Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Prima Pars Artis Logicae

This difficulty depends on matters to be treated in On the Soul III,¹ where the operations of the intellect are discussed. But since it also helps us fully understand in what way a proposition has the character of a whole and a term the character of a part, it is customarily treated here. We shall discuss it briefly, not at length.

I PRESUPPOSE, then, that in this difficulty we are not speaking of the act of judgment or assent falling upon the enunciation itself. We do not doubt that this is a simple quality, that is, a single act of the intellect. The reason is that the act of judgment is not formally composed; rather, it judges things already composed, and even things reasoned out and proved through the third operation. Thus it does not formally consist in a plurality of acts, but at most presupposes several acts about which it judges. In this way we preserve formally an act of judgment in God and the angels, although there is no formal composition of acts. We are speaking, then, of the enunciation that precedes judgment as apprehended, not as judged.

THE SENSE AND POINT OF THE DIFFICULTY CONSISTS in asking, when we inquire whether it is a composed or simple quality, whether it is a plurality of acts which constitutes and forms an enunciation through unity of order and continuation, or whether the enunciation is formed by a single act, though one resulting from the comparison and composition of several simple concepts. What is not at issue is whether it is a quality composed by physical composition, as a body is composed of matter and form. For concepts of the mind cannot be joined to one another in that way, since all are forms and acts, and neither is one matter while the other is form.

The AUTHORS are divided in resolving this difficulty, with arguments of nearly equal and disputable force. Some think that nothing more is required to form an enunciation than several concepts ordered among themselves, just as everyone agrees that in the third operation, which is reasoning, there is no quality or concept resulting from the ordering of propositions in an inference and the utterances constituting a syllogism, but rather several enunciations ordered among themselves. Others think that an enunciation is formed by some concept that orders simple concepts, or that results from those ordered concepts. Some think there is only one act, which not only directs and orders simple concepts but also represents the whole proposition. Others posit four acts: three representing subject, predicate, and copula in themselves, and a fourth directing and ordering those concepts among themselves. Only in this fourth does the proposition formally consist; in the others it consists presuppositionally.

FOR RESOLVING this difficulty, I presuppose that, in St. Thomas’s view, it is absolutely certain that the intellect’s second operation, in which an enunciation is formed, produces a concept or word distinct from the simple concepts produced by the first operation. The concept produced by the second operation has not merely a distinct ordering, but also a distinct representation. This is established by the clearest passages of St. Thomas. In Quodlibet 5, a. 9,² he says: “According to the Philosopher in On the Soul III,³ the intellect has two operations. One is called the understanding of indivisibles. The other is the operation of the intellect composing and dividing, according to which it forms a word. Each of these things constituted by the intellect is called a word of the heart; the first is signified by an uncomplex term, the second by speech.” And in Opusculum 13,⁴ he says: “The intellect forms two things according to its two operations. By the operation called the understanding of indivisibles, it forms a definition; by the operation in which it composes and divides, it forms an enunciation or something of that kind.”

WITH THIS PRESUPPOSED, THE ANSWER IS that it seems more probable in St. Thomas’s view that the concept of the second operation, by which an enunciation is formed, is one act and concept, not only by unity of order but by unity of quality, though formed from several simple concepts presupposed. The opposite view is also probable and is held among St. Thomas’s disciples: namely, that there are several concepts as qualities, composed only by unity of order.

But THE FIRST VIEW is followed by Cajetan, Summa theologiae I-II, q. 113, a. 7, § In respond. ad 2; the Ferrarien, Summa contra Gentiles I, ch. 55, § Ad horum evidentiam; Master Soto in his Summulists, chapter on the proposition; and other Thomists. St. Thomas strongly supports it in the cited passage of Summa contra Gentiles, when he says that “when several things are taken as united in some way, they are understood together. For the intellect understands a continuous whole all at once, not one part after another, and similarly it understands the predicate and then the subject, because it comprehends all the parts under one species of the whole.” So St. Thomas. He teaches exactly the same in Metaphysics VI, last lecture,⁵ and Summa theologiae I, q. 85, a. 4, and q. 58, a. 2. The causal phrase deserves attention: “because it comprehends all the parts under one species of the whole.” If, then, it knows both predicate and subject through one species comprehending them, either that species is expressed, in which case there is one concept, or it is impressed. In the latter case, although one impressed species can form several concepts, it can also form one if we use that species adequately; indeed, when it is taken in the manner of a whole, one species calls for one concept.

YOU WILL SAY: First, St. Thomas is speaking of a judging proposition or assent itself, not an enunciation. Second, he is speaking of one concept or species by unity of order, not unity of entity; for in Summa theologiae I-II, q. 113, a. 7, ad 2, he says that “we understand predicate and subject together insofar as they are united in the order of one affirmation, and in the same way free choice can be moved at once toward two things insofar as one is ordered to the other.” It is clear, however, that the will is moved by two acts, united only by order, and is not simply one act. The same, then, should hold for the intellect when it understands predicate and subject.

But against the first solution is the fact that judgment or assent is not composed of predicate and subject; rather, it falls upon an enunciation already composed, saying “So it is,” as we have already proved. St. Thomas, however, is speaking of that whole composed of predicate and subject, and says it becomes one, as is clear in the cited passage of Metaphysics VI,⁶ where he says that “when the intellect forms a composition or division from simple concepts, it understands both as one, insofar as something one is made from them.” Therefore, St. Thomas is speaking of the enunciation itself, as it is formed and composed from simple concepts, that is, from predicate and subject, not of judgment, which does not form the proposition but falls upon and judges it once formed.

Against the second solution, Cajetan aptly observes in his commentary on that passage of Summa theologiae I-II that free choice is not moved by one act toward God and sin, even if it is moved at once, because one is the reason for the other. The example of the intellect says more than is needed, because it also asserts unity of act. So Cajetan. Hence St. Thomas gave the example of the intellect, in which things are represented by one act or concept, to show that it is not incompatible for the will to be moved at an instant by two ordered acts. The cited passages show that St. Thomas posited unity of species or concept, and not merely simultaneity or ordering.

THE FOUNDATION is taken from what has been said: the intellect can comprehend several things under the character of one through a single concept or species having unity of representation. Therefore, since the second operation forms a new concept that regards several things under the unity of one composite having the character of a whole, it has adequate grounds for representing them by one concept or species. Certainly, when one thing is known with a connotation and relation to another, both can be understood under that relation by one concept one in entity, although it includes several things objectively as united. This is clear when an accident is represented concretely, as “white,” connoting a body, or a whole connoting its parts; and on the opposing view, when it represents one term—for example, the subject—not absolutely but as fitting the predicate, and the copula as joining the two. For unless the intellect represents them in this way, it will never unite them, even by unity of order. If, then, several things can be represented as united through one concept one in entity, one directly and the other by connotation as the term of a relation, why could one concept formed compositionally from several presupposed concepts not represent the whole composite as united and made one? Why should we not attribute to the concept of the second operation, which is more perfect, what belongs to a concept of the first operation representing several things as one, and even to external vision seeing several things in one act of sight? Finally, one science, which is one habit in entity according to St. Thomas’s view (Summa theologiae I-II, q. 54, a. 4, ad 3), suffices to attain discursively all the conclusions of that science, as we shall show in Logic II, q. 27, a. 2. Therefore, the same concept one in entity will suffice to attain all the terms enclosed under one composition in the manner of one.

THE OBJECTIONS FOR THE OPPOSITE VIEW ARE ANSWERED.

Nevertheless, the opposite view is also probable. Its first foundation is that our intellect is formally compositive, not merely objectively—that is, it does not merely apprehend a complex object, which an angel also does, but apprehends by several acts and concepts what an angel apprehends in one act. Therefore, we should not say that it forms a proposition by one concept; for then it would not formally compose or formally compare one thing with another, but only do so virtually. St. Thomas, however, explains this composition of the intellect as a comparison, not as a physical unity, as is clear at the end of Metaphysics VI, last lecture,⁷ where he says that “the composition or division by which the intellect joins or divides what it has conceived exists only in the intellect, not in things; for it consists in a certain comparison of two concepts, whether those two are the same in reality or different.” He could not express more clearly that composition and division consist not in one simple quality, but in many concepts ordered and united.

The same is drawn from Summa theologiae I, q. 58, a. 4, ad 1, where he says that there is no composition and division in angels, although there is a multitude of concepts, “because not every multitude causes composition, but only one in which one thing is attributed to another, which is not found in an angel.” Therefore, composition cannot be accomplished by the simple formation and production of one concept, but by the attribution and composition of one thing to another. He says the same in On Interpretation I, lect. 3,⁸ that truth and falsity “are not found in composition except insofar as [the intellect] compares one concept with another.” And in Summa theologiae I, q. 13, a. 12, he says that our intellect represents God through diverse concepts, representing that diversity through the plurality of subject and predicate. Therefore, subject and predicate are not represented by the one concept by which the proposition is formed.

Finally, speech is that which is subordinated to several concepts; this is how it is distinguished from a term. Therefore, it is not subordinated to only one concept.

The second foundation proceeds from a likeness: although a syllogism is composed of several propositions in the manner of one, it is not formed by one quality, but by several ordered among themselves; likewise, a hypothetical proposition is one only by unity of order. Why, then, would a categorical proposition not be sufficiently formed by coordinating and comparing the concepts of which it consists? Finally, a spoken proposition is composed of several words; therefore, so is a mental proposition. The consequence is proved because St. Thomas, in Summa theologiae I, q. 85, a. 5, in the “But on the contrary” argument, proves that there is composition in the mind from the fact that there is composition in spoken words.

Finally, several difficulties are accumulated: it would follow that the character of verb or copula, subject, and predicate is not formally in the intellect, because one concept one in entity cannot be that of which something is said, that which is said, and the copula by which it is said. It also follows that the same concept could be intuitive and abstractive knowledge, clear and obscure, as when I say “A stone is not an angel or is not God”: I see the stone clearly, but do not see the angel or God; I apprehend them obscurely. Finally, in negative propositions, as when I say “A human being is not wood,” one species cannot represent human being and wood to me, since one is denied and separated from the other. Therefore, several species must concur, and consequently several concepts.

These are the points that make this view probable, but do not prove it conclusively. Hence, maintaining the first view, we answer them as follows.

To the first foundation, we can say in one word that a proposition is called formally composed not by a formality of several entities or a composition of ordered concepts, but by forming one thing from several presupposed things, from whose comparison and collation a third species or concept is formed and results. This is just as the species of a golden mountain is formed from the species of mountain and gold; yet it is one not by unity of order, but by unity of entity. The way of forming one species from several things compared and collated with one another is very different from the simple concept and species of an angel. An angel not only has a concept simple in entity, but that concept is not formed from several things compared and collated with one another. Rather, by its natural efficacy and indivisible light in representing, it represents one thing and thereby all that belongs to it. Thus we do not deny that, in all the passages of St. Thomas, comparison and collation of concepts are required to form propositions. We say, however, that from such formation and collation one word or concept is produced, which is the term proceeding through the second operation, in the way St. Thomas himself says in Summa theologiae I, q. 12, a. 9, ad 2, that the species of a golden mountain is formed from the species of mountain and gold. And in q. 13, a. 12, he expressly says that our intellect represents the plurality of divine names through the plurality of predicate and subject, but represents unity or identity through composition. Clearly, then, besides the plurality of the concepts of subject and predicate, he posits unity or identity, in which composition itself consists. Since this identity and unity of composition is formed from the collation of several things, as though worked out and formed by the intellect’s art, which presupposes several things and does not represent them all by its first and natural efficacy, it is very different from the concept of an angel. The angel’s concept is simpler and more effective in representing a proposition because it is not formed and produced from several things presupposed and previously understood.

To the second foundation we answer that the case of a hypothetical proposition or syllogism differs from that of a categorical proposition. A categorical proposition is what the second operation of our intellect forms primarily and in the first instance. Therefore, since that operation produces a word and concept distinct from the first operation, it must form such a composition by producing one quality, and not merely join the concepts of the first operation by unity of order. Afterwards, to join several categorical propositions already formed, or to move from one to another by reasoning, it suffices to order the propositions among themselves; there is no need to produce another quality in the manner of one representation, but only an ordering or transition from one thing to another, which requires plurality. We can further investigate the reason from St. Thomas’s teaching in Summa theologiae I, q. 85, a. 5, where he teaches that the intellect’s composition is a sign of the identity of the things composed. For the intellect does not attribute one thing to another except by representing the identity by which predicate and subject are united in one thing, signified in the manner of something that has. “And according to this notion of identity,” St. Thomas says in reply to the third objection, “our intellect composes one thing with another by predicating.” St. Thomas teaches that this identity occurs in both accidental and substantial predications in Summa theologiae I, q. 13, a. 12, and that this unity or identity is represented through composition. From this we infer that in the composition made through the identity or removal of identity between the extremes, there is an adequate basis for representing all those parts as identified by one representation, just as the parts are represented by the species of the whole. This is what happens in a categorical proposition. In a hypothetical proposition, and still less in a syllogism, there is no predication of one thing of another and no identity of extremes; rather, several propositions are ordered among themselves. Therefore, there is no basis for attributing to them anything but unity of order among the propositions.

As to what is added about the composition of spoken words, we answer that words represent only through imposition. No single word, however, is imposed to represent an entire proposition; therefore, we must signify the mind’s composition through the continuation and ordering of words. In the mind, the intellect understands predicate and subject together, as we said above from St. Thomas, but not through continuation and succession. Thus when St. Thomas proves composition in the mind from the composition of words, he is speaking of composition on the side of the thing signified, not on the side of representation. For although in both speech and mind one thing is attributed to another, in the mind the species of the whole is formed, in which those parts are attributed; it is not formed in this way in speech.

As to the final difficulty, we answer that the first difficulty does not follow in any way. Predicate, subject, and copula are formally given both antecedently to the formation of the proposition and when the proposition is formed from the coordination and collation of those concepts of noun and verb, in the concept or species itself once formed. In it, predicate, subject, and copula are represented through the character of identity and unity of the whole, just as mountain and gold are represented in the species of a golden mountain, and windows and columns in the species of the whole house, and so on.

As to the second difficulty, I say that it is not incompatible for the same quality formed from several things to represent something intuitively and abstractively with respect to different things, namely, predicate and subject, but not with respect to the same thing. Second, intuitive and abstractive knowledge are found only in simple cognitions, not in composition or reasoning itself. Thus diverse cognitions—intuitive and abstractive, clear and obscure—are presupposed. In composition itself, however, only their identity or difference is considered; under this aspect they are brought together in one concept of identity or difference, although apprehensive and simple knowledge is never both clear and obscure with respect to the same thing. The fact that diverse impressed species can be presupposed in one proposition does not prove that one third species or concept representing them in the manner of one whole cannot be formed, just as from the diverse species of gold and mountain one species and concept of a golden mountain is formed. For just as the intellect can divide things that are united, it also commonly unites diverse things in its concept.