Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Secunda Pars Artis Logicae

TWO THINGS MUST BE PRESUPPOSED, which indeed pertain more properly to another place, but must be touched on briefly for the present difficulty.

The first is that there are beings of reason, which must be treated in the following question. By “being of reason” we understand that which cannot exist in itself and apart from the intellect’s consideration, yet can be considered by the intellect. That we consider many things that do not exist is too evident to need proof. But because the intellect considers everything in the manner of a being, things that are considered but do not exist are called beings of reason, “existing, as it were, only by reason’s benefit and through consideration.” Sometimes such a being of reason is purely fictitious, as when we imagine something by fabricating it without any foundation in reality, for example, when I form a chimera, a golden mountain, and similar things. At other times it is not purely fictitious, but has a foundation in some real being that can be known in such a way that, from this mode of knowing, something is attributed to it or follows from it that is nevertheless not in reality—for example, when I know God in relation to creatures, or know darkness in the manner of a form affecting the air, although in reality it is not a form but the absence of a form. Things fabricated in the first way are called beings of the reasoning reason; those in the second way are called beings of the reasoned reason, that is, founded in the thing known.

The second thing we presuppose is what we mean by the name “formal object.” A formal object is that formality, account, or determination through which something is attained by a habit or power. For in the case of things that are objects of some habit or power, it is clear that there is both the thing attained and the account or determination by reason of which it is attained. Indeed, several formalities may be required for something to be attained; one determines another, and with respect to what it determines is called its formal aspect. This formal account is usually called the account that is attained or the account of attaining; and if it is the ultimate account, by which the others are determined, it is also called the account under which, because the others are contained under it. For we see a stone as the thing seen and the material object, but we see it by reason of color, which is the account by which the stone pertains to sight rather than touch or another sense. Color, in turn, is determined and formed by light, by reason of which the object is ultimately constituted as visible. There is also another account under which, on the side of the power, namely the power or determinate light of knowing itself. We do not treat of that here, but only of the objective formal account. Therefore, when we inquire whether a being of reason is the formal object of Logic, this is the same as asking whether all the things and subject matters treated and directed by Logic pertain to Logic by reason of something that is a real being or a being of reason; and, if it is a being of reason, which one it is.

With these points established, two things are certain in this matter, and the whole weight of the difficulty lies in one point.

First, it is certain and beyond logical controversy that Logic treats at least some beings of reason, which are found in and attributed to the things known and to the words that Logic uses as instruments—for example, the account of genus and species, the account of predicate and subject, and other similar intentions.

Second, it is certain that Logic does not treat every being of reason in its full breadth, such as privations, negations, and other things that are altogether fictitious. It treats only those relations founded in things insofar as they are ordered and known by reason, and these are called logical intentions. These logical intentions relate both to objective concepts, formal concepts, and words, but in different ways. They pertain to things known as foundations in which they are founded and which they denominate, just as a known animal is denominated a genus and a man a species. They pertain to formal concepts and acts of the intellect as operations by which these intentions are formed; therefore, once such intentions are formed, the operations of reason are also denominated as proceeding correctly and in order. They pertain to words as signs or instruments that externally express concepts ordered in this or that way.

Some, then, attending to the things known in which those intentions of reason are founded, simply say that the formal object of Logic is a being of reason, namely a second intention, because it is only by reason of that intention that such things pertain to Logic. This is the common view among Thomists. See Carmelus, Course, disp. 1, q. 2, § 3. Others, attending to words and concepts, say that Logic, insofar as it regards significant words, treats second intentions, but insofar as it regards the operations of the intellect, treats something real, as may be seen in Martinez, q. 4 of the proem. Finally, others, attending only to the operations of the intellect, which Logic directs first and per se, simply say that it treats something real. See Fonseca, Metaphysics II, ch. 3, q. 1, sect. 5; Suarez, Metaphysics, disp. 54; Master Cabero, tract. 1, disp. 1, dub. 2.

THEREFORE, THE POINT OF THE DIFFICULTY IS this: which of all these is formal with respect to Logic? Is it the objective concepts under the account of the intentions they found, or the formal concepts or words under the direction they receive from Logic? And is this direction something real?

RESOLUTION

According to the thought of St. Thomas.

LET THERE BE ONE CONCLUSION: The matter that can be directed by Logic, as an operation, is something real. — The matter that can be denominated by logical art as an object or thing known is anything knowable through those operations of the intellect, whether real or of reason. — But the form, both with respect to the operation that can be directed and with respect to the thing known, under which they pertain to Logic, is something of reason, not purely fictitious, but having a foundation in things as a second intention.

This¹

The conclusion is in keeping with the mind of St. Thomas. Among other things, three passages may be weighed in its favor. The first is in the Proemium to the Ethics,² where he says “that order is related to reason in four ways. For there is one order that reason does not make but only considers, as is the order of natural things. Another order is one that reason makes by considering its own act, for example, when it orders its concepts among themselves and the signs of concepts, which are significant words. A third order is one that reason makes by considering the operations of the will. A fourth order is one that reason makes by considering external things of which it is the cause, such as a field and a house. The order that reason considers but does not make pertains to natural philosophy; the order that reason makes by considering its own act pertains to rational philosophy (that is Logic); the order of the actions of the will pertains to the consideration of moral philosophy; and the order that reason makes by considering external things pertains to the mechanical arts.” See: St. Thomas posits as the object of rational philosophy, or Logic, the order that reason makes by considering its own act. This order is certainly not real, because a real order can indeed be considered through cognition, but cannot be made by consideration alone without some other real external act. For this is what characterizes a relation of reason: it is made or attained through consideration alone.

The second passage is in the first book of the Posterior Analytics, lecture 20,³ where he says “that because reason has to deal with all things that are, and Logic concerns the operations of reason, Logic too will concern what is common to all things, that is, the intentions of reason that apply to all things.”

And third, most clearly, in Metaphysics IV, lecture 4,⁴ he says: “Being is twofold, namely a being of reason and a being of nature. A being of reason is properly said of those intentions that reason devises in the things considered, such as the intention of genus and species and the like. These are not found in the nature of things but follow upon reason’s consideration. This kind of being, namely a being of reason, is properly the subject of Logic.”

SOME RESPOND that St. Thomas is speaking of an object per accidens; or, if he is speaking of an object per se, that he takes “being of reason” to mean the very work of reason insofar as it has dialectical art. But against this: the holy Doctor says that such a being of reason is properly the subject of Logic; therefore he is not speaking of an object per accidens or material object. For he immediately adds that this is every being of nature, insofar as it is subjected to intelligible intentions. He also says that those intentions with which the logician deals are not found in the nature of things, whereas acts of the intellect are found in the nature of things. Therefore, either the work of reason, insofar as it has dialectical art, is formally a being of reason not found in the nature of things—and thus we have what we seek, since according to St. Thomas this is the formal object of Logic—or it is found in the nature of things as such, which contradicts St. Thomas, who says it is not found there.

Others reply that St. Thomas is speaking of a being of reason, that is, an extrinsic denomination, which is the formal object of Logic. But against this: St. Thomas says that Logic treats intentions that reason devises in things considered and that are not found in the nature of things. But those extrinsic denominations either are found in the nature of things insofar as they are extrinsic, in which case Logic does not treat them, or they are not found there but are formed by reason, in which case they are beings of reason, as we maintain.

Finally, others say that St. Thomas is speaking of significant words, which the logician treats as means or instruments, and that the intentions of these words are something of reason. But St. Thomas clearly teaches the opposite, because he speaks of intentions that follow upon the operations of the intellect themselves and that reason makes in its own act, or devises in the things considered, as is clear in the passages from Metaphysics and Ethics cited above, and in Opusculum 42, ch. 4.⁵ Therefore, he is not speaking only of intentions of words, but also of intentions of things known, such as genus, species, and so on, or of those attributed to the proper operations of the intellect themselves.

Therefore, there can be no doubt about St. Thomas’s mind: he posits a being of reason as the formal object of Logic, just as he posits the things known and ordered concepts themselves as its material object, as is clear in the cited passages, in Opusculum 56,⁶ and Opusculum 70, final question, art. 1, ad 3,⁷ and in the first book of the Posterior Analytics, lecture 1.⁸

The basis of the conclusion is that every reality that can be found in the object of Logic is either an act of the intellect by which things known are denominated, the thing itself understood and represented, or something real added to and accruing to concepts or objects known through the ordering of Logic.

The first two pertain, according to their reality alone, to the material object of Logic, because real sciences deal with things known insofar as they are things, and philosophy deals with concepts insofar as they are real perfections of the intellect. Logic, then, formally treats them only insofar as they are ordered artificially. For example, it is per accidens and materially relevant to Logic that the intention of genus is in a tree or a stone; Logic does not treat the nature of the stone or tree itself, but the intention or formality of genus found in all of them.

If the last two are proposed, we ask: what is it that accrues to concepts or objects through Logic’s ordering? If it accrues to the objects themselves as known, it is a second intention and something of reason; for what belongs to things known does not belong to them as they are in reality, and so is not something real but something of reason. If, however, it is only an extrinsic denomination by which the things themselves are denominated as known in this or that way, and which does not supervene on things already known, this is objectionable for two reasons. First, this denomination is not something artificial, but follows naturally and without any art or comparison, as the denomination “seen” follows upon vision in the object. Second, many logical intentions belong only through comparing and relating one thing to another and presupposing that the thing is known and apprehended, such as the order of superior to inferior, subject to predicate, and composition in a proposition and syllogism. Therefore, these are not extrinsic denominations of something known, but something belonging by reason to things known.

If instead it is something accruing to the concepts or acts themselves as they are elicited by the intellect with some influence and ordering from Logic, this too is objectionable. For this ordering impressed on concepts or acts is not something entitative in relation to itself, but something representative or signifying an order toward objects. Logic does not care about the real entity of concepts, nor do concepts need Logic’s ordering for their elicitation, since they are natural and flow naturally from the power; once the species and the power or faculty are posited, they need no art for this emanation. Therefore, the order toward artificially ordered objects is indeed something real in concepts or acts, namely representation, by which they naturally regard objects even if those objects are not real. Yet this order is not the formal object of Logic, but at most an effect that Logic directs in other sciences, so that through Logic’s showing, they may tend and be ordered toward an object disposed in a logical way. But the impression of a higher power or art upon an inferior one, so that it may be ordered to the superior’s object or end, is only an effect of the superior, not its formal object. This is clear in architectonic arts, which direct inferior arts to their end, and in a higher angel illuminating an inferior one; for neither has as its object the act of the inferior that it orders or illuminates. Thus the formal object of such a higher light is not the inferior act that is illuminated, but the object by which the inferior proposition is illuminated. The reason is clear: when a superior power or art impresses upon an inferior and orders it to its own end, the superior is already presupposed to have an end and a specifying object of its own, to which it directs and orders the inferior. Therefore, what properly specifies the superior is not the impression and ordering of the inferior toward such an end, but the end itself, which is the superior’s object and whose order it effectively communicates to the inferior. Similarly, when Logic orders and illuminates the other sciences with respect to the artificial manner of reasoning, it will not have as its formal object the very acts of the other sciences as they tend and are really ordered toward their own ordered objects. Rather, what Logic considers in the object known and proposes to the other sciences to follow will be its formal object. This ordering of objects is certainly a second intention in the objects.

SOME RESPOND that Logic per se regards only the placement and arrangement of concepts, so that one is a predicate and another a subject, and so forth; but that something of reason results from this arrangement is not per se considered by Logic. Others say that Logic directs the intellect to elicit acts whose objects are ordered according to logical intentions; thus the immediate object of Logic is these acts, while the objects of these acts are something of reason insofar as they are ordered, and this is the remote object. Finally, others say that because the operations of the intellect are really perfected through Logic—otherwise the logician would not be more perfect in reasoning than an untrained person—it therefore has some real perfection as its object.

But against the first solution: the placement and arrangement of concepts is not a spatial arrangement, like stones in a house; it is the representation of and tendency toward things correctly placed and ordered among themselves. For concepts are not said to be ordered entitatively, as it were, but representatively and with respect to the objects with which they deal. Therefore, Logic principally regards the ordering of objects, and formally regards the tendency and representation of concepts as a means of attaining these ordered objects.

But against the second solution: Logic does not teach how to elicit acts as regards their entity, but how they are to be arranged artificially. And because an artificial arrangement is found in acts only insofar as they attain ordered and arranged objects, directing the intellect through Logic to elicit its acts artificially is the same as proposing the ordered objects themselves, about which the acts of the sciences are elicited. Thus Logic attains first and per se the second intentions of objects; it communicates to acts, effectively or by way of direction, the order of acts to those intentions.

The third solution, finally, misses the point. We do not doubt that attaining an object insofar as it is correctly ordered is a real perfection of cognition and science; but this is not the formal object of Logic, but the means by which the objects ordered by Logic are attained. This ordering in the objects themselves is something of reason and a second intention. But the acts’ attaining and tending toward such objects as ordered in this way is a real tendency and perfection, derived from Logic’s direction only effectively or by way of direction; for cognition and attainment of beings of reason is a real perfection in cognition.

BUT YOU WILL ASK TWO THINGS: First, is a second intention the formal object of Logic as an account under which or as an account that is attained? I answer that it is the account that is attained. For many properties are demonstrated of second intentions in Logic, such as predicability of the universal; therefore, it is a thing known through the science of Logic and consequently pertains to the account that is known. Hence St. Thomas calls these intentions the subject of Logic in Metaphysics IV, lecture 4.⁹ It is clear, however, that the subject is the thing that is known. The account under which, as in other sciences, is taken according to abstraction from matter, which supplies a mode of intelligibility under which a thing can be known in different ways according to how it is abstracted from matter, as will be explained more fully in Philosophy and in the final question of the Posterior Analytics.¹⁰ The object of Logic, however, which is a being of reason, has an abstraction like that of Metaphysics, namely from all matter—not by purifying actuality from matter, but by negating all matter.

The second question is: among the objects with which Logic deals, which is its principal object? I answer that the syllogism, which is formed through the third operation, is the principal object of Logic; and among syllogisms, demonstration is principal as regards matter. The reason is clear, because, as St. Thomas teaches in Perihermeneias I, lecture 1,¹¹ and Posterior Analytics I, lecture 1,¹² all three operations of the intellect are so related that the first and second are ordered to the third as their principal end, in which reasoning and discourse are perfected; these are correctly arranged through the syllogism and resolved with certainty and firmness through demonstration. Since, then, the science of Logic is properly and essentially directive of reason, that is its principal object in which reasoning and discourse are principally found with certainty and without error. But error occurs either through a defect of form or through contingency in matter. Therefore, as regards form, the principal object is a syllogism correctly arranged; as regards matter, the principal object is demonstration, in which the process of reason is found to be without error both as regards matter and form. Nevertheless, Logic also treats per se what pertains to the other two operations, though less principally, as we showed in Summulae I, q. 1, art. 1.

OBJECTIONS ARE RESOLVED.

First it is argued: A being of reason cannot be the object of a science first and per se; therefore the conclusion is false.

The antecedent is proved as follows. A being of reason is not per se and formally knowable, because it is not per se a being and thus does not per se ground knowability; therefore it is not per se knowable. Further, it has no properties caused by itself about which it could treat, since it causes nothing; nor does it have causes through which it could be known, since it is not caused. Therefore, no science is given directly and per se of such a being of reason.

The reply is that there is no science of a being of reason that has no foundation in or order toward a real being, as with a chimera and similar things. But a science per se can be given of a being of reason that has a foundation in a thing or an order toward a real being, just as sciences treat privations, privation is one of the natural principles in philosophy, and theologians treat many relations and distinctions of reason.

And to the reply: “It is not per se a being; therefore it is not per se knowable.” The consequence is distinguished. If “per se” means subjectively, it is not knowable; I concede. If “per se” means objectively, I deny; that is, it is not an entity in which knowability inheres as in a subject, yet it is an object attainable by some knowability. For something to be simply and univocally knowable, it suffices that it be per se attainable objectively by a power, insofar as the object grounds a necessary connection. Something can likewise be called possible in two ways: intrinsically, through the potentiality it has subjectively and materially to receive something in itself or to come to be in itself; or extrinsically, because as an extrinsic object it is related to an effective power, as St. Thomas teaches in the First Part, q. 9, a. 2. Yet both are simply and univocally possible. Similarly, something can be knowable either by reason of its intrinsic entity, which is the subject of knowability, or because it can be known objectively and can perfect the intellect objectively, as in the case of what is founded in a real being, even if it has its being from the intellect as though effectively; this suffices for it to be simply knowable. St. Thomas explains the Philosopher in this way in Metaphysics VII, lecture 4,¹³ when the Philosopher¹⁴ says that what is not knowable is knowable in a qualified sense. St. Thomas explains: “By derivation, because we can know of what is not knowable that it is not known; and likewise of what is not a being, because it is not.”

And to the second proof it is said that a being of reason does not have properties really caused, but it does have properties founded, following upon, or connected with it; nor does it have real and efficient causes of itself, but it does have foundational and formal causes that ground a true and necessary connection and truth. This is to have, as it were, causes metaphysically, not physically.

Second it is argued: Logic per se regards the operations of the intellect as things to be directed. But some real perfection accrues to these operations from Logic’s ordering; therefore it has something real that it regards formally as its object.

The major premise is clear and often asserted by St. Thomas in the passages cited above. The minor premise is proved as follows. First, understanding and reasoning are more perfect in a logician than in an untrained person who does not know the precepts of Logic. Second, it is proper to demonstration to generate science insofar as demonstration is correctly arranged; but it receives this arrangement from Logic. Third, prudence and the other arts direct their actions according to right morality and art, all of which is something of reason; yet because the directed actions are something real, prudence and the arts are said to have something real as their formal object. Therefore the same should be true of Logic.

The reply is: Presupposing what we said in the conclusion—that the matter directed by Logic is the operations of the intellect, which are arranged artificially, not by receiving something artificially made entitatively in themselves but representatively—not because representation itself is artificial (for concepts represent naturally), but because they attain objects artificially ordered by logical intentions, and thus the operations are denominated artificial by their object.

Hence it is said, in reply to the argument’s minor premise, that although the order and tendency of concepts toward correctly ordered objects is something real, this tendency is not the formal object of Logic, but that by which the intellect attains the objects ordered by Logic.

To the first proof it is said that the act of understanding is more perfect in a logician than in an untrained person in attaining and representing ordered objects better, just as an act of understanding that discerns relations of reason, privations, and other beings of reason is more perfect than one that does not discern them. It does not follow from this, however, that the formal object of Logic is that representation and tendency of cognition; rather, it is the ordering of the objects with which that cognition deals.

To the second proof it is said that the effective and physical causality by which the act of demonstration generates habitual science does not pertain per se to Logic as directing, but to the science that is directed. This effective generation belongs to that science by reason of the real acts of which demonstration consists. It pertains per se to Logic to consider in demonstration the correct syllogistic arrangement and suitability of the matter—that is, that the propositions be necessary and per se and correctly arranged. These are conditions required on the side of the object so that the scientific process may be ordered, not the very effective power of science.

To the third proof, it is said first that there is an evident difference between the arts that deal with external matter and Logic: those arts do regard an order formed and made by the intellect and producible externally through an executive power—for example, that pieces of wood be arranged in a certain shape, position, and placement. This whole is something real in itself, although it depends effectively on reason’s direction. Thus such artificial effects are not said to be something of reason objectively, but effectively: they proceed from reason as the efficient and directing cause of their production, but their being does not consist in objective formation or in being known objectively. Logic, however, regards what is in the object, not by reason of an intellect moving toward execution, but by reason of an intellect dealing purely with objects known.

There is likewise a difference between prudence and Logic, although prudence deals with practicable things, which are interior acts. For prudence has two parts: one deals with judgment about things and deliberation; the other deals with command and precept, or application to things judged and deliberated about. It is not inappropriate for the act of judging or deliberating to deal formally with something of reason, that is, with the very objects ordered by the rules of law or right judgment. This ordering posits nothing real in the things themselves, but is a denomination or relation of reason. Nevertheless, it is not called a second intention, because it belongs to things not as known but as appetible under a moral rule. The act of commanding and prescribing, however, which is principal in prudence, as St. Thomas teaches in the Second Part of the Second Part, q. 47, a. 8, does not directly regard objects by ordering them—for law and reason order them—but directly regards the application of the will to elicit acts concerning ordered objects, since the principal practical difficulty lies in this application. Therefore, in its principal act prudence formally regards the eliciting of acts, which are something real, rather than the ordering of objects. But Logic does not have an act of commanding and applying the will or other powers; it only orders objects in their known being through second intentions. Once this ordering has been made or proposed, without any new difficulty or application of command, the intellect itself or the other sciences form their acts concerning objects ordered in this way. Thus Logic does not formally deal with the eliciting of acts, as practical command does, but with the ordering of objects known.

Finally, it is argued: Logic has as its object the mode of knowing, namely definition, division, and so forth; for it supplies these to the other sciences. But these are formally acts of cognition arranged artificially. Therefore these acts, insofar as so arranged, are the object of Logic and do not pertain to another science; but in this respect they are something real, namely acts of the intellect.

It is confirmed that even if no beings of reason resulted in relation to objects, or even before they resulted, Logic would still have to direct cognition; therefore it does not formally deal with a being of reason as a being of reason.

The reply is that there is no doubt that the acts of reason by which definition, division, and the other instruments of Logic are formed are real entities, having an order of natural representation and tendency toward objects. Logic adds nothing to the acts over and above this tendency in order for them to be called ordered; rather, the whole difficulty concerns the objects known, insofar as they are ordered, and this ordering in the objects is something of reason. As regards eliciting acts toward these objects, there is no difficulty for Logic to overcome, but only a natural representation for the intellect to produce. Therefore, that the acts are real as regards their tendency toward objects and representation, I concede; that they are real as regards the objects ordered through an intention of reason, I deny. This latter formally pertains to Logic, although that by which such an object is attained must be a real concept and act.

Nor can it be said that Logic regards this artifice only by connotation, but formally and directly regards the acts, because the formal account by which those acts pertain to Logic is this artifice. It is by reason of the artifice that these acts pertain to the art, not by reason of their real entity, which is subject to this artifice insofar as it representatively regards that artifice in the ordered object; for in this way they are something natural and are considered by natural philosophy.

In reply to the confirmation, it is said that even if intentions did not result as beings of reason formally and according to objective existence, Logic would still be given to consider their accounts at least on the side of their foundation. But if such intentions were given neither formally nor fundamentally, Logic would not exist. Likewise, on the opposing view, if there were no extrinsic denominations or artificial and real directability of the acts themselves, Logic would not exist, since it deals only with that. As a matter of fact, however, precisely because Logic directs its acts artificially, a second intention results in the ordered objects, because, as we shall say in the following question, art. 4, from St. Thomas, from the very mode of understanding one thing in relation to another there results a relation of reason.

When St. Thomas says that Logic deals with acts of reason to be directed, just as the art of the smith deals with the actions of the hand, in the first book of the Posterior Analytics, lecture 1,¹⁵ the meaning is clear: it deals with acts of reason as matter to be directed, while presupposing the artificial form as the formal account of this direction. As was said, this form belongs on the side of the object with which the act of reason deals, just as the formal object of the smith’s art is not the actions of the hand but the things made by the hands.