Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Prima Pars Artis Logicae

John of St. Thomas

Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Prima Pars Artis Logicae

John of St. Thomas (1589–1644)

First published 1930

Prima pars artis Logicae (formal logic) of the Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus of John of St. Thomas (Joannes a Sancto Thoma), from the Reiser edition (Marietti, Turin, 1930), Reiser tomus I, pars prima.


Praefatio I: Preface

Praeludium I: IN WHICH THE EXERCISE AND PRACTICE OF DIALECTICAL DISPUTATION ARE PROPOSED

Praeludium II: DIVISION, ORDER, AND NECESSITY OF THE ART OF LOGIC

Liber I: ON THE MATTERS PERTAINING TO THE FIRST OPERATION OF THE INTELLECT

Caput I: DEFINITION OF THE TERM

Caput II: DEFINITION AND DIVISION OF THE SIGN

Caput III: ON CERTAIN DIVISIONS OF TERMS

Caput IV: ON OTHER DIVISIONS OF TERMS

Caput V: ON THE NAME

Caput VI: ON THE VERB

Liber II: ON THE MATTERS PERTAINING TO THE SECOND OPERATION OF THE INTELLECT

Caput I: ON EXPRESSION IN GENERAL AND ITS DIVISION

Caput II: ON THE MODE OF KNOWING

Caput III: ON DEFINITION

Caput IV: ON DIVISION

Caput V: ON ARGUMENTATION

Caput VI: ON THE PROPOSITION OR ENUNCIATION

Caput VII: ON THE DIVISIONS OF THE PROPOSITION

Caput VIII: ON THE MATTER OF PROPOSITIONS

Caput IX: ON THE PROPERTIES OF THE PROPOSITION AND THE ORDER IN WHICH THEY ARE TO BE TREATED

Caput X: ON SUPPOSITION

Caput XI: ON THE DIVISIONS OF SUPPOSITION

Caput XII: RULES OF SUPPOSITION

Caput XIII: ON RELATIVES

Caput XIV: ON AMPLIFICATION, RESTRICTION, AND ALIENATION

Caput XV: ON APPELLATION

Caput XVI: ON OPPOSITION

Caput XVII: ON THE CONDITIONS REQUIRED FOR THE SPECIES OF OPPOSED PROPOSITIONS AND THE RULES FOR RECOGNIZING THE SPECIAL OPPOSITIONS THEMSELVES

Caput XVIII: ON THE EQUIVALENCE OF PROPOSITIONS

Caput XIX: ON THE CONVERSION OF PROPOSITIONS

Caput XX: ON MODALS

Caput XXI: ON THE QUANTITY, QUALITY, OPPOSITION, AND EQUIVALENCE OF MODALS

Rotuli I: TABLES OF COMPOUND MODALS

Rotuli II: TABLES OF DIVIDED MODAL PROPOSITIONS WHOSE DICTUM CONCERNS A COMMON TERM

Caput XXII: ON THE REDUCTION OF MODALS TO THEIR DE INESSE PROPOSITIONS

Caput XXIII: ON HYPOTHETICAL PROPOSITIONS

Caput XXIV: ON EXPONIBLES

Liber III: ON THE THIRD OPERATION OF THE INTELLECT

Caput I: ON CONSEQUENCE AND ITS DIVISION

Caput II: ON INDUCTION

Caput III: ON THE ORDER AND MODE OF RESOLVING TERMS BY ASCENT AND DESCENT

Caput IV: ON THE SYLLOGISM AND ITS MATTER AND FORM

A syllogism is defined as “a discourse in which, certain things having been posited and granted, something other than them necessarily follows because those things have been posited.” We should know that a syllogism aims to order reasoning according to the connection of terms with one another, not, as induction does, through resolution and reduction to singulars. It must therefore regard extremes capable of being united with one another, and a rationale or middle term on account of which they are united. Hence, from a middle term applied or united to the extremes, it unites them and infers that the extremes are united with one another. This is the whole order and progression of a syllogism: to infer and deduce a proposition in which two terms, or extremes, are united, from another proposition or propositions in which the middle term, or rationale by which they can and ought to be united with one another, is made explicit. That is why the definition says that it is “a discourse in which, certain things having been posited”—namely, the premises, in which the middle term is applied to the extremes—“something else necessarily follows,” that is, the conclusion is inferred, in which the extremes are joined to one another, “because those things have been posited,” that is, by the force and positing of the premises. An example is this syllogism: “Every body is a substance; every man is a body; therefore every man is a substance.” Here you see three propositions: two premises that infer, and a third that is the conclusion. In the third, the two extremes “man” and “substance” are united; in the premises, the middle term, on account of which those extremes are united, is applied to the extremes. The middle term is “body,” which, because it belongs to man and to substance, makes man and substance belong together.

A syllogism, then, consists of matter and form, like any artifact. Its FORM is the very arrangement and art that orders and disposes the matter so that it can properly infer and conclude. Its matter is twofold: one is proximate, the other remote. The proximate matter consists of the propositions from which the syllogism is constructed; the remote matter consists of the terms or extremes that compose the proposition and into which the syllogism is ultimately resolved. Therefore Aristotle defines a term in this part of logic as that into which a proposition is resolved, as into subject and predicate. It is defined by resolution, as St. Thomas says in Opusculum 48, treatise on the Syllogism, chapter 1, because our knowledge and judgment proceed by resolving a thing into its causes. Thus, insofar as a term serves the judging or resolving part, it is defined by resolution, not by composition. The definition says “as into predicate and subject” because the verb is not a term with respect to the syllogism, but a union; a term is only what functions as an extreme that infers or is inferred. Through the union expressed by the verb, then, there is composed not only what pertains to the truth of an enunciation, but also what pertains to the inferential connection. Thus the union, or copula, of the verb is not that into which the syllogism is resolved, but that which is dissolved when the syllogism is resolved.

Therefore, there are only three propositions in a syllogism: two premises, which infer, and one conclusion, which is inferred. The first premise is called the major proposition, the second the minor, and the third the conclusion or consequent. Similarly, there can be only three terms, although they are repeated in the three propositions. Two are the extremes, which are to be united in the conclusion; the other is the middle, which is united to the extremes in the premises but does not enter the conclusion, for it infers it. One extreme is called major, the other minor. The major extreme is the one taken in the major premise and placed in the conclusion. The minor extreme is the one taken in the minor premise and placed in the conclusion. The middle is the term posited twice in the premises but not in the conclusion. By “term” we mean not only something simple or uncomplex, but also something complex, provided that it functions as one extreme or middle.

The FORM of a syllogism can also be said to be twofold, corresponding to this twofold proximate and remote matter. Since the form of a syllogism is the ordering or arrangement of its matter, the arrangement that orders the remote matter, namely, the terms, is called a figure; the arrangement that orders the proximate matter, namely, the propositions, is called a mode. A figure in a syllogism, then, is the arrangement of terms according to the subject and predicate positions. A mode is the ordering of premises or propositions according to their proper quantity and quality. The proper quality is that at least one premise be affirmative, and that not all be negative. The proper quantity is that at least one be universal, and that not all be particular. Figures are determined according to the predication and subjection of the middle term with respect to the extremes; different figures result from different combinations of predication and subjection, as we shall say in the next chapter.

Caput V: ON THE DIVISION OF THE SYLLOGISM ACCORDING TO MATTER AND FORM

Caput VI: ALL THREE FIGURES AND MODES OF SYLLOGISMS ARE EXPLAINED

Caput VII: ON THE REDUCTION OF IMPERFECT SYLLOGISMS TO PERFECT ONES

Caput VIII: ON THE EXPOSITORY SYLLOGISM

Caput IX: ON THE MODE OF FINDING THE MIDDLE TERM

Caput X: ON THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THE WHOLE ART OF SYLLOGIZING RESTS

Caput XI: ON THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THE GOODNESS OF CONSEQUENCE RESTS UNIVERSALLY

Caput XII: ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE DEFECTS OF A BAD CONSEQUENCE

Caput XIII: ON PARTICULAR DEFECTS

Circa I: CONCERNING THE SYLLOGISM.

Defectus I: COMMON DEFECTS.

Caput XIV: ON FALLACIES

Liber IV: THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ARE TO BE DISPUTED TO ILLUSTRATE CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES OF THIS TEXT

Quaestio I: ON THE TERM

Articulus I: WHETHER DIALECTIC BEGINS WITH THE TERM IN THE RIGHT ORDER OF DOCTRINE

Articulus II: WHETHER THE DEFINITION OF THE ENUNCIATIVE TERM IS GOOD, AND IN WHAT ITS FORMALITY CONSISTS

Articulus III: WHETHER THE DEFINITION OF THE SYLLOGISTIC TERM IS GOOD, AND WHAT ITS FORMALITY IS

Articulus IV: WHAT THE DEFINED THING OF A TERM IS, AND FOR WHAT IT SUPPOSITS

Articulus V: WHETHER WORDS SIGNIFY CONCEPTS OR THINGS FIRST

Articulus VI: WHETHER THE TERM HAS ANY ESSENTIAL DIVISION

Quaestio II: ON THE NAME

Articulus I: HOW THAT CLAUSE IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD: „NO PART OF WHICH SIGNIFIES SEPARATELY”

Articulus II: WHETHER THE INFINITE NAME IS RIGHTLY EXCLUDED FROM THE ACCOUNT OF A NAME

Articulus III: WHETHER THE OBLIQUE CASES ARE RIGHTLY EXCLUDED FROM THE ACCOUNT OF A NAME

Quaestio III: ON THE VERB

Articulus I: WHAT IT IS TO SIGNIFY WITH TIME AND TO BE FREED FROM TIME

Articulus II: WHETHER A VERB CAN BE MADE INFINITE WITHIN A PROPOSITION

Quaestio IV: ON EXPRESSION AND THE MODE OF KNOWING

Articulus I: WHETHER THE DEFINITION OF EXPRESSION IS GOOD AND WHAT ITS DEFINED THING IS

Articulus II: WHETHER THE DEFINITION OF DEFINITION IS RIGHTLY GIVEN

Articulus III: WHETHER THE DEFINITION OF DIVISION AND WHAT PERTAINS TO DIVISION ARE RIGHTLY GIVEN

Quaestio V: ON ENUNCIATION

Articulus I: WHEREIN THE NOTION OF ENUNCIATION CONSISTS, AS IT ABSTRACTS FROM CATEGORICAL AND HYPOTHETICAL ENUNCIATION

Articulus II: WHETHER A CATEGORICAL ENUNCIATION IS SOME SIMPLE QUALITY AND CONCEPT IN THE MIND, OR FORMALLY COMPOSITE

Articulus III: WHETHER THE DIVISION INTO HYPOTHETICAL AND CATEGORICAL IS ESSENTIAL AND UNIVOCAL

Articulus IV: WHETHER THE DIVISIONS INTO AFFIRMATIVE AND NEGATIVE, UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR, ARE GOOD AND ESSENTIAL

Quaestio VI: ON SUPPOSITION AND THE OTHER PROPERTIES OF THE PARTS OF AN ENUNCIATION

Articulus I: WHETHER THE DEFINITION OF SUPPOSITION IS GOOD

Articulus II: WHETHER IMPROPER SUPPOSITION IS FOUND IN THE ULTIMATE CONCEPT OF THE MIND

Articulus III: WHAT IS TO BE NOTED CONCERNING THE OTHER SPECIES OF SUPPOSITION AND LOGICAL PROPERTIES

Articulus IV: WHETHER THE RULES OF APPELLATION GIVEN IN THE TEXT ARE TRUE

Quaestio VII: ON THE OPPOSITION AND CONVERSION OF PROPOSITIONS

Articulus I: WHETHER CONTRADICTORY OPPOSITION IS THE GREATEST OF ALL OPPOSITIONS

Articulus II: WHETHER THERE CAN BE CONTRADICTORIES THAT ARE SIMULTANEOUSLY TRUE OR FALSE

Articulus III: WHETHER THE RULES OF CONVERSION ARE RIGHTLY ASSIGNED

Quaestio VIII: ON CONSEQUENCE AND THE SYLLOGISM

Articulus I: WHETHER THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GOOD AND BAD CONSEQUENCE IS RIGHTLY ASSIGNED

Articulus II: WHETHER INDUCTION IS A FORMAL CONSEQUENCE

Articulus III: WHETHER THE CONCLUSION BELONGS TO THE ESSENCE OF THE SYLLOGISM, OR ONLY THE PREMISES

Articulus IV: WHETHER THE SYLLOGISM IS RIGHTLY DIVIDED INTO PERFECT AND IMPERFECT

Appendix I: TO THE SECOND PART OF THE SUMMULAE

Quaestio I: ON THE TERM

Articulus I: WHETHER DIALECTIC BEGINS WITH THE TERM IN THE RIGHT ORDER OF DOCTRINE

Articulus II: WHETHER THE DEFINITION OF THE ENUNCIATIVE TERM IS GOOD AND IN WHAT ITS FORMALITY CONSISTS

Articulus III: WHETHER WORDS SIGNIFY CONCEPTS OR THINGS FIRST

Articulus IV: WHETHER THE TERM HAS ANY ESSENTIAL DIVISION

Quaestio II: ON THE NAME

Articulus I: HOW THAT CLAUSE IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD: „NO PART OF WHICH SIGNIFIES SEPARATELY”

Articulus II: WHETHER AN INFINITE NAME IS A NAME

Articulus III: WHETHER OBLIQUE CASES ARE RIGHTLY EXCLUDED FROM THE ACCOUNT OF THE NAME

Quaestio III: ON THE VERB

Articulus I: WHAT IT IS TO SIGNIFY WITH TIME AND TO BE ABSOLVED FROM TIME

Articulus II: WHETHER A VERB CAN BE INFINITIZED WITHIN A PROPOSITION

Quaestio IV: ON EXPRESSION AND THE METHOD OF KNOWING

Articulus I: WHETHER THE DEFINITION OF EXPRESSION IS GOOD, AND WHAT IT DEFINES

Articulus II: WHETHER THE DEFINITION OF DEFINITION HAS BEEN RIGHTLY GIVEN

Articulus III: WHETHER THE DEFINITION OF DIVISION AND THE MATTERS PERTAINING TO DIVISION HAVE BEEN RIGHTLY GIVEN

Quaestio V: ON ENUNCIATION

Articulus I: IN WHAT THE ACCOUNT OF ENUNCIATION IN GENERAL CONSISTS

Appendix II: At the end of all the illustrations

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