Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Prima Pars Artis Logicae

Among grammarians, appellation is the same as naming, and to appellare is to name. Among dialecticians it is taken for an application by which the signification of one term is applied in a special way to the signification of another. Appellation is thus defined as “the application of the formal signification of one term to the formal signification of another.” For example, if you say, “Peter is a great logician,” great does not belong to Peter absolutely, but under the aspect and formal character of logic. Appellation therefore has this effect: the appellating term does not belong to the subject absolutely, but by reason of that over which it appellates, as it were bound to that formality, through which it is applied to the subject. Thus in the proposition just given, great does not belong to Peter absolutely, but by reason of logic. Variation in appellation therefore causes a serious, sometimes very subtle, defect in paralogisms. The definition says “application of the formal signification to the formal signification” because formal application to something material is simply application or predication, not appellation; appellation applies something to a subject through some formality, not absolutely. Thus, if you say, “Peter is a harpist and good,” each predicate is applied simply and absolutely to the subject, not appellatively one to the other, that is, under some formality of the other.

Appellation is divided into real and conceptual. Real appellation is made according to real accidents or formalities, as “Peter is a great logician.” Conceptual appellation is made through an accident of reason, as “Man is a species”: the predicate belongs not to man absolutely, but to man as conceived abstractly. Wherever a predicate belongs to a subject not absolutely but by reason of some formality, there is appellation.

There are four rules of appellation: the first two concern real appellation, the other two conceptual appellation.

For real appellation, the first rule is: When an adjective is placed on the predicate side and a substantive on the subject side, there is no appellation to the formal meaning of the substantive, but application to its supposit. Thus the predicate does not appellately refer to the subject; it simply applies its signification to the material supposit of the subject. The ancients used to say the same in other words: the subject stands materially and the predicate formally. See St. Thomas, ST III, q. 16, aa. 7 and 9. Examples are “A physician is great,” “White is sweet,” and “This man” (pointing to Christ) “is eternal.” In these, the predicate is applied to the material supposit of the subject. We except a proposition in which the subject has simple supposition, as “Man is a species”; for there “man” is taken apart from its supposits and stands abstractly, apart from them. By “supposit” we mean the supposit conveyed by the name, not the supposit that belongs to the thing but is not conveyed by the name. Hence “The divine essence generates” is false, since the act of generating is applied to the essence, which is the supposit of that name, not to the person, which in reality is the supposit of the essence.

Note that a term sometimes conveys the role of two supposits, which are the same in reality but formally distinct; a change of this supposit is like a change of appellation. This is the fallacy of accident, which often occurs in paralogisms. For example: “Whiteness is similarity; similarity is intense; therefore whiteness is intense.” The supposit is varied: whiteness is really the same as similarity, but not formally, and so the supposit varies formally. Likewise, the following does not hold in the divine persons: “The Father is God; the Son is God; therefore the Son is the Father.” Although the term “God” is the same in reality, it is virtually multiple and can be identified and modified in the three Persons, who remain distinct, each inadequately modifying the essence. See below, bk. 3, ch. 6.

Finally, when “insofar as” is placed on the subject side, appellation proceeds from the predicate to the reduplicated term, since it is equivalent to placing it on the predicate side. For example, “Christ, insofar as man, is a creature,” “Peter, insofar as white, disperses vision,” and so on. These predicates do not belong to the subject absolutely, but by reason of the reduplicated term.

The second rule is: When a substantive and an adjective are placed on the same side of the proposition, the adjective appellates over the formal meaning of the substantive, as in “Peter is a great logician,” “A great logician disputes,” and so on. The rule is understood provided that the adjective is not disparate from the substantive but can determine it. Thus in “Peter is a black logician” there is no appellation, because the terms are disparate. It is also understood of a substantive term which, though absolute, has the force of connotation, as “man” said of Christ. For “Christ is an eternal man” is denied because eternity appellates over human nature. The same appellation occurs between what is determinable and its determination, as between a substantive and an adjective. Thus, if you say equus regis currit (“a horse of the king runs”), it is signified that it runs when it belongs to the king. But if you say regis equus currit (“the king’s horse runs”), there is no appellation: the proposition is verified of a horse that is or was the king’s. Therefore, when the genitive or determination comes first, it is taken in more than one sense; when the nominative comes afterward, it is taken in a single sense, as we said above. The same applies to “I saw the pope” and “I saw a pope.” In the second, it is signified that one saw him when he was pope; the first does not require this, but only that one saw a man who is or was pope. Finally, for the formal aspect of the adjective to appellate over the substantive, it is required that the adjective truly belong to the supposit of the substantive, though by reason of its formal aspect. Thus when I say, “Peter is a good father,” goodness must belong to the supposit of father by reason of paternity; and when I say, “Christ dies,” death belongs to the supposit by reason of humanity, or insofar as he has the role of a human supposit.

The third rule is: A second-intention predicate that belongs to the thing signified by a name appellates over its primary signification, because it causes simple supposition; thus it does not belong to the supposit absolutely, but as it stands under an abstract concept. For example, “Man is a species,” “Animal is a genus.” A second-intention predicate that belongs to the name or term itself, not to the thing signified, does not appellate. For example, “The term ‘man’ is a noun,” “‘Man is an animal’ is a proposition,” and the like. In these cases the terms have material supposition.

The fourth rule is: A term signifying an interior act of the soul appellates over the object or terminus toward which that act is directed under its own formal character. For example, “I know a man,” that is, under the concept of man; “I know the pope,” that is, insofar as he is pope; “I wish to be delighted,” that is, under the aspect of delight, not of evil. For these acts are always directed at objects not absolutely, but under the formality and precision relevant to that act. This especially occurs when the term signifying the object is placed after the term signifying the act of the soul, and not before it. If you say, “I know the one who is coming,” it does not appellate but rather extends to the object, whether the person is known only as coming or also in himself. Thus this inference does not hold: “I know the one coming; the one coming is Peter; therefore I know Peter.” I may know him under the concept of one who is coming, but not under the concept of Peter.

All the precisions, priorities, and diverse signs of the intellect on which an argument from one thing to another does not hold are grounded in this rule.

All the rules for inferences involving appellations are reduced to this: when appellation varies, the inference does not hold, whether the appellation is real or conceptual. We will discuss this in bk. 3, ch. 9, concerning defects of appellation.