Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Prima Pars Artis Logicae

SOME recent writers abandon Aristotle on this point and say that certain names truly are names even though they have parts that signify separately, as in the name equiferus, respublica, proconsul, and other compounds, whose parts truly and properly signify on their own. Therefore, this clause is false.

Nevertheless, Aristotle explicitly says the opposite in On Interpretation I, in the chapter on the Name¹, and St. Thomas says so in the same place, lecture 4². Aristotle says: “In the name equiferus, ferus signifies nothing by itself, just as in the expression equus ferus.” Explaining these words, the Holy Doctor says that “in this name equiferus, this part, ferus, signifies nothing by itself, as it does in the expression equus ferus.”

AND THE REASON he gives carries great weight. Whenever a vocal sound that is significant in another context is taken together with another, not so that they compose one total and composite signification, but a simple concept, its parts do not enter into the composition of that expression as components of one signification drawn from their own significations. Rather, they receive a distinct imposition to signify one simple concept. Consequently, those parts, insofar as they compose a vocal expression that receives a new imposition, do not compose it as significative. But when they are combined not to receive a new imposition, but to form and construct a complex and composite concept from their significations, they compose as significative. Parts are said to compose a vocal expression so that it receives a new imposition when they are combined to signify anew some simple concept that its individual parts do not signify, as respublica signifies the city itself or the common government through a single simple concept, which the individual words do not signify separately.

To the argument that the parts of that name signify separately, I answer that they signify separately as it were materially and accidentally, not formally—that is, not in the order of composing that expression to which a new signification of a simple concept is to be imposed. Under this formal aspect they do not compose it as significative—that is, as already imposed to signify—but as newly capable of being imposed, even though they have otherwise been imposed before. Thus in the name “dominus,” the syllables do and minus signify separately, but they do not compose that term insofar as they signify separately.

If you object that in the words “proconsul,” “prorex,” and the like, the signification of both component parts is considered so that the whole signification of the name results, since “proconsul” is the same as “vice-consul”, where the signification of pro and consul is not lost but rather considered, so that from them the office of a vice-consul is signified:

I answer, following St. Thomas above, that the thing from which a name is imposed differs from the thing it signifies. In imposing names, one often considers the etymology and origin of a prior signification, which does not contribute to composing the name's signification but to originating it, because the imposer took that prior signification as the occasion for imposing another. Yet because the impositions are different, one is not a part of the other but its origin. We see this in many other names which plainly do not have significant parts: providentia is said as if it meant “seeing ahead,” from pro and videntia; propheta is said as if it meant “one who speaks from afar”; so proconsul is said as originating from pro and consul, and respublica from re and publica, but it is not composed from them.

But you will object again: A complex term truly is a term, since one division of terms is into complex and incomplex; therefore, by the same reasoning, a complex name will truly be a name. Again, an equivocal name is truly a name despite signifying many things; for equivocal things are “those whose name is common,” according to Aristotle in the Categories³. Therefore, likewise, a complex name will not be excluded from the notion of a name merely because it signifies many things.

I answer that the notions of term and name differ. In a term, what is considered formally and principally is its being a part; its being designative and significative is material and presupposed. In a name, by contrast, its being designative of something and, as it were, a mark is principal. For this is why it is called a name, and names are applied to distinguish and make things known. What it has materially is that it is also a term, or part of a proposition. Hence a complex term can have the character of one term because it is one part; for there are also composite parts, such as an arm, which is composed of a hand and other parts. But a complex name does not have the character of one name, since it is not one mark and designation. It can therefore be one in the character of a term and many in the character of a name.

To the point about equivocation, I say that an equivocal expression is one name by reason of being one significant vocal sound, since among concrete accidentals the unity of the subject gives unity simply and individually, even though the forms are many. Thus a subject having color and heat is not many qualities but one quality, as we shall say in Logic, question 13, article 2.