Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Prima Pars Artis Logicae

St. Thomas divided complete discourse into five species, which he enumerates in 1 Periherm., lect. 7,¹ namely, prayer, address, wish, question, and enunciation. All are complete discourses because they produce a complete, that is, unsuspended, sense in the mind of the hearer. We, however, in the present work treat only of enunciation, which is more perfect than the others and serves to express truth, a matter that properly belongs to the business of logic.

WE PRESUPPOSE what we said in book 2, chapter 6: in the usage of learned authors and in the common usage of logicians, enunciation and proposition are taken to mean the same thing, although they can connote different respects, as we explained there. To extricate ourselves from those distinctions, we have used the name “enunciation”; now we inquire into the common account of enunciation in which categorical propositions, which predicate a predicate of a subject, and hypothetical propositions, which join several categorical propositions and thus enounce and compose, agree.

Speaking, then, of enunciation in general, some think that it is not distinct from the act of judgment. They therefore say that a proposition is the intellect’s judgment itself, since judgment is properly capable of truth and falsity. They think that signifying truth or falsity belongs only to a spoken or written proposition. They add that when we form doubtful propositions, about which we make no judgment, such propositions consist only in unfinished concepts signifying the words themselves.

Others, distinguishing judgment, which is assent, from the enunciation or proposition upon which judgment falls and toward which it is directed, think that the essence of proposition as such consists in enunciating absolutely the connections or repugnances of things, from which it follows as a property that it signifies the true or the false.

Others think that the account of proposition as such is not to enounce just anything, absolutely, but to enounce one thing of another. Since this is not found in a hypothetical proposition, but only in a categorical one, they say that the essence of proposition in general consists precisely in enouncing—that is, signifying that something is or is not. It follows that the proposition is true or false, for by the force of its signification alone the proposition enounces. But it is true or false not by its signification, but because the thing signified or enounced is or is not as stated. They directly and simply exclude the hypothetical proposition from this account of enunciation.

Finally, others place the essence of a proposition in its being an affirmative or negative discourse.

I SAY, FIRST: Enunciation does not consist in judgment or assent. A judging proposition must be distinguished from an enunciating one, and judgment can in itself be subsequent to and follow upon enunciation.

This follows from St. Thomas, ST II-II, q. 173, a. 2, and De veritate, q. 12, a. 7,¹ where he says that sometimes a light is given to someone for judging, and sometimes for receiving and ordering, or composing, preexisting species. But this composition or ordering of preexisting species is the composition and ordering of an enunciation, because it is the composition of some signified complex truth, which is found only in an enunciation. Therefore enunciation is distinct from judgment.

And THE REASON IS CLEAR, because judgment is the intellect’s assent concerning something capable of such assent and judgment. Only a complex truth signified by an enunciation is capable of such assent. Therefore the act of judging is distinct from the formation of an enunciation.

The major premise is clear, because judgment is that by which the intellect is determined in assenting that something is or is not so. But it cannot pronounce that something is or is not so except concerning something complex, connected by a verb, as experience shows; this is an enunciation. Therefore the enunciation is formed and apprehended first, and then judged. Finally, it is clear that we sometimes apprehend an enunciation about doubtful things without any judgment, as when we say, “The stars are even in number,” “A treasure is in this place,” about which we do not know how to judge and determine assertorically. Therefore enunciation is one thing, judgment or assertion another.

Note that an enunciation, by reason of the verb of which it consists, both has the power to connect the extremes and has the power to express assertive judgment. Thus judgment and enunciation can sometimes be formed, as it were, by a single act, as when I say, “Man is an animal,” expressing in is both connection and assertion. At other times they are separated, because is is taken precisely with the force of connecting, not asserting.

I SAY, SECOND: The account of enunciation in general consists in this: it is a complete discourse expressing a complex object about which judgment can be made; from this it follows that it signifies the true or the false.

Thus, insofar as it is a complete discourse, enunciation is distinguished from incomplete discourse, which produces a suspended sense. By “expressing a complex object,” and so forth, it is distinguished from other complete discourses that cannot express an object of judgment, such as vocatives, interrogatives, and the like. This is St. Thomas’s opinion in On Interpretation I, lecture 7,² where he says that this is the definition of enunciation: “An enunciation is a discourse in which there is truth or falsity.” Truth or falsity is said to be in an enunciation as in a sign, but in the mind as in a subject; here “in the mind” means the same as in the mind’s judgment. For truth is not immediately in the faculty itself, but in an act of the faculty, and in no act other than judgment. Hence St. Thomas immediately distinguishes enunciation from other discourses, since they do not express a rational judgment, in which truth or falsity consists. Therefore enunciation, as common to categorical and hypothetical propositions, is best explained by saying that it signifies a complex object on which judgment can fall, in which truth and falsity are found. By “complex object” we mean both a complex object formed by the verbal copula joining predicate and subject, and a hypothetical copula joining categorical propositions; judgment is made about either complex, and can have truth or falsity. A discourse on which no judgment can fall, whether assent or dissent, is not an enunciation. On the same matter, see St. Thomas, Opusculum 48, Treatise on Enunciation, chapters 4 and 5.³

The reason is that this account explains the distinction between enunciation and other discourses, the common account of hypothetical and categorical propositions, and also the way they signify truth or falsity. That is the point.

This seems to be what the authors intended to express when they said that the essence of enunciation is a discourse enouncing connections or repugnances among things, or that it is an affirmative or negative discourse. In all these formulations they meant to suggest that enunciation must signify the complex object on which judgment can fall. It can likewise express that judgment when the verb is taken not only in the force of connecting but also in the force of assertion. Thus the signification of connection has as its object what assertion or judgment can fall upon.

I SAY, THIRD: Truth or falsity, as to the actual exercise of conformity or nonconformity, are accidents of a proposition and of a judgment.

And, as St. Thomas says in the cited Opusculum 48,⁴ they are relations of reason. Thus, signifying truly or falsely is not the essence of a proposition; the essence is only to signify an object on which a true or false judgment can fall. The conclusion’s first part is clear from what Aristotle says in the chapter on Substance,⁵ that “the same discourse, remaining unchanged, can change from true to false,” as when I say, “Peter is sitting”: while he is sitting, it is true; when he is not sitting, it is false. Yet the proposition is always the same, because it says and signifies the same thing. Therefore a change in truth or falsity does not change the substance of the enunciation, and truth and falsity are only accidents. Moreover, an enunciation is completed by complex signification, while truth is completed by conformity and adequation to being or nonbeing. This conformity and adequation differs from the adequation of signification and representation, which is found even in sense and simple apprehension, where formal truth is not found. The conformity and adequation of truth consists instead in the adequation and conformity of an affirmation, by which a thing’s being or nonbeing is affirmed or denied, not merely represented. Since an enunciation is completed by signifying a complex object on which assertion and the affirmation of judgment can fall, truth and falsity are consequently accidents of that signification, not the substance of enunciation.

I SAY, FINALLY: The truth of a proposition, formally, in the aspect of adequation or conformity to being or nonbeing, consists in an indivisible and admits of no more or less. Fundamentally, however, in the aspect of certainty and firmness—in which this conformity and adequation has immutability or mutability—it does admit of more and less: one truth is greater than another, and one proposition truer than another, that is, more certain and firm in not changing its truth.

The reason is that between being and nonbeing there is no middle or range, since they are contradictorily opposed. Therefore a proposition’s conformity to being and correspondence with it, insofar as it departs from nonbeing and does not conform to it, or conversely, has no range and admits neither more nor less. The same is true of any relation that consists in an indivisible, such as equality: however one departs from it, one falls away from equality or conformity. But certainty and firmness, which ground truth not as to conformity and correspondence, but as to mutability or immutability in possessing truth, admit of more and less, according as the connection is more or less necessary. In this sense God is supreme truth, because supremely firm, and created truths are firmer the more necessary they are.**

And if you say: even this indivisible adequation in created truths is caused and participated in from God; therefore such truth is greater in God than in creatures, even as to what is indivisible, and so one truth is formally greater than another in him.

It is answered that this conformity of truth in creatures is caused. When it is inferred, “Therefore it is greater in God than in creatures, even in the formality of truth,” the claim is distinguished: it is denied that it is greater on the side of the range of the object about which truth is concerned; let it pass that it is greater on the side of certainty and firmness, and on the side of the being, dependence, and participation of one thing from another. Thus participated truth is always less than unparticipated truth. But because both concern being or nonbeing, there is no range, more, or less in this respect; this pertains to the object and its correspondence in truth. That truth, in reaching being and departing from nonbeing, is more perfect, firm, immutable, and so forth, does admit of more and less. But there is never more or less between being and nonbeing, about which truth is concerned, whether in created or divine truth. Equality is likewise participated from the equality that is in God; created equality is less in its perfection and being, but not in its failure to depart from the point of equality and conformity to its term. If it departed from it in any way, there would be inequality.

OBJECTIONS ARE RESOLVED.

First it is objected to prove that there is no enunciating proposition distinct from a judging proposition. If an enunciation existed before judgment, it would be true or false in signifying, since its essence consists in signifying truth or falsity. Consequently, before judgment it could actually be true or false if the object is or is not as it is signified. But it is unacceptable for truth or falsity to exist before judgment, as St. Thomas teaches in Summa theologiae I, q. 16, a. 2, and De veritate, q. 1, a. 3,⁶ and at the end of Metaphysics VI.⁷ The reason is clear: by merely apprehending an enunciation no one is called mistaken or knowing. Otherwise, someone who apprehended something false without assenting to it would have a false intellect, which is absurd; for God apprehends many false things and is not deceived.

THE REPLY is that truth or falsity is found both in judgment and in enunciation: in judgment, as asserted and judged; in enunciation, as signified and apprehended. Thus formal truth is in judgment as in a subject, but in enunciation as in a sign, as St. Thomas says in On Interpretation I, lecture 7,⁸ and in Sentences I, distinction 19, question 5, article 1, reply to objection 7: “Truth,” he says, “is properly found in the second operation and in its sign, which is enunciation.”⁹ From truth merely apprehended or represented, the intellect is not called mistaken, knowing, deceived, or false; it is so called only from truth judged, namely, when it assents or consents to deception or truth. Nor does St. Thomas deny that truth is found in enunciation by way of representation; he denies that it is found there by way of assent.

Second, you argue: Signifying truth or falsity belongs to things other than enunciation; therefore it is not its definition.

The antecedent is proved. First, even judgment itself, which for us is an act distinct from enunciation, is capable of expressing and representing truth or falsity, as when we assent to a proposition by saying, “So it is.” Second, the words “true” and “false” express truth and falsity, yet they are not an enunciation.

This is confirmed because signifying truth or falsity is to signify indeterminately and under a distinction. It is determined when something signifies a particular truth or a particular falsity. Therefore this does not explain the definition of a proposition, which ought to indicate determinate signification. Moreover, some propositions are determinately true, such as those in natural subject matter.

Nor can one say that a proposition in general signifies truth or falsity, while in particular it signifies determinate truth or determinate falsity. For against this is that the essence of proposition in general would then be defined only by dividing its inferior kinds, just as if we said that animal is a living thing that is either a human being or a horse. Such a definition would be unsuitable, because it would be given through the opposing members that divide the common notion, confusing division with definition.

THE REPLY denies the antecedent. To the first proof we say that signifying truth or falsity is found differently in judgment and in enunciation. In judgment truth is expressed assertorically; in enunciation it is expressed only complexively, although the intellect sometimes exercises both together, signifying the connection of the extremes and at the same time asserting being or nonbeing, as when I say, “Man is an animal.” The word “is” signifies both the connection of the extremes and the intellect’s assertive assent. At other times the signification of assertion is separated from the signification of the connection of the extremes, as when judgment is suspended after an enunciation has been uttered. What we say about the connection of the extremes in a categorical proposition applies to the connection of categorical propositions in a hypothetical one. Signifying truth or falsity in this way—not assertorically, but as it were copulatively, by way of the copula and the union of extremes on which judgment can fall—belongs not to judgment itself but only to enunciation.

To the second proof we say that the words “true” and “false” signify truth or falsity nominally, as the same thing, not as a complex enunciable object on which judgment can fall.

To the confirmation we answer that an enunciation always has determinate signification on the side of the complex object it signifies. But the truth that follows from such signification, or from a judgment made about it, can vary while the enunciating discourse itself remains unchanged, as we said from Aristotle in the chapter on Substance. This truth or falsity does not belong to the essence of enunciation.

And as to what is added about propositions of determinate truth or falsity, we answer that they take their determinate essence not from determinate truth, but from the determinate object signified, whose connection is of such a nature that truth follows from it immutably. Therefore the stated definition, “to signify truth or falsity,” is not to be understood precisely, as if the disjunction between true and false had to be found in every proposition. It is to be understood accommodatively: by the force of the signified object, which is a certain complex, truth or falsity can result, sometimes determinately and immutably and sometimes not, according to the subject matter of the proposition. This is not to define proposition by its division, but by its object, which is capable of truth or falsity, either of both or only one. Nor is it unsuitable to define something by opposites, not as if they belonged to or constituted it simultaneously, but because it can receive them successively, just as substance is said to be capable of contraries.

Third it is argued: Signifying truth or falsity, even on the side of representing a complex object, cannot be the essence of enunciation; therefore the definition is unsuitable.

The antecedent is proved: the representation of a complex object in the mind is a natural representation; therefore it can never be false, but is always true, like simple apprehension. The consequence is clear, because St. Thomas says in Summa theologiae I, q. 17, a. 3, that in simple apprehension there can be truth but not falsity because it is a natural likeness, which can never be unlike its object, but always conforms to it. Therefore, in the same way, an enunciation cannot sometimes fail to conform to what it enounces, which it signifies naturally.

THE REPLY denies the antecedent. To the proof we say that there is a wide difference between the natural likeness of a simple object and of a complex object represented by way of composition. Since the likeness of an enunciation results and is formed by composition of several things, and not by the object’s natural impression, deception can result in the composition itself, insofar as one thing is attributed to another when it does not belong to it. For this reason St. Thomas also allows deception and falsity in the definition itself, Summa theologiae I, q. 17, a. 3.¹⁰ A simple object’s likeness, however, since it proceeds from the object’s own natural impression and not from any composition, is not capable of falsity but only of naturally representative adequation. Moreover, an enunciation can represent the very assent of judgment and not merely the connection of the extremes; in this respect it is capable of falsity if the assent itself is false.

Finally it is argued, because the definition given does not apply to every hypothetical proposition; therefore it has not been adequately given for proposition in general.

The antecedent is clear in this conditional: “If a man has wings, he flies.” It does not signify truth, but a consequence. Therefore not every proposition signifies truth or falsity.

This is confirmed because copulative propositions do not state a truth distinct from a categorical proposition, but an aggregation of truths. If that aggregation is a truth distinct from its constituent parts, it is not a hypothetical truth but a categorical one, since it is one truth arising from two things conjoined or aggregated. For example, if you say, “Peter runs and John reads,” what is signified is that both propositions are true; but to say that both are true is something categorical.

THE REPLY is that hypothetical propositions, insofar as they are such, can have their own truth and falsity distinct from categorical propositions. Their verification does not occur by predicating one thing of another, but by conjoining or disjoining several categorical propositions. Nevertheless, they do not always express truth itself, except when they proceed to assert and express some assent of judgment. A simple discourse likewise has no truth unless it is assertive and enunciative. Therefore, if that conditional or similar propositions are taken precisely with the force of consequence, they do not express truth but an inference; an inference is called good or bad, not true or false. But if they affirm or promise something under a condition, they then have hypothetical truth, and the definition of proposition applies to them. The reply to the confirmation will be given in article 3. For now, we say that the truth resulting conjointly from the parts is not categorical truth, although it depends on and results from categorical truths, because formally it does not consist in predicating one thing of another, but in joining several propositions, which calls for a different judgment and a different truth. That it can be designated by a single categorical proposition, signifying that both propositions are true, does not remove the hypothetical truth consisting in the conjunction of propositions, on which the reflexive proposition falls, by which that hypothetical copula is explained categorically—as if designating in a marked act what that hypothetical truth consists in. We will return to this in article 3.

This difficulty depends on matters to be treated in On the Soul III,¹ where the operations of the intellect are discussed. But since it also helps us fully understand in what way a proposition has the character of a whole and a term the character of a part, it is customarily treated here. We shall discuss it briefly, not at length.

I PRESUPPOSE, then, that in this difficulty we are not speaking of the act of judgment or assent falling upon the enunciation itself. We do not doubt that this is a simple quality, that is, a single act of the intellect. The reason is that the act of judgment is not formally composed; rather, it judges things already composed, and even things reasoned out and proved through the third operation. Thus it does not formally consist in a plurality of acts, but at most presupposes several acts about which it judges. In this way we preserve formally an act of judgment in God and the angels, although there is no formal composition of acts. We are speaking, then, of the enunciation that precedes judgment as apprehended, not as judged.

THE SENSE AND POINT OF THE DIFFICULTY CONSISTS in asking, when we inquire whether it is a composed or simple quality, whether it is a plurality of acts which constitutes and forms an enunciation through unity of order and continuation, or whether the enunciation is formed by a single act, though one resulting from the comparison and composition of several simple concepts. What is not at issue is whether it is a quality composed by physical composition, as a body is composed of matter and form. For concepts of the mind cannot be joined to one another in that way, since all are forms and acts, and neither is one matter while the other is form.

The AUTHORS are divided in resolving this difficulty, with arguments of nearly equal and disputable force. Some think that nothing more is required to form an enunciation than several concepts ordered among themselves, just as everyone agrees that in the third operation, which is reasoning, there is no quality or concept resulting from the ordering of propositions in an inference and the utterances constituting a syllogism, but rather several enunciations ordered among themselves. Others think that an enunciation is formed by some concept that orders simple concepts, or that results from those ordered concepts. Some think there is only one act, which not only directs and orders simple concepts but also represents the whole proposition. Others posit four acts: three representing subject, predicate, and copula in themselves, and a fourth directing and ordering those concepts among themselves. Only in this fourth does the proposition formally consist; in the others it consists presuppositionally.

FOR RESOLVING this difficulty, I presuppose that, in St. Thomas’s view, it is absolutely certain that the intellect’s second operation, in which an enunciation is formed, produces a concept or word distinct from the simple concepts produced by the first operation. The concept produced by the second operation has not merely a distinct ordering, but also a distinct representation. This is established by the clearest passages of St. Thomas. In Quodlibet 5, a. 9,² he says: “According to the Philosopher in On the Soul III,³ the intellect has two operations. One is called the understanding of indivisibles. The other is the operation of the intellect composing and dividing, according to which it forms a word. Each of these things constituted by the intellect is called a word of the heart; the first is signified by an uncomplex term, the second by speech.” And in Opusculum 13,⁴ he says: “The intellect forms two things according to its two operations. By the operation called the understanding of indivisibles, it forms a definition; by the operation in which it composes and divides, it forms an enunciation or something of that kind.”

WITH THIS PRESUPPOSED, THE ANSWER IS that it seems more probable in St. Thomas’s view that the concept of the second operation, by which an enunciation is formed, is one act and concept, not only by unity of order but by unity of quality, though formed from several simple concepts presupposed. The opposite view is also probable and is held among St. Thomas’s disciples: namely, that there are several concepts as qualities, composed only by unity of order.

But THE FIRST VIEW is followed by Cajetan, Summa theologiae I-II, q. 113, a. 7, § In respond. ad 2; the Ferrarien, Summa contra Gentiles I, ch. 55, § Ad horum evidentiam; Master Soto in his Summulists, chapter on the proposition; and other Thomists. St. Thomas strongly supports it in the cited passage of Summa contra Gentiles, when he says that “when several things are taken as united in some way, they are understood together. For the intellect understands a continuous whole all at once, not one part after another, and similarly it understands the predicate and then the subject, because it comprehends all the parts under one species of the whole.” So St. Thomas. He teaches exactly the same in Metaphysics VI, last lecture,⁵ and Summa theologiae I, q. 85, a. 4, and q. 58, a. 2. The causal phrase deserves attention: “because it comprehends all the parts under one species of the whole.” If, then, it knows both predicate and subject through one species comprehending them, either that species is expressed, in which case there is one concept, or it is impressed. In the latter case, although one impressed species can form several concepts, it can also form one if we use that species adequately; indeed, when it is taken in the manner of a whole, one species calls for one concept.

YOU WILL SAY: First, St. Thomas is speaking of a judging proposition or assent itself, not an enunciation. Second, he is speaking of one concept or species by unity of order, not unity of entity; for in Summa theologiae I-II, q. 113, a. 7, ad 2, he says that “we understand predicate and subject together insofar as they are united in the order of one affirmation, and in the same way free choice can be moved at once toward two things insofar as one is ordered to the other.” It is clear, however, that the will is moved by two acts, united only by order, and is not simply one act. The same, then, should hold for the intellect when it understands predicate and subject.

But against the first solution is the fact that judgment or assent is not composed of predicate and subject; rather, it falls upon an enunciation already composed, saying “So it is,” as we have already proved. St. Thomas, however, is speaking of that whole composed of predicate and subject, and says it becomes one, as is clear in the cited passage of Metaphysics VI,⁶ where he says that “when the intellect forms a composition or division from simple concepts, it understands both as one, insofar as something one is made from them.” Therefore, St. Thomas is speaking of the enunciation itself, as it is formed and composed from simple concepts, that is, from predicate and subject, not of judgment, which does not form the proposition but falls upon and judges it once formed.

Against the second solution, Cajetan aptly observes in his commentary on that passage of Summa theologiae I-II that free choice is not moved by one act toward God and sin, even if it is moved at once, because one is the reason for the other. The example of the intellect says more than is needed, because it also asserts unity of act. So Cajetan. Hence St. Thomas gave the example of the intellect, in which things are represented by one act or concept, to show that it is not incompatible for the will to be moved at an instant by two ordered acts. The cited passages show that St. Thomas posited unity of species or concept, and not merely simultaneity or ordering.

THE FOUNDATION is taken from what has been said: the intellect can comprehend several things under the character of one through a single concept or species having unity of representation. Therefore, since the second operation forms a new concept that regards several things under the unity of one composite having the character of a whole, it has adequate grounds for representing them by one concept or species. Certainly, when one thing is known with a connotation and relation to another, both can be understood under that relation by one concept one in entity, although it includes several things objectively as united. This is clear when an accident is represented concretely, as “white,” connoting a body, or a whole connoting its parts; and on the opposing view, when it represents one term—for example, the subject—not absolutely but as fitting the predicate, and the copula as joining the two. For unless the intellect represents them in this way, it will never unite them, even by unity of order. If, then, several things can be represented as united through one concept one in entity, one directly and the other by connotation as the term of a relation, why could one concept formed compositionally from several presupposed concepts not represent the whole composite as united and made one? Why should we not attribute to the concept of the second operation, which is more perfect, what belongs to a concept of the first operation representing several things as one, and even to external vision seeing several things in one act of sight? Finally, one science, which is one habit in entity according to St. Thomas’s view (Summa theologiae I-II, q. 54, a. 4, ad 3), suffices to attain discursively all the conclusions of that science, as we shall show in Logic II, q. 27, a. 2. Therefore, the same concept one in entity will suffice to attain all the terms enclosed under one composition in the manner of one.

THE OBJECTIONS FOR THE OPPOSITE VIEW ARE ANSWERED.

Nevertheless, the opposite view is also probable. Its first foundation is that our intellect is formally compositive, not merely objectively—that is, it does not merely apprehend a complex object, which an angel also does, but apprehends by several acts and concepts what an angel apprehends in one act. Therefore, we should not say that it forms a proposition by one concept; for then it would not formally compose or formally compare one thing with another, but only do so virtually. St. Thomas, however, explains this composition of the intellect as a comparison, not as a physical unity, as is clear at the end of Metaphysics VI, last lecture,⁷ where he says that “the composition or division by which the intellect joins or divides what it has conceived exists only in the intellect, not in things; for it consists in a certain comparison of two concepts, whether those two are the same in reality or different.” He could not express more clearly that composition and division consist not in one simple quality, but in many concepts ordered and united.

The same is drawn from Summa theologiae I, q. 58, a. 4, ad 1, where he says that there is no composition and division in angels, although there is a multitude of concepts, “because not every multitude causes composition, but only one in which one thing is attributed to another, which is not found in an angel.” Therefore, composition cannot be accomplished by the simple formation and production of one concept, but by the attribution and composition of one thing to another. He says the same in On Interpretation I, lect. 3,⁸ that truth and falsity “are not found in composition except insofar as [the intellect] compares one concept with another.” And in Summa theologiae I, q. 13, a. 12, he says that our intellect represents God through diverse concepts, representing that diversity through the plurality of subject and predicate. Therefore, subject and predicate are not represented by the one concept by which the proposition is formed.

Finally, speech is that which is subordinated to several concepts; this is how it is distinguished from a term. Therefore, it is not subordinated to only one concept.

The second foundation proceeds from a likeness: although a syllogism is composed of several propositions in the manner of one, it is not formed by one quality, but by several ordered among themselves; likewise, a hypothetical proposition is one only by unity of order. Why, then, would a categorical proposition not be sufficiently formed by coordinating and comparing the concepts of which it consists? Finally, a spoken proposition is composed of several words; therefore, so is a mental proposition. The consequence is proved because St. Thomas, in Summa theologiae I, q. 85, a. 5, in the “But on the contrary” argument, proves that there is composition in the mind from the fact that there is composition in spoken words.

Finally, several difficulties are accumulated: it would follow that the character of verb or copula, subject, and predicate is not formally in the intellect, because one concept one in entity cannot be that of which something is said, that which is said, and the copula by which it is said. It also follows that the same concept could be intuitive and abstractive knowledge, clear and obscure, as when I say “A stone is not an angel or is not God”: I see the stone clearly, but do not see the angel or God; I apprehend them obscurely. Finally, in negative propositions, as when I say “A human being is not wood,” one species cannot represent human being and wood to me, since one is denied and separated from the other. Therefore, several species must concur, and consequently several concepts.

These are the points that make this view probable, but do not prove it conclusively. Hence, maintaining the first view, we answer them as follows.

To the first foundation, we can say in one word that a proposition is called formally composed not by a formality of several entities or a composition of ordered concepts, but by forming one thing from several presupposed things, from whose comparison and collation a third species or concept is formed and results. This is just as the species of a golden mountain is formed from the species of mountain and gold; yet it is one not by unity of order, but by unity of entity. The way of forming one species from several things compared and collated with one another is very different from the simple concept and species of an angel. An angel not only has a concept simple in entity, but that concept is not formed from several things compared and collated with one another. Rather, by its natural efficacy and indivisible light in representing, it represents one thing and thereby all that belongs to it. Thus we do not deny that, in all the passages of St. Thomas, comparison and collation of concepts are required to form propositions. We say, however, that from such formation and collation one word or concept is produced, which is the term proceeding through the second operation, in the way St. Thomas himself says in Summa theologiae I, q. 12, a. 9, ad 2, that the species of a golden mountain is formed from the species of mountain and gold. And in q. 13, a. 12, he expressly says that our intellect represents the plurality of divine names through the plurality of predicate and subject, but represents unity or identity through composition. Clearly, then, besides the plurality of the concepts of subject and predicate, he posits unity or identity, in which composition itself consists. Since this identity and unity of composition is formed from the collation of several things, as though worked out and formed by the intellect’s art, which presupposes several things and does not represent them all by its first and natural efficacy, it is very different from the concept of an angel. The angel’s concept is simpler and more effective in representing a proposition because it is not formed and produced from several things presupposed and previously understood.

To the second foundation we answer that the case of a hypothetical proposition or syllogism differs from that of a categorical proposition. A categorical proposition is what the second operation of our intellect forms primarily and in the first instance. Therefore, since that operation produces a word and concept distinct from the first operation, it must form such a composition by producing one quality, and not merely join the concepts of the first operation by unity of order. Afterwards, to join several categorical propositions already formed, or to move from one to another by reasoning, it suffices to order the propositions among themselves; there is no need to produce another quality in the manner of one representation, but only an ordering or transition from one thing to another, which requires plurality. We can further investigate the reason from St. Thomas’s teaching in Summa theologiae I, q. 85, a. 5, where he teaches that the intellect’s composition is a sign of the identity of the things composed. For the intellect does not attribute one thing to another except by representing the identity by which predicate and subject are united in one thing, signified in the manner of something that has. “And according to this notion of identity,” St. Thomas says in reply to the third objection, “our intellect composes one thing with another by predicating.” St. Thomas teaches that this identity occurs in both accidental and substantial predications in Summa theologiae I, q. 13, a. 12, and that this unity or identity is represented through composition. From this we infer that in the composition made through the identity or removal of identity between the extremes, there is an adequate basis for representing all those parts as identified by one representation, just as the parts are represented by the species of the whole. This is what happens in a categorical proposition. In a hypothetical proposition, and still less in a syllogism, there is no predication of one thing of another and no identity of extremes; rather, several propositions are ordered among themselves. Therefore, there is no basis for attributing to them anything but unity of order among the propositions.

As to what is added about the composition of spoken words, we answer that words represent only through imposition. No single word, however, is imposed to represent an entire proposition; therefore, we must signify the mind’s composition through the continuation and ordering of words. In the mind, the intellect understands predicate and subject together, as we said above from St. Thomas, but not through continuation and succession. Thus when St. Thomas proves composition in the mind from the composition of words, he is speaking of composition on the side of the thing signified, not on the side of representation. For although in both speech and mind one thing is attributed to another, in the mind the species of the whole is formed, in which those parts are attributed; it is not formed in this way in speech.

As to the final difficulty, we answer that the first difficulty does not follow in any way. Predicate, subject, and copula are formally given both antecedently to the formation of the proposition and when the proposition is formed from the coordination and collation of those concepts of noun and verb, in the concept or species itself once formed. In it, predicate, subject, and copula are represented through the character of identity and unity of the whole, just as mountain and gold are represented in the species of a golden mountain, and windows and columns in the species of the whole house, and so on.

As to the second difficulty, I say that it is not incompatible for the same quality formed from several things to represent something intuitively and abstractively with respect to different things, namely, predicate and subject, but not with respect to the same thing. Second, intuitive and abstractive knowledge are found only in simple cognitions, not in composition or reasoning itself. Thus diverse cognitions—intuitive and abstractive, clear and obscure—are presupposed. In composition itself, however, only their identity or difference is considered; under this aspect they are brought together in one concept of identity or difference, although apprehensive and simple knowledge is never both clear and obscure with respect to the same thing. The fact that diverse impressed species can be presupposed in one proposition does not prove that one third species or concept representing them in the manner of one whole cannot be formed, just as from the diverse species of gold and mountain one species and concept of a golden mountain is formed. For just as the intellect can divide things that are united, it also commonly unites diverse things in its concept.

THAT THIS DIVISION IS ANALOGICAL is thought by various authors, moved by different grounds. Some seem to derive this from St. Thomas, who appears to teach it expressly in opusc. 48, treatise On Enunciation, chapter 6,¹ and On Interpretation 1, lecture 8,² since a hypothetical proposition is not one simply, but one by conjunction, as the Philosopher says in the same place, in the chapter On Enunciation.³ But the account of being and of one being is the same; therefore what is not simply one proposition is not simply a proposition.

Others rely on another ground: they think that at least conjunctive and disjunctive propositions are not, strictly speaking, hypothetical propositions, because they do not signify an enunciative connection, but merely contain propositions joined together accidentally, that is, by the mere simultaneity of utterance.

I SAY, FIRST: The division of proposition into categorical and hypothetical is substantially a division of genus into species, although it has a certain mode of an analogical division.

This view is more common among Thomists and is drawn from St. Thomas, opusc. 48, treatise On Enunciation, chapter 6,⁴ where he first says that this division is as an analogate into its analogates (the word as here indicates a mode), but later adds that this division divides proposition with respect to substance, because it divides it on the side of copulation or conjunction; the division into affirmative and negative, however, divides with respect to quality; and finally the division into universal and particular divides with respect to quantity. St. Thomas therefore holds that the hypothetical pertains to the substance of proposition, and hence that proposition is preserved univocally in it, because its substance is preserved. Accordingly, he finally adds⁵ that when we ask what proposition is, we ask about the substance of proposition, and thus answer that it is “categorical and hypothetical.” Therefore whoever says “hypothetical proposition” says “the substance of proposition.” Nevertheless, because on the side of the thing signified categorical and hypothetical stand as one and many, one prior and the other posterior, it is said to have a mode of analogy, as we shall explain later.

THE FOUNDATION OF THE CONCLUSION consists in this: a hypothetical proposition has everything required for the essential character of an enunciation, insofar as it is hypothetical. For as such it is a complete discourse, and not under the species of an optative, interrogative, or any other kind; therefore it is enunciative.

The antecedent is clear. That it is discourse is evident, since it has significant parts and is not a mere expression, but a mode of knowing. That it is complete is clear because it leaves the hearer’s understanding not suspended, but complete, as when I say: “Peter runs and John sits”; “If Peter runs, Peter moves.”

The consequent, however, is evident: First, by considering the species of complete discourse that we set out above, at the beginning of this question, from St. Thomas. A hypothetical proposition does not make discourse optative, vocative, imperative, or interrogative, as is clear in these propositions: “If a human being runs, he moves”; “John reads and Paul debates.” Therefore it must be enunciative. Also, a hypothetical proposition, insofar as it is such, signifies a truth or falsity distinct from that of a categorical proposition. For judgment is made not only about each categorical proposition but also about the hypothetical conjunction itself—not with respect to the arrangement of inference as in a consequence, but with respect to whether it is or is not so. This is clear in the proposition: “If a human being were a horse, he would be hinnible.” A false judgment is formed about each of the categorical propositions, but a true one about the whole hypothetical proposition. The same holds for a conjunctive proposition and the other hypotheticals. This is therefore a sign that the hypothetical, insofar as it is such, pertains to the character of enunciation, since it signifies a truth or falsity distinct from the categorical proposition, which is the essence of enunciation. Thus, just as complex and incomplex terms agree univocally, although one signifies a composite thing and the other a simple one, so hypothetical and categorical propositions agree univocally in signifying truth, although one is simple and the other composite.

I SAY, SECOND: Conjunctive and disjunctive propositions truly and in the strictest sense are hypothetical propositions.

This is stated expressly by St. Thomas, opusc. 48, treatise On Enunciation, chapter 14.⁶ “A hypothetical proposition,” he says, “is divided into three species: one is conditional, another disjunctive, and another conjunctive.” He says the same in the same work, treatise On Syllogism Simply So, chapter 16.⁷

And THE REASON FOR THIS is that they meet the definition of a hypothetical proposition, which St. Thomas defines as “that which has two categorical propositions as its principal parts.” This is most evident in a conjunctive or disjunctive proposition. Also, the truth and judgment given about a conjunctive or disjunctive proposition differ from the truth and judgment given about a categorical one; more is required to verify one than the other. To verify a disjunctive proposition, it suffices for one part to be verified; to verify a conjunctive proposition, both parts must be verified. The judgment and truth about each categorical proposition separately differ from the judgment and truth about both together, and about whether not only one but also the other is so. This is much clearer in a disjunctive proposition: when one part is false, the whole disjunctive proposition is true. Therefore the judgment and truth of the whole differ from those of the part.

THE OBJECTIONS ARE ANSWERED.

First it is argued: St. Thomas expressly affirms that the division of proposition into categorical and hypothetical is a division of an analogate into analogates, as is clear in opusc. 48, treatise On Enunciation, chapter 6,⁸ because categorical enunciation is one simply, whereas hypothetical enunciation is one by conjunction.

He says the same in On Interpretation 1, lecture 8,⁹ where he says: “An enunciation is one absolutely if it signifies one thing of one thing, or one in a qualified sense, namely, if it is one by conjunction.” Therefore we say, contrary to St. Thomas, that this division is univocal.

And it is confirmed because a hypothetical proposition is called one in a qualified sense, or one by conjunction, insofar as it signifies many things nevertheless united by a certain conjunction. Therefore, at least in the character of a sign, a hypothetical proposition is one in a qualified sense. Therefore it is so also in the character of a proposition, for a proposition is essentially a sign. If, then, it is not one simply in the character of a sign, but only in a qualified sense, neither will it be one simply in the character of a proposition, which is essentially a sign, but only one in a qualified sense.

IT IS ANSWERED that in that work St. Thomas did not say absolutely that this division is a division of an analogate into analogates, but that it is divided “as an analogate into its analogates”—that is, it has the mode of an analogical division, though not its substance. St. Thomas likewise teaches in On the Power of God, question 9, article 2, reply to objection 6,¹⁰ that the division of substance into first and second is not a division of genus into species, but rather of an analogate into analogates. Nevertheless, as we shall see in Logic, it is commonly held that this division is univocal; St. Thomas is interpreted as speaking of an analogical division with respect to its mode.

This univocity in substance and analogy in mode consists in this: two things are considered in a proposition. One is considered with respect to substance, that is, the signification of truth or falsity, or of a complex object insofar as it can be enunciated and judged; in this respect, as we said, categorical and hypothetical propositions agree univocally. The other concerns the identity and unity of discourse insofar as it signifies absolutely; this belongs to the side of the matter, namely, significant discourse, just as in the case of a term whether it is complex or incomplex. With respect to this there is a mode of analogy, insofar as a hypothetical proposition is constituted from categorical propositions and truth is found first in a categorical proposition and afterward in a hypothetical one. But not every priority and posteriority entails true analogy, as is clear in numbers: one number is prior to another and composes it, yet they are not analogical in the character of number. Rather, priority and posteriority in participating in a superior character make for analogy. This explanation is taken from St. Thomas himself, On Interpretation 1, lecture 8,¹¹ where he says: “It is evident that an enunciation which is one by conjunction is also many, and is many insofar as it signifies many things and not one.” And below:¹² “Some enunciation is one simply insofar as it signifies one thing; some is many simply insofar as it signifies many things, but is one in a qualified sense insofar as it is one by conjunction.” Therefore only on the side of the thing signified, and of the unity or identity of signification, is signification called one simply or in a qualified sense. But with respect to the truth asserted and enunciated, St. Thomas does not deny that a hypothetical truth is one simply.

To the confirmation it is answered, first, that even if the character of sign, which is superior, is analogical, it does not follow that the inferior character is not univocal. This is clear in being, in which human being and plant agree analogically, though not with respect to the character of living thing or substance. Second, it is said that the character of sign is not absolutely the genus of a logical artifact, but is so under the character of an artful sign. Thus the character of sign, taken almost materially and absolutely, can be multiplied in simple and complex enunciation; but under the character of an artful, complex, enunciable thing it can have unity simply, insofar as it signifies one truth, even if it is hypothetical. In this way complex and incomplex terms are made univocal in the character of term, just as houses with only one room and houses with twenty rooms are univocally houses.

Second it is argued: A hypothetical proposition is not a single concept of the mind or a simple quality, but a number of ordered concepts, whereas a categorical proposition is one simple concept, as the probable opinion holds. Therefore they do not agree univocally.

IT IS ANSWERED that the argument proves that, in the being of a quality or in entitative and physical being, hypothetical and categorical propositions stand as one and many, which are one in a qualified sense and by unity of order. Nevertheless, in an artful and logical manner, they agree univocally in the character of enunciating truth. Thus, in the character of an enunciable artifact, a hypothetical proposition is one simply and in its own right. A vessel made from one continuous quantity of gold, or assembled from several separate pieces, is univocally a vessel in the character of an artifact, although not with respect to the physical character of quantity or of one substance. And the character of term found in the first operation, and discourse or syllogism found in the third, agree univocally in the character of a logical artifact, though not in physical unity.

To the confirmation it is answered that although a hypothetical proposition is composed from what is formal in a categorical proposition, this very formal element composes materially, not formally. Something is said to compose formally when its formality and essence consist in the character of a composing part, as matter and form do in physical things; in this way it is not divided alongside the whole, but is included in it. But when something is itself a certain whole, though it can compose another thing by means of its formal element—which the other essentially requires for its composition—it is not said to be formally a composing part, although it composes by means of its formal element, because formally it is not a part. Thus it can be a species divided alongside what it composes, just as binary and ternary are species of number, although ternary is essentially constituted from binary.

Finally it is argued against the second conclusion that a conjunctive or disjunctive proposition is not one proposition but many, joined only by the simultaneity of their combined utterance, since they have no truth other than that of their categorical propositions taken together or disjunctively. But such conjunction or disjunction does not make a distinct proposition, only an aggregation of several; therefore they are not species of enunciation.

The antecedent is proved: beyond the aggregation of categorical truths, a conjunctive proposition has no other truth than signifying that both categorical propositions are true, or, if it is disjunctive, that one is true. But this proposition, “Both of those propositions are true,” is a certain third categorical truth. Therefore there will never be a hypothetical truth that, insofar as it is such, is a species distinct from the categorical; if it has a distinct truth, that truth is as it were reflexive and is explained through the categorical proposition “Both are true” or “One is true.”

IT IS ANSWERED: The major is denied. In proof of it, it is said that from the aggregation of categorical truths, made disjunctively or conjunctively, another truth results. Because it depends on categorical truths, it is called a hypothetical truth, since it has categorical propositions as its principal parts. And although the reflexive signification, considered in the act as signified, by which both are said to be true is explained through a categorical proposition, this does not remove the fact that the object signified by that reflexive proposition—which is the hypothetical proposition itself—is in itself a certain truth that is not categorical but hypothetical. For that reflexive categorical proposition is true only because what it signifies is true. But what is signified is that not only one proposition but also the other is true, which is a hypothetical truth and not a simple one. If that reflexive explanation through a categorical proposition sufficed to remove hypothetical truth, then the conditional itself would not be hypothetical, and a syllogism would not be discourse consisting of propositions, since we define a conditional reflexively through one categorical proposition by saying it is a conjunction of several propositions by means of the particle “if,” and that a syllogism is discourse that infers a conclusion from premises. It does not follow, however, that a syllogism is not composite discourse or that a conditional is not truly hypothetical.

Some think that the division into affirmative and negative is accidental, because it is a division according to the quality of proposition, while quality presupposes the essence and substance of a thing. The quality of proposition consists in affirming and denying, just as quantity consists in universality and particularity. Others think it is analogical because it is given according to priority and posteriority: affirmation is prior to negation. As for the division into universal and particular, almost everyone agrees that it is accidental.

NEVERTHELESS, the express view of St. Thomas is that the division of proposition into affirmative and negative is univocal, a division of genus into species. He says so in On Interpretation 1, lecture 8,¹ and more clearly in opusc. 48, treatise On Enunciation, chapter 6. It is clear from St. Thomas’s view that this division is essential and univocal. In the treatise On Enunciation, chapter 6,² after saying that it is a division of genus into species, he adds below that “this division pertains to the quality of enunciation, namely its essential quality, insofar as a difference signifies a ‘what sort of thing.’”

THE FOUNDATION of this view: To prove that the division is univocal, St. Thomas argues against Alexander that the affirmative and negative alike participate in the essential character of enunciation, namely “to signify what is true or false.” For an affirmative proposition signifies what is true or false just as properly and essentially as a negative proposition does.

That the division is essential rather than accidental is proved from the fact that it is a division according to the essential form of proposition, which is the copulation of the extremes signifying truth, insofar as it is grounded in their agreement or disagreement with one another. For before the agreement or disagreement of the extremes, no substance of enunciation can be conceived. The very character of enunciation is first conceived and constituted essentially when the extremes are understood as united in relation to truth. Therefore an essential difference in the character of this union produces an essential difference in the character of enunciation. It is for this reason that a hypothetical proposition differs essentially from a categorical one: it differs in its character and manner of copulating and composing. But negative copulation differs essentially from affirmative copulation, since negation is essentially opposed to affirmation, in that it wholly destroys it.

I SAY, SECOND: The division of proposition according to quantity, namely into universal, particular, and so on, is not essential but accidental.

WE PRESUPPOSE that quantity is not found in every proposition, but only in a proposition consisting of a common term. If its subject is singular, the proposition has no quantity, because quantity in propositions is considered according to the extension of the subject to more or fewer things. A singular proposition, however, has no extension, since it applies to only one thing; hence it is as if indivisible in the genus of propositional quantity.

FROM THIS IT IS CLEARLY INFERRED that this division according to quantity is accidental. First, because it is not taken according to what is essential in proposition, namely the signification of truth or the copulation of the extremes, but according to the extension of the subject in it to the things to which the predicate can apply. Second, because if the whole essence of proposition can be found in an individual without that quantity, as in a singular proposition, then the division according to quantity is not essential.

BUT IF YOU SAY: Some propositions can differ in species solely by reason of quantity. For example, if you say “Every human being is white” and “Some human being is white,” the first is false and the second true, solely by reason of quantity. Therefore different quantity produces an essential and specific difference.

It is answered by denying the antecedent, because truth and falsity are not essential differences, as we said above.³ Hence, from the mere fact that one proposition is true and the other false because quantity varies, it does not follow that they are essentially different. This is especially true with respect to the essential difference of proposition on the side of form and artful composition; in this respect there is no essential difference between those two propositions. But on the side of matter, namely because the thing signified is different, there is no impediment to some propositions differing specifically because they signify things distinct in species. This is not by reason of quantity: even if they have the same quantity, they differ in species in this way, as when you say “Every human being is an animal” and “Every horse is neighing.”

THE OBJECTIONS ARE ANSWERED.

First it is argued to prove that proposition is not rightly divided into affirmative and negative. For affirmation and negation are explained through being and nonbeing: one affirms by saying that something is, and denies by saying that it is not. But nothing common, nor any third middle term, can be given between being and nonbeing, since they are immediately opposed. Therefore this division is neither good nor univocal, since nothing is univocal with respect to being and nonbeing.

And it is confirmed because affirmation and negation are presented according to priority and posteriority. Affirmation is prior to negation, for negation is grounded in affirmation, as is clear from Aristotle, On Interpretation 1, chapter On Enunciation,⁴ and St. Thomas there, lecture 8.⁵ Therefore this is not a division of genus into species, but of an analogate into analogates. The consequence is clear, because the species of one genus are simultaneous by nature, as is said in the Postpredicaments;⁶ therefore one cannot give a division of genus by species that stand to one another as prior and posterior.

IT IS ANSWERED that some are badly troubled by this argument, but without foundation. For I grant that there is no middle between being and nonbeing, nor can anything common be abstracted from them. But there can be something common abstracted from “signifying being or nonbeing,” namely signifying complex extremes and uniting them, which are afterward determinately signified as united by affirmation or negation: one signifies being, the other nonbeing. Thus being and nonbeing themselves are opposed contradictorily, whereas affirmative signification and negative signification are not opposed contradictorily but contrarily, because each signification is positive. They stand as two species of artful and complex signification, and this complex enunciative signification is the common character between them.

To the confirmation it is answered from the teaching of St. Thomas, On Interpretation 1, lecture 8,⁷ and opusc. 48,⁸ where he solves this very argument: not every priority and posteriority constitutes analogy. This is clear in the species of number: one number is prior to another, and yet they are univocally numbers. Potency, habit, and act likewise have a character of priority and posteriority, yet they are univocally qualities. Rather, the priority that makes things participate unequally in a superior character—so that in one it is found primarily and in its own right, and in another in a qualified way and accidentally—makes for analogy, as “being” with respect to substance and accident, and “healthy” with respect to an animal and a plant; for in one it is found priorly, in the other posteriorly. The species of one genus are said to be simultaneous by nature in the simultaneity of their participation in the superior character, not in the simultaneity of their existence with one another.

Second it is argued: The same thing divided cannot be divided by two essential divisions, since essential differences divide a genus equally and are opposed to one another in an adequate way within the same genus. But proposition is divided essentially into categorical and hypothetical, as was said in the preceding article; therefore it cannot again be divided essentially into affirmative and negative, since one division is not contained under the other.

And this is confirmed because the species of genera that are not subordinated cannot be the same, as is said in the Antepredicaments.⁹ But categorical and hypothetical are genera that are not subordinated; therefore they cannot be divided by the same essential differences. Yet each can be divided into affirmative and negative, and, in turn, both affirmative and negative can be divided into categorical and hypothetical. Therefore these divisions cannot be essential, but are accidental.

IT IS ANSWERED, first, that there is no difficulty in the same thing being divided immediately by several essential divisions when the divisions are inadequate—that is, when an essence is constituted by several formalities, each of which can be divided into certain species. This is the teaching of St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I–II, question 95, article 4, body, where he says that “there are many things belonging to the character of human law, according to any one of which human law can properly and in its own right be divided.” There he enumerates different divisions of human law that are per se and essential, according to inadequate considerations. Indeed, in divisions of the categories it is not necessary for every division to be made into two adequate species; it can be made into several species by which the same genus can be divided. For example, animal can be divided into walking and flying, and again into crawling and swimming, and into many diverse essential species. Similarly, quality is divided immediately into habit and disposition, potency and incapacity, and so on.

Second, one can answer that affirmation and negation are not an immediate division of proposition, but its subdivision. For proposition is first divided into categorical and hypothetical, and categorical proposition into affirmative and negative. St. Thomas took this from the Philosopher, On Interpretation 1, chapter On Enunciation,¹⁰ lecture 8,¹¹ saying that “one enunciation is one simply, another is one by conjunction.” He immediately adds: “Another subdivision of enunciation is that, if an enunciation is one, it is either affirmation or negation.” This will be explained more fully just below.

To the confirmation it is answered from this last solution that the antepredicamental rule has no place here, since the division into categorical and hypothetical and the subdivision of the categorical into affirmative and negative involve genera subordinated to one another.

And when it is urged that hypothetical proposition too is divided into affirmative and negative, the answer is, first, that hypotheticals are not said to be affirmative or negative per se, except by reason of the categorical propositions of which they consist. For the hypothetical copulas themselves are not properly denied; rather, verbal copulas are denied, and from their negation hypothetical propositions too are made negative. Hence, when contradictories are formed among hypotheticals, negations are placed in the categorical copulas, not in the hypothetical ones (unless perhaps negation is placed before the whole enunciation). For example, if you say this conjunctive proposition, “Peter runs and John reads,” its contradictory will be this disjunctive proposition: “Peter does not run, or John does not read.” Master Soto rightly observes this in Summulae 3, chapter 9, note 5, where the hypothetical copulas, namely the terms “and” and “or,” are not denied in either place.

Second, it is answered that if a hypothetical proposition is divided per se into affirmative and negative, this affirmation and negation is very different from the affirmation and negation that divides categorical proposition, because categorical and hypothetical copulas are very different; therefore they cannot receive affirmation and negation according to the same character. For a categorical copula is a verb, whereas the copula of a hypothetical proposition is a mode, such as “and,” “or,” or “if.” It is like quality, which as a disposition in its genus is divided into permanent disposition, which is habit, and passing disposition, which is merely disposition; yet when quality is also divided into passion and passible quality according to whether it is permanent or passing, it is not divided by the same differences of permanence and transience as disposition, but by different ones.

Finally it is argued: Some propositions are at once affirmative and negative, or of mixed quality, such as this proposition: “Peter is and was not white.” Therefore this division is not essential, because two essential differences cannot belong to the same individual. Nor can one say that this is two propositions rather than one, for it consists only of one subject and predicate and can be judged with a single judgment. Therefore it is formally one, although it can be virtually multiple, since many propositions can be formed from it.

And this is confirmed because affirmative and negative propositions can be synonymous, such as “A human being is rational” and “A human being is not irrational”; therefore they are of the same species. The consequent is clear because they regard the same object, and species is taken from the object.

IT IS ANSWERED that propositions of mixed quality virtually contain two propositions, because they are as it were twofold, although they are said of the same subject, since the copula is multiplied. Nevertheless, because it is formally one proposition, a proposition of mixed quality that entails an affirmative proposition will be said to belong to the species of affirmative propositions, and the one that is entailed by a negative proposition will belong to the negative species, as we said in the text, in the chapter on the divisions of proposition.¹² Thus one proposition is not constituted formally in two species, but formally in only one; virtually, however, since it is twofold, it belongs to two.

To the confirmation it is answered that although those two propositions are of the same species on the side of matter, or of the subject considered materially, nevertheless they are different on the side of form and the artful mode of enunciating. In this way they are of the same species posterioristically, but different prioristically. For from the same object and matter one can form an enthymeme and a syllogism, which are different in species in the character of artful discourse and consequence, but then will be of the same character posterioristically.