Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Prima Pars Artis Logicae

John of St. Thomas

Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Prima Pars Artis Logicae

John of St. Thomas (1589–1644)

First published 1930

Prima pars artis Logicae (formal logic) of the Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus of John of St. Thomas (Joannes a Sancto Thoma), from the Reiser edition (Marietti, Turin, 1930), Reiser tomus I, pars prima.


Praefatio I: Preface

Praeludium I: IN WHICH THE EXERCISE AND PRACTICE OF DIALECTICAL DISPUTATION ARE PROPOSED

Praeludium II: DIVISION, ORDER, AND NECESSITY OF THE ART OF LOGIC

Liber I: ON THE MATTERS PERTAINING TO THE FIRST OPERATION OF THE INTELLECT

Caput I: DEFINITION OF THE TERM

Caput II: DEFINITION AND DIVISION OF THE SIGN

Caput III: ON CERTAIN DIVISIONS OF TERMS

Caput IV: ON OTHER DIVISIONS OF TERMS

Caput V: ON THE NAME

Caput VI: ON THE VERB

Liber II: ON THE MATTERS PERTAINING TO THE SECOND OPERATION OF THE INTELLECT

Caput I: ON EXPRESSION IN GENERAL AND ITS DIVISION

Caput II: ON THE MODE OF KNOWING

Caput III: ON DEFINITION

Caput IV: ON DIVISION

Caput V: ON ARGUMENTATION

Caput VI: ON THE PROPOSITION OR ENUNCIATION

Caput VII: ON THE DIVISIONS OF THE PROPOSITION

Caput VIII: ON THE MATTER OF PROPOSITIONS

Caput IX: ON THE PROPERTIES OF THE PROPOSITION AND THE ORDER IN WHICH THEY ARE TO BE TREATED

Caput X: ON SUPPOSITION

Caput XI: ON THE DIVISIONS OF SUPPOSITION

Caput XII: RULES OF SUPPOSITION

Caput XIII: ON RELATIVES

Caput XIV: ON AMPLIFICATION, RESTRICTION, AND ALIENATION

Caput XV: ON APPELLATION

Caput XVI: ON OPPOSITION

Caput XVII: ON THE CONDITIONS REQUIRED FOR THE SPECIES OF OPPOSED PROPOSITIONS AND THE RULES FOR RECOGNIZING THE SPECIAL OPPOSITIONS THEMSELVES

Caput XVIII: ON THE EQUIVALENCE OF PROPOSITIONS

Caput XIX: ON THE CONVERSION OF PROPOSITIONS

Caput XX: ON MODALS

Caput XXI: ON THE QUANTITY, QUALITY, OPPOSITION, AND EQUIVALENCE OF MODALS

Rotuli I: TABLES OF COMPOUND MODALS

Rotuli II: TABLES OF DIVIDED MODAL PROPOSITIONS WHOSE DICTUM CONCERNS A COMMON TERM

Caput XXII: ON THE REDUCTION OF MODALS TO THEIR DE INESSE PROPOSITIONS

Caput XXIII: ON HYPOTHETICAL PROPOSITIONS

Caput XXIV: ON EXPONIBLES

Liber III: ON THE THIRD OPERATION OF THE INTELLECT

Caput I: ON CONSEQUENCE AND ITS DIVISION

Caput II: ON INDUCTION

In the preceding book, chapter 5, on argumentation, we said that all the species of argumentation could be reduced to two: induction and syllogism. For an enthymeme is a truncated syllogism, and an example is an imperfect induction, as St. Thomas says at the end of 1 Poster., lect. 1. Hence, finally, in lecture 30 of the same book, St. Thomas lists only two ways of acquiring knowledge: demonstration and induction. Demonstration is a syllogism that proceeds from universals, while induction proceeds from singulars, since all our cognition originates from singulars, which are perceived through the senses.

Induction is therefore defined as “a progression from singulars sufficiently enumerated to the universal”; for example, if you say, “This fire heats, and that one, and that one, etc.; therefore every fire heats.” And since opposites have the same account, under this definition of induction by ascent is understood its opposite, descent, that is, a progression from the universal to singulars. Induction, insofar as it proceeds by ascent, is ordered to discovering and proving universal truths as universal—that is, insofar as they consist of the singulars contained under them. For something cannot be proved to be such universally except because its singulars are such. Descent, however, is ordered chiefly to showing the falsity of a universal as universal: the falsity of a universal is best shown by descending under it and showing that some singular is not such. Still, once the truth of the universal has been established and discovered through ascent, descent also serves to show the universal’s correspondence to the singulars contained under it. The principal function of induction, however, is to bring proof of a universal to the senses by ascending from singulars.

It is therefore clear that Aristotle rightly set out the difference between syllogism and induction in the second book of the Prior Analytics, chapter 23. A syllogism uses a middle term to show that the extremes are united with one another; induction, by contrast, proves the extreme of the middle by means of a third. That is to say, a syllogism uses premises in which the middle is assumed to be united with the extremes, so that through it the union of the extremes with one another may be proved. Induction, however, does not assume a middle uniting the extremes in order to prove that the extremes are united with one another. Rather, it proves that an extreme, or some predicate, belongs to a common subject because it belongs to the singulars, or that it belongs to the singulars because it belongs to the common subject.

You may ask how many kinds of ascent and descent there are and what they are. I answer that there are four: conjunctive, disjunctive, compounded, and disjoined. Conjunctive ascent and descent occurs when singulars are enumerated through conjunctive propositions, as in “Every man is an animal; therefore this man is an animal, and that man is an animal,” etc. Disjunctive occurs when they are enumerated through disjunctive propositions, as in “Some man is white; therefore either this man is white, or that man is white,” etc. Compounded ascent and descent occurs when a term is resolved by singulars enumerated together in a complex proposition. For example, “All the apostles of God are twelve” is resolved as “This one and that one, etc., are twelve,” enumerating them all in one proposition. Disjoined occurs when a term is resolved through its singulars, enumerated separately in a single proposition. Thus, if you say, “Every man is an animal,” the predicate “animal” is resolved disjointly as “Every man is this animal or that animal or that other animal,” so that the whole disjunction is the predicate. Whether induction, by its formal account and its own proper force, is a formal consequence, we shall say below in question 8, article 2.

Caput III: ON THE ORDER AND MODE OF RESOLVING TERMS BY ASCENT AND DESCENT

Caput IV: ON THE SYLLOGISM AND ITS MATTER AND FORM

Caput V: ON THE DIVISION OF THE SYLLOGISM ACCORDING TO MATTER AND FORM

Caput VI: ALL THREE FIGURES AND MODES OF SYLLOGISMS ARE EXPLAINED

Caput VII: ON THE REDUCTION OF IMPERFECT SYLLOGISMS TO PERFECT ONES

Caput VIII: ON THE EXPOSITORY SYLLOGISM

Caput IX: ON THE MODE OF FINDING THE MIDDLE TERM

Caput X: ON THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THE WHOLE ART OF SYLLOGIZING RESTS

Caput XI: ON THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THE GOODNESS OF CONSEQUENCE RESTS UNIVERSALLY

Caput XII: ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE DEFECTS OF A BAD CONSEQUENCE

Caput XIII: ON PARTICULAR DEFECTS

Circa I: CONCERNING THE SYLLOGISM.

Defectus I: COMMON DEFECTS.

Caput XIV: ON FALLACIES

Liber IV: THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ARE TO BE DISPUTED TO ILLUSTRATE CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES OF THIS TEXT

Quaestio I: ON THE TERM

Articulus I: WHETHER DIALECTIC BEGINS WITH THE TERM IN THE RIGHT ORDER OF DOCTRINE

Articulus II: WHETHER THE DEFINITION OF THE ENUNCIATIVE TERM IS GOOD, AND IN WHAT ITS FORMALITY CONSISTS

Articulus III: WHETHER THE DEFINITION OF THE SYLLOGISTIC TERM IS GOOD, AND WHAT ITS FORMALITY IS

Articulus IV: WHAT THE DEFINED THING OF A TERM IS, AND FOR WHAT IT SUPPOSITS

Articulus V: WHETHER WORDS SIGNIFY CONCEPTS OR THINGS FIRST

Articulus VI: WHETHER THE TERM HAS ANY ESSENTIAL DIVISION

Quaestio II: ON THE NAME

Articulus I: HOW THAT CLAUSE IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD: „NO PART OF WHICH SIGNIFIES SEPARATELY”

Articulus II: WHETHER THE INFINITE NAME IS RIGHTLY EXCLUDED FROM THE ACCOUNT OF A NAME

Articulus III: WHETHER THE OBLIQUE CASES ARE RIGHTLY EXCLUDED FROM THE ACCOUNT OF A NAME

Quaestio III: ON THE VERB

Articulus I: WHAT IT IS TO SIGNIFY WITH TIME AND TO BE FREED FROM TIME

Articulus II: WHETHER A VERB CAN BE MADE INFINITE WITHIN A PROPOSITION

Quaestio IV: ON EXPRESSION AND THE MODE OF KNOWING

Articulus I: WHETHER THE DEFINITION OF EXPRESSION IS GOOD AND WHAT ITS DEFINED THING IS

Articulus II: WHETHER THE DEFINITION OF DEFINITION IS RIGHTLY GIVEN

Articulus III: WHETHER THE DEFINITION OF DIVISION AND WHAT PERTAINS TO DIVISION ARE RIGHTLY GIVEN

Quaestio V: ON ENUNCIATION

Articulus I: WHEREIN THE NOTION OF ENUNCIATION CONSISTS, AS IT ABSTRACTS FROM CATEGORICAL AND HYPOTHETICAL ENUNCIATION

Articulus II: WHETHER A CATEGORICAL ENUNCIATION IS SOME SIMPLE QUALITY AND CONCEPT IN THE MIND, OR FORMALLY COMPOSITE

Articulus III: WHETHER THE DIVISION INTO HYPOTHETICAL AND CATEGORICAL IS ESSENTIAL AND UNIVOCAL

Articulus IV: WHETHER THE DIVISIONS INTO AFFIRMATIVE AND NEGATIVE, UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR, ARE GOOD AND ESSENTIAL

Quaestio VI: ON SUPPOSITION AND THE OTHER PROPERTIES OF THE PARTS OF AN ENUNCIATION

Articulus I: WHETHER THE DEFINITION OF SUPPOSITION IS GOOD

Articulus II: WHETHER IMPROPER SUPPOSITION IS FOUND IN THE ULTIMATE CONCEPT OF THE MIND

Articulus III: WHAT IS TO BE NOTED CONCERNING THE OTHER SPECIES OF SUPPOSITION AND LOGICAL PROPERTIES

Articulus IV: WHETHER THE RULES OF APPELLATION GIVEN IN THE TEXT ARE TRUE

Quaestio VII: ON THE OPPOSITION AND CONVERSION OF PROPOSITIONS

Articulus I: WHETHER CONTRADICTORY OPPOSITION IS THE GREATEST OF ALL OPPOSITIONS

Articulus II: WHETHER THERE CAN BE CONTRADICTORIES THAT ARE SIMULTANEOUSLY TRUE OR FALSE

Articulus III: WHETHER THE RULES OF CONVERSION ARE RIGHTLY ASSIGNED

Quaestio VIII: ON CONSEQUENCE AND THE SYLLOGISM

Articulus I: WHETHER THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GOOD AND BAD CONSEQUENCE IS RIGHTLY ASSIGNED

Articulus II: WHETHER INDUCTION IS A FORMAL CONSEQUENCE

Articulus III: WHETHER THE CONCLUSION BELONGS TO THE ESSENCE OF THE SYLLOGISM, OR ONLY THE PREMISES

Articulus IV: WHETHER THE SYLLOGISM IS RIGHTLY DIVIDED INTO PERFECT AND IMPERFECT

Appendix I: TO THE SECOND PART OF THE SUMMULAE

Quaestio I: ON THE TERM

Articulus I: WHETHER DIALECTIC BEGINS WITH THE TERM IN THE RIGHT ORDER OF DOCTRINE

Articulus II: WHETHER THE DEFINITION OF THE ENUNCIATIVE TERM IS GOOD AND IN WHAT ITS FORMALITY CONSISTS

Articulus III: WHETHER WORDS SIGNIFY CONCEPTS OR THINGS FIRST

Articulus IV: WHETHER THE TERM HAS ANY ESSENTIAL DIVISION

Quaestio II: ON THE NAME

Articulus I: HOW THAT CLAUSE IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD: „NO PART OF WHICH SIGNIFIES SEPARATELY”

Articulus II: WHETHER AN INFINITE NAME IS A NAME

Articulus III: WHETHER OBLIQUE CASES ARE RIGHTLY EXCLUDED FROM THE ACCOUNT OF THE NAME

Quaestio III: ON THE VERB

Articulus I: WHAT IT IS TO SIGNIFY WITH TIME AND TO BE ABSOLVED FROM TIME

Articulus II: WHETHER A VERB CAN BE INFINITIZED WITHIN A PROPOSITION

Quaestio IV: ON EXPRESSION AND THE METHOD OF KNOWING

Articulus I: WHETHER THE DEFINITION OF EXPRESSION IS GOOD, AND WHAT IT DEFINES

Articulus II: WHETHER THE DEFINITION OF DEFINITION HAS BEEN RIGHTLY GIVEN

Articulus III: WHETHER THE DEFINITION OF DIVISION AND THE MATTERS PERTAINING TO DIVISION HAVE BEEN RIGHTLY GIVEN

Quaestio V: ON ENUNCIATION

Articulus I: IN WHAT THE ACCOUNT OF ENUNCIATION IN GENERAL CONSISTS

Appendix II: At the end of all the illustrations

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