Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Prima Pars Artis Logicae

We are now compelled to treat also of the syllogistic term, although this might seem to pertain more properly to the treatise on the syllogism itself, so that we may explain perfectly the definition of a term and the difference between considering it as an enunciative term and as a syllogistic term. For some think that the Philosopher gave the definition of a term in this way, when he said: “I call a term that into which a proposition is resolved, as into predicate and subject,”¹ and that this alone is the definition of a term to be accepted, even with respect to the term’s consideration in relation to the enunciation itself and not to the syllogism. Indeed, some adhere so literally to those words of the definition that they deny a term the essence of a term when it composes, and grant it only when it terminates the resolution of a syllogism or proposition—or even only when, through the act of the intellect resolving, it actually terminates that resolution, but not when it has the potency to terminate it—although the words in the definition do not say “act,” but “potency.”

I SAY, THEN, FIRST: In the first book of the Prior Analytics the Philosopher did not define every term in general from which a proposition as an enunciation can consist, but a term precisely insofar as it serves to construct the syllogistic order.

This is manifest to anyone who looks at the definition itself. For the Philosopher said: “I call a term that into which a proposition is resolved as into subject and predicate.” In this definition he manifestly did not include all the parts of an enunciation, namely the verb, syncategorematic terms, and negations; and yet the Philosopher numbered the verb among the parts of an enunciation in the first book of On Interpretation.² There, lect. 1, St. Thomas noted that it “is to be numbered among the more principal parts.”³

From what was said in the preceding article it is manifest that, since an enunciation is ordered to constructing truth, which is found in judgment and enunciation themselves, it requires more parts for its construction, because truth depends on them, than does a syllogism. A syllogism does not formally regard composing truth, but inferring; for it presupposes truth constituted in the propositions and adds only that it is inferring or inferred.

I SAY SECOND: A term, even when considered according to the syllogistic order, has its quiddity and essence not only in terminating the resolution of a syllogism and proposition, but also in composing them; nor does it consist only in the very exercise of actual resolution, but also in that on which such resolution falls, namely, being a part or extreme composing a proposition and syllogism.

There is indeed a difference of opinion about where the simple expression derived the name “term”: whether from terminating the resolution, or from terminating construction or composition. The Conimbricenses report both as probable in their commentary on the first chapter of the first book of the Prior Analytics, q. 1, a. 3. But this concerns the etymology of the name. For we assume that a term has both functions: composing and resolving what is composed from it. We say that it consists not only in the function or office of resolving, but essentially also imports the very formality of composing. Some deny this, thinking that a term can be defined essentially only through the termination of resolution itself, not through the notion of a part.

We take the contrary view from St. Thomas in the first book of On Interpretation, lect. 1. Speaking of the three considerations of a simple expression reported above, and coming to the third consideration of the term, which Aristotle considered in the first book of the Prior Analytics, he says: “Third, they are considered according as the syllogistic order is constituted from them, and thus they are treated in the books of the Prior Analytics.”⁴ Behold: he says that the most formal consideration of the term, as it is treated in the books of the Prior Analytics, is according as the syllogistic order is constituted or composed from them.

Moreover, St. Thomas, explaining in Physics II, lect. 5 the Philosopher’s statement that “propositions are the matter of conclusions,”⁵ and asking how this is to be understood, says: “insofar as the terms, which are the matter of propositions, are also the matter of the conclusion, although not according as they stand under the order of propositions.”⁶ Thus terms have the character of matter in the conclusion and propositions, that is, in the whole syllogism. But it belongs to the intrinsic notion of matter not only to terminate the resolution of a composite, but also to construct and compose it itself as a part. Therefore being a composing part pertains to a term no less than being the end and term of resolution.

And it is CONFIRMED, because nothing is resolved except into that of which it consists and by which it is constituted; but it is constructed from parts, which are separated when resolution is made. Therefore, if it belongs to the essence of the definition of a term that it be that into which a proposition is resolved, it also belongs to its essence that it be that from which the proposition is constructed. Consequently, it can be defined by being a part or extreme of a proposition, since it can be defined by everything that belongs to its essence.

But why, you will ask, did Aristotle define a term by the office of resolution alone, saying, “I call a term that into which a proposition is resolved”? Was so great a Philosopher incomplete? We answer: One who defines through resolution also understands composition in brief. For if something is resolved into the parts of which a proposition consists, by that very fact he signifies virtually that it is composed from those same parts. Nevertheless, the Philosopher rightly expressed resolution rather than composition in the definition of the syllogistic term: both because this was more conducive to explaining the simplicity of a term—for the simplicity of a part is recognized better and more distinctly through what remains once the composite is dissolved, since in this way it is found in the ultimate resolution without involving anything else; and because this was useful for knowing the analytic and resolutive procedure Aristotle was teaching there, which is proper to Logic, namely, that we might know that beyond which logical resolution does not pass. For it stops at the term into which a proposition is ultimately resolved. It pertained to knowledge of logical resolution to make known to us that beyond which it does not pass in resolving. If it were taught through composition, it would not be clear whether something else remained from which the proposition was also composed, and to which logical resolution could extend. See this solution in St. Thomas, Opusculum 48, treatise On the Syllogism Simply Speaking, ch. 1.⁷

From what has been said I DRAW TWO CONCLUSIONS. The first is that, if we speak of an enunciative term, the verb “is” is also a term, because it too is a part composing the signification of truth as the copula of the extremes, as we said above. But if we speak of a syllogistic term, the verb “is,” insofar as it is a copula, is not a term, because it is neither a major nor a minor extreme nor a middle; it is not a predicate or subject, which is required for something to be an extreme of a syllogism or a middle serving for inference. Thus the verb “is” is not a term in Aristotle’s definition, in the sense of being formally an inferring or inferred term, which pertains to the formality of a syllogism. It is, however, an enunciative term, because it is a part composing the enunciation with respect to the very character of true or false. The case is different if it does not function merely as a copula but as an extreme, as when I say “Peter is,” that is, exists, in the second-adjacent use.

Second, I conclude that an enunciative term has the essence of a term—that is, of a part of a proposition—even outside a proposition, although it does not then actually exercise the function of terminating or composing that proposition. Outside a proposition, however, it is not a predicate or subject, but predicable or subjectable. The reason is that the actual essence of a term is being a part of a proposition; but the character and essence of a part consists in its being compositive and constitutive of a whole, not in its actually composing it. Hence it is one thing actually to have the essence of a part and the actual relation of a part, and another to have the actual exercise of composing, just as a rational soul, even when separated, is a part, although it does not actually compose. The same is evident in the parts of artificial things, such as the parts of a house or chair, which are actually parts—that is, actually have the entity constitutive of a part—even if they do not actually compose. It is one thing, then, actually to construct, and another to be actually constructive. The latter is the character of a part; the former is its exercise, just as the visual power is actually a power even when it does not actually see. Actually composing, then, depends on application and existence in a whole; actually being a part is having the entity from which a whole can be made or into which it can be resolved. Being a predicate and subject, and having supposition or ampliation and the like, are different: these involve the actual exercise of predicating or being subjected, not merely being predicable, subjectable, or supposable.

THE ARGUMENTS ARE ANSWERED.

First, it is argued: The formality of a part or extreme is not enough for something to be called a term; the formality of terminating is additionally required, since something resolves and terminates actually and formally only then. Therefore, this formality alone constitutes the character of a term; the other formalities, such as being a part, an extreme, or a sign, are necessarily presupposed but do not formally constitute the character of a term. Hence St. Thomas says in Metaphysics VII, lect. 12, that the whole essence of a definition is in a certain way comprehended in the difference.⁸ Therefore, the definition of a term should be given only through what is its ultimate difference, namely, terminating the syllogistic resolution.

It is confirmed: Nothing is said essentially to be that from which it is, but that which it is; a term is from a part, therefore it is not a part. The major premise is clear, because that from which something is relates to it as a part, whereas no part is predicated of the whole. The minor premise is clear, because from the formality of a part and the formality of termination it results that the part is a term; therefore, a term is from a part but is not a part.

It is confirmed a second time, because a legitimate definition of a syllogistic term must be given through what belongs to a term in general and to this term in particular. But the character of terminating as such belongs to a term in general; terminating a resolution belongs to a term of resolution; and terminating a syllogistic resolution belongs to a syllogistic term. Therefore, a term is rightly defined as a term of syllogistic resolution.

WE ANSWER the principal argument from what was said: the formality of terminating or composing is required for the character of a term, not with respect to the actual exercise of composition and resolution, but with respect to the actual entity and proportion from which composition can take place. For actual termination or composition presupposes in the very part assumed for composition the due nature and proportion for being so assumed. Although the very character of a part states an actual relation to the whole of which it is a part, it is one thing to exercise the regard for a whole and another to exercise composition. The first is intrinsic and inseparable from a part, because by the very fact that it is a part it actually regards the whole—as something constructive, not as something actually constructing—just as a potency actually regards its object as able to act, not as acting; the latter pertains to actual operation. Therefore, by having the due proportion for composing and resolving a proposition, a term has the character of a term, even if it does not actually resolve and terminate. Thus the common saying is verified: “the words placed in a definition signify not act but potency.”

In the cited place, however, St. Thomas does not reduce the definition to the difference alone in such a way that the genus is excluded, as is evident in itself. Rather, he means that differences are the very form of the genus with determination; therefore, a definition can be explained through the difference alone, as the holy Doctor explains there.⁹

To the first confirmation it is said that from the formality of a part and the formality of actual termination it does not result that the part is a term, but that it exercises the office of a term; this exercise presupposes an already constituted term. Through the formality of a part itself, however, it is constituted as apt and proportionate to composition and resolution, even before it exercises them actually.

To the second confirmation we answer that the genus of a term and its difference are not the actual exercise of terminating or composing a syllogism, but actually having aptitude and proportion for composing and resolving. In the same way, the essence of a soul is not actually to terminate the resolution or composition of a human being, but to be able to compose and terminate it.

Second, it is argued: The character of a part is not found outside a whole, speaking per se and essentially; for by the very fact that it is outside the whole, it is not a part but a whole in itself. But if something that is once a whole later becomes a part, being a part is accidental to it. A term, however, is found in the character of a term outside a whole and separately, outside a proposition. Therefore, it is not per se essentially a part, but a kind of whole.

Nor does the example of a separated soul, which does not lose the character of a part, stand in the way. A soul is a certain spiritual substance existing per se and therefore remains separated from the whole. But a term is not something existing per se; therefore, the character of a part is not attributed to it separately from a whole, but only within the whole, just as other forms that do not exist per se also do not have the character of a part outside a whole.

And it is confirmed, because a term is constituted in the being of a term by a second intention, which is the relation of a part to a whole. But this relation consists in the actual exercise of regarding, not in a potency to regard. Therefore, if it is constituted in the being of a part by a relation, it is constituted through the actual exercise of a part, not through a potency to compose.

WE ANSWER that it is not of the character of a part that it actually compose, as is clear from the example given of a separated soul; we showed the same above concerning the parts of artificial things.

To the objection we answer that, just as a rational soul really exists per se outside a whole, so a term can be known separately from a whole; and because a being of reason has no other being than being known, a term can therefore exist by reason outside a whole while retaining the very character of a part.

Or, second, it is said that even if a part cannot in fact exist outside a whole because of the dependence it has on the whole in existing, nevertheless the office of a part does not consist in actual composition, as is clear in prime matter itself, which can at one time be under one form and one composite, and at another time under another. Thus, although it cannot exist outside a whole, at least naturally, its office does not consist in the actual exercise of composing this whole or that one, but in a potency for either.

To the confirmation we answer that a potency to regard is different from a potency to compose, as we said above. It is perfectly possible that a potency to compose actually regard the very whole it can compose, although it does not actually compose it, just as a visual potency actually regards a visible object although it does not actually see. The relation or intention of a part is said to constitute the term in the artificial being of a term insofar as it bears the character of a part capable of composing a proposition, not of one actually composing it. The proposition is not composed from that relation, but from the term itself, which bears the character of a part.

Finally, it is argued: Aptitude for making a proposition is accidental to a term; therefore, it cannot be essentially defined through it.

The antecedent is proved: The actual making of a proposition in exercise is accidental to it; therefore, so is the proximate aptitude for composing. For act and proximate potency are in the same genus. A term, however, signifies a proximate potency for composing, since a radical and remote potency is also found in the sign itself considered in itself.

And it is confirmed, because the second operation is ordered to the third just as the first is to the second; and yet the second is not defined by its order to the third. Therefore, neither is the first operation, in which the term is found, defined by its order to the second.

WE ANSWER that a term consists in a proximate potency for making a proposition, understanding “proximate potency” to mean that which is of itself ultimately ordered and prepared for composing. To the statement that “potency and act are in the same genus,” we answer that it is one thing for them to be in the same genus—that is, in the same category—and another for them to be in the same genus, that is, in the same predicable or mode of predicating, so that what belongs essentially to a potency also belongs essentially to its act. We are not disputing the first point, whether an act must always be in the same category; there are many counterexamples concerning potencies and acts that are not ordered per se and intrinsically, a matter to be disputed elsewhere. But the second point is manifest: potency can belong essentially to something and act accidentally, as the ability to compose belongs essentially to the soul and the ability to see to the eye, although actually composing or actually seeing does not.

To the confirmation we answer that the second operation does not regard the third as a final and simple part having no other essence than that of a part, as a term does. Rather, the second operation has a composite being in itself and is a kind of whole; it regards the third operation not as a simple composing part, but as inferring and moving from one thing to another, which is not per se and primarily the being of a part as a term.