Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Prima Pars Artis Logicae

The title presupposes that there is order in every doctrine, that is, in every science which treats its subjects scientifically; it must not begin with this or that subject by chance or at whim, for in that way it would produce confusion rather than clarity, which depends chiefly on the order of treatment. Therefore it is proper to the wise person to order things, as is said in Metaphysics 1.¹

Second, I presuppose from the proem of the Physics that, in proceeding, the order of nature and that of art or science are the same: they begin from what is more imperfect and easier, and are brought to completion or end in what is more perfect. Thus, in intention, more perfect things are prior—that is, intended first—while in execution they are last. They stand conversely with respect to perfection. For cognition more readily touches on things that are more common, and is then more imperfect; it is perfected, however, when it knows things more particularly. Therefore doctrine, like nature, begins from what is more common—that is, what pertains to more things—and from what is simpler and better known to us. But cognition in its execution does not begin from things better known, not to us, but in themselves because of their great perfection, which are called better known by nature—that is, of a nobler and more knowable nature—even though they are not easier. On this see Physics, question 1.²

I SAY, THEN, FIRST: It belongs to Logic in its own right to direct all three operations of the intellect, which are simple apprehension, composition, and discourse.

No one doubts that the second and third operations belong to Logic; some doubt the first. But this follows clearly from Aristotle and St. Thomas, who says in Posterior Analytics 1, lecture 1:³ “One action of the intellect is the understanding of indivisibles or incomposites, insofar as it conceives what a thing is; and the doctrine Aristotle gives in the book of the Categories is ordered to this operation.” The holy Doctor affirms the same no less openly in On Interpretation 1, lecture 1,⁴ where he distributes the order of Aristotle’s books in Logic according to these three operations of the intellect.

YOU WILL SAY that St. Thomas does not teach that the first apprehension absolutely and in its own right belongs to Logic, but belongs to it accidentally and by reason of something else, namely judgment. For what is first in simple apprehension later becomes a partial object of judgment; in that first state it does not belong to Logic, but does so in the second.

But, first, the contrary is the case because the Divine Thomas speaks of one operation in the same tenor and manner as of another, nor does he make a treatise that directs the first operation accidentally any more than one that directs the second. Further, the first operation too is directly capable of direction and grounds its intentions: namely, the relations of higher and lower, of universal and particular among the predicables, and the coordinations of the categories, in which we distinguish things confusedly apprehended into their classes. All this requires some art and direction, insofar as these things are arranged in an ordered and distinct way and the confusion under which things are first apprehended is removed. This pertains to the first operation, not to composition and discourse, since complex things are rather excluded from the categories and only simple things are placed there, as will be said in Logic, in the Antepredicaments;⁵ nor can this be directed by any art other than Logic. Therefore, and so on.

I SAY, SECOND: Among the operations themselves, Logic, in the proper order of doctrine, begins by directing the first operation.

This is clear from what has been said. Second, the order of an art must be proportioned and conformed to the order of nature, for art imitates nature. But by nature the intellect proceeds in knowing from the first operation to the second. Therefore the art of Logic too must proceed from the first operation to the second in directing.

I SAY, LAST: Within the first operation itself, it is most fitting to begin, in the sequence and order of treatment of Logic’s prioristic resolution, from the term or simple expression—not absolutely, but insofar as it is a part of an enunciation and bears a relation to composing it.

This conclusion depends on what is to be said in the following article. Meanwhile, it is gathered clearly from St. Thomas, On Interpretation 1, lecture 1,⁶ where he says: “If someone asks, since simple things were discussed in the book of the Categories, why it was necessary to determine the name and the verb again here, one must answer that simple expressions may be considered in three ways. First, insofar as they signify simple acts of understanding absolutely; in this way their consideration belongs to the book of the Categories. In another way, according to their character as parts of an enunciation; in this way they are treated in this book, and therefore are presented under the character of noun and verb, whose character it is to signify something with or without time, and other such features that pertain to expressions insofar as they constitute an enunciation. Third, they are considered insofar as the syllogistic order is constituted from them; in this way they are treated under the character of terms in the book of the Prior Analytics.” These are St. Thomas’s words.

THE REASON IS that although the absolute consideration of a thing usually precedes its relational consideration, nevertheless, in relation to some special treatise or end, relational consideration can come first. For in the present work we treat of things that pertain to logical form, or prioristic resolution; in Logic we treat of things that pertain to matter and posterioristic resolution. The considerations of the categories, in which simple expressions are considered absolutely, pertain to the matter or posterioristic part of Logic, since the categories are series of predicates, or of higher and lower grades, genera and species, and so on. All this belongs on the side of the things themselves, from whose connection, as from matter, demonstration or opinion is fashioned. But consideration of the term or simple expression, insofar as it pertains to the prioristic part, looks to the construction and composition of the enunciation and syllogism. Hence it must be considered in relation to the things it constructs or into which the constructed thing is resolved. In this relational consideration, we had to consider its relation to enunciation before its relation to syllogism, because enunciation precedes syllogism. We therefore fittingly begin from the term according to its function or relation in making an enunciation, and shall thereafter treat it in relation to the extreme of a syllogism.

THE OBJECTIONS ARE ANSWERED.

Against the first conclusion you object: The adequate object of Logic is the artful mode of knowing; therefore, in a cognition where there is no art and no artful mode, Logic has no right or direction, just as it cannot direct sight or hearing. But simple apprehension is devoid of every art and mode of knowing, because it is borne toward its object as naturally as the external senses are; indeed, it is called simple apprehension because it has nothing of art in it. Therefore it in no way belongs to dialectic to direct it.

IT IS ANSWERED by denying that simple apprehension is devoid of every logical art. For although it is devoid of the art of composition and division, it is not devoid of the art of distinction and coordination, as when we distinguish higher from lower grades, the intention of genus from that of species, common from particular, concrete from abstract, and the like. Since many things are usually apprehended confusedly and in a tangled way in the first apprehension itself, unfolding and coordinating them is an art required for a mode of knowing, for example for definition and division, which are usually made according to the intention of genus and difference. But correcting errors in simple apprehension on the part of the nature or thing apprehended will belong to the metaphysician; on the part of form and second intention—for example, on the part of genus and difference, concrete and abstract, and the like—it will belong to the logician.

Second it is argued against the second and third conclusions: The proper order of doctrine requires us to begin in the order in which nature does, namely from what is more imperfect and better known to us. But the term, as it is presented by us, is neither more imperfect nor better known to us; therefore one must not begin from it.

The minor is proved: It is not more imperfect, because the term can still be resolved into other, more imperfect things of which it consists, namely signification, voice, syllables, and so on. Therefore one ought to treat of the sign before the term, and of voice and syllables. Nor is it better known to us, because something is better known than it. First, in confused cognition, the whole is better known than the part, and thus discourse and proposition are better known than the term. Then, in definitional and distinct cognition, the term is defined by the proposition; therefore the proposition must be better known, since it stands as the defining expression with respect to the term as defined, and thus makes it manifest. Otherwise, if we had no knowledge of the proposition, how would we define the term by it?

And this is confirmed: Aristotle in Prior Analytics 1, chapter 1⁷ first defined proposition, then the term as that into which a proposition is resolved; therefore knowledge of the proposition must be presented before that of the term.

IT IS ANSWERED by denying the minor. To the proof of the first part it is answered that the term is indeed resolvable into things prior to it, of which it consists, but treating those things does not belong to the logician; rather, the logician presupposes them. The physicist treats voice in itself and natural signs; the grammarian treats syllables; the establishment of signs by convention pertains to the commonwealth, and politics treats them insofar as they pertain to public communication among human beings. If the logician treats a sign at all, either he borrows this from other sciences or treats it insofar as it is the foundation of second intention in logical instruments such as term and discourse. Thus logical resolution properly stops at the term, just as construction is of proposition and syllogism. The further resolution of the term, namely into voice, signification, and the like, is not part of logical inquiry, just as a sculptor stops at the wood from which he makes a statue, although wood and bronze are resolved into matter and form—not by art, but by nature.

To the proof of the second part it is answered that something is better known than the term by confused cognition, but not by distinct and scientific cognition. We, however, begin to treat the term in a scientific order and with distinct cognition, which presupposes confused cognition of the whole. Hence, to define the part through its relation to the whole as an extrinsic term, it suffices to presuppose the whole itself as confusedly known, not scientifically and distinctly. And when it is pressed that the defining expression must be better known than what is defined, the answer is that it must be better known, but not more knowable: that is, it must be something known to everyone at least by simple and confused cognition, though not scientifically—especially in the case of things defined in relation to something extrinsic, which are definitions as it were by addition, as is said in Metaphysics 7.⁸ For the relation to that thing is intrinsic, not the extrinsic thing to which such a relation obtains; thus perfect knowledge of that extrinsic thing is not required. For example, if color is defined by its relation to sight, sight need not first be known definitively and scientifically. In a word, when something is defined, it suffices that its defining expressions be better known with respect to whether it is, not with respect to what it is.

To the confirmation it is answered that it supports our position. For the Philosopher, when he is about to treat syllogism, first touches on its proximate matter, which is propositions, and from there on its remote matter, which is terms. Therefore syllogism is made from propositions, and proposition from terms. If, then, when a syllogism is resolved, the term is the last thing into which it is resolved, one must begin from it as the last element in the syllogistic order, if one begins scientifically.

Finally it is argued: Every science begins from universals; therefore Logic ought to begin not from the term, but from that in which term and proposition agree in the logical genus, namely second intention in common. This also agrees with the way the Philosopher begins in the Physics: he begins from mobile being in common, then treats its particular parts in the books On the Heavens, On Generation, On the Soul, and so on. Therefore Logic likewise ought to begin from logical being, that is, second intention, and then descend to its parts.

It is confirmed because the mode of knowing itself is easier to know than the term, since the mode of knowing itself facilitates and prepares the way to knowing, being an instrument of knowing. Therefore the mode of knowing ought to be treated first, as what is easier or facilitates science, and afterward the particular knowable objects, namely term, discourse, and so on.

IT IS ANSWERED that Logic begins from what is more universal when it begins from the term—not more universal in predication, but in composition or causation. For the term composes all the logical instruments: discourse, proposition, syllogism, and even the mode of knowing itself, namely definition, division, and so on. But it is not always necessary to begin from what is most universal in predication, as when it presents no special difficulty insofar as it is conceived in common, but only insofar as it is explained through its parts. The mode of knowing in common, for example, has no difficulty other than the one explained through its parts. As for the order observed by the Philosopher in the Physics, we say that the same order is observed in Logic: just as the physicist first treats mobile being as a common object and begins scientifically from the principles and elements that constitute mobile being, namely matter and form, so Logic treats the mode of knowing, or logical form—which is second intention—in common as its object, but nevertheless begins scientifically from its first and simplest constitutive element, which is the term.

To the confirmation it is answered that the mode of knowing, insofar as it must be known and defined scientifically and distinctly as a thing to be known as an object, is no easier to know than the term, since the term is a part of it, and distinct and scientific knowledge of a composite begins from knowledge of its parts. But the mode of knowing as a condition or instrument of knowing in its exercise, and as that by which we know, is easier than the term and prepares the way to it, as it does also to all objects that must be known scientifically. For this it is not necessary to know the mode of knowing quidditatively and scientifically beforehand, but only by some imperfect and confused cognition, as the whole is known with respect to its parts. In sum: A doctrine that begins scientifically from the term also begins to know scientifically the mode of knowing itself, proposition, and syllogism, because scientific knowledge of these begins from distinct knowledge of their parts, and the first part of them is the term.