Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Prima Pars Artis Logicae

Not everyone accepts the definition given by Aristotle¹; they reject it because it seems to coincide with complex terms, or terms of a composite form. For these have parts that signify separately, and therefore the whole definition of speech seems to fit them. Hence they define speech differently, as “several expressions or terms suitably arranged,” as though this too were not found in a complex term.

Others alter Aristotle’s definition, thinking that speech must consist of a noun and a verb, or at least a verb, even if not a noun. They therefore define speech as “a significant conventional voice consisting of a noun and a verb suitably agreeing with each other, or at least of a verb and a voice, if it is not significant.”

Others accept Aristotle’s definition but take issue with what is defined in speech. They think the definition of speech belongs to a voice only denominatively, as to a subject or substitute of which it is said that it is speech. They are right if “voice” is taken in itself and absolutely. But they add that this definition belongs essentially to what results from the voice and its complex signification, as to what speech is, rather than to what is said or denominated as such; in this they proceed as they do in defining a term.

Finally, others also accept Aristotle’s definition but say that the form of speech is the grammatical union of its parts.

I SAY FIRST: The best definition of speech is the one given by the Philosopher, and it is essential and quidditative in the same way as the definition of a term and a noun given above.

This conclusion is common among Aristotle’s interpreters. To explain it, it is enough to give St. Thomas’s teaching on On Interpretation I, lect. 6,² where he explains this definition very well. Speech concerns the intellect’s second operation, or the intellect as composing, not as simply apprehending. This is evident in itself, since by speech we express something joined and composed with another, whereas by a term we express something uttered separately and simply. Therefore, speech must involve several parts or expressions not merely by way of an accumulation or confused multiplication, but by way of ordering and union—and not just any union, but one that makes and composes some whole. For the parts of a complex term are also suitably arranged; but because they compose not a whole but a part, a complex term is not speech, as we will say shortly. Since, then, the definition of speech defines a certain composed and complete artifact, it is very unsuitable to explain it by saying that it is “several expressions,” which is found in a term. A composite thing is not aptly defined by saying that it is several parts, but by saying that it is one thing composed of parts, or a certain total sign or significant voice consisting of parts.

When the Philosopher says, “some part of which signifies separately as an expression,” St. Thomas rightly observes two things.³ First, the Philosopher did not say, “a part of which, separated, signifies something,” but “some part of which is significant.” This is because of negations, says St. Thomas, and syncategorematic terms, which do not signify something but signify in some way, and yet are parts of speech. Second, the Philosopher says that a separated part signifies “as an expression, not as an affirmation,” because it is enough for speech that one of its parts be a simple expression; it need not be an affirmation or negation, though this too can be found in some speech, namely, in hypothetical speech. Speech had to be defined here as common to all; moreover, the character of a part in itself is found only in an expression or term. A proposition, even if it composes a hypothetical proposition, is not a part in itself and primarily, but accidentally, as we said above when treating the term.⁴

From these points it follows that speech need not consist of a noun and a verb as its parts. This is also clear from complete speeches themselves, since many do not consist of a noun but of infinitive verbs, as in “to run is to move,” as St. Thomas teaches in On Interpretation I, lect. 8.⁵ Indeed, it can consist of a verb and an adverb, as in “one runs quickly,” “it is well,” and so on. Among imperfect speeches too, which St. Thomas says in lect. 6⁶ truly are speeches, although they produce an imperfect sense, there is an imperfect speech without a verb, as when I say “a just man.” St. Thomas calls this speech in On Interpretation I, lect. 4,⁷ because it has significant parts and produces an imperfect sense—that is, one suspended in the hearer’s mind. Therefore, it is an imperfect speech without a verb. On the other hand, one can also be found with a verb but no noun. Therefore, it is not of the essence of speech in general to consist of both a noun and a verb, or of either one of them in particular.

I SAY SECOND: An imperfect speech and a complex term coincide materially and differ only formally.

There are complex terms that join several incomplex terms, such as “white man.” We say that the same words can also be an imperfect speech, but they differ according to the different formal character of a whole and a part, even when the part itself is composite. Parts can be joined in one thing in two ways. First, their composition can terminate in that thing as in a whole. Second, they can compose it without stopping there, instead being ordered further to a whole that the composed part also regards. An example of the first is the way bodily parts, such as an arm or a foot, are ordered to compose an animal, which is a whole, and their union terminates there. An example of the second is the way the parts from which an organic part is constituted—for example, flesh, sinews, and the like—compose it. These parts do not compose the organic part as a whole, but as a more principal part ordered to compose the whole itself. Thus the composed part and the whole are called “composed” in different ways. A composed part has the parts of which it consists quasi-materially, not formally—that is, not under the formality of a part in relation to a whole. That formality consists in the parts being joined so that they stop at the whole itself and are not ordered to anything further. But when they compose something without stopping there, and are ordered further to a whole, that thing is said to have parts, but not under that formality of a part. Nevertheless, if the organic part itself is separated from the animal and becomes a whole, its parts are ordered to it formally as parts, that is, under the formality and relation of part to whole.

In the present case, therefore, a complex term, such as “white man,” has parts not formally but materially, like a composed part and not like a whole, because those parts are joined in the complex term in such a way that through it they are ordered to constitute some whole. But the same complex, “white man,” when separated and taken after the manner of a whole, is an imperfect speech, just as a separated organic part is a whole; while it is in the animal, it is not a whole but a composed part. Therefore, a complex term and an imperfect speech differ only by this formality of whole and part.

I SAY THIRD: What is defined in speech is neither a third thing constituted and resulting from a significant voice and the form or second intention of speech, nor the significant voice itself in itself, which merely receives the form, is its subject, and is denominated speech; rather, it is the very notion and form of speech taken concretely.

This conclusion has no difficulty other than the one common to every definition of an accident taken concretely, which was settled above when treating the definition of a term; see there.⁸

I SAY FINALLY: The essential form of speech is not the union or grammatical connection by which its parts are joined.

Some think that the form of speech is this union of parts, but they are mistaken. Union is indeed the form and act of things insofar as they are capable of union; nevertheless, it is not the form that essentially constitutes the whole, but applies and unites the essential form to its matter or subject. Therefore, union, insofar as it is union, is not the constitutive form of a composite, nor can a specific and intrinsic form constituting a whole consist in it. For in its intrinsic notion, union means a means, application, or copula of extremes; therefore, it presupposes other extremes that constitute the thing and are united through it as through a means. Hence union itself is not the form that essentially constitutes, but one that applies the constitutive form.

BUT YOU WILL SAY: What, then, is the essential form of speech? We answer that just as in a physical whole there is a partial form, such as the soul in relation to the body, and a total form, such as humanity in relation to the supposit, so in speech the partial form will be the predicate, or something in place of the predicate, in relation to the subject—or rather (since, as St. Thomas says in On Interpretation I, lect. 8,⁹ one part in speech must determine another) the determining part is the form. If the parts determine one another, each is form insofar as it determines, and matter insofar as it is determinable, as is said in the mutual contract of marriage. The total form, however, is the very composed and complex signification insofar as it takes on the intention and relation of a whole. In this way it is related, as it were, in opposition to the term itself, which is a part: just as a term signifies after the manner of an artificial part, and this is its essential notion, so speech signifies complexly after the manner of a whole, and this is its essential form.

THE OBJECTIONS ARE ANSWERED.

You will object first: The definition of speech does not distinguish speech from a term; therefore, it is not a good definition.

The antecedent is proved: It does not distinguish imperfect speech from a complex term. For a complex term too is “a significant voice whose parts signify separately,” and yet it is truly a term, while imperfect speech is truly speech. Therefore.

WE ANSWER from what was said in the second conclusion: a complex term and imperfect speech can coincide materially, but they always differ formally, as was explained there.

But you will insist: An imperfect speech, even as speech, is a part; therefore, it does not differ from a complex term.

The antecedent is proved. First, St. Thomas says in On Interpretation I, lect. 6,¹⁰ that all parts of speech are referred to complete speech, of which imperfect speech is a part, since it too has parts that signify. Therefore, imperfect speech does not function as a whole but as a part. Second, complete speech is a whole complete in the genus of speech; therefore, imperfect speech is incomplete and something less than the whole, and therefore is a part. Finally, imperfect speech still belongs to the first operation, not the second; therefore, it is a part. The antecedent is clear from St. Thomas, Opusculum 48, treatise on Enunciation, ch. 3,¹¹ who says that something is missing from the sense produced by imperfect speech, because composition and division are missing. Therefore, what pertains to the second operation is missing, since the second operation is composition and division; therefore, it remains within the limits of the first operation.

We answer by denying the antecedent. To the first proof we say that St. Thomas calls imperfect speech a part either by taking “part” broadly for that which is an imperfect whole, since for that very reason it can be ordered to a perfect whole, at least as something to be perfected in the same line and genus of whole; or, if St. Thomas takes “part” strictly and properly, imperfect speech is understood to be a part materially, not formally—that is, insofar as it coincides with a complex term.

To the second proof we say that imperfect speech is something incomplex and less than the perfect whole, but not as a part; rather, it is an imperfect whole in process of becoming, in relation to the perfect whole. Imperfect speech is, as it were, speech begun in relation to complete speech.

To the third proof we say that St. Thomas denies imperfect speech the composition and division that function as affirmation and negation removing the mind’s suspension. In this way it lacks something of perfect composition and division, which generates a complete sense. It does not, however, lack the character of the second operation, which is imperfect composition and division. Indeed, the fact that it generates a suspended and imperfect sense proves that it differs from a complex term. A term, whether complex or incomplex, generates no sense at all, not even a suspended one, but only pure apprehension—of one thing, if it is an incomplex term, or of several things and concepts. Of these it generates only simple apprehension, and so remains within the notion of a term and a part. Imperfect speech, however, generates some sense beyond apprehension, although begun and imperfect, because it begins to pass beyond apprehension toward the composition of a whole, and there suspends rather than completes the sense. Therefore, it is a sign that it belongs to the second operation, but imperfectly and inchoately; thus it does not have the character of a part but of a whole.

Second, you will object: It is not of the essence of speech that its parts be significant, or that they not signify as an expression; therefore, this is wrongly placed in the definition of speech.

The antecedent is proved from speeches made up of non-signifying voices, such as “A is not B” and “blitiri is not a noun.” The same argument applies if “A” were imposed to signify the whole clause “man is white”; then it would be speech, and yet it would have no significant parts. As to the second part, it is proved that the speech “if Peter runs, he moves” does not have expressions as its parts, but speeches, namely “Peter runs” and “Peter moves.” Therefore, the parts of speech need not signify as expressions.

The argument can be confirmed by the probable opinion that a mental proposition is a simple quality; for then it has no significant parts. Therefore, that definition is not certain and common to every opinion.

WE ANSWER by denying the antecedent. To the first proof, we said above, q. 1, a. 2, when treating the term, how it is a significant voice. Here we add that the Philosopher did not say in the definition of speech that all its parts must signify separately, but that some part of it signifies separately. Thus, a proposition or speech made up of non-signifying voices has at least some significant part, for example, the verb “is”; for even speeches involving non-signifying terms cannot be made without a verb. See what we said there.

To the second proof we answer from St. Thomas, On Interpretation I, lect. 6,¹² that when speech is said to have significant parts, they must signify as expressions; this at least must be found in every speech. If it also has parts as affirmations, so much the better. Or, second, composite speech has parts as expressions mediately, since it is ultimately resolved into them.

To the confirmation we answer, in the discussion of the proposition below,¹³ that even if a mental proposition does not have parts entitatively, it has them objectively, because it signifies something complex. It also has them presuppositively, because it is formed from several apprehensive concepts as presupposed, although it does not have them formally and entitatively, as a certain quality does.

Finally, it is argued: Speech is formally a being of reason, because it is a second logical intention; therefore, it is not well defined by a voice, which is something real.

WE ANSWER that this is common to every logical instrument, which Aristotle invariably defines by a significant voice. Briefly, there is no problem in a second intention being founded on something real in the first intention and having it as the subject of denomination. Thus, there is no problem in defining a logical intention through something real as an extrinsic subject and foundation. We do not agree with those who say that speech or a term cannot absolutely be called a real being, but must be called a being of reason because formally it is a being of reason. If that were true, it could not absolutely be called a voice or a concept, since voice and concept are real beings. This is especially so because in artifacts the matter can be predicated of the whole, since it contains its entire substance, while the artificial form adds only an accident. Hence St. Thomas says in On Interpretation I, lect. 4,¹⁴ “one must grant that ‘a bowl is shaped wood,’ and likewise ‘a noun is a significant voice,’ although one can also grant denominatively that a bowl is wooden and a noun is vocal.” When the Philosopher denies in Metaphysics VII, text 25,¹⁵ that a statue is gold or stone, he is speaking of stone as unshaped and not subject to the form of art, but taken precisely as natural substance, as can be seen in St. Thomas’s explanation there.¹⁶ Therefore, since an accident or form taken concretely supposits for its subject, when the subject is something real and the form is a being of reason, it cannot absolutely be called a being of reason, but only with the qualification “formally”; absolutely, however, it can be called a real being by reason of that for which it supposits concretely.