Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Prima Pars Artis Logicae

Since supposition is the taking of a term for that of which it is verified, it involves a relation and order to three things, and its divisions are taken accordingly: it relates to what is signified, for which it supposits; to the verb, with respect to which it supposits; and to a modifying sign, by which it is modified in order to supposit.

FIRST, then, on the side of what is signified, supposition is divided into proper and improper. Proper supposition is taking a term for what it properly signifies or represents. For example, when I say “The lion roars,” “lion” is taken for the animal it properly signifies. Improper supposition is taking it for what it signifies improperly and, as it were, metaphorically. Thus, when I say, “The lion of the tribe of Judah conquered,” “lion” is taken for Christ, whom it does not properly signify. So in “Christ conquered” and “The lion of the tribe of Judah conquered,” the subject is taken for the same thing, namely Christ, but with a different concept and representation. In the first, Christ is represented absolutely and simply, because properly; in the second, Christ is represented with a connotation of the real lion. Thus the name “lion” improperly represents and supposits for Christ by reason of its connotation, not by representing him through its simple and direct signification. These metaphorical modes of speech are therefore elegant and pleasing, since they signify things not simply, but as it were by a circuit and connotation.

Proper supposition is divided into three species: material, simple, and personal.

Material supposition is taking a term for itself, that is, for the word itself. That is why in defining proper supposition we said it is taking a term for what it properly signifies or represents. For when it supposits materially, it represents itself, not signifies, as when I say, “Man is a noun,” or “blitiri is a vocal sound,” unless perhaps “the word man” or “the word blitiri” is understood. Material supposition is recognized in three ways. First, when a non-signifying term is used, such as blitiri or scindapsus, since these can supposit only for themselves. Second, when signs of mention are used, such as “this word,” “this term,” and so forth; these make the thing they indicate stand materially. Third, when the predicate signifies not the thing but the term, as in “Man is a vocal sound” or “man is a noun.”

Simple supposition is taking a term for what it signifies first and immediately, not mediately. Thus, if I say “Man is a species,” “man” supposits simply. Note that names signify two things: first, what is primary and formal, and second, that in which this primary item is found. The latter is as it were the name’s secondary signification, since what the name signifies is found in it as in a subject and material recipient. For example, “man” signifies human nature primarily and immediately, and mediately everything in which that nature is found, that is, all human individuals. Simple supposition, then, is taking a term for its primary and immediate signification so precisely that it does not pass to the secondary signification and the things in which the primary is found, but stands precisely for the primary signification. It is therefore simple and precise supposition: it stands for the immediate and primary signification, not as a double supposition that passes to the secondary and mediate signification. When I say “Man is a species,” “man” is not taken for individuals, but for man as such, abstracting from individuals. Hence it does not follow: Man is a species; therefore Peter is a species. Appellation is therefore always involved in simple supposition, because the predicate belongs to the subject under some precision and formality by which it does not descend to individuals.

Personal supposition is taking a term for individuals, or for the things signified materially and mediately. It is called personal because it belongs, as it were, to the persons or supposits of a thing. For example, when we say “Every man is an animal,” this also belongs to individuals, and descent is valid: therefore this man is an animal, and so forth. Hence personal supposition permits ascent and descent, unlike simple supposition.

SECOND, personal supposition is divided according to its order to the verb or copula into essential or natural supposition and accidental supposition. Natural supposition is taking a term for all the things for which it is naturally apt to be taken; in other words, taking it for that to which the predicate belongs intrinsically and essentially, as in “Man is an animal,” where the verb “is” abstracts from time in its verification. Accidental supposition is taking a term only for those of which it is verified according to the demand of the verb; in other words, taking it for that to which the predicate belongs not intrinsically but accidentally, as in “Man is just” and “man disputes.”

THIRD, supposition is divided on the side of signification into common and singular. Common supposition is taking a common term for its inferiors, as in “Man disputes.” Singular or discrete supposition is taking a singular term for a singular thing, as in “Peter disputes” or “this man disputes.”

FOURTH, common supposition is divided on the side of signs into determinate and confused. Determinate supposition is taking a common term that is indefinite or affected by a particular sign, as in “Man disputes” or “a certain man disputes.” Confused supposition is taking a common term with a universal sign or a special sign of confusion, as in “Every man disputes” or “Only man disputes.” Confused supposition is twofold: distributed and confused only. Distributed supposition is taking a common term immediately affected by a sign of distribution, as in “Every man disputes”; “man” stands distributively. Confused-only supposition is taking a term mediately affected by an affirmative universal sign or by a special sign of confusion. An example of the first is “Every man is an animal,” where “animal” stands confused only. Examples of the second are “Only man disputes” and “An eye is required for seeing,” where “man” and “eye” stand confusedly. In the next chapter we shall explain the special signs of confusion. Confused-only supposition is either disjunct or collective. Disjunct supposition is the kind illustrated by the examples just given. Collective supposition is affected by a collective sign, as in “All the apostles are twelve” and “All the planets are seven”; “apostles” and “planets” stand confusedly and collectively.

The difference among these suppositions is also commonly recognized by the descent or ascent appropriate to each. Determinate supposition takes disjunctive descent; distributed supposition, conjunctive descent; confused-only supposition, disjunct or collective descent. What conjunctive and disjunctive ascent, and disjunct and collective ascent, will be explained in the next book, chapters 2 and 3.

Since ascent and descent belong only to personal supposition, because they proceed with reference to individuals—to which we descend from the universal, or from which we ascend to the universal—and only personal supposition is taken for individuals, different kinds of personal supposition are best distinguished by the different descent and ascent to individuals. Since descent and ascent are as it were a kind of motion, a term under which we can descend and ascend immediately and independently of another is said to supposit or stand movably. When descent or ascent cannot be made immediately, but depends on resolving another term (resolution being the same as descent and ascent), the term is said to stand immovably. Disjunct and collective descent are not considered a resolution of the term simply, since descent is not made through propositions more evident in truth, as resolution requires, but by enumerating the same term. For example, in “Every man is an animal,” disjunct descent applies to “animal”: every man is this or that or that other animal. In “A horse is required for riding,” disjunct descent under “horse” is: this or that horse is required for riding. Such enumeration does not further manifest or resolve the truth, but only enumerates the terms. Likewise, “All the apostles are twelve” is resolved as follows: these and those, and so on, are twelve.