Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Prima Pars Artis Logicae
John of St. Thomas (1589–1644)
First published 1930
Prima pars artis Logicae (formal logic) of the Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus of John of St. Thomas (Joannes a Sancto Thoma), from the Reiser edition (Marietti, Turin, 1930), Reiser tomus I, pars prima.
Praefatio I: Preface
Praeludium I: IN WHICH THE EXERCISE AND PRACTICE OF DIALECTICAL DISPUTATION ARE PROPOSED
Praeludium II: DIVISION, ORDER, AND NECESSITY OF THE ART OF LOGIC
Liber I: ON THE MATTERS PERTAINING TO THE FIRST OPERATION OF THE INTELLECT
Caput I: DEFINITION OF THE TERM
Caput II: DEFINITION AND DIVISION OF THE SIGN
Caput III: ON CERTAIN DIVISIONS OF TERMS
Caput IV: ON OTHER DIVISIONS OF TERMS
Caput V: ON THE NAME
Caput VI: ON THE VERB
Liber II: ON THE MATTERS PERTAINING TO THE SECOND OPERATION OF THE INTELLECT
Caput I: ON EXPRESSION IN GENERAL AND ITS DIVISION
Caput II: ON THE MODE OF KNOWING
Caput III: ON DEFINITION
Caput IV: ON DIVISION
Caput V: ON ARGUMENTATION
Caput VI: ON THE PROPOSITION OR ENUNCIATION
Caput VII: ON THE DIVISIONS OF THE PROPOSITION
Caput VIII: ON THE MATTER OF PROPOSITIONS
Caput IX: ON THE PROPERTIES OF THE PROPOSITION AND THE ORDER IN WHICH THEY ARE TO BE TREATED
Caput X: ON SUPPOSITION
Caput XI: ON THE DIVISIONS OF SUPPOSITION
Caput XII: RULES OF SUPPOSITION
Caput XIII: ON RELATIVES
Caput XIV: ON AMPLIFICATION, RESTRICTION, AND ALIENATION
Caput XV: ON APPELLATION
Caput XVI: ON OPPOSITION
Caput XVII: ON THE CONDITIONS REQUIRED FOR THE SPECIES OF OPPOSED PROPOSITIONS AND THE RULES FOR RECOGNIZING THE SPECIAL OPPOSITIONS THEMSELVES
Caput XVIII: ON THE EQUIVALENCE OF PROPOSITIONS
Caput XIX: ON THE CONVERSION OF PROPOSITIONS
Caput XX: ON MODALS
Caput XXI: ON THE QUANTITY, QUALITY, OPPOSITION, AND EQUIVALENCE OF MODALS
Rotuli I: TABLES OF COMPOUND MODALS
Rotuli II: TABLES OF DIVIDED MODAL PROPOSITIONS WHOSE DICTUM CONCERNS A COMMON TERM
Caput XXII: ON THE REDUCTION OF MODALS TO THEIR DE INESSE PROPOSITIONS
Caput XXIII: ON HYPOTHETICAL PROPOSITIONS
Caput XXIV: ON EXPONIBLES
Liber III: ON THE THIRD OPERATION OF THE INTELLECT
Caput I: ON CONSEQUENCE AND ITS DIVISION
Caput II: ON INDUCTION
Caput III: ON THE ORDER AND MODE OF RESOLVING TERMS BY ASCENT AND DESCENT
Caput IV: ON THE SYLLOGISM AND ITS MATTER AND FORM
Caput V: ON THE DIVISION OF THE SYLLOGISM ACCORDING TO MATTER AND FORM
Caput VI: ALL THREE FIGURES AND MODES OF SYLLOGISMS ARE EXPLAINED
Caput VII: ON THE REDUCTION OF IMPERFECT SYLLOGISMS TO PERFECT ONES
Caput VIII: ON THE EXPOSITORY SYLLOGISM
Caput IX: ON THE MODE OF FINDING THE MIDDLE TERM
Caput X: ON THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THE WHOLE ART OF SYLLOGIZING RESTS
Caput XI: ON THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THE GOODNESS OF CONSEQUENCE RESTS UNIVERSALLY
Caput XII: ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE DEFECTS OF A BAD CONSEQUENCE
Caput XIII: ON PARTICULAR DEFECTS
Circa I: CONCERNING THE SYLLOGISM.
The first defect in syllogisms is arguing in four terms, since the whole art of syllogism consists in connecting two terms with each other, inferred from their connection with a third. Hence there ought to be no more than two extremes and no more than one middle. Thus this is invalid: “Every human being is possibly white; an Ethiopian is a human being; therefore an Ethiopian is white,” because the middle is not only the term “human being” but also the term “possibly.” To this is reduced the requirement that the extremes be complete extremes: for if they are not complete, the argument proceeds with more than three terms.
The second defect: The middle must not be taken equivocally, but in the same sense in both premises; otherwise it could not unite the extremes with one another. Thus this is invalid: “Every dog is a barker; some star is a dog; therefore some star is a barker.”
The third defect: Nothing follows from purely particular premises. We explained this above.1
The fourth: Nothing follows from purely negative premises. This too was explained above.2
The fifth: The middle is not completely distributed in one of the premises. Hence this is invalid: “Every animal was in Noah’s ark; Socrates is an animal; therefore Socrates was in Noah’s ark.”
The sixth: No term should be distributed in the conclusion unless it was distributed in one of the premises. This was explained above3 and coincides with the defect of arguing from the undistributed to the distributed. Also belonging here are defects involving amplification or restriction, such that the middle is not taken more broadly where it is undistributed than where it is distributed.
The seventh defect: The middle enters into the conclusion. Otherwise all syllogisms in which appellation is varied would be valid, for example, if you say: “Every human being is a creature; Christ is a human being; therefore Christ is a creature insofar as he is a human being.” “Every likeness is a quality; this quality is intense; therefore this likeness is intense insofar as it is a quality.”
The eighth defect: The particular rules for the figures of syllogisms set out above4 are not observed, such as that in the first figure the major proposition cannot be particular, along with the other rules explained there.