Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Prima Pars Artis Logicae
John of St. Thomas (1589–1644)
First published 1930
Prima pars artis Logicae (formal logic) of the Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus of John of St. Thomas (Joannes a Sancto Thoma), from the Reiser edition (Marietti, Turin, 1930), Reiser tomus I, pars prima.
Praefatio I: Preface
Praeludium I: IN WHICH THE EXERCISE AND PRACTICE OF DIALECTICAL DISPUTATION ARE PROPOSED
Praeludium II: DIVISION, ORDER, AND NECESSITY OF THE ART OF LOGIC
Liber I: ON THE MATTERS PERTAINING TO THE FIRST OPERATION OF THE INTELLECT
Caput I: DEFINITION OF THE TERM
Caput II: DEFINITION AND DIVISION OF THE SIGN
Caput III: ON CERTAIN DIVISIONS OF TERMS
Caput IV: ON OTHER DIVISIONS OF TERMS
Caput V: ON THE NAME
Caput VI: ON THE VERB
Liber II: ON THE MATTERS PERTAINING TO THE SECOND OPERATION OF THE INTELLECT
Caput I: ON EXPRESSION IN GENERAL AND ITS DIVISION
Caput II: ON THE MODE OF KNOWING
Caput III: ON DEFINITION
Caput IV: ON DIVISION
Caput V: ON ARGUMENTATION
Caput VI: ON THE PROPOSITION OR ENUNCIATION
Caput VII: ON THE DIVISIONS OF THE PROPOSITION
Caput VIII: ON THE MATTER OF PROPOSITIONS
Caput IX: ON THE PROPERTIES OF THE PROPOSITION AND THE ORDER IN WHICH THEY ARE TO BE TREATED
Caput X: ON SUPPOSITION
Caput XI: ON THE DIVISIONS OF SUPPOSITION
Caput XII: RULES OF SUPPOSITION
Caput XIII: ON RELATIVES
Caput XIV: ON AMPLIFICATION, RESTRICTION, AND ALIENATION
Caput XV: ON APPELLATION
Caput XVI: ON OPPOSITION
Caput XVII: ON THE CONDITIONS REQUIRED FOR THE SPECIES OF OPPOSED PROPOSITIONS AND THE RULES FOR RECOGNIZING THE SPECIAL OPPOSITIONS THEMSELVES
Caput XVIII: ON THE EQUIVALENCE OF PROPOSITIONS
Caput XIX: ON THE CONVERSION OF PROPOSITIONS
Caput XX: ON MODALS
Caput XXI: ON THE QUANTITY, QUALITY, OPPOSITION, AND EQUIVALENCE OF MODALS
Rotuli I: TABLES OF COMPOUND MODALS
Rotuli II: TABLES OF DIVIDED MODAL PROPOSITIONS WHOSE DICTUM CONCERNS A COMMON TERM
Caput XXII: ON THE REDUCTION OF MODALS TO THEIR DE INESSE PROPOSITIONS
Caput XXIII: ON HYPOTHETICAL PROPOSITIONS
Caput XXIV: ON EXPONIBLES
Liber III: ON THE THIRD OPERATION OF THE INTELLECT
Caput I: ON CONSEQUENCE AND ITS DIVISION
Caput II: ON INDUCTION
Caput III: ON THE ORDER AND MODE OF RESOLVING TERMS BY ASCENT AND DESCENT
Caput IV: ON THE SYLLOGISM AND ITS MATTER AND FORM
Caput V: ON THE DIVISION OF THE SYLLOGISM ACCORDING TO MATTER AND FORM
Caput VI: ALL THREE FIGURES AND MODES OF SYLLOGISMS ARE EXPLAINED
Caput VII: ON THE REDUCTION OF IMPERFECT SYLLOGISMS TO PERFECT ONES
Caput VIII: ON THE EXPOSITORY SYLLOGISM
Caput IX: ON THE MODE OF FINDING THE MIDDLE TERM
Caput X: ON THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THE WHOLE ART OF SYLLOGIZING RESTS
Caput XI: ON THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THE GOODNESS OF CONSEQUENCE RESTS UNIVERSALLY
Caput XII: ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE DEFECTS OF A BAD CONSEQUENCE
From the preceding chapter it is gathered that there is one principle and root from which the defect and invalidity of consequences arise, namely: “Whenever the antecedent can be made true and the consequent false, the consequence is bad.”
For since a consequence is an inferential connection between two propositions, whenever a true antecedent is given without a true consequent, the connection is neither good nor formal, because one can stand without the other, that is, the truth of one without the truth of the other. But if one stands without the other, the connection is dissolved; therefore that connection and consequence is bad, because it can be dissolved. Hence it follows that whatever makes the antecedent more readily true than the consequent leads to a bad consequence, because it makes it possible for the antecedent to stand true without the consequent. Conversely, whatever makes the consequent harder to render false than the antecedent contributes to, or establishes, the goodness of the consequence.
From these principles all the defects of consequences can be elicited, so that one can assign to each consequence the defect from which it suffers. Indeed, Master Soto, in book 5 of the Summulae, assigns seven intrinsic defects and just as many extrinsic defects in syllogisms. He calls those defects intrinsic which belong to the middle; they are called intrinsic because they render the premises incapable. He calls extrinsic those which belong to the extremes in the manner of inferring conclusions, because they fail to observe the logical properties or the proper arrangement in quantity and quality, distribution, etc. Nearly all intrinsic defects reduce to this: either the middle is taken equivocally, or it is not distributed completely or perfectly, or the conditions and rules set out above1 are not observed, so that the middle is not taken more broadly where it is undistributed than where it is distributed. Finally, extrinsic defects consist in failing to observe all the logical properties in the extremes. These defects will be shown individually in the following chapter.