Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Prima Pars Artis Logicae

Name: Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Prima Pars Artis Logicae
Author: John of St. Thomas

First published 1930

Prima pars artis Logicae (formal logic) of the Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus of John of St. Thomas (Joannes a Sancto Thoma), from the Reiser edition (Marietti, Turin, 1930), Reiser tomus I, pars prima.

Rotuli II: TABLES OF DIVIDED MODAL PROPOSITIONS WHOSE DICTUM CONCERNS A COMMON TERM

Simple universals with respect to both dictum and mode:

Every man necessarily disputes.
Every man impossibly disputes.

Simple particulars with respect to both dictum and mode:

Some man possibly disputes.
Some man possibly does not dispute.

The first two in the upper place are simply contraries; the two in the lower place are simply subalterns of those first two, and are simply subcontraries to one another. Considered transversely, they are simply contradictories; and by prefixing or postposing negation they become equipollent according to the rules given above for equipollents.

Universals with respect to dictum, but not with respect to mode:

Every man possibly disputes.
Every man possibly does not dispute.

Particulars with respect to both dictum and mode:

Some man possibly disputes.
Some man possibly does not dispute.

These are subalterns only with respect to the subject, but not with respect to the mode.

For this reason we have placed them here on account of subalternation. The particulars with respect to dictum and the universals with respect to mode, which seemed to belong here, will be placed more appropriately in the following table. The first two are not contraries to one another, because although they require contrariety with respect to the subject, the particular mode expressed by “possibly” prevents contrariety: the same universality and particularity remain. The two lower propositions are simply subcontraries, but when considered transversely they are not contradictories, because the same particularity remains through “possibly”; rather, they are subcontraries with respect to mode. The first two nevertheless contradict the modals with a particular dictum and common mode, which we shall list immediately.

Universals with respect to mode, and particulars with respect to dictum:

Some man necessarily disputes.
Some man impossibly disputes.

Particulars with respect to mode, but not with respect to dictum:

Every man possibly disputes.
Every man possibly does not dispute.

The two above are disparate with respect to one another, as are the two below, because the same particularity and universality remain in each pair; but considered transversely they have simple contradiction. To make them contrary only with respect to the subject or only with respect to the mode, observe this: always place a universal dictum and mode in one of the propositions. Otherwise, if one is universal and the other particular in both respects, they will be disparate. For example, these are contrary with respect to mode: “Every man necessarily disputes,” “Some man impossibly disputes”; and these with respect to dictum: “Every man possibly disputes,” “Every man impossibly disputes.” Similarly, in subcontraries with respect only to the subject or only to the mode, observe that one of the propositions must always have particularity of both dictum and mode.

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Praefatio I: Preface

Praeludium I: IN WHICH THE EXERCISE AND PRACTICE OF DIALECTICAL DISPUTATION ARE PROPOSED

Praeludium II: DIVISION, ORDER, AND NECESSITY OF THE ART OF LOGIC

Liber I: ON THE MATTERS PERTAINING TO THE FIRST OPERATION OF THE INTELLECT

Caput I: DEFINITION OF THE TERM

Caput II: DEFINITION AND DIVISION OF THE SIGN

Caput III: ON CERTAIN DIVISIONS OF TERMS

Caput IV: ON OTHER DIVISIONS OF TERMS

Caput V: ON THE NAME

Caput VI: ON THE VERB

Liber II: ON THE MATTERS PERTAINING TO THE SECOND OPERATION OF THE INTELLECT

Caput I: ON EXPRESSION IN GENERAL AND ITS DIVISION

Caput II: ON THE MODE OF KNOWING

Caput III: ON DEFINITION

Caput IV: ON DIVISION

Caput V: ON ARGUMENTATION

Caput VI: ON THE PROPOSITION OR ENUNCIATION

Caput VII: ON THE DIVISIONS OF THE PROPOSITION

Caput VIII: ON THE MATTER OF PROPOSITIONS

Caput IX: ON THE PROPERTIES OF THE PROPOSITION AND THE ORDER IN WHICH THEY ARE TO BE TREATED

Caput X: ON SUPPOSITION

Caput XI: ON THE DIVISIONS OF SUPPOSITION

Caput XII: RULES OF SUPPOSITION

Caput XIII: ON RELATIVES

Caput XIV: ON AMPLIFICATION, RESTRICTION, AND ALIENATION

Caput XV: ON APPELLATION

Caput XVI: ON OPPOSITION

Caput XVII: ON THE CONDITIONS REQUIRED FOR THE SPECIES OF OPPOSED PROPOSITIONS AND THE RULES FOR RECOGNIZING THE SPECIAL OPPOSITIONS THEMSELVES

Caput XVIII: ON THE EQUIVALENCE OF PROPOSITIONS

Caput XIX: ON THE CONVERSION OF PROPOSITIONS

Caput XX: ON MODALS

Caput XXI: ON THE QUANTITY, QUALITY, OPPOSITION, AND EQUIVALENCE OF MODALS

Rotuli I: TABLES OF COMPOUND MODALS

Rotuli II: TABLES OF DIVIDED MODAL PROPOSITIONS WHOSE DICTUM CONCERNS A COMMON TERM

Caput XXII: ON THE REDUCTION OF MODALS TO THEIR DE INESSE PROPOSITIONS

Caput XXIII: ON HYPOTHETICAL PROPOSITIONS

Caput XXIV: ON EXPONIBLES

Liber III: ON THE THIRD OPERATION OF THE INTELLECT

Caput I: ON CONSEQUENCE AND ITS DIVISION

Caput II: ON INDUCTION

Caput III: ON THE ORDER AND MODE OF RESOLVING TERMS BY ASCENT AND DESCENT

Caput IV: ON THE SYLLOGISM AND ITS MATTER AND FORM

Caput V: ON THE DIVISION OF THE SYLLOGISM ACCORDING TO MATTER AND FORM

Caput VI: ALL THREE FIGURES AND MODES OF SYLLOGISMS ARE EXPLAINED

Caput VII: ON THE REDUCTION OF IMPERFECT SYLLOGISMS TO PERFECT ONES

Caput VIII: ON THE EXPOSITORY SYLLOGISM

Caput IX: ON THE MODE OF FINDING THE MIDDLE TERM

Caput X: ON THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THE WHOLE ART OF SYLLOGIZING RESTS

Caput XI: ON THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THE GOODNESS OF CONSEQUENCE RESTS UNIVERSALLY

Caput XII: ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE DEFECTS OF A BAD CONSEQUENCE

Caput XIII: ON PARTICULAR DEFECTS

Circa I: CONCERNING THE SYLLOGISM.

Defectus I: COMMON DEFECTS.

Caput XIV: ON FALLACIES

Liber IV: THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ARE TO BE DISPUTED TO ILLUSTRATE CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES OF THIS TEXT

Quaestio I: ON THE TERM

Articulus I: WHETHER DIALECTIC BEGINS WITH THE TERM IN THE RIGHT ORDER OF DOCTRINE

Articulus II: WHETHER THE DEFINITION OF THE ENUNCIATIVE TERM IS GOOD, AND IN WHAT ITS FORMALITY CONSISTS

Articulus III: WHETHER THE DEFINITION OF THE SYLLOGISTIC TERM IS GOOD, AND WHAT ITS FORMALITY IS

Articulus IV: WHAT THE DEFINED THING OF A TERM IS, AND FOR WHAT IT SUPPOSITS

Articulus V: WHETHER WORDS SIGNIFY CONCEPTS OR THINGS FIRST

Articulus VI: WHETHER THE TERM HAS ANY ESSENTIAL DIVISION

Quaestio II: ON THE NAME

Articulus I: HOW THAT CLAUSE IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD: „NO PART OF WHICH SIGNIFIES SEPARATELY”

Articulus II: WHETHER THE INFINITE NAME IS RIGHTLY EXCLUDED FROM THE ACCOUNT OF A NAME

Articulus III: WHETHER THE OBLIQUE CASES ARE RIGHTLY EXCLUDED FROM THE ACCOUNT OF A NAME

Quaestio III: ON THE VERB

Articulus I: WHAT IT IS TO SIGNIFY WITH TIME AND TO BE FREED FROM TIME

Articulus II: WHETHER A VERB CAN BE MADE INFINITE WITHIN A PROPOSITION

Quaestio IV: ON EXPRESSION AND THE MODE OF KNOWING

Articulus I: WHETHER THE DEFINITION OF EXPRESSION IS GOOD AND WHAT ITS DEFINED THING IS

Articulus II: WHETHER THE DEFINITION OF DEFINITION IS RIGHTLY GIVEN

Articulus III: WHETHER THE DEFINITION OF DIVISION AND WHAT PERTAINS TO DIVISION ARE RIGHTLY GIVEN

Quaestio V: ON ENUNCIATION

Articulus I: WHEREIN THE NOTION OF ENUNCIATION CONSISTS, AS IT ABSTRACTS FROM CATEGORICAL AND HYPOTHETICAL ENUNCIATION

Articulus II: WHETHER A CATEGORICAL ENUNCIATION IS SOME SIMPLE QUALITY AND CONCEPT IN THE MIND, OR FORMALLY COMPOSITE

Articulus III: WHETHER THE DIVISION INTO HYPOTHETICAL AND CATEGORICAL IS ESSENTIAL AND UNIVOCAL

Articulus IV: WHETHER THE DIVISIONS INTO AFFIRMATIVE AND NEGATIVE, UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR, ARE GOOD AND ESSENTIAL

Quaestio VI: ON SUPPOSITION AND THE OTHER PROPERTIES OF THE PARTS OF AN ENUNCIATION

Articulus I: WHETHER THE DEFINITION OF SUPPOSITION IS GOOD