellect that forms them is denominated from them through its immediate cognition: for an intellect that forms the intention of a syllogism is said to syllogize, and one that forms the intention of a proposition is said to enunciate, and so on. But God is not said to syllogize or enunciate. Therefore he does not form these relations immediately through his cognition, but only knows that they are formed by us. This pertains to the first conclusion, not to this second one, in which we speak of cognition that forms immediately, not cognition that knows what has been formed by another.

I SAY, THIRD: There are some relations of reason that are not grounded in imperfect cognition; these are caused by the divine intellect as it were proximately and fundamentally, not formally in the way in which they follow from and are caused by our cognition.

For an understanding of this conclusion, note that some relations or distinctions of reason are not grounded in an imperfect mode of knowing God, but rather in a mode of perfect cognition, insofar as he is known under every mode in which he is participable and imitable by creatures. This cannot be known without comparison with creatures; and this comparison is a certain relation of reason, because God is not really related to creatures, being wholly independent of and absolute from them.

Nevertheless, this comparison can be understood to belong to God in two ways. In one way, because it is considered after the likeness of a formal relation and a real relation, although it is not in itself a real relation. In another way, it can be understood not as a formal comparison of God to creatures, but rather as ordering creatures to himself and making them participants in and imitators of himself; hence a foundation is taken whereby God himself too is considered as compared to creatures. I understand St. Thomas in this second way when he says that ideal relations, which are relations of reason, belong to God from eternity and are caused by the divine intellect comparing its essence to creatures, as in 1. p. q. 15. art. 2. ad 3. and 4., where he teaches that “these relations are caused not by things, but by the divine intellect comparing its essence to things.” Moreover, these relations of reason are said to be caused by the divine intellect, that is, grounded by it, and to be understood by God fundamentally, as seems to be inferred from St. Thomas himself, in 1. dist. 36. q. 2. art. 2. ad 2.,² where he says that these relations “are in God according to reason and intellect, because the divine intellect from eternity understood its essence as imitable in diverse ways by creatures; and for this reason there was from eternity a plurality of ideas in the divine intellect, not in his nature.” Thus St. Thomas attributes to the divine intellect only cognition of its essence as it is diversely imitable by creatures. St. Thomas does not say that he understands this imitability after the manner of a comparison and relation. Therefore, if to cause these relations means only to understand one’s essence as diversely imitable, and this imitability is the foundation of a relation of reason, not the relation of reason itself formally (for that God is imitable and participable is not formally to be compared and ordered to creatures, which is what that relation formally does, rendering him compared and ordered), we must explain St. Thomas as speaking of fundamental causation when he says that these relations are caused by the divine intellect.

AND THE REASON for this conclusion, thus explained, is as follows: A relation of reason is formed when it follows from a mode of knowing, such that the intellect strives to apprehend as a being what is not a being; and when what is not a relation in the thing is understood after the manner of a relation, a relation of reason is formed. All this is imperfect knowing, attributing to something, as it were connotatively, what it does not have in itself; and this certainly cannot belong to God.

Therefore, that relation of reason can be known by God only either through his essence as the principle of knowing, from which it would be participated; or after the likeness of a real relation; or as formed by our intellect; or through the opposite form which it removes, as with a negation. It cannot be conceived by God in the first way, because a relation of reason is not a participation of God, nor is it caused by him; nor can it be formed after his likeness, since there is nothing real that stands after the likeness of God. Nor in the second way, because then God would know a being of reason in the way we apprehend it, that is, by attributing to it a beingness it does not have, as when we know a nonbeing after the likeness of a being. This does not belong to God, because whatever he apprehends, he apprehends so perfectly that he can also judge it as he apprehends it; for if he judged otherwise than he apprehends, he would be imperfect. But if he judged to be a relation what he apprehends after the likeness of a relation, when it is not one, he would judge falsely. Nor in the third way, because then a being of reason is not formed immediately by God, but is understood as formed by us. We have already spoken of this in the first conclusion; here, however, we speak of formation made immediately by God. Nor in the last way, because then it is not taken as a being of reason, but as a negation of this sort given in reality by way of a removed form, not after the likeness of a positive form. Nor is it the same to know a negation through an opposite form and after the likeness of something; for it is not understood after the likeness of its opposite when its removal is known through it. It is altogether ridiculous to say, as some do, that God can know something otherwise than it is, provided he also knows it as it is. This is the same as saying that God can have some imperfection, provided he also has a perfection.

THE ARGUMENTS ARE ANSWERED.

First it is argued to prove that God, speaking absolutely, forms beings of reason, because he knows that we form them. A being of reason consists in being known, and to be known is its being. But beings of reason are known by God simply because he knows us to form them; therefore they have objective being through such cognition, since they are an object of cognition.

It is confirmed: To effect a being of reason is nothing other than to know a nonbeing after the manner of a being. But when God knows my fiction, he knows those fictions there after the manner of a being, because they are contained there in this way. Therefore, while he knows fictions, he makes fictions. The major is evident, and the minor is proved: For when God apprehends my fiction, he makes my fiction present to his cognition; therefore he gives it objective being, because objective being is presence to cognition.

I ANSWER that a being of reason does not consist in being known as it were denominatively and extrinsically (for this is common to real beings and beings of reason alike), but in being known as it were consequentially, that is, when from the very being known it follows that a nonbeing has the status of a being. But when from cognition there follows precisely the denomination “known”—that is, only that the object is known—there is no formation of a being of reason; rather, what has been formed is presupposed, because it is known as formed. Hence from the fact that it is known as thus formed, it does not have objective being formally, but only denominatively. It is said to have being formally when it has no being other than being known. But if it is known after it has been formed, it is already presupposed to have being; consequently, such cognition does not make being follow, but the being it has is denominated known. Therefore, in order to receive being formally and first, the intellect must know what is not a being, and from the mode of knowing—because it is known after the likeness of a being—it must follow that in the very being known there is a being, rather than its already being presupposed as formed and having being.

To the confirmation: The minor is distinguished. That God knows a fiction formally and immediately after the manner of a being is denied; that he knows it presuppositionally and mediately, that is, as formed and contained in my cognition, is granted.

To the proof it is said that, by thus knowing a fiction and a being of reason, God makes it objectively present to himself as formed by another intellect and known as that which—this is denied; as formed by himself—this is denied. Hence he does not give it objective being formally, as was said, but denominatively, because he knows it as formed by another; he does not form it first and in himself.

Second it is argued: God knows objects in the mode in which they are knowable. But beings of reason do not have their own intelligibility in themselves; they are knowable only after the manner of a real being. Therefore, they are also known by God in this way. But a being of reason is formed when it is known as a being of reason after the likeness of a real being; therefore, it is formed by God.

The major is from St. Thomas, 1. p. q. 14. art. 9., where he says, “God knows all things whatever they are, in whatever way.”

It is confirmed, because if God does not form beings of reason, this is chiefly on account of the perfection of his act, which reaches its object through apprehension in such a way that it also judges it through assent. But it is quite possible for God to understand a nonbeing after the manner of a being and yet judge that such a being is a fiction. For the formation of a being of reason does not consist in the judgment itself, but in the cognition expressing a nonbeing after the manner of a being; for we form a being of reason through simple apprehension, even before judgment. Therefore, a being of reason can be formed even though God judges it not to be a true being. Finally, it is consistent with the perfection of the divine act that God know privations and nonexistent creatures and affirm of them that they are not beings; therefore, through such cognition those privations and nonbeings are rendered known. But being known in them is not a real being; therefore, it is a being of reason.

I ANSWER that God knows all knowables in whatever way they are knowable on the part of the thing known, but not in every way on the part of the mode of knowing; otherwise one could prove that God knows by reasoning, because things are knowable to us in that mode. And so “in whatever way” should not be construed with “knows,” but with “are”: that is, God knows whatever things are, in whatever way they are.

To say that it is no problem for God to know something after the likeness of another, provided he also knows it in itself, we have already said, is altogether impossible, because knowing after the likeness of another is an imperfection. But on the part of the thing known, it is no problem for God to know a being of reason in the mode in which it is knowable to us, insofar as he knows it as formed by us.

As for what is added concerning the borrowed knowability by which a being of reason is knowable, we say that although a being of reason is known by borrowed knowability on the part of the thing known and as it is in our intellect, if it is nevertheless known as formed, such borrowed knowability neither forms nor constitutes it, but only denominates it extrinsically as known, because it finds it already formed.

To the confirmation it is answered that the formation of a being of reason is not incompatible with God because he apprehends and judges at the same time; rather, the reason is that he cannot apprehend one thing after the likeness of another—which is to apprehend in a connotative mode—unless he also judges in the way he apprehends. He does, however, know us to apprehend one thing after the likeness of another, and he sees and judges beings of reason formed in our concept.

And to the other part of the confirmation it is answered that God understands privations through the form of which they are privations, as St. Thomas says, 1. p. q. 14. art. 9. and 1. Contra Gent. cap. 71., but not after the likeness of the opposite form; for being after its likeness is incompatible with its being opposite. He knows things that do not exist but are possible through his essence. The being-known that results from such cognition is an extrinsic denomination, which is not formally a being of reason, but is so fundamentally, as said above.³ And when he affirms of negations, privations, and other fictions that they are not or are impossible, he apprehends the negations and privations themselves, insofar as they are negations, through the form denied; insofar as they are beings of reason or fictions, he apprehends them as formed by us, not by himself, and affirms of them, thus formed by us, that they are impossible.

Third it is argued against the final conclusion: Ideal relations are eternal not in some created intellect but in the divine intellect, as St. Thomas teaches in the places cited in the conclusion; therefore they are in the divine intellect formally, and not only fundamentally.

The consequent is evident, first, because relations as understood are actual and not merely fundamental, since their formal being is to be understood. Second, because St. Thomas grants to the divine intellect what he denies to the human; but in the human intellect those understood relations have being formally and not merely fundamentally; therefore, they do so in the divine intellect as well. Finally, for on this reasoning one would also say that the distinction of the attributes exists from eternity, because it exists fundamentally from eternity, although formally it is only in a created intellect.

It is confirmed because St. Thomas says “that those relations are caused by the divine intellect comparing its essence to things.” But they are not caused as to their foundation (for this is presupposed by the intellect, not caused); therefore, they are caused as to the formal aspect of that relation and distinction of reason. Likewise, he does not compare his essence except by understanding the comparison itself; therefore the comparison is rendered known and has objective being, which is formally to be a being of reason.

I ANSWER that those ideal relations are eternal proximately and fundamentally, not formally according to that formal character by which they are conceived after the likeness of a relation.

To the first proof of the consequent it is answered that those relations are understood by God not formally in themselves,⁴ but in their foundation, that is, in the essence known as imitable by creatures, as St. Thomas himself teaches in the passage cited above. The comparison of the divine essence, however, is not known after the likeness of a relation, and therefore is not formally in the divine intellect as a relation. Rather, creatures are understood as subject to the imitability of the divine essence and as participating in it; those relations are grounded in this, and thus the relation of comparison is said to be known proximately and fundamentally. Therefore those relations are said to be understood in the way in which the essence is said to be compared: namely, by knowing God’s imitability in many ways, not by forming a comparison after the likeness of a relation.

To the second proof it is said that St. Thomas grants to the divine intellect what he denies to the human as regards knowing from eternity that imitability of the divine essence which it compares to creatures; for the human intellect cannot know this from eternity. But St. Thomas does not grant to the divine intellect that this imitability and comparison is known formally after the likeness of a relation and a real distinction.

To the third proof it is said that there is a great difference between the foundation of the distinction of attributes and that of the distinction of ideas. For the attributes ground their distinction in the very eminence of the divine nature, which contains all perfections—not as known by God, but as knowable by us—so that both are required: on the part of the divine nature, such eminence, and on the part of the knower, such limitation. But the distinction of ideas is not grounded in divine eminence as limitedly knowable, but as diversely imitable; and knowing those diverse modes of imitability pertains to the highest perfection of divine cognition.

To the confirmation it is answered that those relations are caused by the divine intellect, that is, grounded by it. The intellect does not cause a remote foundation, but it can cause the proximate foundation of certain relations of reason, just as some logical intentions are grounded in a nature as known. The relations of ideas, however, are not grounded in the divine nature in itself, but as known through the mode of diverse imitability. For it is not set before God as an exemplar except insofar as it is known; and by reason of this known imitability, ideal relations are said to pertain to the completion of ideas, namely, so that ideas are known as distinct. Moreover, the very imitability and comparison of the divine essence to creatures is not known by God after the likeness of a relation that inheres on God’s side; rather, he is said to compare his essence only by knowing it as imitable by a creature. But when the comparison itself and imitability are known after the likeness of a relation, then those relations are said to exist formally in the cognition.