Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Prima Pars Artis Logicae

SOME, holding that the essential account of a term consists neither in signification nor in the account of a part or extreme of a proposition, but presupposes all these, and consists only in the account of terminating syllogistic resolution, consequently assert that there is no other per se division of a term than into a prioristic and a posterioristic term, since only this twofold resolution is found, and consequently the term, whose essence is to terminate this resolution, is divided per se only by it. They add, however, that the division of a term into major extreme, minor extreme, and middle term is not a per se division, but a division of an accident into its subjects.

On the contrary, those who hold that the formal and quidditative account of a term consists in its being a part or extreme of a proposition must consequently assign a specific and essential division of the term according to the different specific account of the part that can compose an utterance or proposition. What this division is must now be investigated.

THEREFORE I SAY FIRST: A syllogistic term, as such, is not divided by an essential division according to the termination of prioristic or posterioristic resolution.

THE BASIS IS that all this can belong to one and the same simple term; therefore it does not make an essential division in the account of a term.

The consequence is sound, because if this were an essential division, it could not belong to one and the same term; otherwise two opposed essences would belong to the same thing. For the same reason, since the same term can be univocal, common, connotative, and of first intention, univocal and common are not essential divisions of a term. The antecedent is evident: the same term, for example human being, insofar as it grounds a necessary connection with its proper properties or essential predicates, grounds demonstrative posterioristic composition and resolution; with respect to contingent predicates it grounds topical resolution. Insofar as it regards universality or particularity, affirmation or negation, it grounds composition and resolution in the prioristic form, which is wholly based on “being said of all” and “being said of none,” from which the various modes and figures of syllogistic form receive their termination. Therefore all these respects can belong to the same term, and so they do not divide it essentially; rather, they are all found in the same term.

I SAY SECOND: An enunciative term is divided essentially into noun and verb, and into categorematic and syncategorematic. The other divisions, although they divide the term according to a different account of sign, on the part of the different thing signified, do not divide the essential account of the term itself as a part of a proposition.

THE BASIS of this conclusion is that an enunciative term consists most formally in the account of a part that composes and resolves an enunciation, as we showed above.¹ Therefore that which divides the account of a term per se and essentially is that which divides the account of a part in the term per se and essentially. Whatever divides it under an account other than that of a part will not be understood as a per se division of a term, as term. A division according to different things signified, however, produces a diversity of signification not only in the term but also in the utterance.

In the account of a part, categorematic and syncategorematic terms differ first and essentially: the categorematic has the account of a principal part, which signifies something per se, while the syncategorematic has the account of a part that modifies and signifies in some way. Thus St. Thomas said in On Interpretation 1, lecture 1,² “these syncategoremata are more bindings of parts than parts”; hence this difference in the account of a part and term is essential and intrinsic. Next, within the categorematic term, noun and verb are parts that compose in different ways according to the account of a part, since the noun composes as an extreme and the verb as a copula. But in the account of a part, being an extreme that composes differs greatly from being a copula. Union differs more in the account of composing than matter and form differ from each other; matter and form, however, differ in partial species, so the copula differs all the more. Moreover, the specific distinction of parts is taken according to their different relations and functions, as hand differs in species from foot, and eye from ear. These are heterogeneous parts, which differ in species in the account of a part, whatever may be the case as to whether they also make a specific difference in the account of substance. Since the copula and extremes are heterogeneous parts, not similar parts with the same function, they therefore differ in species in the account of a part.

As for the other divisions of terms, it is clear that they are not essential, because they differ only on the part of the thing signified, the mode of signifying, or whether the sign is natural or conventional. All this pertains to the diversity of a term under the absolute account of sign, not under the relative account of part, which is the final constitutive difference of a term. For the account of sign pertains to a term insofar as it can be ordered to compose with another, just as it pertains to the account of a proposition insofar as it is composed of other things.

This conclusion is clear by examining some of the divisions of terms proposed in the text. For the division of a term into mental, spoken, and written is according to different subjects: one signifies naturally, namely the mental term, while the other two signify conventionally, namely the spoken and written terms. This is material with respect to the very essence of a term, which consists in a second intention and the relation of a part. Indeed, this intention even in a mental concept is not something real but something of reason, like all other logical intentions; they do not belong really to the concepts themselves but are grounded in the things represented in them insofar as those things are known, as we shall say in Logic q. 1³ and 2.⁴ Therefore, on this account, there is no essential difference between the intention of a mental term and that of a spoken term.

Likewise, the divisions into univocal and equivocal, common and particular, connotative and absolute, of first and of second intention, and the like, are divisions on the part of a different thing signified or a different mode of signifying, not according to a different orderability of one sign to another or to the whole composite under the account of a part. In a word, they do not pertain to the essential division of a logical sign, but of a grammatical, political, or sign considered in itself. For words and signs pertain to logic insofar as they are ordered to the construction and composition of discourse and judgment; they pertain to grammar or politics insofar as they signify different things and differ precisely on the part of what is signified. Hence the divisions just mentioned do not make a sign or term differ essentially under the account of logical sign, that is, as productive of logical operations, even though those terms differ on the part of what they signify. This is material with respect to their different ways of constructing propositions or syllogisms, just as flesh, bones, and sinews differ in the account of a part in the human body because they compose it in different ways, while the fact that this part of flesh or bone has this shape or color does not essentially vary the account of a part.

Since, however, one might doubt whether the division of a term into predicate and subject, or into major and minor extreme, is an essential division, because these seem to compose a proposition and syllogism in different ways, we address this question.

I SAY FINALLY: The division of a term into predicate and subject, and into major and minor extreme, is not essential but accidental.

THE REASON IS that this division pertains only to the actual exercise of the term within a proposition or syllogism. For, of itself, every term that is capable of being a subject is also capable of being a predicate, unless perhaps it is a syncategorematic expression or a verb exercising the account of copula; these are distinguished essentially in the account of term, as we said.⁵ The fact that one term is actually placed as subject in a proposition and another as predicate pertains to the term’s actual exercise, not to its essence. For the essence of a term is also found outside a proposition, and there a term has the capacity to be made a subject and to be predicated. Then, within a proposition, it is in fact taken as predicate and subject, which is accidental to it, just as its exercise of composing within a proposition is. The same must be said of the major and minor extreme within a syllogism, for in truth this is nothing other than being predicate and subject or a similar exercise.

BUT YOU WILL OBJECT: Sign is the genus of term; therefore any essential division of sign makes a term differ essentially.

The consequence is proved because it is impossible for a genus of a thing to be divided essentially and for the species composed from that genus to be varied only accidentally by that division; for example, if animal is essentially diversified, then human being and horse are so all the more. Therefore, if sign is divided essentially under the account of sign into mental and spoken, common and singular, and the other divisions of terms, it cannot be divided only accidentally under the account of term.

It is confirmed as well: a term is ordered per se to a proposition; therefore a term ordered per se to a proposition distinct in species will be a term distinct in species. But propositions are distinguished in species according to the different thing signified, or the different truth they signify; therefore so are terms.

It is answered that sign is not the genus of term absolutely, taken under any account whatever, as substance or quantity is a genus in the category of substance or quantity absolutely; rather, sign is the genus of term insofar as it is subject to logical intention, that is, insofar as it can be ordered to the operations of reason. For sign is considered in this way as artificial and as pertaining to the genus of an art. A term and an utterance are a kind of artificial thing; sign, therefore, is their genus only insofar as it enters the order and line of an artifact. In this regard one must carefully observe, for artificial things, whether real or of reason, that their genus is not the matter of which they consist under any consideration whatsoever, but the matter insofar as it enters the order and line of the artificial. For natural and artificial things do not belong to the same genus; hence the species of artificial things have nothing as their genus except insofar as it assumes the order and account of an artificial thing. Therefore every division of matter that does not concern it insofar as it is subject to an artificial form, but considers it in itself as something natural, does not divide an artifact essentially, but only materially and accidentally—as if a statue were divided into wooden, stone, and golden statues, or into different species according to different kinds of wood. Likewise, a term is not divided essentially as a logical artifact if it is divided only according to a diversity of signs insofar as they are signs, and not insofar as they are artificial things in the logical genus.

To the confirmation, it is answered that a term is not ordered per se, totally, and adequately to only one determinate proposition, but to any proposition that can be made from such a term, just as prime matter is ordered to any corruptible form. Therefore a different species of proposition on the part of the thing signified does not vary a proposition in the artificial form of logic, but in the account of representation and sign, which pertains wholly to the side of matter; in the same way, it does not formally diversify a term in the artificial form of logic.

OTHER MINOR OBJECTIONS may be raised—for example, that different definitions are found in the other divisions of terms: the definition of a connotative term differs from that of an absolute term, a common term, a singular term, and so on. Different logical intentions are likewise found in them. Finally, one term cannot become another: for example, a common term cannot become singular or absolute, and so on. All these are signs of an essential distinction.

The answer to all these points is that the definitions mentioned are either descriptive or, if they are essential with respect to the things defined, those things are nevertheless accidental with respect to a term. They are called accidental in the account of term, although essential in the account of connotative and absolute, common and singular, and so on. For example, if a human being were defined insofar as white, as that which scatters vision, the definition would be accidental to a human being and essential to white; so too these terms include the account of term as a subject, not as a genus, just as white includes body and snub includes nose. Likewise, the intentions they include are accidental to a term, although essential to such a term—for example, to a connotative or absolute term, as such—just as predicability is a proper accident of universality and the supposition of a term within a proposition. Finally, that one term cannot become another is not a sufficient sign of an essential distinction: one human being cannot become another, yet they are not distinguished in species. Thus terms cannot become other terms not because they differ essentially, but because they would have to change the signification that is required per se for the account of term.