Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Prima Pars Artis Logicae

It is clear from Aristotle in On Interpretation I, the chapters on the noun and the verb¹ that it is taken as certain that oblique cases are excluded from the notion of a noun, because they do not signify directly and by naming in themselves, which is required for the notion and function of a noun. Something is signified by naming when it is signified in the mode of a “what”; for in this way it is signified as standing, as it were, in itself, which distinguishes the notion of a noun from that of a verb, which signifies as if in the mode of what flows, not what stands in itself. But when something is signified in the mode of “whose” or “to whom,” it is not signified in the mode of what it is in itself, but as belonging to another; in this it falls short of and departs from the mode of substance and of what stands in itself, which pertains to the notion of a noun. Aristotle gives a sign of this in the chapter on the noun, and Thomas there at the end of lect. 4,² because oblique cases by themselves are not sufficient to constitute truth or falsity with the verb “is,” as the nominative is.

An oblique case cannot, however, be excluded from the notion of a noun by the phrase “of which no part, etc.,” because an oblique case as such is not complex, but follows the nature of its nominative form. For if the nominative is complex or incomplex, so too is the oblique. The mode of signifying “whose” or “to whom” does not multiply the concept or make it complex, but adds a mode to the same concept; otherwise the nominative, too, would be complex, because it signifies in the mode of “what,” just as an oblique case signifies in the mode of “whose.”

If you ask why Aristotle first defined a noun without the terms “finite” and “nominative,” and then added them to exclude infinite and oblique nouns, St. Thomas answers in On Interpretation I, lect. 5,³ that Aristotle first gave only the common notions of noun and verb, not definitions complete in every respect, including their special conditions, which he later expressed by adding those terms. For he began the definition with what is more common and afterward completed it by expressing more fully what is required for the notion of a noun without qualification.

THE QUESTION, however, is quite controversial: do oblique and nominative forms have concepts of the same notion and species in the intellect? We cannot examine this difficulty at length here, because it involves many matters pertaining to metaphysics.

Briefly, however, I say that two statements of St. Thomas are found in this regard, by which we can track down his view. The first is that, on the side of the thing signified, nominative and oblique forms signify the same thing and consequently have the same concept, as it were categorematically and logically: thus if a nominative form is absolute, connotative, common, univocal, and so forth, the oblique form is as well. For these are differences that are, as it were, categorematic and logical. This is taken from Thomas, On Interpretation I, at the end of lect. 4,⁴ where, following the Philosopher, he says “that the notion signified by a noun is the same also in the cases of the noun.” Therefore, on the side of the notion or thing signified, nominative and oblique forms have the same thing.

The second statement is in Quodlibet IV, a. 17,⁵ where the holy Doctor says “that a diversity of understandings can accompany a diversity of words, either because of a diversity in the thing understood or because of a diversity in the mode of understanding. This happens whenever there is a diversity of consignification that follows from a different mode of understanding one and the same thing; and it appears especially in time, which is mingled in itself with the operation of the human intellect. Therefore, one must say that the enunciable ‘Socrates sitting’ and ‘Socrates having sat’ are not the same.” Here Thomas plainly acknowledges that a difference of time in a verb requires different concepts. But the oblique cases of a verb are formed through different inflections of time, as the Philosopher says in On Interpretation I, the chapter on the verb,⁶ and Thomas there, lect. 5.⁷ The same account therefore seems to apply to the oblique cases of a noun; hence Thomas adds in the cited Quodlibet, in the reply to the third objection, “that diversity of signification removes the identity of a noun to such an extent that, according to the Philosopher, oblique forms are not nouns.”

Therefore, according to St. Thomas, one must say that oblique cases have a concept different from the nominative, not by reason of a different thing conceived, but by reason of a different mode of conceiving one and the same thing. For one and the same concept cannot represent one thing in the nominative and in the oblique, because in the oblique some relation and bearing is expressed that is not explained in the nominative: namely, the relation of possession or something like possession. For it is signified as “whose,” not as “what.” But where a different relation and bearing is expressed, there is a different concept and representation, because this relation pertains to a different mode of understanding and signifying one and the same thing. Although the concept does not vary on the side of the thing signified, it does vary in the notion and function of the noun, by turning from the mode of signifying as a “what” to the mode of signifying as “whose.” For this reason St. Thomas said that the identity of the noun is removed—namely, in its notion and mode of naming. This is clearer in the cases of a verb, since they vary according to the signification of different times, past or future, which undoubtedly require a different representation.

Two arguments remain. The first is that many modes which express a different relation and bearing posit only a different exercise of the concept, not a different representation; therefore, the same is true of oblique cases.

The antecedent is established by many examples. For the same concept can now be a predicate, now a subject, and can have this or that supposition, and can change from true to false without any intrinsic variation in its representation. The same is true of intuitive and abstractive cognition, according to the highly probable opinion that they are not essential differences of cognition.

The second argument is that if this mode of obliquity suffices to vary the intrinsic representation of a concept, we cannot avoid the conclusion that nominative and oblique forms differ categorematically, which we deny.

The consequence is proved: First, infinite nouns differ categorematically from finite ones; therefore, oblique cases differ from nominatives all the more. For oblique cases are farther from the categorematic notion—that is, of predicate or subject—than infinite nouns are. Second, every categorematic variation is only according to a different mode of expressing one and the same thing, as a noun and a verb can signify the same thing, as I run and running. But because one is in the mode of what flows and the other in the mode of what stands in itself, one is a noun and the other a verb. Likewise, white and whiteness signify the same thing and differ only on the side of what is connoted or substituted for; and this suffices for categorematic diversity. Why, then, should the mode of signifying as “what” and as “whose” not suffice, when the “whose” in the oblique also expresses a different connotation and something like inherence, denoting possession, while the “what” in the nominative does not?

TO THE FIRST I answer by denying the consequence, and I point out the difference: some modes belong to a concept by the very nature of representing or consignifying, while others belong to it because of some extrinsic comparison or application by the intellect that conceives or by the object known. Modes of the first kind require a different representation; those of the second kind do not. Hence Thomas did not reduce the difference of the oblique from the nominative to a different mode of applying concepts, but to a different mode arising from a different way of understanding one and the same thing. Thus we say that the relation of predicate and subject in concepts, diversity of supposition, and the like do not arise from the mode of understanding or representing a thing, but from the application and use of the intellect, insofar as, by understanding the relation of one thing to another, it applies and joins one to the other in different ways. Likewise, truth and falsity arise from whether a thing is or is not: when the thing exists, truth arises in the expression; when it does not exist, falsity arises, while the expression itself remains unchanged, as the Philosopher says in the chapter on substance.⁸ For the representation need not vary; rather, the existence of the object varies, so that a different relation of conformity or nonconformity to it results. In the same way, when a thing is posited as present or absent with respect to the coexistence or noncoexistence of the duration of cognition, the notion of intuitive or abstractive cognition varies while the same formal representation remains, according to that opinion. But a difference of past or future time in a verb, or a difference of consignification in the cases of a noun, pertains to a different mode of understanding one and the same thing, as Thomas says in the cited Quodlibet. For something is understood in the nominative as a person or thing acting, but in the oblique as a patient, or as connoting that it belongs to another, or something similar; these are different modifications of the representation and of the represented object. Thus, the relation of an acting, possessing, or receiving person—“from whom,” “to whom,” and so forth—is not signified as a certain thing, but as a mode of a thing, which is signified now as “from whom,” now as “to whom,” now as “what.” In this way, through that different mode of explaining it, a concept is produced; therefore, this is not mere application, but a different explanation of the concept.

TO THE SECOND: The consequence is denied, because for a term to be categorematically different, it must have a different mode as it were on the side of the thing signified, not merely on the side of signification and the mode of understanding.

To the first proof, it is said that infinite nouns transfer the noun to another signified thing, namely, the negation of its positive form, and thus differ categorematically on the side of the thing signified. Oblique forms, however, retain the same thing signified and only make its mode and relation oblique in understanding it; therefore, they do not differ categorematically from their nominative form. Their being less suited to function as predicates or subjects than infinite nouns is not due to a difference in the thing signified, but to their defect and departure from the mode required for predication: namely, signifying in the mode of a “what,” as that which is predicated or subjected. Although an infinite noun changes the thing signified from positive to negative, it still signifies it as a “what,” not as “whose.”

To the second proof, it is said that categorematic difference is according to a different mode of signifying that is attributed to and belongs to the thing itself that is signified: for example, having the mode of what inheres or stands in itself, of being common or particular, of being absolute from connotation or not absolute, and the like, which modify the thing signified itself, as it were. Oblique cases, however, are only different modes of consignification, and pertain to a certain deficiency of the noun itself as a noun. Insofar as it is a noun, it signifies a thing in such a way as to note or designate what it is; oblique forms, by contrast, note that it belongs to someone or is for someone, and so on. This varies the mode of consignifying the thing in the noun’s nature as a naming and designating term, which pertains to a mode that affects a thing categorematically. For such a mode can also be designated by a nominative form, and not only by an oblique, as is clear from the examples given of the categorematic common, connotative, absolute, and so on.

From what has been said, it is clear that this definition of a noun is essential, because it explains the generic and superior notions of a logical sign and the differential notions of such a sign, by which it differs from an expression, a verb, and adverbs, since it signifies as something and not as something qualified. Thus it is an essential definition and should be explained in every respect like the definition of a term, with the addition of the terms explained up to this point, which explain the proper quiddity and function of a noun.