Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Prima Pars Artis Logicae

In disputes about the definitions of things, almost everything is ultimately reduced to a question about the name. Since a definition is a principle used by a science to know the natures of things and their attributes, it has no prior principles by which it can be discerned except names and the different ways of conceiving the same thing. This perhaps happens most of all in the questions usually raised about the definition of a term.

Therefore, to proceed more clearly, WE DISTINGUISH an enunciative term and a syllogistic term, on the basis of the teaching of St. Thomas reported in the preceding article, in On Interpretation I, lect. 1: simple expressions have three considerations,¹ according as they pertain to the categories, according as they are parts of an enunciation, and according as a syllogism is constituted from them as from its extremes. Since we are not treating of the categories here, we consider and define a term according to the latter two senses. In the first of these we call it an enunciative term, as it expresses an order to an enunciation; we treat it in this article. In the last sense we call it a syllogistic term; we shall treat it in the following article.

In defining a term, then, it is remarkable how much the AUTHORS vary. Some extend the notion of a term quite broadly even to non-signifying voices, provided they can be extremes in a proposition. Others include any simple significant expression, without regard to whether it can be an extreme of a proposition. Others require both formalities for the character of a term: that it be a sign or significant voice as genus, and that it be a part or constituent of a proposition as difference. Others add a third, still more restrictive formality: that a term be a part of a proposition not in just any way, but a principal part, which is an extreme; and so they define a term as an extreme of a proposition. Finally, others add a fourth formality: that it be not only a sign, nor only a part, even as an extreme—since all these are presupposed—but ultimately an actual extreme of syllogistic resolution, so that when a syllogism and proposition are resolved, it then has the essential and ultimate difference of a term, because the proposition is resolved into it. The Philosopher says that a term is “that into which a proposition is resolved.”² They add, however, that a term consists of signification and the character of a part as of prior and presupposed formalities, such that these are not verified essentially of the term itself, but of the term’s substitute or subject.

I SAY FIRST: It belongs to the essential notion of a logical or artificial term that it signify by convention, if it is vocal or written, but not if it is a concept.

This conclusion is common among dialecticians, who follow Aristotle in defining all logical instruments—the syllogism, speech, noun, verb, and so on—by significant voices. St. Thomas follows him in On Interpretation I, lect. 1,³ treating the definition of the noun, and lect. 6,⁴ treating the definition of speech; he excludes voices that signify naturally, although Plato in the Cratylus thought the opposite,⁵ because speech and its parts are not natural things, but certain artificial effects, and therefore must signify artificially. Voices lacking signification, however, represent only naturally, not by convention, and therefore do not of themselves pertain to constructing speech.

THE REASON IS that no voice naturally represents the copula of other things; therefore, at least as regards the copula, they need a voice signifying by convention. Second, if the copula signifies by convention, it cannot of itself unite naturally representing extremes. If you utter the word “is” between two groans or two laughs, it unites nothing except ridiculously. Natural voices, then, are not united by the copula “is,” and so logical art ceases; it cannot be practiced without the verb or without signification, one of which determines the other. But a non-signifying voice does not determine a significant voice, as when you say “scindapsus,” “blitiri,” adding nothing else. Third, a non-signifying written mark does not compose logically, such as figures or characters not imposed to signify but naturally carved; therefore, neither do non-signifying voices. Whether Logic can accidentally take up a non-signifying voice to compose speech, we shall say in the arguments.

I SAY SECOND: It belongs to the notion of an enunciative term that it express an order to a proposition, not only as an extreme of a proposition, as predicate and subject, but also according to a more common notion that includes the verb and other parts. Hence its ultimate formality is being a part of an enunciation.

This conclusion is common among the Thomists, Peter of Spain, Soto, Báñez, and others. It is clearly drawn from St. Thomas and the teaching of Aristotle. For in On Interpretation I, ch. “On Enunciation,”⁶ explaining how noun and verb are excluded from speech, the Philosopher says: “Noun and verb, then, are only an expression, since it is not to say that someone enunciates something by a voice signifying in this way.” Explaining these words there in lect. 8, § He excludes it from unity,⁷ St. Thomas says: “Noun and verb, then, are only an expression: an expression, that is, not an enunciation; and it seems from his manner of speaking that he himself imposed the name ‘expression’ to signify the parts of an enunciation.” Thus St. Thomas. It is clear, then, that the Philosopher imposed on verb and noun a common name, namely, that they are “only an expression”; and, St. Thomas says, he imposed this name to signify the parts of an enunciation. Therefore, according to St. Thomas, expression as a part of an enunciation is a common notion of verb and noun. Consequently, a simple expression or term—which is the same thing—must be treated and defined as a part of an enunciation; indeed, it is considered under this consideration of a part in the book On Interpretation. Therefore, the definition of a simple expression insofar as it is a part of an enunciation pertains to the logician and belongs to the notion of a logical term. For what a science considers and treats in general it also defines in general; otherwise it could not treat it.

If you ask whether this consideration of a part includes all the parts of an enunciation or only the principal ones, we answer from St. Thomas there that only nouns and verbs are the principal parts of speech: pronouns are included under nouns, and participles under verbs. Other things that grammarians call parts are rather connections among the parts of speech, signifying the relation of one to another, than parts of speech, just as nails and similar things are not parts of a ship but connections among its parts. It is therefore clear that in its general sense a term or expression includes every kind of part insofar as it is a part, including adverbs and pronouns, which are syncategorematic terms; but in a special and strict sense it includes only the principal parts, that is, noun and verb, to which the others are reduced. This holds not only when a verb also has the character of an extreme, as when I say “Peter runs,” where “runs” is the predicate, but also when it is only a copula, because the copula principally constitutes composition and signifies affirmation, through which truth is signified and an enunciation constituted. Syncategorematic terms, however, are connections that signify in some way and not something; therefore, they can never have the character of predicate and subject, as a verb can, and they do not signify in the manner of a copula, which principally constitutes the very signification of truth that is an enunciation.

That the character of a part is the ultimate formality of a term taken in general is clear from this: noun and verb agree only in this character insofar as they express a relation to an enunciation, namely, that they are parts of an enunciation. Therefore, this alone constitutes the common notion of noun and verb, which common notion is called a term or expression. If any other formality is set aside, what is common to noun and verb is understood to remain; therefore, the term as expression is understood to remain. Beyond the notion of a part, only the actual exercise of composing a whole and resolving it remains. No distinct formality is understood to be added to the notion of a part by its actually composing or resolving; only the exercise of the formality of a part is added, which can do both by the very fact that it is a part, as will be explained more fully in the next article. The character of a part does not consist in the exercise of composing, but in the potency to compose, as is clear in matter and form, whose entities are not the very exercise of composing; a separated soul is a part although it does not actually compose.

THE ARGUMENTS ARE ANSWERED.

First, it is argued against the first conclusion that non-signifying voices constitute and complete true speech, as when you say “A is not B” or “Blitiri is not scindapsus”; therefore, they truly are terms.

Nor can it be said, that they constitute it materially, or that speech constituted only materially is speech. For a formal and true speech results from them, since it produces the sense of speech in the hearer’s mind; therefore, they constitute it formally, and these are non-signifying voices.

And it is confirmed from Aristotle’s definition of speech, both from the definition and from his usage. From the definition: he says speech is “that some part of which signifies separately.” Therefore, it is not required that all the parts signify separately; some non-signifying part can therefore pertain to speech. From usage: Aristotle very frequently forms his demonstrations from letters alone, such as “A is B” or “C is A,” which signify nothing as expressions. Therefore, non-signifying voices too compose a proposition and syllogism, and signification is not required for the character of a term.

WE ANSWER that when a proposition or speech is made from non-signifying voices, that voice stands materially for itself, as in material supposition, for example, when I say “Man is a noun” or “man is a voice.” Those voices stand for themselves because they represent themselves to the senses; for this they do not need signification, but self-representation, which supplies the place of signification. As for composition through the verb “is,” which unites the extremes, the non-signifying voice itself, even when held materially, does not compose. For how can the verb “is,” through its conventional signification, unite that which naturally represents and is held materially as a voice? Therefore, non-signifying voices, or voices held materially, do not compose formal speech formally and artificially; rather, some significant voice is understood, by reason of which the artificial composition is made, since this is formal. Thus when I say “Blitiri is not a noun,” “the voice ‘blitiri is not a noun’” is understood; there “voice” is the term signifying and composing formally, while “blitiri” stands there only materially. The same applies to resolution: speech is not resolved formally and artificially into “blitiri,” but objectively and materially; formally it is resolved into “the voice ‘blitiri’” and into “noun.” Sometimes, however, for brevity, we use only “blitiri” and understand “voice,” although “blitiri” is not what formally composes, but what is designated materially, just as a groan or laugh cannot compose with the verb. This is simply the true and certain solution.

To the confirmation I say, as regards the definition of speech, that Aristotle did not intend that non-signifying voices could compose formally and per se, but that at least some part of speech must signify something as a categorematic term, even if the remaining parts signify only in some way as syncategorematic terms, as St. Thomas explains in lect. 6 of On Interpretation I,⁸ not that voices entirely lacking signification can formally compose speech together with the verb. As for Aristotle’s use of simple letters, the answer from what was said is that those letters either stand there materially, representing themselves, or they compose formally and artificially with “the voice A” or “the voice B” understood; or, if they compose formally by themselves, it is understood that the voice A or B composes, as it has been imposed to signify those first elements and first letters. For A has been imposed to signify and does not signify only naturally, as is clear in the preposition “a” or “ab”; and similarly it signifies the letter or figure A, while the voice B signifies the letter B.

Second, it is argued: No definition should be less known than what it defines; therefore, the definition of a term should not be given through a proposition, since a proposition is less known to us; for no knowledge of it is presupposed when a term is defined. Therefore, a term should not be taken relatively to a proposition, but absolutely in itself, as a certain expression.

It is confirmed, because terms can be taken absolutely and defined insofar as they are simple expressions, and as they are common to the three considerations given by the holy Doctor: as they pertain to the book of the Categories, and as they are parts composing a proposition or syllogism. Thus they can be defined in general according to an absolute consideration.

WE ANSWER: As we said in the preceding article, it is enough to give a definition through something better known by imperfect knowledge and with respect to whether it is. It is not always required that it be given through something better known with respect to what it is and by scientific cognition, especially in the case of things defined through an order to something extrinsic, as was said there. For example, to define the visual power it is enough to know that a visible colored thing exists, with respect to whether it is.

To the confirmation we answer that a term, insofar as it pertains to the categories, is taken as it is coordinated according to higher and lower degrees; insofar as it pertains to the composition of a proposition or syllogism, it is taken for the sign which the intellect and Logic use as an instrument of their compositions. Thus terms cannot be defined by one definition; or, if they could be, it is not relevant here, where we treat only of a term insofar as it pertains to logical form and prioristic resolution, as has often been said.

Finally, it is argued to prove that the character of a part cannot be the formality of a term: the formality of a part differs from that of an extreme; but a term has the character of an extreme; therefore, it is not constituted solely by the formality of a part.

The minor premise is proved from the common definition of a term, that a term is an extreme of a proposition, which is taken from Aristotle in Prior Analytics I, ch. 1: a term is “that into which a proposition is resolved.”⁹ The major premise is clear, because the notion of a part is more universal than that of an extreme. A part is preserved in that which composes a whole, whereas an extreme contains and closes off the whole itself, so that the whole does not extend beyond it, and it functions as a principal part.

It is confirmed, because if the definition of a term is given through the notion of a part, it belongs to things other than what is defined and is therefore not a good definition. The antecedent is proved, because it also belongs to a proposition and speech, since a proposition composes a syllogism and another hypothetical proposition, which essentially consists of other propositions.

Nor can one say that they are parts, but not per se, primarily, and essentially like terms, rather accidentally and secondarily. For the contrary is true: a syllogism and a hypothetical proposition are composed per se from propositions; therefore, propositions are per se composing and constitutive parts of them, and consequently are per se parts.

WE ANSWER that the definition of a term as an extreme of a proposition does not include every term generally, but only the more principal parts, and not even all of them, but only those functioning as predicate and subject. Hence it applies more properly to a syllogistic term than to an enunciative term, and for this reason the Philosopher gave that definition of a syllogistic term. We, however, are treating here of an enunciative term, precisely insofar as it regards an enunciation, and therefore we have taken it more generally than in the definition of a syllogistic term. The reason for this difference is that an enunciative term is ordered only to constructing truth in an enunciation, whereas a syllogism is ordered to inferring. Truth is composed not only from the extremes, but also from the joining verb, adverbs, or negations, on which the truth of a proposition often depends; therefore, all these must be considered among the terms as constituents of a proposition. Syllogistic inference, however, is considered not as true but as inferring, and it requires only three terms: two functioning as the extremes in the conclusion to be inferred, and a third functioning as the middle, proving and inferring and joining by inference. Hence only the extremes of propositions are syllogistic terms.

But if you say that these terms cannot concur without a verb to infer a conclusion, and therefore the verb too will be a syllogistic term, we answer: I deny the consequence. For the verb is required not to join the extremes by way of inference and proof, but by way of enunciation; and because an enunciation is presupposed to a syllogism, the verb is also required, but not formally for the syllogism; it is presupposed by reason of the enunciation, not by reason of inference.

To the confirmation we answer, first, that speech and a proposition cannot be parts of a categorical proposition, but only of a hypothetical proposition or syllogism; a term, however, is a part of a categorical proposition and through it also of a hypothetical one, which does not belong to things other than what is defined. Or, second, we answer with the solution given that a proposition and speech are not parts primarily and per se, but a kind of whole composed of parts; accidentally, however, they are parts of another whole, just as a house is per se a certain artificial whole but accidentally a part of a city.

To the reply we answer that a hypothetical proposition and a syllogism are composites in the manner in which the Philosopher said in the chapter on enunciation¹⁰ that a hypothetical proposition is one by conjunction, whereas a categorical proposition is one simply. Composites that are composed by conjunction and order can be composed of parts that are not per se and primarily parts, but accidentally and materially, because they are presupposed in themselves as certain wholes and composites, just as an army is composed of many people and a city of many houses, which are certain wholes. When you hear “parts composing per se,” do not understand “per se” as natural per se-ness, but as artificial per se-ness in the logical genus, such that in this genus terms are per se and primarily artificial constituents because they have no other essence previously constituted; propositions, however, even in this genus, are not per se parts or constituents, but are per se wholes and composites, while accidentally they compose other things.