Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Prima Pars Artis Logicae

Four particles in the definition of the name require explanation, since the others have already been explained in the definition of the term. The first is “no part of which,” etc. The second, that it be “finite.” The third, that it be “in the direct case.” The fourth, that it signify “without time.” This last, however, will remain to be explained in the following question, where we treat the verb, which signifies with time. We explain the rest in this question.

SOME recent writers abandon Aristotle on this point and say that certain names truly are names even though they have parts that signify separately, as in the name equiferus, respublica, proconsul, and other compounds, whose parts truly and properly signify on their own. Therefore, this clause is false.

Nevertheless, Aristotle explicitly says the opposite in On Interpretation I, in the chapter on the Name¹, and St. Thomas says so in the same place, lecture 4². Aristotle says: “In the name equiferus, ferus signifies nothing by itself, just as in the expression equus ferus.” Explaining these words, the Holy Doctor says that “in this name equiferus, this part, ferus, signifies nothing by itself, as it does in the expression equus ferus.”

AND THE REASON he gives carries great weight. Whenever a vocal sound that is significant in another context is taken together with another, not so that they compose one total and composite signification, but a simple concept, its parts do not enter into the composition of that expression as components of one signification drawn from their own significations. Rather, they receive a distinct imposition to signify one simple concept. Consequently, those parts, insofar as they compose a vocal expression that receives a new imposition, do not compose it as significative. But when they are combined not to receive a new imposition, but to form and construct a complex and composite concept from their significations, they compose as significative. Parts are said to compose a vocal expression so that it receives a new imposition when they are combined to signify anew some simple concept that its individual parts do not signify, as respublica signifies the city itself or the common government through a single simple concept, which the individual words do not signify separately.

To the argument that the parts of that name signify separately, I answer that they signify separately as it were materially and accidentally, not formally—that is, not in the order of composing that expression to which a new signification of a simple concept is to be imposed. Under this formal aspect they do not compose it as significative—that is, as already imposed to signify—but as newly capable of being imposed, even though they have otherwise been imposed before. Thus in the name “dominus,” the syllables do and minus signify separately, but they do not compose that term insofar as they signify separately.

If you object that in the words “proconsul,” “prorex,” and the like, the signification of both component parts is considered so that the whole signification of the name results, since “proconsul” is the same as “vice-consul”, where the signification of pro and consul is not lost but rather considered, so that from them the office of a vice-consul is signified:

I answer, following St. Thomas above, that the thing from which a name is imposed differs from the thing it signifies. In imposing names, one often considers the etymology and origin of a prior signification, which does not contribute to composing the name's signification but to originating it, because the imposer took that prior signification as the occasion for imposing another. Yet because the impositions are different, one is not a part of the other but its origin. We see this in many other names which plainly do not have significant parts: providentia is said as if it meant “seeing ahead,” from pro and videntia; propheta is said as if it meant “one who speaks from afar”; so proconsul is said as originating from pro and consul, and respublica from re and publica, but it is not composed from them.

But you will object again: A complex term truly is a term, since one division of terms is into complex and incomplex; therefore, by the same reasoning, a complex name will truly be a name. Again, an equivocal name is truly a name despite signifying many things; for equivocal things are “those whose name is common,” according to Aristotle in the Categories³. Therefore, likewise, a complex name will not be excluded from the notion of a name merely because it signifies many things.

I answer that the notions of term and name differ. In a term, what is considered formally and principally is its being a part; its being designative and significative is material and presupposed. In a name, by contrast, its being designative of something and, as it were, a mark is principal. For this is why it is called a name, and names are applied to distinguish and make things known. What it has materially is that it is also a term, or part of a proposition. Hence a complex term can have the character of one term because it is one part; for there are also composite parts, such as an arm, which is composed of a hand and other parts. But a complex name does not have the character of one name, since it is not one mark and designation. It can therefore be one in the character of a term and many in the character of a name.

To the point about equivocation, I say that an equivocal expression is one name by reason of being one significant vocal sound, since among concrete accidentals the unity of the subject gives unity simply and individually, even though the forms are many. Thus a subject having color and heat is not many qualities but one quality, as we shall say in Logic, question 13, article 2.

INFINITE NAME is said to be “that which, when some negation is added, renders its signification indeterminate or infinite.” For negation attached to a term can act on it in two ways: first, in such a way that it passes into the term’s signification, destroying its determinate and positive signification and substituting in its place the negation of the thing signified, which indeed applies to all subjects capable of such a negation. Second, negation can be attached to a term without changing its signification, but by removing composition or copulation, since its force attaches to the verb as it copulates the extremes. When it acts in the first way, it is said to infinitize, that is, to render the name itself indeterminate. In the second way it is said to negate, and it makes the proposition itself negative. Hence this effect of negating, since it concerns the copula that it negates, is exercised only within a proposition. Thus, for the infinitization of a name, the negation must not be signified by the very first imposition; rather, an added negation, by affecting the name itself, must render the name negated and its signification indeterminate—that is, signifying not what a thing is, but what it is not. Thus the names “no one” and “nothing” are not infinite, because they signify negation itself in its own right and directly under a determinate concept, rather than making some positive signification indeterminate by an added negation. Hence it also follows that in an infinite name the signification is not changed by a new imposition, but by the impediment of negation, which by its negative signification has the power to impede the signification of another thing and, by impeding it, to remove it.

FROM THIS IT FOLLOWS that an infinite name is incomplex and connotative. That it is incomplex is expressly taught by Aristotle in the first book of the Perihermeneias, in the chapter on the Name,¹ and by St. Thomas there, lectures 4 and 5.² The reason is that an infinite name does not leave its signification in the state it was in, but changes it into its opposite, namely, into the negation of its signification. Therefore it does not retain a double signification, namely, the positive one it signifies of itself and the added negation; for if it retained both, it would not change the former. Therefore it is not complex, since there is no double signification there, as complexity requires. Thus we see that in the complex expression “no man” no infinitization occurs, because both significations remain intact. Therefore, when infinitization occurs, it is a sign that both significations do not remain intact; consequently, the expression does not remain complex, because it no longer has a double signification.

That it is connotative is clear from this: an infinite name cannot signify negation abstractly, for otherwise it would not be verified of anything positive. One cannot say that a stone is the negation of a man, but one says that it is a non-man. Therefore the negation of man is signified concretely, so that it can be verified of that of which it is predicated; therefore it is also signified connotatively, since formally it signifies the denied form and, on the side of what has that form, the subject of which it is concretely verified. This is what it is for something to be connotative.

GIVEN THESE POINTS, I SAY: An infinite name is excluded from the account of a name by the particle “finite.”

This conclusion is expressly stated by Aristotle in the chapter on the Name and by St. Thomas there, lectures 4 and 5. As to the FIRST PART, namely, that it is not a name, nearly everyone agrees. The reason is that infinitization removes the proper and essential function of a name, which is to be a mark of something. For it is called a name because it is a mark; therefore it must mark and designate something in order to be a mark. But an infinite name neither marks nor designates anything, because it leaves its signification indeterminate and signifies only what something is not, and not what it is.

And observe that signifying something determinate is understood in two ways: first, on the side of the thing signified, because the thing itself is determinate; second, by the mode of signifying, because that mode is determinate, that is, designative of what it signifies. For something to be a name, it is not required that it signify something determinate in the first way. However indifferent and common something may be—even if it is a negation—if that very indifferent and common account is signified, this suffices for a name’s determinate signification, because we can conceive what even negation itself or any common account is, or what it is like. What is required is that something be determinate in the second way, so that it signifies what something is and not merely what it is not; for in the latter case it determines and designates nothing, and so impedes the very function of a name, which is to name, designate, or mark something. For by naming we designate and distinguish one thing from another.

THE SECOND PART, namely, that an infinite name is excluded by the particle “finite” and not by another, is opposed to some recent writers, who strike out that particle as superfluous. But the contrary is clear from St. Thomas, both in Opusculum 48, chapter on the Name,³ where he adds that particle to the definition of a name, and because in the first book of the Perihermeneias, lecture 5,⁴ treating of the infinite verb—and the same applies to the name—he says that the Philosopher first defined the verb in general and afterward, by these particles, excluded things that are imperfectly verbs. Thus a perfect and exact definition of a name and a verb requires these particles, so that what belongs to the quiddity of a name may be set down explicitly and expressly. For since the definition of a name had stated that it is a significant utterance, and a name must signify not just anyhow but by way of a mark and designation, it was necessary to add the particle “finite” in order to explain this function.

Nor was the infinite name sufficiently excluded by the particle “incomplex,” because, as we have seen, an infinite name is not complex but incomplex; otherwise, if it were complex, a proposition whose subject was infinitized would thereby be a negative proposition, because that negation would extend to the copula as well, and not only to the subject. But the copula, when negated, makes the proposition negative. This consequence is absurd and admitted by no dialectician, as is evident in conversion by contraposition, which proceeds from a negative to an affirmative proposition with infinitized terms.

OBJECTIONS ARE ANSWERED.

First you will object: Negation must enter the name it infinitizes not only materially but also significatively and by its ultimate concept; therefore it does so by a concept different from the one it infinitizes, and so the infinite name is subordinated to a double concept, which is to be complex.

The antecedent is clear, because the force of negation in infinitizing a name is founded on negation as signified, and not on the material sound of the word “non”; for if negation is not signified, it removes or negates nothing. Therefore, in the infinitization of a name, negation enters not materially but significatively and by its ultimate concept.

THE ANSWER IS that in an infinite name, as in other names of composite form, there is both the derivation of one name from another and composition. If we attend to derivation, it is certain that the signification of one is derived from the signification of another, just as, in the etymology of names, one name usually originates from the signification or significations of others; yet this does not suffice for complexity, as is clear in itself. But as regards the composition of an infinite name, the word “non” and the name attached to it are related materially; nevertheless, that infinitization by which the name’s positive signification is impeded proceeds from the signification of the negative word, as it were derivatively and efficiently, not compositionally. For infinitization is not just any negation, but a negation that changes and impedes the name’s signification; and the signification that results from this impediment and infinitization applies to both words as to a single term of composite form. Hence, by infinitizing the name, the word “non” accidentally destroys its own signification.

Second you will object: An infinite name is truly a term, since it does not lose its signification but changes it; and similarly, it is an extreme of a proposition, as is clear in “A stone is a non-man.” Therefore it has the account of a name.

The consequence is proved, because nothing more is required for the account of a name; and St. Thomas says in the first book of the Perihermeneias, lecture 1,⁵ that every proposition must consist at least of a name and a verb, since these are its principal parts. Therefore, if a genuine proposition is formed from a verb and an infinite name, the infinite name truly is a name.

It is confirmed: if some verb truly copulated the extremes in a proposition, it would truly be a verb; therefore, if some name truly is an extreme capable of being copulated, it truly is a name. For just as a verb is that which copulates, so a name is that which can be copulated; in this respect a verb and a name are correlative.

THE ANSWER IS that the consequence is denied. To the proof, it is said that, for something to have the account of a name, it suffices to be an extreme of a proposition when it has this in its own right and, as it were, intrinsically, but not when it does so accidentally, because it takes on something like the status and property of a name. For many things can be placed in a proposition as extremes, not because they are names, but because they are held in the force of a name, as St. Thomas teaches in the first book of the Perihermeneias, lecture 5,⁶ and in Opusculum 48, chapter on the Verb;⁷ for example, “To run is to move.” Indeed, adverbs too can be so taken, as in “Yesterday is not today” and “Quickly is not slowly.” For through the accommodation of the intellect they acquire a certain use as a name, not through the proper character of their signification; and when so taken in the force of a name, they can form an utterance or proposition accidentally, not in their own right.

To the confirmation it is said that if a verb copulates in its own right and by the proper character of its signification, it truly is a verb; but if it does so through accommodation or extrinsic derivation, it is not a verb in its own right. Thus the cases of a verb are excluded from the verb, although they copulate in a proposition, because they are derived from and fall away from the verb that they copulate. Or, second, it is said that a verb has no exercise other than signifying by copulating when it is inside a proposition; hence, if it has this, it is a verb. But a name has not only the function of being capable of copulation and union, but also of being a marker and designator, as it were a mark of a thing, without which it does not have the true function of a name. Therefore, although it is capable of being copulated in a proposition where it is taken in the force of a name, it is not thereby a name, because it is not a mark.

Finally, it is argued: An infinite name signifies something certain and determinate on the side of its formal signification, although it signifies indeterminately on the side of its material signification and what it connotes. Therefore it is simply a name; for each thing is to be judged by the character of its formal signification, which is primary, and not by what it connotes.

The antecedent seems certain, because “non-man,” for example, signifies a determinate negation, namely, of man and not of horse, just as “blind” signifies the negation of sight and not of hearing; and yet “blind” truly and properly is a name. Indeed, in this use, transcendent or supertranscendent names such as “intelligible” and “imaginable” also signify something indeterminate, because they are said both of what is and what is not, of real beings and beings of reason; and yet they truly are names. Therefore, and so on.

It is confirmed: these transcendent or supertranscendent names can be infinitized by adding a negation, and yet they remain true names; therefore so do other names. The minor is proved by the name “non-being”: when so infinitized, it either signifies something or nothing. If nothing, then it does not signify, and so it will not be a name or a term, but will have been stripped of its signification. But if it signifies something, then it signifies being, and thus “non-being” would signify being, which is contradictory.

THE ANSWER IS that infinitization in a name consists in its being indeterminate by its mode of signifying, not on the side of the thing signified; and this mode belongs on the side of the formal signification, because it signifies the negation of the form itself, not by saying what the negation itself is, but what the form is not. Something is judged to be a name not only by the thing signified, but also by the mode in which it is signified, just as a verb signifies in one way and a name in another, although they concern the same thing, as “I run” and “running” do. Thus, because an infinite name does not signify in a determinate mode, as if marking and designating, it is not a name. The opposite is true of “blind” and similar names, which signify the negation of a form itself, and not what the form is not. Transcendent names signify something determinate on the side of the mode of signifying, although on the side of the thing signified it is indeterminate and most common; for they signify what that most common concept is, not what it is not.

To the confirmation, the minor is denied, and to the proof it is said that those infinitized names signify the negation of being not in a determinate mode—that is, by saying what the negation of being is—but in an indeterminate mode, namely, by saying what is not being. And to the objection that this negation of being is a being and signifies something, namely, something of reason, it is answered that insofar as it is signified by that infinitized name, it signifies precisely the negation of being in that indeterminate mode, although through reflexive cognition that negation can be cognized in the manner of a being. This, however, belongs to another name, which signifies that reflex concept of non-being in the manner of a being, not to the infinitized name.

It is clear from Aristotle in On Interpretation I, the chapters on the noun and the verb¹ that it is taken as certain that oblique cases are excluded from the notion of a noun, because they do not signify directly and by naming in themselves, which is required for the notion and function of a noun. Something is signified by naming when it is signified in the mode of a “what”; for in this way it is signified as standing, as it were, in itself, which distinguishes the notion of a noun from that of a verb, which signifies as if in the mode of what flows, not what stands in itself. But when something is signified in the mode of “whose” or “to whom,” it is not signified in the mode of what it is in itself, but as belonging to another; in this it falls short of and departs from the mode of substance and of what stands in itself, which pertains to the notion of a noun. Aristotle gives a sign of this in the chapter on the noun, and Thomas there at the end of lect. 4,² because oblique cases by themselves are not sufficient to constitute truth or falsity with the verb “is,” as the nominative is.

An oblique case cannot, however, be excluded from the notion of a noun by the phrase “of which no part, etc.,” because an oblique case as such is not complex, but follows the nature of its nominative form. For if the nominative is complex or incomplex, so too is the oblique. The mode of signifying “whose” or “to whom” does not multiply the concept or make it complex, but adds a mode to the same concept; otherwise the nominative, too, would be complex, because it signifies in the mode of “what,” just as an oblique case signifies in the mode of “whose.”

If you ask why Aristotle first defined a noun without the terms “finite” and “nominative,” and then added them to exclude infinite and oblique nouns, St. Thomas answers in On Interpretation I, lect. 5,³ that Aristotle first gave only the common notions of noun and verb, not definitions complete in every respect, including their special conditions, which he later expressed by adding those terms. For he began the definition with what is more common and afterward completed it by expressing more fully what is required for the notion of a noun without qualification.

THE QUESTION, however, is quite controversial: do oblique and nominative forms have concepts of the same notion and species in the intellect? We cannot examine this difficulty at length here, because it involves many matters pertaining to metaphysics.

Briefly, however, I say that two statements of St. Thomas are found in this regard, by which we can track down his view. The first is that, on the side of the thing signified, nominative and oblique forms signify the same thing and consequently have the same concept, as it were categorematically and logically: thus if a nominative form is absolute, connotative, common, univocal, and so forth, the oblique form is as well. For these are differences that are, as it were, categorematic and logical. This is taken from Thomas, On Interpretation I, at the end of lect. 4,⁴ where, following the Philosopher, he says “that the notion signified by a noun is the same also in the cases of the noun.” Therefore, on the side of the notion or thing signified, nominative and oblique forms have the same thing.

The second statement is in Quodlibet IV, a. 17,⁵ where the holy Doctor says “that a diversity of understandings can accompany a diversity of words, either because of a diversity in the thing understood or because of a diversity in the mode of understanding. This happens whenever there is a diversity of consignification that follows from a different mode of understanding one and the same thing; and it appears especially in time, which is mingled in itself with the operation of the human intellect. Therefore, one must say that the enunciable ‘Socrates sitting’ and ‘Socrates having sat’ are not the same.” Here Thomas plainly acknowledges that a difference of time in a verb requires different concepts. But the oblique cases of a verb are formed through different inflections of time, as the Philosopher says in On Interpretation I, the chapter on the verb,⁶ and Thomas there, lect. 5.⁷ The same account therefore seems to apply to the oblique cases of a noun; hence Thomas adds in the cited Quodlibet, in the reply to the third objection, “that diversity of signification removes the identity of a noun to such an extent that, according to the Philosopher, oblique forms are not nouns.”

Therefore, according to St. Thomas, one must say that oblique cases have a concept different from the nominative, not by reason of a different thing conceived, but by reason of a different mode of conceiving one and the same thing. For one and the same concept cannot represent one thing in the nominative and in the oblique, because in the oblique some relation and bearing is expressed that is not explained in the nominative: namely, the relation of possession or something like possession. For it is signified as “whose,” not as “what.” But where a different relation and bearing is expressed, there is a different concept and representation, because this relation pertains to a different mode of understanding and signifying one and the same thing. Although the concept does not vary on the side of the thing signified, it does vary in the notion and function of the noun, by turning from the mode of signifying as a “what” to the mode of signifying as “whose.” For this reason St. Thomas said that the identity of the noun is removed—namely, in its notion and mode of naming. This is clearer in the cases of a verb, since they vary according to the signification of different times, past or future, which undoubtedly require a different representation.

Two arguments remain. The first is that many modes which express a different relation and bearing posit only a different exercise of the concept, not a different representation; therefore, the same is true of oblique cases.

The antecedent is established by many examples. For the same concept can now be a predicate, now a subject, and can have this or that supposition, and can change from true to false without any intrinsic variation in its representation. The same is true of intuitive and abstractive cognition, according to the highly probable opinion that they are not essential differences of cognition.

The second argument is that if this mode of obliquity suffices to vary the intrinsic representation of a concept, we cannot avoid the conclusion that nominative and oblique forms differ categorematically, which we deny.

The consequence is proved: First, infinite nouns differ categorematically from finite ones; therefore, oblique cases differ from nominatives all the more. For oblique cases are farther from the categorematic notion—that is, of predicate or subject—than infinite nouns are. Second, every categorematic variation is only according to a different mode of expressing one and the same thing, as a noun and a verb can signify the same thing, as I run and running. But because one is in the mode of what flows and the other in the mode of what stands in itself, one is a noun and the other a verb. Likewise, white and whiteness signify the same thing and differ only on the side of what is connoted or substituted for; and this suffices for categorematic diversity. Why, then, should the mode of signifying as “what” and as “whose” not suffice, when the “whose” in the oblique also expresses a different connotation and something like inherence, denoting possession, while the “what” in the nominative does not?

TO THE FIRST I answer by denying the consequence, and I point out the difference: some modes belong to a concept by the very nature of representing or consignifying, while others belong to it because of some extrinsic comparison or application by the intellect that conceives or by the object known. Modes of the first kind require a different representation; those of the second kind do not. Hence Thomas did not reduce the difference of the oblique from the nominative to a different mode of applying concepts, but to a different mode arising from a different way of understanding one and the same thing. Thus we say that the relation of predicate and subject in concepts, diversity of supposition, and the like do not arise from the mode of understanding or representing a thing, but from the application and use of the intellect, insofar as, by understanding the relation of one thing to another, it applies and joins one to the other in different ways. Likewise, truth and falsity arise from whether a thing is or is not: when the thing exists, truth arises in the expression; when it does not exist, falsity arises, while the expression itself remains unchanged, as the Philosopher says in the chapter on substance.⁸ For the representation need not vary; rather, the existence of the object varies, so that a different relation of conformity or nonconformity to it results. In the same way, when a thing is posited as present or absent with respect to the coexistence or noncoexistence of the duration of cognition, the notion of intuitive or abstractive cognition varies while the same formal representation remains, according to that opinion. But a difference of past or future time in a verb, or a difference of consignification in the cases of a noun, pertains to a different mode of understanding one and the same thing, as Thomas says in the cited Quodlibet. For something is understood in the nominative as a person or thing acting, but in the oblique as a patient, or as connoting that it belongs to another, or something similar; these are different modifications of the representation and of the represented object. Thus, the relation of an acting, possessing, or receiving person—“from whom,” “to whom,” and so forth—is not signified as a certain thing, but as a mode of a thing, which is signified now as “from whom,” now as “to whom,” now as “what.” In this way, through that different mode of explaining it, a concept is produced; therefore, this is not mere application, but a different explanation of the concept.

TO THE SECOND: The consequence is denied, because for a term to be categorematically different, it must have a different mode as it were on the side of the thing signified, not merely on the side of signification and the mode of understanding.

To the first proof, it is said that infinite nouns transfer the noun to another signified thing, namely, the negation of its positive form, and thus differ categorematically on the side of the thing signified. Oblique forms, however, retain the same thing signified and only make its mode and relation oblique in understanding it; therefore, they do not differ categorematically from their nominative form. Their being less suited to function as predicates or subjects than infinite nouns is not due to a difference in the thing signified, but to their defect and departure from the mode required for predication: namely, signifying in the mode of a “what,” as that which is predicated or subjected. Although an infinite noun changes the thing signified from positive to negative, it still signifies it as a “what,” not as “whose.”

To the second proof, it is said that categorematic difference is according to a different mode of signifying that is attributed to and belongs to the thing itself that is signified: for example, having the mode of what inheres or stands in itself, of being common or particular, of being absolute from connotation or not absolute, and the like, which modify the thing signified itself, as it were. Oblique cases, however, are only different modes of consignification, and pertain to a certain deficiency of the noun itself as a noun. Insofar as it is a noun, it signifies a thing in such a way as to note or designate what it is; oblique forms, by contrast, note that it belongs to someone or is for someone, and so on. This varies the mode of consignifying the thing in the noun’s nature as a naming and designating term, which pertains to a mode that affects a thing categorematically. For such a mode can also be designated by a nominative form, and not only by an oblique, as is clear from the examples given of the categorematic common, connotative, absolute, and so on.

From what has been said, it is clear that this definition of a noun is essential, because it explains the generic and superior notions of a logical sign and the differential notions of such a sign, by which it differs from an expression, a verb, and adverbs, since it signifies as something and not as something qualified. Thus it is an essential definition and should be explained in every respect like the definition of a term, with the addition of the terms explained up to this point, which explain the proper quiddity and function of a noun.